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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation seeks to provide an intraracial narrative history of African American 
politics and class tensions in Atlanta, Georgia from 1966, the year when black power movement 
forces emerged and helped to elect Maynard H. Jackson as Atlanta’s mayor to the 1996 
Centennial Olympiad.  Also, this study is an ambitious attempt to cultivate a newly emerging 
field called Black New South Studies, which, in many ways, parallels the field of African 
American Studies.  Its research interests focus on the experiences of African Americans in the 
South with national and international implications as seen through a post-Civil Rights context. 
Grounded in primary sources, including extended interviews with black Atlantans and analyses 
of popular culture texts, this study grapples with the historiography of the new African American 
Urban History, African American Folk Culture and Resistance, and Hip Hop by charting various 
manifestations seen through the city’s rise from regional center to global commercial city.  
Indeed, Atlanta is a City representing the highest educational, political, and economic aspirations 
and achievements of African Americans over the past century and yet home to some of the 
roughest and most destitute black ghettos in the South and nation. As such it represents various 
interconnections and interactions between diverse black populations within the urban New 
South.  
The city’s old and powerful black middle class, along with a powerful white business 
elite, have long shaped New South politics. Yet in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, the 
majority of Atlanta’s black communities remained in abject poverty and gave way to some of the 
harshest socio-economic conditions in America at the behest of black city administrators.   
 iii 
An important aspect of this dissertation rejects Atlanta’s “black Mecca” status.  In doing 
so, a major dimension of this particular transformation is the role of Hip Hop culture as a 
counter-narrative to the evolution of Atlanta as a world-class commercial center. Specifically, the 
Dirty South Hip Hop Movement, manifested in such groups as OutKast and Goodie Mob, 
cultivated a counter movement that portrayed the experiences of the poor and homeless in 
Atlanta’s black ghettoes as the underbelly of Atlanta’s rise to world fame and fortune. The music 
and lyrics demonstrate the inherent tensions within Atlanta’s black community as the city rose to 
newly found prestige and status provided these artists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 18, 1990, the International Olympic Committee selected Atlanta, Georgia, 
to be the host city of the XXVI (1996) Centennial Olympiad.  Under the leadership of Mayor 
Maynard Holbrook Jackson Jr., Atlanta’s clinching of the Centennial Olympiad was a sum total 
of a changed Atlanta which transformed its urban status from regional capital of the South and 
gave it a new moniker as the Deep South’s first world class and international city.  It was 
Jackson’s might and tenacity that spearheaded this opportunity, one that carried its own 
contradiction.  The Centennial Olympic Games marked Atlanta as a world-class city, but it also 
marked a need for a sharper focus on its history, culture and social development. The world and 
local communities now reckoned with Atlanta and paid increasing attention to her 
accomplishments and failures; she stood at the world’s center stage and endured the world’s 
praise and blame.  This was the second time within a century that Atlanta stood in a glass house. 
Almost one hundred years prior, in 1895, the City hosted the Cotton States and International 
Exposition where African American educator and leader Booker T. Washington gave his 
“Atlanta Compromise” address and drew national attention to Atlanta as the chief exemplar of a 
“New South” that had arisen from the ashes of the Civil War.  
With the Olympics, attention now focused on Atlanta’s accomplishments as a regional 
commercial center and its social failures as evidenced in the Atlanta Race Riot of 1906 and 
Georgia’s long history of racial lynching between 1895 and 1935.1  Nonetheless, unlike other 
southern urban areas, Atlanta is unique and has been deemed historically by pundits  as the 
“promise land” of the New South for African Americans.  After the Civil War, newly freed 
blacks migrated from rural places in the South to Atlanta to work in the textile mills and earned 
                                                 
1 Historical American Lynching Project, http://people.uncw.edu/hines/HAL/ HAL%20Web% 20Page.htm. 
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wages which enabled them to achieve a better quality of life than possible under pre-
Emancipation servitude slave labor conditions.  Simultaneously, African Americans education 
seekers came  to Atlanta, educated themselves, and formed a thriving black middle class. This 
black middle-class was largely created and sustained by Atlanta’s unique system of black 
institutions of higher learning. At the turn of the twentieth century, Atlanta was home to four 
black colleges: Morehouse, Spelman, Morris Brown and Clark; one black university, Atlanta 
University (now Clark-Atlanta University); and one black seminary center: Gammon 
Theological Seminary. This unique cluster of higher educational institutions played a pivotal role 
in the production of a black middle class community.  William E. B. Du Bois’ The Souls of Black 
Folk, written in 1903, explores the development of this new professional class and it implications 
for the strivings of the black South.  Du Bois writes “Such are not men of the sturdier make; they 
of Atlanta turned resolutely toward the future; and that future held aloft vistas of purple and 
gold--Atlanta, Queen of the cotton kingdom; Atlanta, Gateway to the Land of the Sun; Atlanta, 
the new Lachesis, spinner of web and woof for the world.  So the city crowned her hundred hills 
with factories, and stored her shops with cunning handiwork, and stretched long iron ways to 
greet the busy Mercury in his coming.  And the nation talked of her striving.”2 This quote is not 
only particular to black Atlanta, it is a more general description of the political economic rise of 
Atlanta. 
 Atlanta has an old and powerful black middle class and its historical role in shaping New 
South politics, as well as its relationship to the City’s larger black working class, deserves 
greater and varied historical analysis. It is a city representing the highest educational, political, 
and economic aspirations and achievements of African Americans over the past century and yet 
home to some of the roughest and most destitute black ghettos in the South and nation. Thus 
                                                 
2 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks reprint (New York:  Penguin Books, 1989), 72.  
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Atlanta represents various interconnections and interactions between diverse black populations 
within the urban New South.  The aforementioned educational institutions are all located in 
Atlanta’s West End, where prominent blacks lived, yet it was also home to the city’s black 
ghetto. Histories of Atlanta often portray it as a thriving city with wealthy blacks, but Atlanta 
also has one of the highest poverty rates amongst comparable U.S. urban areas.  This story is 
rarely told but is a worthy and necessary discussion for any comprehensive and balanced 
treatment of Atlanta’s economic and social development. 
This present dissertation argues that modern Atlanta became a geo-political space for a 
particular strand of black nationalism, manifested in education, business, politics and cultural 
expression, and reflective of the shift of blacks from rural to urban landscapes.  The research 
focus starts in 1966, the year in which both the Black Power movement emerged and urban 
unrest struck the city to change the South in general and Atlanta in particular.  It tells how 
Atlanta’s black community stood at the center of city’s rise to world class status and of how 
Atlanta’s black working class became increasingly disenfranchised as the larger city was 
franchised within a global economy. A major dimension of my examination of this particular 
transformation is the role of Hip Hop culture in offering a counter narrative about the evolution 
of Atlanta as a world-class commercial center. Specifically, I focus on the Dirty South Hip Hop 
Movement, manifested in such groups as OutKast and Goodie Mob and the way in which it  
cultivated a counter movement that portrayed the experiences of the poor and homeless in 
Atlanta’s black ghettoes as the underbelly of Atlanta’s rise to world fame and fortune. I examine 
the music and lyrics of these artists as a means to demonstrate the inherent tensions within 
Atlanta’s black community as the city rose to new and unprecedented levels of prestige and 
status.  As reflected in the Dirty South Hip Hop Movement, segments of the black working class 
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believed that Mayors Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young’s facelift of the city occurred at the 
expense of ordinary working people, who frequently criminalized, segregated and further divided 
along class lines.  In contrast to this view, segments of Atlanta’s black middle class saw Jackson 
and Young as a business and political prodigy who spearheaded the transformation of Atlanta 
into a world-class commercial center. Winning the Centennial Olympic Games affirmed 
Atlanta’s status as a reinvigorated city built for global commerce, and thus for the second time 
Atlanta had risen like the mythical phoenix, rebuilding itself from the rubble and ash as the 
South’s first truly international city. Symbolically, Atlanta’s hosting of the 1996 Olympic Games 
served as a pivotal moment in history of the Black New South.  Black politicians and 
professionals stood at the center of the one of the American South’s greatest achievements.  In a 
region that had been historically marked by the sordid relationships of racism and oppression, it 
seemed as if blacks had awakened from the nightmare of Jim Crow into the dream of a new 
“black Mecca.”  Because of the Centennial games, Atlanta’s history, its people and culture 
became points of interest from the local to the global and its new status placed it at the crux of 
intra-racial class tensions captured in the cultural expressions of the Dirty South Hip-Hop 
Movement.  This movement opened Atlanta in particular and the South in general to a working 
class critique of the social costs of the transition from a regional city to a global commercial 
center. Hence, the Dirty South Hip-Hop Movement provides a lens for contrasting black middle 
class and black working class sensibilities regarding Atlanta’s emergence into an international 
city.  
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Historiography 
 
The Dawning of the Black New South introduces a new interdisciplinary focus on new 
African American urban history that I call Black New South studies. This newly constructed 
field will in ways similar to African American studies contribute to scholarship of the black 
South in a post-Civil Rights context.  There is little scholarship that deals with the geo-political, 
social and cultural history of black Atlanta, Georgia in a post Civil-Rights context.  In order to 
effectively ground this dissertation, I have elected to employ three historiographies:  the new 
African American Urban historiography, a historiography of African American cultural 
resistance and the historiography of Hip Hop.   
 
New African American Urban Historiography 
 
  Since the 1960s, there have been several major shifts in the historical scholarship on 
African Americans in urban areas. In the late 1960s, urban historians surmised that the plight of 
the “inner city” faced indomitable odds.   Later, in a February 1983 issue of the Journal of Urban 
History, Elliott Rudwick surveyed the state of urban history in an article entitled “Black Urban 
History: In the Doldrums.”  At the end of the 1960s, when urban problems and racial conflict 
dominated the public consciousness, Rudwick noted that “black urban history appeared to be 
headed for an unbeatable future.”  He contended that “policymakers, scholars, and Americans 
generally sought some historical depth about how these troubles began.”  However, Rudwick 
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concluded that African American urban history had become a quagmire of narrowly focused, 
poorly conceived, or weakly researched studies.3 
In 1987, Kenneth Kusmer reexamined the scholarly landscape in a review essay entitled 
“Urban Black History at the Crossroads.”  Kusmer evaluated a wave of new books published in 
the mid 1980s, suggesting “a new renewal of interest in black urban history as a research field.”  
Important new community studies offered a variety of new ways of understanding the 
urbanization of the black population.  Yet for Kusmer, the diversity of the new scholarship in 
African American urban history raised questions about the direction of the field.4  By the mid 
1990s, black urban history had taken off in many new directions and utilized interdisciplinary 
methodologies that pushed the field outside of the Rudwick/Kusmer paradigm.  In May of 1995, 
the Journal of Urban History published ten articles that stressed the new tensions and trends that 
had emerged in African American urban history.  In 1996, historians Kenneth Goings and 
Raymond Mohl compiled and edited The New African American Urban History, documenting 
new trends and tensions while juxtaposing the new urban history with older models.    The new 
African American urban history examines southern cities and focuses on trends such as agency 
and resistance, social histories that focused more on grass roots activism and less on black elites. 
It also focuses on migration and early social movements which produced new ways of looking at 
the periodization of African American history, examines religion, black theology and the 
teaching of black liberation, reexamines civil rights and understands the creation of the second 
ghetto and the underclass.5 
                                                 
 3 Elliott Rudwick, “Black Urban History:  In the Doldrums,” Journal of Urban History 9, no. 2 (February, 
1983):  251. 
 
4 Kenneth Kusmer, “Urban Black History at the Crossroads,” Journal of Urban History 13, no. 4 (August 
1987): 460. 
5Kenneth Goings and Raymond Mohl, The New African American Urban History (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1996). 
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In these new shifts, historians focused especially on the importance of agency among 
African Americans— an interpretive thrust that has shaped new writing in the field for a decade 
or more.  The New African American Urban History conveys a sense of active involvement, of 
empowered people engaged in struggle, living their lives in dignity and shaping their own 
futures.  Earlier scholarship in African American urban history was heavily weighted toward the 
study of black elites and elite organizations; it tended to focus on segregation, race relations, and 
the role of the political and economic institutions (white and black) in establishing the 
parameters of black life.  The new African American urban history has abandoned the 
disproportionate emphasis on black elites to portray a more diverse community with sharply 
etched divisions of class and culture.  Earlier works depicted working class as an undifferentiated 
mass that followed the lead of prominent black elites. The new history has provided a deeper 
more textured sense of the black working class—of its transformation from southern agricultural 
roots to urban industrial labor, from peasantry to proletariat.  At the same time there is a 
recognition that many aspects of rural African American culture persisted or were adapted to life 
in the big city.  Black working class community and culture were made and remade in response 
to urban and industrial life.6 
                                                 
6 Robin Kelley, Race Rebels:  Culture, Politics and the Black Working Class (New York:  Free Press, 
1994). Race Rebels has unearthed new forms of agency that demonstrate wider patterns of resistance.  In a study of 
the blacks in the urban South, Kelley described a tradition of “infrapolitics”—a pattern of daily behavior, an 
oppositional culture, more or less overt, in which African Americans demanded respect and recognition in 
uncounted daily encounters in the streets streetcars and busses, on the job, in the courts, and elsewhere.  See also 
Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interest:  Race, Class and Power in Twentieth Century Norfolk, Virginia  (Berkeley, CA:  
University of California Press, 1991); Aldon Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Free Press,  
1986);  Charles Payne, Groundwork:  Local Black Freedom Movements in America, (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997); John D’Emilio, Lost Prophet:  The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004); Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement:  A Radical 
Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2005). 
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Historiography of African American Folk Culture and Resistance 
 
The dynamic formation of the black American South may have more to tell us about the 
nation’s tragic racist past and enduring racial dilemmas than any other region, yet this region 
remains understudied in the field of American history. Despite some important studies by 
pioneering scholars in the field, the formation of black southern culture in the context of slavery 
and racial oppression still needs to be documented and analyzed over time and space.  
In the mid to late 1950s, shifts within the historiography of slavery challenged the 
paternal sentiments spawned by U. B. Phillips and historians began looking at African slaves and 
the culture that they created outside of the gaze of their white masters.  Sterling Stuckey’s Slave 
Culture looks at the ways in which Africans of different ethnicities in the course of their 
enslavement in America as slaves worked together to form a common African culture and a 
black nation.  He argues that these enslaved African had a central value system that stemmed 
from their ancestral past and influence.  This was the cultural value system of slaves at the time 
of emancipation and it would prove to be a major force in shaping race relations between blacks 
and whites in the U.S.  For his analysis, Stuckey utilized music, dance and folklore to show how 
African culture shaped the emergence of black culture in the United States.7   
Stuckey’s argument is one that is connected to a larger trend in historical writing where 
the interpretation of black culture became increasingly important.    Before Stuckey, scholars 
such as John Lovell Jr. and Lawrence Levine had set out to understand the most elemental social 
                                                 
7 Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture:  Nationalist Theory and the Foundation of Black America reprint (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); See also John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community:  Plantation Life in the 
Antebellum South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972);  Stanley Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American 
Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1959); Eugene Genovese, Roll! Jordan 
Roll!:  The World the Slaves Made (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in 
Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976.) 
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interpretation of African American folk life and spoke convincingly of the need for future 
exploration of slave spirituals for their social truths.  In Lovell’s case, he believed that in order to 
uncover the social messages embedded in black expressive culture, he suggested a close 
examination of the meaning of black song and black poetry in America.  In his study of 
spirituals, he conferred with scholars, musicians, and writers traveled extensively, and pursued 
his investigations in the areas of literature, music, dance, ethnomusicology, folklore, 
anthropology, theology, philosophy, history, and psychology.8 
Lovell argued the premise that folk music really transmits a consensus of the feelings of 
the community.  With this, Lovell identifies the folk community that gave rise to the songs and 
the creators who actually framed them.  For that community, it was possible to define at least one 
goal that was probably shared by all—the goal of freedom.  Lovell distinguishes several features 
of this community and against this background, scrutinizes the slave spiritual as to its purpose in 
the community, its meanings and messages, and the attitudes reflected in it.  For the community, 
this music and folk culture expressed subtle and non-permissible messages by means of mask 
and symbol and pushed for scholars to go beneath the surface of the words to realize what hope 
was symbolized.  “Only the insider knew that ‘Go Down Moses,’ or ‘Chariots a comin’ might 
alert those waiting as escape to freedom or that ‘Wade in the Water” was practical instruction to 
a fugitive who might be chased by bloodhounds.  There was a wide variety of purposes beyond 
the simple expression and communication.9  
                                                 
8 John Lovell, Black Song:  The Forge and the Flame:  The Story of How the Afro-American Spiritual was 
Hammered Out (New York: Paragon House Publishers,1986); Doris E. McGinty, “Black Song: The Forge and the 
Flame,” Journal of Negro Education, 44, no. 2 (Spring, 1975): 208-213; See also Leon Litwack, Trouble in Mind:  
Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998). 
 
9 McGinty, “Black Song,” 211-12. 
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Lawrence Levine’s Black Culture, Black Consciousness asserts that scholars must and 
can get at the life and thought of the masses of people whom historians regard as inarticulate.  
Levine’s analysis is for scholars, a path breaking and successful attempt to utilize anonymous 
creations of black folk to probe their thinking and world-view and the ways in which these 
changed over time.    This book is marked by a subtle grasp of continuity and change in black 
folk culture and the multiple meanings, functions, and ambiguities in the songs and stories.  
Shifting back and forth between the sacred and the secular, Levine first examines the sacred 
world-view of slaves, and demonstrates how under the impact of emancipation and the 
acculturation that followed over the decades, the antebellum synthesis broke down, with black 
culture drawing closer to mainstream American culture yet retaining its own autonomy and a 
distinct sense of African American identity.  Levine’s path breaking treatment of the spirituals 
exemplifies his understanding of the complexities and ambiguities in the slaves’ view and how 
their fusion of African and Euro-Christian elements functioned to sustain personal integration 
and a strong sense of community in a hostile society that denied their worth as humans.  In short, 
this folk creation--whose communal nature is revealed in the antiphonal character of the songs—
revealed a rich fantasy life, pervaded not by a feeling of unworthiness, but by a sense of change, 
personal worth, and ultimate justice.10 
Levine also utilizes secular animal trickster tales and presents the ways in which these 
anecdotes were different kinds of coping mechanism.  Derived in Africa, these stories of 
powerless creatures that attain their ends through native wit and guile rather than power of 
authority were transformed in the United states, where the animal trickster functioned 
                                                 
10 Lawrence Levine, Black Culture, Black Consciousness:  Afro-American Thought from Slavery to 
Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); August, Meier, “The Triumph of Melville Herskovits,” 
Reviews in American History 6, no. 1 (March 1978): 21-28. 
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simultaneously on several levels; as black slave, as white master, as irrational force.  In the 
trickster tale, the weak use their wits to evade and outfox the strong, clearly expressed the 
realities facing the slaves who daily had to employ guile rather than force in their relations with 
their masters.   What becomes duly noted is the painful realistic story of the hostile environment, 
painting the world in brutal and irrational terms, with the tricksters seeking not only self-
preservation but also status and power, and proving quite willing to use injustice and often 
senseless cruelty in outwitting not only the strong, but the weak as well.11 
Though much of African American folk culture is tied to non-secular entities,  secular 
entities such as first work songs and later blues and jazz became a prominent part of the African 
American folk culture in the 20th century.  Absent from black folklore, for example, were the 
Robin Hoods who stood up to the established power on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden.    
What this creates is a dialectic where on all fronts, black folk music remained in the style of 
audience participation and the intimate relationship that persisted between performer and 
audience.  Moreover both the hero stories and the blues songs dealt with matter that grew out of 
the black experience and spoke to that experience. 
Lastly, and very fittingly, Levine stresses the growing element of protest that explicitly 
overturns the subordinate status in which whites held blacks—that characterized black folk 
culture in the 20th century.  This can be seen along the lines of criticizing the boss man in many 
work songs; in the decline of the slave trickster stories; in the rise of lore about how slave 
ancestors stood up to white masters, even at considerable personal cost.12 
In the first chapter of his book Going Through the Storm, entitled Through the Prism of 
Folklore, Stuckey examines folk song and tales where he asserts that slaves were able to fashion 
                                                 
11 August Meier, “The Triumph of Melville Herskovits,” 21-28. 
 
12 Ibid, 26. 
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a life and set of values—an ethos—which prevented them from being imprisoned altogether by 
the definitions which the larger society sought to impose.  To Stuckey, this ethos was an 
amalgam of Africanisms and New World elements that helped blacks to feel their way along the 
course of American oppression, enabling them to endure. Stuckey contends that the process of 
dehumanization was not nearly as pervasive as Stanley Elkins would have us believe; that a very 
large contingent of African Americans, guided by this ethos, was able to maintain their essential 
humanity.  In this analysis, Stuckey utilizes folklore as a means to reflect the thoughts and 
sensibilities of ordinary black people. He assumes that the attitudes of the masses are represented 
by the themes of folklore.13 
 
Historiography of Hip Hop 
 
Derrick Alridge and James B. Stewart’s “Introduction: Hip Hop in History: Past, Present, 
and Future” from the Journal of African American History, Special Edition: the History of Hip 
Hopis the most present historiography of Hip Hop. These authors assert that over the past three 
decades, Hip Hop has developed as a cultural and artistic phenomenon affecting youth culture 
around the world.  From this article, it is clear that Hip Hop, for many youth, reflects the social, 
economic, political, and cultural realities and conditions of their lives, speaking to them in a 
language and manner they understand.  With this, Alridge and Stewart conclude that as a result 
of both its longevity and its forceful message for many youth worldwide, Hip Hop cannot be 
dismissed as merely a passing fad or as a youth movement that will soon run its course.  To them 
Hip Hop must be reckoned with as a cultural, political, economic, and intellectual  phenomenon 
                                                 
13 Sterling Stuckey, Going Through the Storm: The Influence of African American Art in History (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
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worthy of scholarly study, similar to previous African American artistic and cultural 
movements.14 
Alridge and Stewart affirm that Hip Hop culture consists of at least four components:  
Disc jockeying (deejaying) break dancing, graffiti art, and rapping (emceeing). Since its 
emergence during the early to mid 1970s, Hip Hop has included not just a musical genre, but 
cultural markers that rest on sensibilities of a generation of youth born between 1965 and 1984.15  
This component of Hip Hop culture is indicative of  the phenomenon’s reach where it is 
conducive for and  imperative that the voices of this generation be articulated and heard. 
Alridge and Stewart’s article is an invaluable resource in terms of grappling with the 
literature that is focused on Hip Hop.  Since 1994 when Tricia Rose published her study Black 
Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America, few studies have appeared that 
examined Hip Hop in historical terms.  Rose and Robin D.G. Kelley’s Race Rebels:  Culture, 
Politics, and the Black Working Class emerged as the seminal pieces of work that grappled with 
the significance of Hip Hop music and culture.  Rose’s work lent credence to the development of 
Hip Hop and effectively countered the naysayers who suggested that the phenomenon was 
unworthy of scholarly attention in historical terms.  With this, Rose investigated rap music and 
examined its impact on youth culture, charting and predicting numerous current trends and 
tensions that are central to Hip Hop culture.  Though Kelley’s book goes beyond a focus on Hip 
Hop, he connects Hip Hop to African American history and explicates it as an ongoing tradition 
                                                 
14 Derrick P. Alridge and James B. Stewart, “Introduction:  Hip Hop in History:  Past, Present, and Future.” 
Journal of African American History 90, no. 3, (Summer 2005): 190-96, 
 
15 Ibid, 190, See also Bakari Kitwana, The Hip Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in African 
American Culture (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2002). According to Alridge and Stewart, Kitwana asserts that 
the Hip Hop generation is comprised of those born between 1965 and 1984 that identify with the language, culture, 
and music associated with Hip Hop.  For practical purposes, this periodization works, but those born before 1965 
and after 1984 who embrace Hip Hop cannot be excluded. 
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within black working-class culture and agency.16  Both Rose and Kelley laid the foundation as to 
how Hip Hop would be written as scholars further engage the political, social, and cultural 
aspects of Hip Hop music and culture. 
In recent years, more historical studies on the Hip Hop of the early 1990s  to  emerge. 
Journalist Jeff Chang’s Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop:  A History of the Hip Hop Generation proffers 
an oral and narrative history.  A number of other works have also emerged providing the 
historical underpinnings for the scholarly study of Hip Hop.  David Toop’s Rap Attack 3 is a 
revised edition of Rap Attacks 1 and 2.  Toop’s account is one of the earliest analyses of Hip Hop 
outlining Hip Hop history through his own personal interviews and connections with early Hip 
Hoppers.  His three volumes give a wistful account of 1970s and 1980s Hip Hop, but is limited 
in terms of historical analyses and the interpretive depth and breadth of Rose and Kelley.  17  
Oral history provided a means in the beginning to historicize Hip Hop.  Alan Ogg’s The 
Hip Hop Years: A History of Rap is a collection of personal interviews that proffer a narrative 
history of Hip Hop practitioners.   James G. Spady’s Twisted Tales: In the Hip Hop Streets of 
Philly is a collection oral histories and interviews with Hip Hoppers that are direct explanations 
from influential individuals who have impacted and been impacted by Hip Hop.  The 
significance of Spady’s work is that it provided archival material during the early years when 
there was limited documentation other primary sources on Hip Hop.  Jim Fricke and Charlie 
Ahearn’s Yes, Yes, Y’all:  The Experience Music Project Oral History of Hip Hop’s First Decade 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 190-191; Tricia Rose, Black Noise:  Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America 
(Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1994); Robin Kelley, Race Rebels:  Culture, Politics, and the 
Black Working Class (New York: Free Press, 1994). 
 
17 Ibid, 191; Jeff Chang, Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop:  A History of the Hip Hop Generation (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2005); David Toop, Rap Attack 3:  African Rap to Global Hip Hop (London: Serpent Tale, 4 
Blackstock Mews, 2000). 
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gives firsthand accounts with Hip Hop pioneers along with visual imagery through photographs 
from the early Hip Hop era, necessary primary source material for Hip Hop scholars.18 
Charise Cheney’s Brothers Gonna Work it Out:  Sexual Politics in the Golden Age of Rap 
Nationalism grapples with  issues centered the association between performers, their art, and 
consumers behavior while trying to understand how these dynamics artists’ expectation, 
motivations, and political sentiments.  Through Gramscian organic intellectual tradition, Cheney 
weds rap and politics by framing her argument in terms of rap nationalist and raptivist (an 
amalgam of the words rapper and activist).  With this, she excavates “raptivism” within black 
popular culture and political culture.    While she represents these raptivists as characters from 
the Gramscian organic intellectual tradition, she engages in the work of speaking truth to power.  
One particular note is that Cheney realizes her limits in this argument, writing that the inclusion 
of all rap music under the banner of political “dilutes rap music’s significance as a mode of black 
cultural expression…and undermines the social authority of those artists whose lyrics explicitly 
and mindfully engage the issue of black liberation.” 19  
This dissertation will fit into these different historiographies hoping to expand our 
understanding of Atlanta by utilizing and challenging some of the tensions and trends that are 
grounded in historical studies and will lead the way to establishing Black New South Studies, an 
interdisciplinary field that will help us better understand the black American South in a post-
Civil Rights context.  The Dawning of the Black New South will add to the new African 
American urban historiography because it moves away from the urban north and Midwest, and it 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 191; Alan Ogg and David Upshal, The Hip Hop Years:  A History of Rap (New York: Fromm 
International, 1999);  James G. Spady, Twisted Tales:  In the Hip Hop Streets of Philly (Philadelphia, PA: 
UMUM/LOH Publishers, 1995); Jim Frick and Charlie Ahearn, eds., Yes, Yes, Y’all:  The Experience Music Project 
Oral History of Hip Hop’s First Decade (Cambridge, MA:  De Capo Press, 2002). 
     
  19 Tami Navarro, “Book Review—Brothers Gonna Work it Out,” New Black Magazine 28 April 2006; 
Charise L. Cheney, Brothers Gonna Work it Out: Sexual Politics in the Golden Age of Rap Nationalism (New York: 
New York University Press, 2005), 7. 
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will tease out those tensions of black masses juxtaposed with black elites.  It is also necessary to 
look at the culture of Atlanta in a post-Civil Rights context by understanding urban renewal, 
black electoral politics, the olympification of Atlanta and the City’s popular culture.   
This dissertation contributes to historiography of African American folk culture and 
resistance because, in many ways, one can examine “Dirty South Hip Hop” as a genre of folk 
culture that is reflective of the social thought of Atlanta’s black working class.  This analysis will 
require a deep interpretive investigation on the multiple meanings, functions and ambiguities of 
the rap music.  With this, the musical content will serve as an archive in some regards.  As those 
African American folk historical and cultural scholars have done before me, it is my goal to 
serve as an interpreter of the multiple meanings, functions and ambiguities of this recent form of 
black southern folk culture. 
Lastly, this dissertation will southernize the historiography of Hip Hop by focusing on the 
urban South.  As mentioned in the historiography, much of the scholarship in Hip Hop studies 
has centered on New York and other east coast cities such as Philadelphia.  Yet, the experiences 
of southern blacks provide a different purview than their east coast kith and kin.  This shift does 
not discount New York’s role in rap and Hip Hop culture, but merely diversifies the characters 
that embody Hip Hop. Most aspects of African American popular culture (e.g. folklore, blues, 
gospel, jazz, etc.) have moved from the black South to the urban north, Midwest and west coast, 
but Hip Hop is the first genre that was created in urban north and found its way into the rural and 
urban South.  
Also, this dissertation’s utilization of rap music and Hip Hop culture show the particulars 
of how the development of a genre of music and culture is indicative to the development or 
underdevelopment of the communities from which artists hail.  This investigates the impact of 
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racial uplift theory, urban regime theory, political economy, neo-liberalism and culture of 
poverty on public policy which can be spewed and accessed critically by citizens.  The 
significance of using popular culture in this dissertation provides an interesting scope to the 
emerging trends and tensions that are particular to a particular space. This Hip Hop spoke in 
terms that countered Atlanta’s notoriety and asserted the realities of the city’s development and 
its influence on the music. 
Because Atlanta emerged as the unofficial capitol and most notable international city of 
the Black New South, it holds a place of significance among all southerners.  Atlanta is a 
crossroads where rural and urban, southern and northern, eastern and western, and national and 
international people and cultures come together.  Atlanta’s interesting story creates space for a 
new paradigm in the academic research being cultivated that will guide future research and 
scholarship.  Black New South Studies is an emerging field that, in many ways, will function in a 
similar fashion to African American Studies.  However, its rigorous research and scholarship 
will focus on the experiences of African Americans and in the post-Civil Rights South era.  This 
interdisciplinary field investigates and challenges tensions and trends that have often been 
overlooked by scholars studying African Americans, seeking to analyze and explicate national 
and international implications centered on history, urban and rural popular culture, education, 
electoral politics, land ownership, health disparities, sociology, psychology, religion and 
spirituality, and business just to name a few.   
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PROLOGUE 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BLACK ATLANTA BEFORE 1966 
 
Operatin’ under the crooked American system too long. OutKast, pronounced out cast, 
an adjective meaning homeless or unaccepted in society, but let’s look deeper than that.  
Are you an OutKast?  If you understand and feel the basic principles and fundamental 
truths contained within this music, you probably are.  If you think it’s all about pimpin’ 
hoes and slammin’ Cadillac do’s, you probably a cracker, or a nigga that think he a 
cracker, or maybe just don’t understand. An OutKast is someone who is not considered 
to be part of the normal world.  He’s looked at differently. He is not accepted because 
of his clothes, his hair, his occupation, his beliefs or his skin color.  Now look at 
yourself, are you an OutKast?  I know I am.  As a matter of fact, fuck being anythang 
else.  It's only so much time left in this crazy world.  Wake up niggaz and realize what's 
goin’ on around you.  Poisonin’ of the food and water, tamperin’ of cigarettes, disease 
engineering control over your life.  Take back your existence or die like a punk.  This is 
Big Rube, sayin’ right on to the real, and death to the fakers.  Peace out.20 
 
In 1993 when Dungeon Family member and poet Big Rube blatantly soliloquized the conditions 
of the black working poor and homeless of Atlanta, Georgia, it marked a major shift in American popular 
culture.  Atlanta, Georgia, an American southern city, had now moved to the American mainstream. 
Audiences knew that there was a different message to be gleaned from this soliloquy.  Big Rube’s raspy 
voice and black Georgian parlance signified that Atlanta now held the status of a city whose 
downtrodden had a new voice, hence his soliloquy.  
Since the Emancipation Proclamation, Atlanta, Georgia boasted a history where African 
Americans thrived through the establishment of black owned businesses and a considerable 
system of black education.  Yet, in this soliloquy, Big Rube drew attention to those excluded 
from Atlanta’s black bourgeoisie21 and challenged the idea that Atlanta was the best city for all 
African Americans.  He did not contradict Atlanta’s image as  black Mecca with a burgeoning 
and vibrant black middle class.  Rather, he challenged the view of Atlanta as a city of progress 
                                                 
20 OutKast, “Tru Dat,” Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik LP, La Face Records, 1993.  
 
21  E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie: The Book that Brought the Shock and Self-Revelation to Middle-
Class Blacks in America Reprint (New York: Free Press, 1990). The term black bourgeoisie coined by E. Franklin 
Frazier is altogether different than that of black elites, the black intelligentsia or the black middle class.  It refers to 
black capitalists or those African Americans whose affluence and status allowed them to advance political programs 
that expressed their sentiments even through Jim Crow.  With this, the black bourgeoisie centered its politics 
particular economic, social and political interests. 
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for a black community. This prologue seeks to explicate and analyze trends and tensions seen in 
Atlanta after the Civil War that influences the historical, cultural, economical, political and 
cultural aspects of post-Civil Rights Black Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
Contending New Souths 
 
Atlanta:  the phoenix which rose form its ashes, without bitterness or rancor, to 
welcome modernity of Northern money, and yet to coming bustle and growth with the 
grace and comfort of a Southern past; a city “too busy to hate,” ready to set aside the 
uglier aspect of a bad social system and move on to newer ways; a boom city where 
business and government work together; the Forward-Looking Southern City ready to 
be a national city.22 
 
On December 22, 1886, Henry Grady, managing editor for the Atlanta Constitution and 
member of the Atlanta Ring of Democratic Leaders, spoke before the New England Society of 
New York.  His speech detailed the coming of a “New South,” in which he advocated industrial 
development as a solution to the postwar South’s economic and social troubles.  As such, Grady 
turned his attention toward promoting Atlanta, Georgia’s, economic development potential.  
Though this idea was not original with Grady, his advocacy of unity and trust between the North 
and South spurred northern investments in Atlanta’s industries. 
                                                 
22 Reese Cleghorn, “The Death of a Myth,” Atlanta Magazine, December 1968: 24. In many myths and 
legends, the Phoenix symbolized rebirth. At its death, it went to the City of Heliopolis in Egypt, settled into its nest 
and took one last look at the world around it, immolated itself, and rose from the ashes renewed and young. This 
myth emphasized the afterlife, survival and strength in modern culture and literature. According to other legends, it 
also had regenerating capabilities, which made it almost immortal. The Phoenix was universally considered a 
champion of good, and a truly magical creature. They were generally reclusive, but occasionally worked with 
honorable wizards and magicians for some greater good. The Phoenix abhorred evil, and did not associate with any 
entity without honor and goodness. The Phoenix did not actively seek out evil to destroy, but would not pass up the 
opportunity to destroy evil when it presented itself. It was always the symbol for creation from destruction, in spite 
of differences in beliefs or ideology. It was believed to possess the ability to heal itself of any hurt or wound 
inflicted by an enemy.  
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Grady’s New South idea was not received or seen as progressive by all.  To southern whites, 
Grady’s New South ideology disheartened southern farmers at the behest of northern interests.  
Farmers ignored Grady’s advice to raise crops with cotton for additional revenue and higher 
cotton prices.  Grady struggled greatly to portray good race relations for northerners interested in 
southern industrial investments, but troubled by the South’s oppressive and violent racial order.  
In numerous editorials, Grady purported that blacks enjoyed “fair treatment” in Georgia and 
throughout the South.  This discourse pleased white southern readers as few northern investors 
looked past the South’s record of black disenfranchisement, exploitation, and violence.  More 
importantly, Grady’s New South paradigm represented a faithful adjustment of Old South 
traditions to New South conditions.   His attempts to affix northern interest to Atlanta were cut 
short with his untimely death in 1889.  Yet, his influence as the spokesman of the New South 
was extensive, providing both the ideological framework that centered Atlanta as the burgeoning 
symbol of the New South.23 
For black southerners, Grady’s New South idea was in part, an attempt to revise the Old 
South’s hegemonic order of white supremacy.  The failure of the New South proponents to 
denounce the blatant racial oppression of the late nineteenth Century reminded southern 
blacks of an experience least removed from slavery.  Still, Atlanta was different with a 
diverse and resilient black community.  If there was anything that sets Atlanta’s African 
American community apart from other southern cities, it was a select few that were able to 
achieve positions of political and economic power far beyond the most imaginable 
expectations of the black masses in the rest of the South.  But for the rank and file of blacks 
in Atlanta, life was marked by the prevailing notions of American racism and white 
supremacy that left black Atlantans, in the main, at the bottom of the economic, political and 
social life of the city.  There was no firm basis to the popular myth that white Atlantans, 
through their charity and kindness, were the foundation of Black progress.  Most of Atlanta’s 
affluent African Americans fought their way off the bottom rung under their own brawn, 
although there had been steadfast and significant support from a small segment of the white 
                                                 
23 New Georgia Encyclopaedia, s.v. “Grady, Henry W,” 
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-2451 (accessed 21 March 2008); Harold E. Davis, Henry 
Grady’s New South: Atlanta, A Brave Beautiful City (Tuscaloosa:  University of Alabama Press, 1990); Joel 
Chandler Harris, Joel Chandler Harris’s Life of Henry W. Grady Including His Writings and Speeches (New York:  
Cassell, 1890); Raymond B. Nixon, Henry W. Grady:  Spokesman of the New South (New York:  Russell and 
Russell, 1943); Paul M. Gaston, The New South Creed:  A Case in Southern Mythmaking, (New York:  Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1970). 
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population in the city.  Blacks in Atlanta flourished because the community as a whole 
educated themselves and carved a place in the business life of the city.  They built a black 
educational juggernaut that came to be a center for black education, not only in Georgia and 
the nation, but in the entire world. 
 In 1968 as the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders Report was released, a 
team of journalists were assembled from the Atlanta Journal to better understand how the Kerner 
Report applied to Atlanta.  These journalists produced “The Two Atlantas,” a six week series 
that examined the delineation of race in post-Civil Rights Atlanta.  The “Two Atlantas”   The 
first article of the series entitled “Negro History in Atlanta,” provides context to black life and 
history in black Atlanta.  According to the article, the 1850 U.S. census indicated that Atlanta 
had a total white population of 2,058 and 511 blacks, 493 bondsmen and 18 free blacks.24  After 
the Civil War, a great influx of African Americans came into the City.  The article notes that 
during the 1850s, white merchants and “mechanic” were startled with the number of free blacks, 
primarily of mixed heritage, who worked as dentists, barbers, and blacksmiths and mentions City 
council minutes from the era that show white Atlantans protest to the City government over 
competition from free blacks. The article points to Roderick Badger, a free black, who as early as 
1859 was the target of protests by white tradesmen who filed a complaint with the City council 
for “tolerating the black man” in Atlanta.  Badger remained in Atlanta and became one of the 
city’s most prominent dentists with a large white clientele.25   
 According to the “Two Atlantas” Team report, slaves were still bought and sold in 
Atlanta during the Civil War.  Most strikingly, they uncovered advertisements from a local 
newspaper showing slave traders still in business as late as May 1864—approximately 15 
                                                 
24 Census Data from 1790 to 1960 can now be obtained on line at: http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census; 
Negro History in Atlanta, “The Two Atlantas:  An In Depth, Painstaking Examination of the Racial Picture Today in 
Atlanta,” Atlanta Journal, 3. Newsweek Inc. Collection, EU. 
    
25 Ibid. 
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months after Abraham Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation in January of 1863. During 
the siege of Atlanta, blacks were forced to work on construction gangs that built breastworks and 
parapets.  There seemed to be little fear among masters that the City’s slaves would revolt, and, 
in fact, Atlanta’s slaves worked for their masters, deserting them only when federal troops 
entered the city.  Since slavery, the basis of the southern economy, was destroyed during the war, 
the economic ruin of the rural areas, which followed in the wake of the war, spawned a great 
migration by blacks to Atlanta.  They took up residence in the areas along the railroad tracks 
known as the bottoms, a name that signaled the location’s poor living conditions and structures 
of despair.  Most freed men and women could not find work in the city’s textile industry and 
poor whites held deep resentment toward them because of the already bankrupt market. Evidence 
of this can be seen in the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mill strike in 1897. 26   
Black determination to find work intensified hostility and fears among poor white 
Atlantans.  More industrious blacks were able to gain entrance to professional work places as 
barbers, mechanics, dentists, drug salesmen, and doctors.  Of the most successful of these was 
Alonzo Herndon, founder of the Atlanta Life Insurance Company.  Herndon was born into 
slavery and came to Atlanta from Social Circle, Georgia in 1876.  Upon arriving in the City, he 
                                                 
26 Negro History in Atlanta, “The Two Atlantas:  An In Depth, Painstaking Examination of the Racial 
Picture Today in Atlanta,” Atlanta Journal, Newsweek Inc. Collection, 3, box 1, folders 7-11, EU, MARBL. 
Statistics show that approximately 500,000 bondsmen were set free in the South, a cost of $272 million lost by 
whites overnight. Also see Philip Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States (New York, 
International Publishers 1947), 210. This account asserts that blacks did not obtain widespread employment in the 
textile mills despite the fact that textile manufacturing in the South underwent great advances.  White mill workers 
flatly refused to work alongside blacks and spawned the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mill strike in Atlanta, described by 
the Atlanta Constitution as a spontaneous protest against the employment of twenty Negro women spinners, who 
worked alongside white women. 
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opened a barbershop in the Markham House and by 1908, had accumulated property valued at 
$80,000. 27 
Shortly after the Civil War and with the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, 
Atlanta’s City Council implemented due process by passing ordinances that made blacks subject 
to the same laws as whites and repealing discriminatory laws against blacks.  Blacks also 
attained suffrage.  Duly noted is that white Atlantans overwhelmingly opposed this legislation.  
In 1871, William Finch and George Graham became the first blacks to be elected to the Atlanta 
City Council.  Finch was particularly influential in the city, and worked tirelessly for free 
education for black children. 28  
It was during the Reconstruction era years that blacks in Atlanta were able to make the 
greatest strides in education, particularly in higher education. Atlanta University was founded in 
1865; Morehouse College, then in Augusta, but soon moved to Atlanta, opened its doors in 1867; 
Clark College was founded in 1869.  Subsequent black institutions founded after Reconstruction 
were Spelman College and Morris Brown College founded in 1881 and the Gammon 
Theological Seminary founded in 1886.  No force in the city had more political, social, cultural 
and historical significance for blacks than the founding of these institutions of higher education.  
According to sociologist Joseph Jewell, as early as 1865, James Tate and Granithan Daniels, 
both former slaves, opened the first public school in Atlanta for black children on Gilmer Street. 
It later became the Storrs School headed by the American Missionary Association.  Blacks who 
had also been quasi-members of white churches in slavery founded their own churches during 
                                                 
27 Negro History in Atlanta, 3. See also Carole Merritt, The Herndons: An Atlanta Family (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2002);  Alexa Benson Henderson, Atlanta Life Insurance Company: Guardian of Black 
Economic Dignity (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990). 
 
 
28 Negro History in Atlanta, 3. 
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Reconstruction.  In time, these churches would furnish some of the most remarkable black 
leaders known in the era.  Also during Reconstruction blacks were elected to the state legislature 
and helped write the Georgia Constitution of 1868.  This caused more resentment between blacks 
and whites as there were difficulties for black politicians to obtain political power and provide 
effective leadership.  This, along with the lack of support from fellow white Republicans as well 
as the unrelenting efforts of white Democrats to regain control, undermined black political 
gains.29   
By 1872, whites were back in control of the state government.  In the 1880s, a series of 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court as seen in the U.S. v. Reese and U.S. v. Cruikshank 
decisions, both made in 1876, flattened almost all of the social gains made by blacks since 
1865.30 Education provided an interesting view of these sentiments.  According to historian June 
Patton, because there were no public state supported institution of higher learning for blacks as 
mandated for black education under the Morrill Act, an $8,000 grant was allotted to Atlanta 
University.  Simultaneously, Georgia State school commissioner Orr argued that college 
                                                 
29 Ibid, See also Joseph O. Jewell, “Black Ivy: The American Missionary Association and the Black Upper 
Class in Atlanta, Georgia, 1875-1915.” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1998), see chapter 
entitled “Black Ivy; Missionary Education and Atlanta’s Black Upper Class.”  
 
30 Negro History in Atlanta, 3. See also Edmund Drago, Black Politicians and Reconstruction in Georgia: A 
Splendid Failure (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); In U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), the 
Court struck down the Enforcement Act of 1870 because one of its sections permitted federal prosecution for refusal 
to accept votes without limiting the offense to denials based on race or prior condition of slavery; In U.S. v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), the Court did not incorporate the Bill of Rights to the states and found that the First 
Amendment right to assembly "was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own 
citizens" and that the Second Amendment "has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national 
government."  Reese and Cruikshank enabled the southern states to deny the vote to blacks on seemingly nonracial 
grounds, such as literacy, and thus was the foundation for later black disfranchisement. 
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education for blacks was far in advance of the demands of the present condition of black society 
and thus delighted in his refusal to fund public education for black students.31 
As the quality of black life continued to decline, Atlanta business and industrial might 
embodied the “coming of the New South” for whites.  In 1895, as a sign of her progress, Atlanta 
hosted the Cotton States and International Exposition, a publicity laden fair that celebrated the 
progress of the South since the Civil War as well as the redemption of white control over blacks.  
The fair, held in Piedmont Park, was also the site where Booker T. Washington delivered his 
“Atlanta Compromise” speech.  Washington advised blacks in the South to concentrate on 
vocational training and not attempt to mix socially with whites.  He connected the interests of 
African Americans with the prosperity of the region and proposed that blacks focus on 
businesses where he believed them to have more prospect in the South than the North.  The 
speech was purported as a major sensation by the mainstream press. However, for blacks, 
Washington had dealt a deafening blow.  For more than two decades, he casted a long shadow 
over development in the South. He did so, however, over criticism of other black leaders such as 
W.E. B. Du Bois, a professor at Atlanta University, who had founded  a center to examine social 
aspects of black life in American in 1896.32 
The violence and terror against blacks during Reconstruction was still as profound at the 
turn of the 20th Century.  According to the “Two Atlanta’s” Writing Team, between the years of 
1888 to 1903, 241 African Americans were lynched in Georgia, which made it second only to 
Mississippi [294] in that time period.33  Yet in the midst of hostility, Atlanta’s black community 
                                                 
31 June Patton, Major Richard Robert Wright Sr. and Black Higher Education in Georgia, 1880-1920, 
(Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1980), see chapter entitled “The Politics of Education:  The Struggle for 
Georgia’s First Black State Supported College.” 
32 Negro History in Atlanta, 3. 
 
33 Project HAL:  The Historical American Lynching Data Collection Project obtained at 
http://people.uncw.edu/hinese/HAL/HAL%20Web%20Page.htm (accessed March 28, 2008). 
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established businesses that served black clientele.  By 1900, blacks in Georgia had amassed 
assets valued at around $14 million in property, much of which was in Atlanta. This gave way to 
the beginnings of several black owned, operated, and secure firms served Atlanta’s black 
community over the next two decades.  Of these businesses, Alonzo Herndon’s Atlanta Life 
Insurance founded in 1905; the Atlanta Savings Bank founded in 1909; and the Citizens Trust 
Company founded in 1921 were most significant within black America.34   
At the dawning of the 20th Century, much of Atlanta’s black community watched in 
horror as the city stood at the center of and bore witness to a national trend of race hate and 
terror. White supremacy at its best coupled with racial hostility as a result of  loss at the behest of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction era spawned legislation designed to impede black progress. On 
September 22, 1906, racial hostility reached a fever’s pitch and birthed the Atlanta Race Riot, a 
four-day nightmare where shooting, stabbing, and dragging blacks from vehicles as well looting 
and burning black neighborhoods ravaged Atlanta’s black community.  By the end of the riot, 
twenty-five blacks and two white were killed, and least 70 blacks were injured. 35 
In 1908, Georgia’s Governor Hoke Smith fulfilled a campaign promise by passing laws 
that deprived blacks from voting in the primary election.  These laws effectively disfranchised 
blacks.  By 1913, state laws required segregation in almost every aspect of public life and death, 
as the new mandated racially laws segregated cemeteries.  As acts of racism continued to rise in 
the early 20th century, what became clear was that in  America in general, and Georgia in 
particular, patriotism towards America pushed blacks to defend this racist regime to show 
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themselves as citizenship worthy, seeking inclusion with the same sense as whites.  Of the first 
seven Atlantans called to serve in World War I, two were blacks.36  The fact that Blacks were 
willing to fight for this nation 
As Atlanta’s white community burgeoned into the celebrated capital of the New South, 
little had changed since Reconstruction for the ordinary black men and women. Black migration 
into Atlanta during the early decades of the 20th century was indicative of the farm-to-city trend 
seen nationwide.   From 1900 to 1920, the black population in Atlanta grew from 35,727 to 
67,796 and the white population increased from 54,090 to 137,785.  By1930, with the beginning 
of the depression and decimation of the  cotton crops by the boll weevil, there were 90,075 
blacks and 180,247 white inside the city’s limits.37 Black sharecroppers came to the city from 
rural areas to avoid starvation and homelessness.  Sharecropping plantations with little cotton 
production called for the eviction of black workers by white plantation owners.  A large segment 
of both populations were poor and lacked formal education. Whites arriving from farms had little 
more than blacks, but nonetheless the color of their skin in Jim Crow Atlanta enabled greater 
social mobility and  a wider range of opportunities than blacks in the city.  Whites could take 
residence in all parts of the city whereas blacks were forced by law and custom to reside in the 
“black areas of town.”  The railroad lines from Atlanta’s origins as a railroad hub determined the 
residential patterns of the city.  Whites did not like the property along the rail lines and as a 
result, blacks ended up residing in and around this area.   
Despite white terror, racism and poverty, there were glimmers of hope and 
accomplishment within Atlanta’s black communities.  In 1922, the first segregated municipal 
swimming pool for blacks was built at Washington Park on the West Side of Atlanta.  Since 
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blacks were still able to vote in general elections, they were able through a school board election  
to attain the first black public secondary school, Booker T. Washington in 1924.  In 1926, Leo 
“Tiger” Flowers of Atlanta became the first African American to hold the middleweight boxing 
championship of the world.  The Atlanta Daily World was founded in 1928 and by 1932 it was 
the only daily black newspaper in the nation.  Also, in 1932, the Atlanta Negro Chamber of 
Commerce was formed.  Yet throughout, the most significant accomplishment for black Atlanta 
was the colleges that made up the Atlanta University Complex.38   
With Du Bois’ research and teaching, Atlanta University became the only university in 
the world committed to a scientific study of black life.  Du Bois stated "without undue boasting 
that between 1896 and 1920 there was no study of race problems in America which did not 
depend in some degree upon the investigations made at Atlanta University."39  Yet the most 
meaningful contribution of Atlanta University was the preparation of highly qualified leaders, 
businessmen, and educators it sent to Atlanta’s black communities.  Teachers were plentiful. 
Children of Atlanta’s struggling professionals returned to their community and built family 
interests.  Atlanta was one of the most successful black business communities in the nation, 
resulting in a powerful black economic bloc with effective capital and savoir-faire that many 
thought would lead the way for the masses.  Further, one of the first interracial committees 
organized in the South and one of the first in the nation was born through the influence of the 
university in 1918.  Initially name the Committee on Interracial Cooperation, this organization 
became the Southern Regional Council in 1944.40  
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 The glimmer of hope continued.  In 1946, Primeus King, an African American from 
Columbus, Georgia, challenged the white Democratic primary in the U.S. Supreme Court and 
brought forth a new era for black Atlantans.  The court ruled the white primary illegal, and 
Atlanta’s black community of 100,000 found themselves suddenly with a powerful, even 
decisive, political voice in the affairs of the city. In 1948, Atlanta Police Chief Herbert Jenkins 
answering a plea from black leadership and defying white public sentiment and hired six black 
policemen. By 1949, African Americans represented at least 25 percent of Atlanta’s registered 
voters. In July of that same year, the Atlanta Negro Voters League, a bipartisan political 
organization was founded by black leaders at the Butler Street YMCA  and served as a 
clearinghouse for black problems and as broker for the African American vote until the early 
1960s.41 In the early 1950s, a group of black ministers ended segregation on public transportation 
by refusing to sit at the back of the bus.  In 1954, Dr. Rufus Clement, the president of Atlanta 
University, became the first African American ever to win a city-wide election gaining a seat on 
the Atlanta school board.  In 1965, Q.V. Williamson was elected to the board of alderman, being 
the first African American to hold this position since Reconstruction. The early 1960s saw the 
removal of “white” and “colored” signs from public areas.  A series of sit-ins resulted in the 
desegregation of public accommodations in Atlanta though not without violent reactions from 
whites.  One of the most meaningful episodes in the city’s history came in 1965 when native son, 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., won the Nobel Peace Prize and was honored. 
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 During the three decades that wrought change, Atlanta found itself with two successive 
mayors who demonstrated an ability to hold the support of the black community while placating 
whites.  Mayor William Hartsfield and Ivan Allen attributed this purported harmonious racial 
spirit to effective black leadership combined with the vision of a “city too busy to hate” coined 
by their own administrations.   Also, blacks attributed much to Governor Ellis Arnall who, in 
1946, took the most courageous stand when he vowed to enforce the Supreme Court ruling that 
outlawed the white primary.  Arnall refused to placate the white sentiment of neighboring 
southern states eager to disfranchise the black vote in the 1940s.  However, a deeper 
investigation of the “City Too Busy to Hate” image reveals a reality of deep divisions and 
entrenched racial hostility.   
 Understanding the “City Too Busy to Hate” slogan requires a deeper investigation that 
unpacks the reality of the message. When the Supreme Court decision of 1954 outlawed racial 
segregation in the nation’s schools, Georgia law makers, seeking to avoid the repercussions of 
maintaining a dual educational system, sought sanctuary in the “private school plan,” which 
threatened that any school system attempting to integrate would be denied state funds and thus 
closed.  However, in 1956, and for the first time in nearly a century, Georgia resurrected the 
confederate symbol by changing its state flag in symbolic opposition to Brown v. Board of 
Education.42 The first case in Georgia filed, under the auspices of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), came against the Atlanta Board of Education in 
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1958.  The plaintiffs won their case, and the Board was ordered to submit plans to desegregate 
by December 1959.  The plans were to become effective in 1960.43 
 In the meantime, a small number of Atlanta citizens became conscious of the struggles 
taking place in Virginia and Little Rock and were concerned about the problems faced by their 
own schools.  Consequently, they began to provoke public discussions on methods of keeping 
public schools open.   Regardless of the disengagement of the local power structure and the 
unyielding state political leadership, these citizens, bolstered by Ralph McGill, the anti-
segregationist editor for the Atlanta Constitution, encouraged others to take a stand.  The, white 
parents of Atlanta’s youth organized HOPE, Inc. (Help Our Public Education) and soon became 
the “rallying ground for moderates” previously hesitant to speak out.  White Atlantan’s 
resistance to moderates was articulated by MASE (Metropolitan Association for Segregated 
Education) and GUTS (Georgians Unwilling to Surrender) created by Lester Maddox, who later 
became governor of the state of Georgia.44  During the 1960 General Assembly, there was a 
movement to retain massive resistance laws; however, committees were created that held state-
wide hearings and recommended possible revisions of Georgia Law for the next General 
Assembly.  For example, the Sibley Committee suggested “a course designed to keep the schools 
open with as much freedom of choice to each parent and community as possible.”  The massive 
resistance laws were repealed and the “freedom of choice” plan was reluctantly approved by the 
1961 legislature.  Atlanta was able to follow the Court’s order to desegregate the eleventh and 
twelfth grades beginning with the 1961 school year.45 
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 Embarrassed by racist reactions toward desegregation by white southerners in Little Rock 
in 1957 and New Orleans in 1960, Hein contends that Atlanta Public Schools transitioned with 
dignity partly because of the group called the Organizations Assisting Schools in September 
(OASIS), a fifty-three member alliance comprised of religious, civic and service groups and 
agencies.  OASIS reached hundreds of thousands of Atlantans through town hall meetings and 
speeches.  Hein notes that fearful of unrest, the Chamber of Commerce ran a full-page 
advertisement in the Atlanta Constitution and the Atlanta Journal that asked, “How Great is 
Atlanta?” with implications that unrest would damage the city’s reputation while the world 
watched.46 
 According to Hein, another measure in Atlanta Public School’s desegregation transition 
was Ralph McGill, the white liberal editor for the Atlanta Constitution.  On the eve of August 30, 
1961, the first day of school, members of the press and other news media poured into Atlanta to 
cover desegregation.  Ralph McGill commented that the city that “has always tried to look 
forward not backwards” was ready for the world’s attention.  Hein notes that each member of the 
press was given a handbook entitled Background:  Atlanta, prepared by OASIS “for reporters 
covering desegregation of Atlanta Public Schools.”  It provided facts about those involved, 
including the ten selected black students, public officials and organization leaders. It also 
included statements from Mayor William Hartsfield, Police Chief Herbert Jenkins, School 
Superintendent John Letson and others, all stressing Atlanta’s determination to obey the law 
peacefully.  The media were impressed considering the harassment endured from city officials 
and angry whites in Little Rock and New Orleans. According to Newsweek, “Atlanta was 
anxious to cater to the working press.”  What was increasingly clear was Atlanta’s calculated 
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approach to desegregation, which took two years of preparation.  Mayor William Hartsfield 
warned, “What happened in Little Rock won’t happen here.  We’re going to ride herd on these 
damn rabble-rousers.  We have a loyal police chief…who knows more about the race problem 
than any chief in the nation…We’ve had men from our force in Little Rock and New Orleans 
studying what they did wrong…. when racists come in this town, they know they’re going to get 
their heads knocked together.47  On August 30, 1961, four Atlanta high schools were quietly 
integrated.  The success of peaceful desegregation combined with the confident words of Mayor 
Hartsfield was the beginning of Atlanta’s reputation as a “city too busy to hate.”48   
 Hein notes that in his press conference held on August 30, 1961, President John F. 
Kennedy applauded Atlanta “for the responsible law-abiding manner” displayed.  Media 
coverage and publicity from numerous sources, including the New York Times, praised Atlanta 
for providing “a new and shining example of what can be accomplished…[by] people of good 
will and intelligence.” Life Magazine gave special coverage and commendation to the Atlanta 
Police Department; and Look Magazine called Atlanta “the leader of the New South.”49 
 Hein contends that Atlanta’s image of progressive race relations was helped by racists’ 
outbursts in surrounding counties and southern states.  Ralph McGill was credited with 
packaging Atlanta differently while critically assessing “bloody and murderous mob attacks” in 
the Atlanta Constitution.  As such, Attorney General Robert Kennedy cited Atlanta as the 
epitome of a city where law and order were more important that prejudice, attributing much of 
Atlanta’s success to Ralph McGill. It was clear that McGill’s influence not only affected local 
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attitudes, but also national attitudes through his syndicated column, which appeared in more than 
a hundred American newspapers.  This, in turn enhanced an already positive image of Atlanta.50 
 Nonetheless, according to Hein, Atlanta’s racial picture was less than idyllic from within.  
In 1963, Ivan Allen Jr. was the only southern mayor to speak before Congress on behalf of the 
Civil Rights Bill of 1964, which ended discrimination in public accommodations and implied 
that the business community had an important role in arranging partial desegregation of public 
facilities in Atlanta before such action was required by law.  In 1967, Chief Herman Jenkins was 
the nation’s only Chief of Police to serve on the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, which later produced the Kerner Report.51 
 According to Hein, in the mid 1960’s it was believed that “Forward Atlanta,” a business 
plan conceived by businessmen for the business community, was at the center of Atlanta’s stellar 
image. Atlanta became one of the most well-advertised cities in the nation with new 
construction, a cultural boom, and professional sports.  The mid to late 1960s welcomed three 
sports franchises: the Atlanta Braves and the Atlanta Falcons in 1966; and the Atlanta Hawks in 
1968.  In 1969, a thirty-four page spread on Atlanta through National Geographic stated that 
“golden prosperity is….upon the city. New jobs created since 1961 number nearly 160,000 for a 
gain of 43 percent, a sharper climb than any other major U.S. metropolitan area.”  In 1966, 
Atlanta had the nation’s lowest unemployment ratio (1.9 percent).  The city led all other 
metropolitan areas in percentage gains in wholesale sales, and, in five years, it moved up from 
twenty-first in the nation in housing starts to eighth.  Of the nation’s five hundred biggest 
industrial corporations, four hundred maintained operations in Atlanta.  The fact that one 
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hundred and thirty delegations from other cities and states visited Atlanta to study its 
development was evidence in itself of an excellent national image in 1969.52 
 However, the aforementioned depiction of Atlanta mainly reflected the condition of its 
white citizens.  To black Atlanta, the ‘city too busy to hate” was a fabrication. They viewed the 
popular image of Atlanta as synonymous with white Atlanta, both nationally and locally, while 
Atlanta’s black community was altogether different and often referred to as a separate and 
distinct community. 
 In his twenty-four year tenure as Mayor of Atlanta, William Hartsfield’s support came 
from four main sources:  business leaders, most of the alderman and city officials, middle and 
upper-income whites and, increasingly over the years, blacks.  This support was harnessed 
because Hartsfield developed an alliance between Atlanta business and civic leaders, black 
leaders, and his administration.  Black voting strength increased with time.  Once, black leaders 
approached Hartsfield demanding lighting on black streets; Hartsfield said that he would take 
action if they returned with 10,000 votes. They returned with the signatures and Hartsfield 
delivered on the streetlights.  In 1952, Hartsfield established the first interracial committee in 
Atlanta to bring about a better understanding of the problems of black expansion, to stabilize 
some white neighborhoods adjacent to black areas, and in other neighborhoods, to promote a 
peaceable transition from white to black.  Another advancement made by the city under the 
leadership of Hartsfield was the desegregation of Atlanta’s restaurants and lunch counters.  Much 
of this progress was accomplished through clandestine negotiations among business leaders and 
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leaders of the black community following more than a year of anti-segregation protests and sit-
ins by black college students, including activists such as Julian Bond and Lonnie King.53 
 In 1961, the traditional Hartsfield voting coalition of businessmen, blacks and Northside 
whites elected Ivan Allen Jr. as mayor over segregationist Lester Maddox.  In 1963, Allen went 
to Capitol Hill to solicit public accommodations, which were already in partial operation in 
Atlanta.  Re-elected in 1965 in a landslide victory, it was revealed that Allen had received only 
51 percent of the white votes.”  His victory was due to the black voters.  Roger Williams noted 
that “Negroes did not love Allen, he is after all, a patrician white southerner, but most recognize 
in him qualities of decency and genuine human concern—plus an overriding desire to sustain 
Atlanta’s national image.”54  
 However, in a 1968 article in the Atlanta Inquirer, a columnist wrote, “Let no one 
mistake Black Atlantans’ pride in their city…. blacks enjoy Atlanta, but they don’t like it like it 
is.”55  Other popular sentiments were more forthright:  “Atlanta enjoys a reputation that it does 
not deserve,” or “Atlanta’s image only looks good when compared to Mississippi.”56 Though 
whites and blacks in Atlanta worked together to achieve national credence, white and black 
Atlanta were very different.  Moreover, the vast majority of whites in Atlanta were ignorant of 
the conditions under which most of the black community lived.57 
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 This brief and concise history of pre-Civil Rights black Atlanta provides purview and 
context for this dissertation that focuses on post Civil Rights black Atlanta.  In the last half of the 
Twentieth Century, Atlanta acquired the moniker, black Mecca based on the perception that an 
abundance of opportunity existed for blacks with education and/or skill. However, the rank and 
file of black Atlanta lacked education and skill. In 1968, there were approximately 50,000 
inhabitants in Atlanta’s ghettoes, 32,000 Atlantans lived in public housing, and it was difficult to 
measure the number of homeless blacks.  These statistics suggest that Atlanta was in fact, a black 
Mecca for some.  However, this dissertation attempts to provide a counter-narrative to black 
Mecca image.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONTENDING VISIONS OF A BLACK NEW SOUTHS AND THE BUILDING OF 
BLACK ATLANTA, 1865-1968 
 
 
See in the third grade this is what you were told. You were bought! You were sold!58 
         —Cool Breeze  
 
 Atlanta deserves a central place in our efforts to understand African American history 
and race relations in the United States. Throughout the 20th Century, Atlanta was the center of 
black achievement in the South as well as the nation.  Much of the reputation regarding black 
progress was centered on the system of higher education.  However, the fundamental impact of 
education linked to autonomous black communities, has been regarded as the most important 
acquisition for African Americans throughout their experience in America.  
 
The Quest for Black Education 
 
 Educational expansion in the state of Georgia made no provisions for black higher 
education with the exception of the appropriation to Atlanta University, which ended in 1887.59 
This neglect was partially counterbalanced by colleges organized for black students by 
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taught theology.  Much of the hostility toward Atlanta University resulted from fear by whites that the school’s 
“Yankee” faculty was teaching northern social ideas to black students. 
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individuals, organizations, and various religious denominations.  Atlanta’s first black college was 
Atlanta University, founded by the American Missionary Association in 1865.  The Augusta 
Institute founded by Richard C. Coulter and William J. White was founded in 1867, but was 
moved to Atlanta in 1879 and renamed the Atlanta Baptist College in 1890. In 1913, under the 
leadership of Dr. John Hope, the school was renamed Morehouse College in honor of Henry 
Morehouse.60  In 1869, the Rev. J.W. Lee began the school that in 1877, with the aid of the 
Freedmen’s Aid Society of the Northern Methodist church, was christened as Clark University.  
Two additional colleges were opened in Atlanta in 1881 when the African Methodist Episcopal 
church began Morris Brown College and Sophia B. Packard and Harriet E. Giles founded Atlanta 
Baptist Female Seminary, later named Spelman College.  In 1883, the theology department of 
Clark University founded and organized a separate institution after receiving and endowment of 
$200,000 form Elijah Gammon of Batavia, Illinois.  In 1886, it became Gammon Theological 
Seminary.  In the absence of black public high schools in Georgia, most of the students at these 
institutions, during their early development, were in preparatory programs.  However and 
according to June Patton, these schools were as deserving of the title college as the University of 
Georgia where many students were deemed illiterate and elementary English, algebra and 
arithmetic were taught.  As a result of these private efforts, by 1887, Atlanta had become the 
capital of black post-secondary education in America, and the visibility of black institutions in 
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Atlanta increased opposition among whites to state appropriations for the support of public 
higher education for blacks.61 
In 1890, the state of Georgia finally secured the funding for a public land grant 
institution, the Georgia State Industrial College for Colored Youth, located  in Savannah.  It 
became increasingly evident that the state of Georgia would only support an industrial college 
that would train blacks for skilled labor. The issue over black education, as far as the state of 
Georgia was concerned, dealt heavily with the influence of northern “Yankee” missionaries upon 
southern blacks.  Sinister claims charged northerners with fostering jealousies and hatred 
towards southern whites.  Whites frowned upon the practice of “social equality” between white 
teachers and black pupils. Yet a new showdown was emerging within the black community that 
pitted liberal arts education against industrial education. As seen in racial uplift theory, the 
notion of self-help and service to the black masses espoused by the black middle class, from 
which black elites and middle classes distinguished themselves from the black majority as agents 
of civilization, tensions between black elites, middle, working, and poor classes brewed, 
surrounding access to education, whether public or private. As such, black elites and middle 
classes were drawn to private institutions because of their wealth, the institution’s exclusivity 
and New England puritanical teachings, for which they felt to be more appropriate for success in 
a white dominated social system. What is necessary to understand is that a central assumption of 
racial uplift ideology was that African Americans’ material and moral progress would diminish 
white racism. However, in its emphasis on class distinctions and patriarchal authority, racial 
uplift ideology was tied to the same pejorative notions of racial pathology bestowed upon blacks 
by whites. 
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On September 18, 1895, African American leader and educator Booker T. Washington 
spoke before a predominantly white crowd at the Cotton States and International Exposition in 
Atlanta, Georgia. His address would prove to be one of the most influential speeches in 
American history. Historian Louis Harlan asserted that although the organizers of the exposition 
worried that “public sentiment was not prepared for such an advanced step,” they decided that 
inviting a black speaker would impress Northern visitors, philanthropists, and investors with the 
evidence of racial progress in the South. Washington soothed his listeners’ concerns about 
“uppity” blacks by claiming that his race would be content with living “by the productions of our 
hands.”62  
In his address, Washington purported that blacks had gained power much too quickly 
during Reconstruction and should focus on being less of a force in the politics of the New South 
and more of an integral part of the southern economy by being better neighbors to white 
southerners.   Washington stated: 
Not only this, but the opportunity here afforded will awaken among us a new era of 
industrial progress. Ignorant and inexperienced, it is not strange that in the first years of 
our new life we began at the top instead of at the bottom; that a seat in Congress or the 
state legislature was more sought than real estate or industrial skill; that the political 
convention or some teaching had more attractions than starting a dairy farm or 
stockyard.63 
 
Historian James Anderson’s argues that the educational philosophy initiated by Samuel 
Armstrong, Booker T. Washington’s mentor at Hampton Institute, prescribed industrial 
education as a prerequisite to a subordinate role that Armstrong believed African Americans 
were ordained to play in the economy of the South.  Like many white southern leaders at the end 
of Reconstruction, Armstrong supported black disenfranchisement and anticipated African 
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Americans position on the lower stratum of the South’s occupational ladder.  While most white 
southerners felt that education would ruin blacks, Anderson argues that Armstrong, unlike other 
southern leaders, believed in the importance of universal education.  He held deep faith in the 
powerful capacity of moral and industrial education to socialize blacks to understand and accept 
their disenfranchisement and to make them more productive laborers.64 
According to Anderson, Armstrong’s opinion was firmly rooted in the educational 
philosophy that governed Hampton Institute, where training leaders for the South’s black 
educational system was considered a much more important goal than teaching agricultural skills.  
In exchange for universal schooling, Hampton’s style of industrial education became part of a 
continuing New South ideology that sacrificed black social and political interest to the need for 
black workers in an economy based on agriculture.  This “Hampton Model” of black industrial 
education was on a collision course with institutions of black higher education whose philosophy 
was just the opposite.65 
Historian Leroy Davis asserts that the American Missionary Association (AMA) and the 
American Baptist Home Missionary Society (ABHMS) as well as many black leaders and 
educators were apprehensive about Washington’s new recognition. Weeks before Washington’s 
speech, ABHMS and AMA leaders assembled at the annual meeting of the American Social 
Science Association to discuss the growing affinity to support only industrial education for 
blacks.66 
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According to Davis, critical assessments of this trend appeared in editorials of the 
ABHMS journal, the Home Mission Monthly, and the New York Independent late in September 
and were revisited often in numerous publications from that point on.  Writers argued, “Negro 
industrial education concept was based upon the denial of the humanity of a whole race” and was 
intended to make the “Negro absolutely content with his lot as a servant.” On another note, 
higher education, according to the missionary organization writers, rested on a belief in 
“thorough humanity of the black man, with divine endowment of all the facilities of the white 
man; capable of culture, capable of high attainments under proper conditions and with sufficient; 
a being not predestined to be simply a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the white race.”  
Henry Morehouse, the executive director of the ABHMS, believed blacks would “progress 
largely through the wise leadership of a gifted intelligentsia,” and gave top priority to educating 
the “talented tenth.”  He also believed that black Progress would come through the leadership of 
“noble and powerful minds raised up from their own ranks.”67 Though philanthropic northern 
whites conflicted with Washington’s assertions, they were unaware of the by products that would 
emerge within the black community.  As a result, it was necessary for black educators to weigh 
in and counter balance the adverse side effects prescribed through northern education and 
puritanical values for southern blacks. 
Historian James Anderson notes that both Du Bois and Hope believed it necessary to promote 
liberal arts and professional education that would train black intellectuals along with lawyers, 
physicians, dentists and storekeepers.  To Du Bois and Hope, liberal arts education was 
necessary for building an autonomous black community.68 Du Bois, a native of Great Barrington, 
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Massachusetts was educated at Fisk in Nashville and became the first African American to earn a 
doctorate degree from Harvard University.  He would serve as a faculty member and scholar 
activist at Atlanta University from 1897-1910.  Du Bois was also instrumental in raising the 
nation’s awareness of Atlanta University with his studies on blacks.   John Hope was a native of 
Augusta, Georgia and was educated at Worcester Academy and Brown University.  Hope was 
the first black faculty member at Atlanta Baptist College (later Morehouse College) where he 
also became the first black president in 1906 and later became the first president of the Atlanta 
University System in 1929. Unlike industrial education as Anderson asserts, both Du Bois and 
Hope believed that liberal arts curriculum would produce the much-needed leaders for a 
community such as teachers, doctors, and lawyers.69  
Louis Harlan notes that at the time when Booker T. Washington gave his speech at the 
Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta, neither Du Bois nor Hope were the 
intellectual giants that they would become.  Though they did not agree with Washington’s 
stance, they both recognized Washington’s new popularity and initially did not openly challenge 
his Hampton Model until 1903.  Evidence shows that shortly after Washington gave his speech 
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in Atlanta, Du Bois telegraphed “Let me heartily congratulate you upon your phenomenal 
success at Atlanta.”70 
 
John Hope, Booker T. Washington, and Black Atlanta 
 
In many regards, Dr. John Hope was recognized as one of the foremost educators that 
devoted his life to the education of African Americans.  First as a faculty at Roger Williams 
University at Nashville, Tennessee, and later at the Atlanta Baptist College, now Morehouse 
College, he proved himself as an inspiring teacher.  In 1906, he succeeded Dr. George Sale as 
president of Atlanta Baptist College, becoming the first African American to do so.  For 25 years 
he worked to build up a high-ranking institution for black men in Atlanta.  In the early 20th 
century and presently, Morehouse stands as one of the highest ranking historically black colleges 
and the only all-male black institution of higher learning.  The earlier prestige is due largely to 
the efforts of John Hope.  In 1929, when Atlanta University, Morehouse College, and Spelman 
College were affiliated with the university system, Hope was unanimously chosen to be its first 
president. As president of the Atlanta University system, more than a million dollars were spent 
for building and for physical improvements of the campus, and more than two million dollars 
were added to the university endowment.  However, his greatest achievement was bringing 
together Atlanta’s six institutions of higher learning to work for the good of all. In addition to 
Hope’s activities, he improved living conditions for blacks in Atlanta.  He was very active in 
attaining federal aid in clearing a portion of slum area in Atlanta’s West End and the building of 
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public housing for black families and as a result, was appointed by Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes to be chairman of the Citizen’s Advisory Committee to supervise the University 
Housing Project.  This project was of significant worth in that it was the first of its kind to be 
authorized and the first to be actually undertaken.  The building of the model apartments, which 
housed 677 families, was completed in May of 1936. As a staunch advocate of racial uplift and 
black education in the South, Hope was, at the time of his death, carrying out a unique project, 
which might be termed a pioneer in the field of liberal education for black youth.71 
Leroy Davis notes that John Hope was present at Atlanta’s Piedmont Park and heard 
Washington’s talk and, for the most part, kept his thoughts about Washington to himself. Yet his 
letters written to his wife Lugenia Burns during their courtship evidenced Hope’s disdain for 
Washington’s model.72  Never taking aim at Washington, Hope commented in a series of lectures 
that preached liberal arts education and was concerned with building an autonomous community.  
He believed that liberal arts education was central in the training of African American leaders 
and key to social progress. He also believed in preparing a black intelligentsia.  Hope, as Du 
Bois, pushed for the concept of the ‘talented tenth.” John Hope was aware of the looming 
tempest that pitted industrial education versus higher education and recognized, in Anderson’s 
words, that “Washington and Tuskegee were Armstrong and Hampton in blackface.73  
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Black Education and its Influence on Atlanta’s Black Community 
 
If you want to touch Negro welfare quickly and effectively at many points, do it 
through the teacher and the school.  For the life of the community centers in them, 
flows around them, depends on them.  Extending far beyond desk and blackboard, 
the influence of the Negro teacher reaches out into the homes of the pupils and 
often makes all the difference between a good and a bad community. 
      --John Hope, President 
         Atlanta University74 
 
Close friends and colleagues at Atlanta, W.E.B. Du Bois and John Hope along with tailor 
and city councilman William Finch and former slaves James Tate and Grandison B. Daniels, 
who opened the first public school in Atlanta for black children, were widely considered the 
impetus in the movement for public education for black children and liberal arts education in 
Atlanta’s black community. Yet, Du Bois and Hope believed in a concept proposed by Du 
Bois—a “talented tenth—the best of the race that they may guide the mass away for the 
contamination and death of the worst, in their own and other races.”75  Cultivating a group to 
lead and masses to follow presents a contentious point whereas it is necessary to focus more on 
the ninety percent than the ten percent set aside for leadership.  Yet Du Bois and Hope believed 
that liberal arts education would cultivate the “black intelligentsia.”  In a speech delivered on 
April 12, 1896, Hope stated: 
Now we consider it right and proper that a certain percent of our people should have 
such training as will put them on a level with all other races in the quest for higher 
knowledge in letters and science.  The progress, dignity, and respectability of our 
people depend on this.  Mere honesty, mere wealth will not give us rank among the 
other people of the civilized world:  and, what Is more, we ourselves will never be 
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possessed of conscious self-respect, until we can point to men in our own ranks who are 
easily the equal of any race.76 
 
Du Bois and Hope envisioned that public education for black children would feed Atlanta’s 
black institutions of higher learning and therefore provided the community with aspects of 
industrial education, but more importantly, a professional class that could negotiate with the 
other races.  It was Hope’s mission to move Morehouse College, and later the Atlanta University 
System, from normal schools to colleges with real training because he believed that blacks were 
destined to remain in the South, and that a premium collegiate education be sustained and 
nurtured in the region where the majority of African Americans resided.77  
 Atlanta, Georgia stood at center stage as an ivory tower for educating African Americans.  
Yet, book learning and skill were not the only attributes brought on by black education. The 
significance of black education, according to Davis, was seen in the development of two distinct 
class groups within the African American community:  1).  A black upper class that was of 
mixed heritage and inherited wealth from their white lineage; 2).  A black middle class with 
education but no inherited wealth.   Yet, the new southern African American middle-class was, 
in many ways, similar to the upper-class elite.  Certainly many graduates of Atlanta University, 
Morehouse College and Spelman were light-skinned, and almost all of them enjoyed the same 
social activities of the elite.  Black Middle-class graduates of the city’s colleges were also critical 
of the behavior and social activities of the black rank and file, and believed their only salvation 
lay in education and the adoption of a “high” European culture. The fine line that distinguished 
the black upper-class from the middle class may have been, as Hope believed, inherited 
opportunity versus self-made opportunity, surely there was overlap between the two classes in 
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this black “world-within-a-world.”  Historian Faye Robbins recognized the existence of upper-
class elite, yet believed that the line separating the middle class from the upper class in the 1890s 
“cannot be drawn with the evenness of a board saw in two pieces, but is more like the jagged 
edge of one broken across the knee.78 
 
W.E.B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, and Black Atlanta 
 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois played a critical role in grappling 
with the social ills of America in general, and black Atlanta in particular. In 1897, Du Bois 
accepted a position to teach sociology, a field of study in its infancy, at Atlanta University.  At 
Atlanta according to Saunders Redding, Du Bois set up a program of studies of African 
Americans, which was to be “primarily scientific—a careful search for truth conducted as 
thoroughly, broadly, and honestly as the material resources and mental equipment at command 
would allow.” In 1903, Du Bois wrote a series of essays and sketches entitled The Souls of Black 
Folk aimed to ‘sketch, in vague, uncertain outline, the spiritual world’ of black America. It 
carried a prophecy that has haunted America: “The problem of the Twentieth Century is the 
problem of the color-line.”79 In this, Du Bois thoroughly discussed the work of Booker T. 
Washington, the meaning of progress, education, politics, race relations, and religion.  Most 
important, were Du Bois’ discussions of the quest for liberal arts education and its relevance for 
sustaining an autonomous black community.  It was not until the publication of his essay entitled 
“Of Mr. Booker T. Washington” that Du Bois openly criticized Washington.  He felt that 
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Washington’s program of industrial education was outmoded and commensurate with the 
philosophy of the old South.  Du Bois was particularly disturbed by the timing of Washington’s 
“Atlanta Compromise” Speech, coming at a time when life in the South was a violent and 
oppressive era for blacks.  
Du Bois thought that Washington’s Hamptonian model focused solely on revenue and 
material gains, and missed the mark toward social mobility for African Americans.  The 1890s 
presented a particular moment in the history of the South.  According to Du Bois, it was a 
watershed moment where interactions between educated, uneducated, blacks, and whites were 
frequent. Washington’s program, Du Bois maintained, relegated blacks to the very bottom of the 
New South’s social order. Du Bois wrote: 
In the history of nearly all other races and peoples the doctrine preached at such crises 
has been that manly self-respect is worth more than lands and houses, and that a people 
who voluntarily surrender such respect, or cease striving for it, are not worth civilizing.  
In answer to this, it has been claimed that the Negro can survive only through 
submission. Mr. Washington distinctly asks that black people give up, at least for the 
present, three things: first, political power; second, insistence on civil rights; third, 
higher education of Negro youth,--and concentrate all their energies on industrial 
education, and accumulation of wealth, and the conciliation of the South. This policy 
has been courageously and insistently advocated for over fifteen years, and has been 
triumphant for perhaps ten years. As a result of this tender of the palm-branch, what has 
been the return? In these years there have occurred: 1) The disfranchisement of the 
Negro; 2) The legal creation of a distinct status of civil inferiority for the Negro; 3) The 
steady withdrawal of aid from institutions for the higher training of the Negro.80 
 
The Souls of Black Folk also explored the development of a new professional and 
working class and its implications for the strivings of the black South.  As Du Bois put it:  
Such are not men of the sturdier make; they of Atlanta turned resolutely toward the 
future; and that future held aloft vistas of purple and gold--Atlanta, Queen of the cotton 
kingdom; Atlanta, Gateway to the Land of the Sun; Atlanta, the new Lachesis, spinner 
of web and woof for the world.  So the city crowned her hundred hills with factories, 
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and stored her shops with cunning handiwork, and stretched long iron ways to greet the 
busy Mercury in his coming.  And the nation talked of her striving.81 
 
Atlanta’s characterization as the new Lachesis, a mythical entity that measured the length of the 
thread of human achievement, posited the city as the American South’s phoenix of promise.  
Employed as textile factory, washerwomen, skilled workers, artisans, and porters, opportunities 
for work encouraged freedmen to migrate to Atlanta.  Though these labor-oriented occupations 
eased economic despair, they did little to establish the foundation needed to make the black 
community a viable economic and social force. To Du Bois, this was his outcry for free public, 
liberal arts and professional education for black America. 
 In his essay entitled “Of the Wings of Atalanta,” Du Bois used a mythical anecdote to 
explain how greed, capitalism and materialism were the utmost nemeses of black America as a 
whole and to Atlanta’s black community in particular.  His reference to the Greek mythical 
character Atalanta was a symbol of Atlanta’s black community. As such, Atalanta was the 
princess of Boeotia, a fair maiden and master huntress who vowed that she would only marry the 
man who beat her in a foot race.  Of those vowing for her hand in marriage was the young and 
dashing suitor Hippomenes.  Legend told of her fleet of foot, which assured her victory as well 
as the death to those suitors whom dared to race her.  Hippomenes, sentencing himself to death if 
defeated, chose to distract her during the race by laying three golden apples along the course of 
the race. As the race commenced and Atalanta sprinted towards the finish line, she became 
distracted and tempted by the golden apples and eventually focused her attentions on them 
instead of reaching the finish line.    
Du Bois wrote “She fled like a shadow, paused, startled over the first apple, but even as 
he stretched his hand, fled again; hovered over the second, then, slipping from his hot grasp, flew 
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over river, vale, and hill; but as she lingered over the third, his arms fell round her, and looking 
on each other, the blazing passion of their love profaned the sanctuary of Love, and they were 
cursed.  If Atlanta be not named for Atalanta, she ought to have been.”82 Atalanta represented 
black America in general and black Atlanta in particular.  Hippomenes and his golden apples 
represented the economic gains brought on by the new industry and social interactions emerging 
in the South.  These economic gains would also be enhanced by industrial education preached by 
Washington. The finish line represented a self-sufficient black community.  Du Bois’ focus on 
“the wings of Atalanta” was symbolic of the black educational institutions of higher learning that 
called Atlanta home.  The idea that education in pursuit of wealth and status could side track 
black Atlanta from the more important goals of political enfranchisement, civil equality, and a 
higher order of civilization. 
Du Bois’ idea of liberal arts education put African Americans in charge of their destiny and 
would not allow them to fall prey to the exploitative agendas of both prejudice and 
paternalistic whites. To articulate this idea, Du Bois wrote:  
Atalanta is not the first or the last maiden whom greed of gold has led to defile the 
temple of love; and not maids alone, but men in the race of life, sink from the high and 
generous ideals of youth to the gambler’s code of the Bourse; and in all our Nation’s 
striving is not the Gospel of Work befouled by the Gospel of Pay?  So common is this 
that one-half think it normal; so unquestioned, that we almost fear to question if the end 
of racing is not gold, if the aim of man is not rightly to be rich.  And if this is the fault 
of America, how dire a danger lies before a new land and a new city, lest Atlanta, 
stooping for mere gold, shall find that gold accursed!83 
 
“Of the Wings of Atalanta” spoke directly to the pivotal issues pertinent to free public 
education for black children, liberal arts education for college curriculum, and professional 
education for business owners, lawyers, doctors, dentist etc.  With this, Du Bois carved out the 
blueprint for sustenance for early 20th century black America at large and Atlanta’s black 
community in particular. Black triumph lay with the institutions of higher education in Atlanta. 
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Du Bois felt that swiftness to sustenance, through industrial education was not the key to 
attaining good relations between the races but that liberal arts education—to discipline and 
furnish the mind, develop character, and enrich life by encouraging future learning—would deem 
African Americans worthy of business partnerships and social interactions.   
 On status, Du Bois coined the term the “Talented Tenth,” emphasizing the necessity for 
higher education to develop the leadership capacity among the most able ten percent of black 
America. He wrote “Hither has the temptation of Hippomenes penetrated; already in this smaller 
world, which now indirectly and anon directly must influence the larger for good or ill, the habit 
is forming of interpreting the world in dollars.  The old leaders of Negro opinion, in the little 
groups where there is a Negro social consciousness, are being replaced by new; neither the black 
preacher nor the black teacher leads as he did two decades ago.  Into their places are pushing the 
farmers and gardeners, the well-paid porters and artisans, the businessmen—all those with 
property and money.”84   With this, Du Bois spoke to the shifts in leadership and goals from 
preacher and teacher, the center of the old black community, to businessmen and artisans.  This 
idea reiterates the symbolic meanings of the golden apples laid by Hippomenes where African 
Americans moved from righteousness to greed and served prophetic in the future of black 
professionals in Atlanta.   
What was clear with Du Bois was the notion that African Americans had forgotten the 
importance of religion and faith fostered during the experience of slavery.  He hoped that black 
businesses, black schools, black political movements and black cultural expressions, four major 
components of black life would foster a sustainable and autonomous black community.  All of 
these factors were congruent with the black Atlanta.  Du Bois wrote “What if the Negro people 
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be wooed from a strife for righteousness, from a love of knowing, to regard dollars as be all and 
end-all of life?  What if to the Mammonism of America be added the rising Mammonism of the 
re-born South, and the Mammonism of this South be reinforced by the budding Mammonism of 
its half awakened black millions?  Whither, then, is the new-world quest of Goodness and 
Beauty and Truth gone glimmering?  Must this, and that fair flower of Freedom which despite 
jeers of latter-day striplings, sprung from our fathers’ blood, must that too degenerate into a 
dusty quest of gold—into lawless lust with Hippomenes.”85   Du Bois’ questioning indicates his 
belief that African Americans inherited too much integrity and wisdom, and had suffered at the 
hands of too many hardships to become idolaters of money.  He was convinced that destiny 
would lead African Americans on this journey for education, which in time could provide more 
agency and self-determination for the black community.  Thus chose Atlanta as the city best 
suited for this feat because of the historically black institutions of higher learning that called 
Atlanta home. 
Du Bois believed that the benefit of a college education made white America respect 
black communities.  A college education certified that blacks were worthy of all rights and 
privileges bestowed upon American citizens. Though Du Bois believed in cultural autonomy, 
education validated the ability to think and serve as leaders of their own communities.  He wrote 
“And the final product of our training must be neither a psychologist nor a brick mason, but a 
man.  And to make men, we must have ideals, broad, pure, and inspiring ends of living—not 
sordid money-getting, not apples of gold.  The worker must work for the glory of his handiwork, 
not simply for pay; the thinker must think for truth, not for fame.  And all this is gained only by 
human strife and longing; by ceaseless training and education; by founding Right on 
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righteousness and Truth on the unhampered search for Truth; by founding the common school on 
the university, and the industrial school on the common school; and weaving thus a system, not 
distortion and bringing a birth, not an abortion.”86 It is with these dynamics that we must 
understand why Atlanta has such a thriving black middle class.  Atlanta has more historically 
black institutions of higher learning than any other city in the U.S.  A significant percentage of 
college educated blacks either lived in Atlanta or were educated in Atlanta, giving Atlanta and 
the Atlanta University Center a strong hold on black education from which a vibrant, yet rigid 
middle class emerged.  This structure imbibed a black social class alienated from the black 
masses through hereditary rank, profession, and wealth. 
 
The Black Atlanta(s) 
 
“Black Atlanta” refers to a collection of black enclaves scattered across the city.  Different 
enclaves might order the collective goals differently—lower stats blacks placing pursuit of viable 
employment above formal education, propertied blacks placing moral reformation and political 
access above social activity.  Nonetheless, like the interlocking pattern of a honeycomb, diverse 
segments of the black population in  Atlanta were linked through shared cultural fraternity and 
racial solidarity, forming a larger community—each group a multi-sided unit, separate and 
discrete, yet also interdependent, creating a variegated and dynamic whole.”87 
 
Historically, Atlanta has played its roles in the sordid and troubled history of race 
relations that has long been the moniker of the American South.  Evidence of this was seen 
through the Atlanta Race Riot of 1906 and the long history of lynching that plagued the state of 
Georgia and the Atlanta area in the early 20th century.  During the summer of 1906, white 
resistance to black Atlanta’s rising economic and social power, along with the sensationalizing 
rhetoric of white politicians and unsubstantiated news stories about a black crime wave created 
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dangerous levels of racial tension and hostility in Atlanta.  The riot lasted from September 22-25, 
1906 and at the end of the riot, at least 25 blacks and two whites lay dead.  The race riot that 
brought national attention to the city in 1906 was, in part, an attempt to destroy the gains made 
by black Atlantans as a result in the coming together of the educational, political, economic and 
cultural factors present in Atlanta’s black community.88  Most importantly, we must understand 
the theme of intraracial cooperation which was central to the physical and socioeconomic 
development of black Atlanta.  The ideology of racial solidarity became the foundation on which 
organizations and institutions were built.   As a result of such, African Americans’ commitment 
to the vote, to education, to fair wages, and to equitable treatment as citizens was tied to 
commitment to their community and “the race” at large.  Because black Atlantans were not 
permitted access to municipal services and benefits, access to financial institutions, and the rights 
of citizenship, upper-class blacks were able to evade some of the social controls imposed by 
whites on the black working class and poor because of their connection to their white heritage.   
With the establishment of educational institutions, the American Missionary 
Association’s overall goal of securing educational access for Atlanta’s black community and 
training teachers was manifested.  According to sociologists Joseph Jewell, the Storrs Free 
School provided a solid educational foundation for religion and citizenship for black school 
children in Atlanta, while Atlanta University trained teachers who subsequently staffed schools 
in Atlanta and other areas of Georgia and the South.  In an article written by Du Bois, the scholar 
asserted that in the city of Atlanta alone, it was estimated that at least 75 percent of the city’s 
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teachers were Atlanta University graduates.89  Through their affiliation with the AMA’s 
educational institutions, members of Atlanta’s black community, students instructed in genteel 
conduct.  The AMA’s educational institutions provided the youth of Atlanta’s burgeoning black 
elite, as part of a black urban regime, with a shared social experience that necessarily served to 
establish and over time, continually reinforce the important social connections that are central in 
the formation of an upper elite among select families. 90 
According to Virginia Hein and as previously stated, Atlanta’s highly developed black 
middle and upper classes were advancing economically, socially, and politically.  There were 
enclaves of black neighborhoods where a large percentage of blacks owned homes, yet the neatly 
maintained neighborhoods on the West side of Atlanta in which white Atlanta was unaware, was 
noted as ‘a mark of segregation.  They…… [were] as comfortable as those in the white 
neighborhoods, but they [were] part of a ghetto’ which crossed the center of the city like a belt 
and then spread westward.”  Hein asserts that Atlanta’s black community emerged as a 
remarkable and towering vanguard of black business, which deemed Atlanta “the largest single 
depository of black capital in the U.S.,” according to Fortune Magazine.  Black businessmen, 
affluent by any standard, were at the center of black community leadership.  Hein notes the 
difference between Atlanta’s white and black power structures, asserting that black Atlanta 
comprised primarily of businessmen, educators and ministers were of great importance to the 
black power structure.  Citing Dr. Fred Crawford, she notes that Atlanta had one of the most 
articulate black leadership structures in America, white or non-white and the extent of its 
nationwide influence suggested it was the epitome of black “establishment” in the entire country.  
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It was also believed that Atlanta had the most highly educated black population in the U.S. 
largely attributed to the aforementioned Atlanta University system.    According to Hein and 
emphasized by Crawford of Emory University, “if leadership in America, white or non white 
were as socially conscious, active, knowledgeable, and articulate as many of the black leaders in 
Atlanta, many of America’s problems would be appreciably minimized, if not eliminated.”91 
By and large, the most of the meaningful gains attained by black Atlantans in the 1960s 
came from voting.  A federal court put black political consciousness into law in 1946 when the 
Georgia white primary law was struck down.  Hein asserts that it is at that instance that cordial 
relationships developed between Auburn Avenue and Hunter Street, two black business districts, 
and some influential whites was not only good for Atlanta business, but for Atlanta politics as 
well.  From this inception, there was little resistance in registering black voters in Atlanta and 
they feared no retribution for registering as blacks did in other parts of the state and the South.  
Consequently, Hein lends credence to this by charting Atlanta’s black voter registration growth:  
3000 (4 percent of total Atlanta registration) in 1946; 41,000 (28.6 percent) in 1961; 64,000 
(35.8 percent) in 1966; and 93,000 (44.8 percent) in 1969.92   
According to Hein, the influences that contributed to this sharp rise in political 
participation rested on black Atlanta’s fondness of auxiliary institutions of churches, social clubs, 
professional and business groups and, specifically, the Atlanta Negro Voters League.  Churches 
played a paramount role by creating black political awareness.  Hein, notes that scholar Mary 
Louis Frick maintained that experienced politicians held ministers in high regard.  On black 
ministers, Frick spoke of them “as perhaps the most powerful of all influences on the Negro 
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voter.”  Black newspapers influenced the pulse of black participation.  The Atlanta Daily World, 
one of only two such daily papers in the nation, had 22,000 subscribers by 1969.  Frick reported 
that the black community thought of it has the “independent, conservative and pro- Republican,” 
while the Atlanta Inquirer, established in 1960 to fill a void in political news coverage, was 
regarded as “independent, liberal, activist within the law, and a bit pro-Democrat.”  Both 
newspapers encouraged voting participation.93 
 Unlike other southern civil rights hotbeds such as Birmingham and Montgomery, Atlanta 
was never considered as a true civil rights battleground, partly due to black urban regime 
politics. This black urban regime’s role in the quest for black education was largely centered 
around a term coined by Tomiko Brown-Nagin called “Atlanta style.”  According to Brown-
Nagin, it involved a small number of collaborators from among Atlanta’s black professional and 
civic elite acting as spokespersons and decision makers for the entire African American 
community—but without input or consent.94  Unlike direct action grassroots organizations, this 
group, as a black urban regime, favored private negotiation with Atlanta’s white civic and 
business elite to secretly settle race-related disputes in Atlanta in the years after Brown v Board 
of Education of 1954.  Brown-Nagin notes that though secret deal making went undisputed by 
the larger black community in the early years (1940-1959), vocal opposition arose after the 
student movements where working and poor classes criticized black elites for making decisions 
without their input.  Anti-democratic and paternalistic, the “Atlanta style” was the antithesis of 
the direct action approach of the civil right movement, essentially an “old boy’s network.” 
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Atlanta’s approach to addressing race-related problems rested on a hierarchy of social relations 
and an elite style of decision making.95 
Brown-Nagin asserts that the influence of the “Atlanta style” of interracial negotiation 
during the 1940s and 1950s illuminated intra-racial and class dynamics.  This group of black 
elites pushed racial solidarity above civil unrest through voting campaigns and political 
endorsements.  To grassroots and student movement organizations, the fact that the “Atlanta 
style” negotiators answered to Atlanta’s white civic and business leaders proved to be crippling, 
because racial solidarity meant endorsing black candidates instead of negotiating for whites.  
This lent credence to the notion that the negotiators were more concerned with their own agendas 
of self-interests than actually advancing democracy.  Black elites and middle classes thrived 
during segregation and hoped to form a gentlemen’s agreement between blacks and whites.  
Because the two groups held common socioeconomic status, black negotiators assumed that 
white negotiators would not view them through the prism of racism—or as racial opponents—
better yet seeing them as fellow gentleman with whom they could partner with to address 
difficult issues for the common good.  96 More important, this kind of interracial negotiation 
precluded working and poor classes from the political negotiations.    The biracial negotiators 
assumed that a mixture of gentlemen’s agreements and civil rights injunctions would lead the 
elimination of segregation and greater social and political equality for Atlanta’s black 
community. 
Because black elites formed social clubs and attended churches that catered specifically 
to their class, their social institutions cultivated and guarded an elite identity.  Declaring 
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themselves as the Talented Tenth, as described by Du Bois, elite blacks expected to exercise 
leadership over social, economic, and political matter affecting black Atlanta, as it did not occur 
to them that the working and poor classes would be involved in advocacy or policy making.  The 
idea of the Talented Tenth promoted self improvement and social climbing, common with the 
atmosphere of Atlanta’s rapidly expanding economy. Fundamentally, it was the idea, shared or 
professed by many decision makers and public figures in the city—black and white—that 
Atlanta, as the quintessence New South city, was special, and that its distinctiveness made it 
ideally suited to address the problem of race.  Atlanta, from this perspective, was truly “a city too 
busy to hate.”97   
Historian Alexia B. Henderson notes that black businessmen capitalized on the system of 
segregation imposed by white politicians and supported by the white business elite.  Atlanta 
businessmen had long clustered on Auburn Avenue and Hunter Street near the downtown 
business district and served both blacks and whites. After the Atlanta Race Riots in 1906, the 
businesses served an exclusively black clientele.98  The survival of these businesses along 
Auburn Avenue was largely dependent on black patronage and the system of segregation, 
catering to the needs of the black community.  It was these business owners that determined the 
course of the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta. 
In 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders released a report 
commissioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson, to investigate the causes of the 1967 riots in the 
United States.  Johnson was interested in understanding the causes that ignited these riots in 
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order to; if at all possible, prevent this kind of civil unrest from erupting again.   Chaired by 
Illinois governor Otto Kerner Jr., this report often referred to as the “Kerner Report” was made 
public on February 29, 1968.  Its finding was that the riots resulted from black frustration 
towards discrimination.  It surmised, “Our nation was moving toward two societies, one black 
and one white— separate and unequal.”99 This investigation concluded that the main cause of 
urban violence was white racism.  It called to create jobs, construct new housing, and dismantle 
de facto segregation and poverty in order to eradicate vicious ghettoes in central cities—the 
largest city of a standard metropolitan statistical area, that is, a metropolitan area containing at 
least one city of 50,000 or more inhabitants.100    
As a result, a team of journalists from the Atlanta Journal authored The Two Atlantas: An 
In Depth, Painstaking Examination of the Racial Picture Today in Atlanta. This series, dating 
between May 5th and May 23rd of 1968, followed a rough outline of the report by the National 
Advisory Commission on the Civil Disorders, as it applied to Atlanta.  They studied local black 
history, black family structures, relationships between the police and the black community, black 
political progress, employment situations, educational systems, exploitation of the black poor, 
housing problems, and the impact of the death of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., in order to 
understand black perspectives on discrimination.  Through feedback from its readers, the Two 
Atlanta Writing Team concluded that Atlanta was not moving toward to societies, one black, one 
white…Atlanta was two societies.101 It was evident that the citizens of the two Atlantas knew 
little about each other and few had any way of learning more.  Yet, in understanding Atlanta’s 
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black communities what the Kerner Report missed was that Atlanta, in fact, was three societies, 
one white and two black.    
Much of this chapter’s focus has discussed agents of change in the perpetuation of a 
black Mecca, yet a significant portion of Atlanta’s black community was still plagued by social 
ills and urban blight.  The second black Atlanta were victims of inadequate housing, poor 
municipal services, idleness, dirt, decay, overcrowding, poor play ground facilities or none at all, 
and poverty—always, endlessly, to little money.  Those who lived in poverty area slums—
especially the black slums—had never received an equal share of the city services. Hein notes 
that on social blight, according to Anne Rivers Siddons, she wrote “Streets were unpaved, 
schools were much more crowded, the enforcement of sanitation, housing and other standards 
were much less stringent and street lights were virtually non existent stated by surveys on social 
blight.  Their problems touched every imaginable strata and facet of human 
frustration…indignities and discrimination….inequitable real estate practices……garbage 
uncollected….sewers running open, rats and vermin running unchecked.”102  As such, what 
resulted was inadequate childcare, a lack of recreation equipment and rampant unemployment.  
What was concluded by surveys done to measure social blight was that almost everyone that 
lived in this Atlanta was extremely skeptical of the local government’s motivation from 
which…most people did not believe the benign expressions of good intent made by local 
officials. 103  
According to Hein, during the 1960s, “Atlanta’s population increased from 487,455 in 
1960 to 502,500 in 1969; the non-white population grew from 186,820 (38.3 percent of the total) 
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to 236,800 (47.7 percent).  The city gained about 50,000 non-whites and lost about 35,000 whites 
in nine years making a net gain in total population of 15,000.  Importantly, the major complaints 
amongst black Atlantans between 1950 and 1960 were: 
1. Their schools were inadequate and overcrowded 
2. They needed better housing 
3. Too few blacks served on grand and petit juries 
4. Not enough blacks were employed by the city and none of those employed had been 
promoted   
5. Blacks had had no representation on the Atlanta Board of Aldermen 
6. Black should receive more job opportunities with local governmental agencies 
At the beginning of the decade, most of Atlanta’s progress was made in areas such as public 
parks, buses, lunch counters and libraries, yet the following figures show discrimination endured 
by blacks in the early 1960s when they constituted more than one- third of the city’s population: 
41 major parks for white Atlantans; three for blacks 
20 football fields for whites; non for blacks 
16 recreation centers for white; three for blacks 
12 swimming pools for whites; three for blacks 
22 baseball diamonds for whites; three for blacks 
119 tennis courts for whites; no more than eight for blacks”104  
In addition to being sub standard, these facilities were so overcrowded that they tended to 
become trouble spots.  However, Atlanta was the second city to receive approval and funds for 
its Model Cities Plan and, with the assistance of Economic Opportunity Atlanta (EOA), the city 
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instituted an active community development program which was expanded to provide year round 
neighborhood services in disadvantaged areas.105 
 Hein also noted that “in spite of the aforementioned wealth in Atlanta’s black 
community, the median income of a black family in the 1960 census was less than half of the 
white family’s $6350 a year, and forty-eight percent of black families earned less than $3,000 a 
year.  In 1960 half of all black male employees and three quarters of all black female employees 
in Atlanta were laborers, service or domestic workers, compared with seven percent of white 
males and nine percent female workers.  The overall unemployment rate of 1.9 percent, of which 
Atlantans were so proud of in the mid-sixties, was deceptive, according to a National Education 
Association (NEA) Special Study, as it did ‘not show the extent of underpaid, untenured, 
unstable laboring domestic, and other low status service employment among Atlanta’s black 
employed persons.’  Few blacks, including those with college degrees, were able to find 
employment opportunities in Atlanta that were not restricted to teaching, black businesses, or the 
post office.  In order to find positions equal to their education, most black graduates had to leave 
Atlanta.  Municipal employment practices improved decidedly throughout the decade, at least in 
regard to the hiring and promoting of blacks.  In 1967 more than half of those hired by the city 
were blacks though, according to the Kerner Report, it only brought their proportion of the city 
work force to twenty-eight percent.  Of 908 police department employees, eighty-five were 
black—a higher proportion of blacks than in most major police departments in the nation. In 
1969, out of 897 sworn personnel in the police department, blacks constituted about seventeen 
percent.  As of March 1969, an Atlanta Constitution staff writer reported that some thirty-nine 
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percent of the city hall workforce was black, but none of the city’s twenty department heads and 
precious few supervisory employees, in general were black.”106   
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders report applied to Atlanta in 
numerous ways.  According to the Two Atlantas series, it was estimated that in the Old Fourth 
Ward slum area in1968, the average black family had five or six children, lived in fewer than 
five rooms and existed on an inadequate diet.  Women headed most of these families.  
Approximately 32,000 people lived in Atlanta’s 16 housing projects.  Four of these housing 
projects were built for whites.  Black Atlantans inhabited the others.  It was estimated that 75 
percent of the 32,000 residents were black.  Of those 32,000, 18,000 were children.  In 1963, 
women headed 45 percent of these households.  But by 1967, that figure had risen to 63 percent.  
What can be concluded from this was a failed welfare system that did not aid male-headed 
families.  According to the 1967 Fulton County Department of Human Resources Records, black 
females comprised of 51.5 percent of all people on welfare.  According to the Georgia State 
Department of Welfare, of those families that received aid to dependent children during the 
1966-67 fiscal year, 75.8 percent were black.  The report also shows that nearly one-fourth of all 
black births were illegitimate.107  The importance of the Kerner Report was believed to be critical 
in understanding of black urban sociology and spawned reactionary media from numerous 
central cities.  Yet the statistics here pathologized black communities in promoting racial 
stereotypes not only believed by white Atlantans, but educated blacks as well.  As such, the Two 
Atlanta Study focused on the ways in which business models, economics, education, 
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employment, politics and institutions of faith could help bridge the gap between the Atlantas.  As 
Hein noted, most of white Atlantans had heard of, without ever seeing, “Summerhill,” “Vine 
City,” and Dixie Hills” where dissatisfaction had been strongly expressed in the mid-sixties by 
black Atlantans who had not felt the “benevolent glow of the city’s enlightenment.”108   
By the end of World War I and the exposure it gave to black soldiers, tied with increasing 
educational opportunities and financial improvement, two kinds of black family structures—two 
different kinds of family life—developed.  According to Dr. William Jackson, Former Dean of 
the School of Social Work at Atlanta University and authority in black development noted that 
with the structure of the uneducated and economically disadvantaged became less cohesive, 
unstable and disorganized and more dependent on society, while the educated and financially 
advantaged black family developed an opposite structure.  According to Jackson, the results of 
that development were apparent in Atlanta where there was a vast difference between the life of 
the city’s low income economically deprived families, scarred by denials of inadequacies, and 
that of those fortune.109  Though there was some truth to this account, it is irresponsible for us to 
generalize Atlanta’s poor blacks.  More importantly, what can be taken from Dr. Jackson’s 
account can be interpreted as a popular sentiment amongst Atlanta’s black middle and upper 
classes. 
One area of investigation that the Two Atlantas Team focused on was the two societies 
that emerged within Atlanta’s black community.  According to this study, there were those that 
worked at “respected places” and those that loitered on the street corner.  To those on the street 
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corner, the police represented the system of oppression that did not accept them as part of 
society.  Blacks in the ghetto tended to see law enforcement as those who evicted them from 
their homes, garnished their wages, or repossessed their belongings.  The relationship between 
those on the corner and law enforcement spoke to the delicacy of the larger issue, the interaction 
between Atlanta’s black poor and the government, where if tempers flared, it would lead to a 
rebellion with the black poor at its center in Atlanta. No aspect of Atlanta’s racial picture was 
more critical to our understanding than the street corner—with the policemen representing one 
perspective of society and blacks on the corner representing the other—that the two Atlantas 
most frequently come together.110   
In many ways, Atlanta was ahead of other American cities when a 1964 report issued by 
the Atlanta Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency pinpointed poverty as the chief 
cause of crime.  The commission headed by the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Griffin 
Bell and started out studying rising crime rates but found themselves deeply entrenched in study 
of social problems.  What became apparent was that the two were inseparable and as a result, 
Atlanta’s City Hall created a crime prevention program based on the notion that one must 
understanding poverty betters an understanding of high crime rates.  Subsequently, many of 
Atlanta’s black community, though primarily spokesmen for the middle class, conceded that 
police-community relations had improved since 1966. At the recommendation of the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, City Hall hired 59 extra police officers to work in 
communities in an advisory capacity.111   
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Within these two worlds of Atlanta’s black community, poor blacks, frustrated by 
opportunities open to those outside of the city’s ghettos were denied the things believed were 
readily available to whites and black upper and middle classes.  What is clear is that poor blacks 
goals were shaped by an educational system designed for middle class white America.  In return, 
poor black Atlantans felt the need to strike at the establishment, of which the police were the 
most accessible representative.  
 
On Politics 
 
Both leadership establishments in black and white Atlanta felt that politics were a way to 
bring the two societies together.   Black state representative Julian Bond stated, “A 
disadvantaged people have to try a variety of ways.”112  Politics paved streets, provided some 
jobs and made sure some schools were built in black neighborhoods in need as opposed to white 
neighborhoods.  Much of Atlanta’s middle class leadership agreed that a political solution to 
black problems was valid. Political strategy was a calculated approach to bettering living 
conditions, but more importantly, there needed to be a campaign movement that connected and 
familiarized Atlanta’s black masses to the local political process. 
The overwhelming sentiment amongst Atlanta’s black community of all classes translated 
into the same “powerlessness” mentioned in the Kerner Report.  Many blacks felt that the 
political process was not for them, yet in all fairness, Atlanta’s blacks had more influence in city 
politics than blacks in other southern cities.  In 1968, Atlanta’s black community comprised 45 
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percent of Atlanta’s population and one-third of the city’s registered voters.  In the 1961 race for 
mayor, Ivan Allen supported by blacks, outpolled segregationist and later Governor Lester 
Maddox 31,000 to 125 among black voters, a fact that provided Mayor Allan with his margin of 
victory.  To Atlanta’s black leadership, bloc voting was nonsense and many admitted to 
supporting a candidate that would serve their interest.113 This lends further credence to issues 
centered on class divisions and interests amongst black Atlantans. 
In 1965, black real estate mogul Q.V. Williamson became the first African American 
elected to the city’s board of aldermen since reconstruction.  He was also the second African 
American in the 20th century to win any city wide political race.  A result of this power of the 
vote, white politicians became more interested in the request of black leaders, but despite the 
advancements accomplished for black in Atlanta’s politics, there were also setbacks.  The black 
position in 1960s Atlanta politics underwent local growth progression since its early days.  Gone 
were the times when a single black leader could deliver the entire black vote alone, and, as such, 
white Atlanta had to reckon with the whole of black Atlanta, listening to the request of all facets 
of the masses.114 
As black voters gained more experience, their voting organization progressed from 
machine politics, where one man wielded power, to a democracy, where numbers of interest 
groups directed the vote.  This change forced politicians—both black and white—to spend more 
time courting the black vote and forced black Atlanta to recognize the detriments of the Atlanta 
style of interracial negotiation.  This thrust forced politicians to move out onto the “grassroots” 
level and campaign close to the people.  This movement shook black Atlanta to its core where a 
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chasm developed between Atlanta’s “in office” black leaders and their constituents.  What 
emerged was a new coalition called the Metropolitan Atlanta Summit Leadership Congress, 
which hoisted a new movement in black Atlanta politics as opposed to the Old Guard’s Atlanta 
Summit Leadership Conference.  The new coalition slowly replaced the Atlanta Summit 
Leadership Conference founded in 1964.  At that time it was the most powerful voice for Black 
Atlanta.   
Previously, all Atlanta black office holders were middle class representing the poor 
people living in the ghettos.  Middle class and old guard black leaders, such as Rev. William 
Holmes Borders, knew that his constituents called him Uncle Tom and replied, “I don’t give a 
cuss what they say. I can get things done.”115  Regardless, it was true that the younger leaders—
epitomized by the new Summit’s grassroots approach—were succeeding in wrestling control of 
political leadership from “Atlanta Style’s” old guard.  
A high point in the struggle came in the fall of 1967 when leaders of the old guard 
attempted to deal with the city without consulting all of the Summit member organizations.  A 
split occurred which indicated that the new Summit had gained more and more support.  This 
was viewed as part of the trend that de-centralized leadership amongst blacks. Upper class black 
leaders were accepted at City Hall. They went behind closed doors without consulting with the 
black masses and as such, those in the ghettoes became suspicious. The common sentiment 
amongst Atlanta’s black working class and poor was that regardless of leadership ability, 
Atlanta’s City Hall wanted black leaders with pedigree. Despite attention from city officials and 
the media, it was concluded that black militant leaders had little influence in Atlanta.  However, 
black politicians conceded that black militants had a major effect on black leaders because their 
presence forced them to be more militant. 
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One observation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was that 
almost all the urban rebellions sites of the summer of 1967 had governing councils elected 
through city-wide elections rather than by wards.  Thus, the report maintained, city-wide 
elections made black communities feel less influential in city affairs.  In Atlanta, it was apparent 
that ward elections—which were last held in the 1930s—could put more blacks on the 
aldermanic board.  This issue, therefore, took on racial implications.  In the 1968 General 
Assembly of the Georgia legislature, Julian Bond introduced a local bill that required ward 
elections for half of the city’s then 16 aldermen.  Black members of the legislature supported the 
measure.  Whites opposed it.  The bill was defeated handily. A white leader conceded that ward 
elections in Atlanta would be dangerous for white leaders.116  It was clear that despite divisions 
among local leaders within Atlanta’s black community and the superseding power of the white 
establishment, politics remained a meaningful way to solve some problems—not only for upper 
and middle classed blacks, but for poor blacks as well. 
Black participation in Atlanta politics forced the white establishment to reassess the 
estimation of black ability in government.  Furthermore, many black politicians felt that white 
politicians had to grapple with the possibility of black opposition, which would be well respected 
within the black community.  In 1968, an African American sat on the Atlanta board of 
Aldermen, there were many state representatives and two senators from Fulton County, and 
some black leaders felt that the possibility of a black mayor was not out of the question.  
Clarence Bacote, a former professor at Atlanta University and authority in black Atlanta politics, 
concluded that black participation in politics locally had altered the customs of this society.  
Bacote asserted that black men rarely, if ever, supported reactionary candidates, a fact that he felt 
significantly improved the quality of leadership in Atlanta.  Whites now faced blacks in direct 
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political competition and a more moderate white Atlanta community that would not easily give 
in to the Old South mentality.  Seeing blacks function in the legislature, in civic organizations, 
on the aldermanic board, on police committees, in government service, as firemen, postmen, and 
policemen—all of this made white Atlanta reexamine its relationship with the Atlanta’s black 
community.117 
 
On Education 
 
Between 1960 and September of 1967, the Atlanta Public School System gained 25,000 
black students while simultaneously losing 7000 white students.  This major shift was a result of 
white Atlanta’s refusal to share neighborhoods with blacks, pacing a mass exodus to the suburbs 
by Atlanta’s whites.  Whites moved out of the city as blacks moved in. Atlanta’s public housing 
crisis played a critical role to Atlanta’s white flight.  Often, a single black family could not afford 
rent alone, and as such, invited neighbors—and their children—to move in with them in hopes of 
getting their children in a better school environment.  A school that was adequate for a white 
neighborhood became half adequate for a black neighborhood.  The black schools were likely 
double in enrollment, and thus, in the eyes of school officials, Atlanta’s school problems became 
inextricably tied to housing.  Segregation in one; forced segregation in the other.  Fifteen 
previously all-white schools had gone all or almost all black since 1960.  In the turnover, most of 
them became overcrowded.118 
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The blame for this educational crisis rested on Atlanta’s refusal to desegregate its housing 
patterns.  In 1968, Atlanta had 10 high schools that were all black and two that were 
predominantly black.  Simultaneously, there was only one all-white high school, East Atlanta, 
and 11 others were predominantly white.  Dr. John Letson, Atlanta School Superintendent 
contended that there was nothing to prevent any child from attending any public school in 
Atlanta.  However, transportation difficulties, location of the homes, and the possible reception 
received from other students deterred many blacks from going across town to an all-white 
school.119  Educators estimated that if three out of ten students in a school were black, the school 
would go all black.  This concept was termed as the tipping point.  Steps to integrate the Atlanta 
School System were impeded by white flight.   
Another problem that hindered bringing Atlanta’s societies together was figuring out where new 
integrated schools would be located.  Neighborhoods located in “fringe” areas were felt places 
with the best chances to be integrated.  Often times, when a school was built in a fringe area, 
whites moved and the school would become all black.120    
As far as education within Atlanta’s black community, all students were given IQ test 
that purportedly showed results that paralleled their economic levels.  The Atlanta School 
System knew that IQ test were biased where middle class white children performed better and as 
such, this further complicated the placement for black children.  Dr. Darwin Womack, Assistant 
Superintendent of School Plant Planning and Construction for Atlanta schools, stated, “ghetto 
children came from homes where they never saw printed materials, books or magazines around 
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the house and that motivation was not a value of black ghetto children.”121  What is increasingly 
clear here is that, as liberal and progressive as Atlanta School officials were, they still held fast to 
ignorant stereotypes of poor blacks.  However, there were some tutorial programs such as the 
Vine City Foundation that provided one-on-one tutelage for poor blacks.  It offered 
compensatory educational programs at no expense and was not aimed as a problem of race and 
intelligence, but the sociological problems as it related to background and exposure, something 
that school officials attributed to class.  Atlanta’s black upper and middle classes far less utilized 
these programs, which tended to single out Atlanta’s black poor. 
From 1962-1968, $60 million was spent on school facilities in Atlanta.  It was reported 
that 70 percent of this had gone to the betterment of overwhelming black areas. An effort that 
increased teachers’ salaries, reduced the pupil-teacher ratio, created new programs, and built a 
new technical high school.  Nevertheless, between Atlantas societies, there was no equality.  Five 
of the six largest high schools in Atlanta were all-black.  Ten of the twenty-five high schools 
were overcrowded and six of these schools were predominantly black.  According to school 
board records, there were fewer special classes for students in predominantly black schools 
where there were no speech or hearing therapists.  However, the ten predominantly white high 
schools had special classes. In the 1967-68 academic year, predominantly black high schools 
averaged about $171 in expenditures per student.  Predominantly white schools averaged about 
$219 per student.   
Although black schools had the edge on white schools in average number of pupils per 
teacher with 18.9 in predominantly black schools as opposed to 19.1 in predominantly white, the 
average number of students per classroom was 28 in predominantly black schools and 27 in 
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predominantly white.122  What is suggested here is that predominantly white schools offered 
more classes than predominantly black schools. According to the Kerner Report, integration was 
the primary education strategy.  Though there were improvements, the issue of integrating 
schools in Atlanta became more evasive due to whites unwillingness to learn with blacks.   
Amid cries of black power that emerged in the 1960s, Atlanta, just as the rest of the black 
world, partook in a movement that emphasized racial consciousness and called for black political 
and cultural institutions to nurture and promote black collective interests, advance black values, 
and secure black autonomy. As such, blacks felt that one of the great tragedies in the American 
education system was the lack of African American history taught in schools.  The history of 
African Americans, in this country, was buried under centuries of white supremacy and 
hegemony and as such, blacks were forced to live in a country without some common knowledge 
of its past.  Before the black power movement, what was commonly taught in the history 
curriculum was that prior to the American Civil War, blacks were content with being slaves.  In 
Atlanta, the absence of the black American experience taught in the educational curriculum did 
not parallel the experiences of Atlanta’s black children due to white supremacy.   Yet as a result 
of desegregation, there were efforts to include black history through supplemental materials.  
Integrated books were used as early as 1963 in the Atlanta School System.  Interestingly enough, 
integrated books were used in all-black schools, whereas, predominantly white schools continued 
to use segregated texts.  This suggested that Atlanta’s school officials felt that adjusting to 
integration was a black problem, and as such, whites were more capable to adjust.  This notion is 
in total disagreement, contrary to the actual concept of white flight which perpetuates an 
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assimilationist pedagogy for blacks. However, it was noted that middle class black parents made 
a gallant effort to teach black heritage to their children in their homes.123 
 
On Employment and Economics 
 
Pervasive unemployment and underemployment were the most persistent and serious 
grievances in minority areas and inextricably linked to urban rebellions.    To poor black 
Atlantans, the idea of the American dream was not at all attainable and as such growing up in the 
other Atlanta, the same Atlanta that reared, educated and influenced Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 
blacks had almost given up on this dream. For those with little education, the Economic 
Opportunity of Atlanta program (EOA) was created to help the unemployed.  The EOA placed 
those looking for work with jobs.  There were those who connected unemployed blacks with 
loathsome stereotypes as individuals who were too lazy to work.  One EOA work stated “They 
live off each other, off women on welfare or on day labor.  When they do get a job, it is easier to 
drop back into the old habits that to get up and go to work every day.” 124  However, records 
indicate that many of Atlanta’s unemployed blacks lost jobs because they had not been 
forthcoming about prison records and were deemed untrustworthy. As such, the vast majority of 
Atlanta’s working class and poor blacks earnestly sought good jobs, worked hard at it and strove 
for higher position on the socio-economic ladder.  With the emergence of a new market due to a 
technology boom that required skilled labor, blacks with little formal education did not qualify 
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for these jobs and were forced to settle for jobs that did not pay them enough, forcing to live just 
above the poverty line with a threat of going below it. This is a major example of discrimination 
against blacks. 
In Atlanta’s business sector, blacks complained that business firms often hired only one 
or a very few token blacks as showcases of integration and progress.  Many felt as if these firms 
were not actually hiring black employees to work, but felt that these token blacks would attract 
black consumers.  What was also evident was that blacks were not treated equally when applying 
for jobs.  Being told that they were too educated for some jobs, which was another form of subtle 
discrimination, also worked against black college graduates.  Subject to unnecessary testing, 
discrimination manifested itself in ways that resembled literacy tests given to blacks going to 
vote before the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  An account from the Atlanta Urban 
League stated, “Studies have shown these tests are geared towards white society and most of 
them pick at your adaptability to white society, your interest in music, fine arts, travel.  In other 
words, your broadness.”125   
Statistics from the 1960s indicated that blacks in Atlanta had good reason for their 
complaints.  According the 1960 census, only 20 percent of the city’s black work force was 
employed by private industry as opposed to the 80 percent that worked for the government. The 
same census showed blacks as considerably under represented in every job category except as 
service workers, the lowest paying service jobs also being threatened with elimination.126  The 
employment trends from 1960-1970 showed that the demand for laborers dropped 13 percent 
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while white-collar clerical jobs increased over 40 percent.127  With this, programs such as the 
Merit Employment Association (MEA) were created that demonstrated how determination and 
education carved a place for blacks in the white dominant world of business and industry.  
Witnesses were students supported by the MEA that went to predominantly black high schools 
and talked about the need to attain “marketable skills where neither black power nor white power 
were the solution to our (America’s) problem, but ‘green power’ was.”128  Interestingly, though 
different from Atlanta’s street corner society, the witnesses were nonetheless a part of Atlanta’s 
two societies. 
In March of 1968, fifty Atlanta businessmen met for luncheon at the Stadium Club to 
discuss way to put “hard core unemployed” Atlantans to work.129  Interestingly enough, many of 
Atlanta’s businessmen were ignorant to the fact that Atlanta had so many unemployed which lent 
credence to the fact that there were indeed societal chasms that existed with little 
communication.  As a result of no communication, poor blacks distrusted white employers and 
white employers did not know where to find poor blacks.  An account from the Atlanta Urban 
League suggested that even though white employers advertised jobs, blacks often did not apply 
because they did not believe that they had a chance.  Simultaneously, white employers were 
grappling with hiring and promoting blacks as well as appeasing their long time white 
employees.  
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In order to bridge the employment gap, the local chapter of the National Alliance of 
Businessmen (NAB) announced the beginning of a job drive to help the city’s unemployed.  The 
leaders asked for the help and cooperation of the 50 businessmen at the meeting.  It marked the 
first time local business had taken any measures toward recognizing the problem.  The aim was 
to dismantle obstacles that existed between Atlanta’s societies when it came down to the 
category of jobs.  These obstacles included:   
1.  The applicant must be high school graduate  
2.  The applicant must be able to pass certain aptitude and intelligence test 
3.  The applicant must be over 21 
4.  The applicant must be under 50 
5.  The applicant must be male; applicant must be white 
6.  The applicant must not be physically handicapped. 
Importantly, the NAB businessmen pointed out that these qualifications often had little to do 
with the jobs that they were written for.130  
The NAB drive collected 1718 job pledges, 96 percent of it goal.  Salaries for jobs ranged 
from $1.60 minimum wage up to few at $3 an hour.  The next step was to actively recruit the 
jobless to take the jobs.  To ensure the campaign’s success, a unique approach was implemented 
where the employers went into Atlanta’s slums to recruit the unemployed.  As such, six rolling 
“job mobiles” circulated in the slums to lure potential workers.  The job mobiles, old buses 
donated by churches and individuals were designed to recruit people, transport them to available 
jobs, and insured that they were accepted and worked out successfully.   Former Georgia Labor 
Commissioner Sam Caldwell stated, “Many times, these people would be referred to a job, then 
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be screened out once they got there because of educational requirements prison records or 
something else.”131  The responsibility in making this program work lay with both the 
unemployed as well as the employer, but Atlanta businessmen realized that they had to make the 
first move.  The NAB local efforts demonstrated that progress could exist between Atlanta two 
societies in the category of jobs.  Not all of Atlanta businessmen cooperated. However, there was 
an attempt to establish contact between the two Atlantas.  
The aforementioned relationships between the economies the Atlantas, particularly 
between white fraudulent businessmen who exploited the black poor, were strained.  Poor blacks 
believed that white local merchants exploited them and evidence substantiated these beliefs.  
There were grocery stores in Atlanta that inflated its prices to coincide with the arrival of welfare 
checks. There was a deceptive business outfit known as “the blue suede shoe boys” threatened 
poor black homeowners with foreclosure and eviction unless home repair contracts were signed.  
There were door-to-door salesmen in Atlanta who sold $100 vacuum cleaners for $300, 
discounted the contracts to a finance company the next day and then disappeared.  There were 
loan companies in Atlanta that charged $108 interest on a one year $300 loan.  The same loan at 
a downtown bank cost $24.  There were grocery stores in Atlanta that charged tax on each item 
and then tax again on the total price.  There were poor blacks in Atlanta who had to buy at a 
higher priced grocery store because it was the only one in their ghetto and they had no car to take 
them out of the area to another store.  There were black people in Atlanta—and a few white—
conned or intimidated into buying overpriced items from fast talking door-to-door salesmen.  
There were black people in Atlanta—and some white who got into trouble because of too easy 
credit buying and poor money management.  In other cities, exploitation by white merchants was 
given as the reason for most of the fires in urban rebellions.   Evidence of this can be seen after 
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one store burned in one area of Atlanta following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 
residents in the neighborhood said the white store owner that shortchanged young children who 
would come into his store.132   
 There is evidence in Atlanta that supported the contention of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders that confirmed complaints of exploitation.  Legal aid handled 
4000 cases ever year where merchants filed lawsuits for money owed by poor blacks. In an 
astounding two-thirds of the cases, either the court ruled in favor of the defendant or the 
merchant dropped the charges after receiving a letter from legal aid.  More interestingly, only a 
small percentage of economically exploited black Atlantans ever sough help from qualified 
attorneys because most did not realize their exploitation.  One of the major financial problems 
weighing on poor blacks was readily available credit without qualification.  Lenders were not 
concerned with whether these people could pay because creditors were prone to blame consumer 
for not using better judgment.  It was estimated that 50 percent of profit in Atlanta stores was 
attributable to service charges and interest.133 
 
Housing 
 
Public housing was first enacted in Atlanta for those of all races.  However, in the 1960s, 
housing discrimination in Atlanta prevented access to many areas of quality living particularly 
the suburbs where quality housing existed.  Landlords created “back pressure” that made it 
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possible to break up apartments for denser occupancy while it kept rent of deteriorated ghetto 
housing higher than it would be in a truly free market.  In 1968, there were approximately thirty 
slumlords in Atlanta who rented to 50,000 occupants in ghetto areas.  Most of the slumlords were 
white while 75 percent of the renters were black.  There were between 17,000 and 19,000 units 
of sub-standard housing in Atlanta.  In addition, between 1000 and 1200 units were deemed 
dilapidated each year. Poor housing conditions for Atlanta’s blacks, was one of the major 
concerns for the city’s administration.  A housing shortage existed and the magnitude of the 
matter was believed to be equal to the number of sub-standard housing. Ironically in middle class 
white Atlanta, there was no housing shortage as proof can be seen in housing advertisement of 
the Sunday classified section of the Atlanta Journal, yet only a few of these housing units were 
open to poor Atlantans and even fewer were open to poor black Atlantans which showed the 
desperate need for public housing in the city. In January of 1968, then Mayor Ivan Allen set 
housing as his primary goal in his “State of the City Address.”134    
In 1967, Mayor Ivan Allen announced a drive to build 9,800 public housing units by the 
end of 1968 and 7,000 the following year.  This undertaking totaled about 1000 acres in land.  
However, the idea was hit with resistance by Atlanta’s white middle class communities, with the 
belief that public housing in their neighborhood ruined their communities.  This thwarted efforts 
to rid the city of slum communities, an issue supported by voters, yet these voters wanted no 
parts of the public housing community which was primarily black and poor.  Their sentiment was 
that the black poor should have decent housing but not in their neighborhoods.  When the city 
attempted to get land in southwest Atlanta’s Cascade Heights re-zoned for public housing, the 
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citizens in the area arose in indignation and defeated the motion saying that there was too much 
public housing in the area to begin with.  It should be noted that Southwest Atlanta has 
historically been an area where both blacks and whites lived.  However, what is not clear were 
black upper and middle class sentiments on this issue.135 
Southwest Atlanta had ten percent of the city’s public housing.  Documents show that the 
popular sentiment amongst city officials was that all public housing was being pumped to 
Atlanta’s 7th ward, Atlanta southwest side.  As such, City Hall struggled to find pieces of land for 
public housing that were agreeable to its neighbors, city planners, and the federal government 
who underwrote the cost of the housing.  There were 9029 units of low-rent public housing units 
where 32,000 Atlantans lived.  Another 140 units were under construction next to Perry Homes.  
In urban renewal areas, 82 units were occupied while 650 units were under construction.  
Another 4,550 low-rent public housing units were in the planning stage would be opened in the 
next 18 months.  That gave Atlanta 14,000 units.  The city would have had 90 percent of the 
housing goal of 9,800 units committed to construction in 1968 if land had been available when 
the program was started in 1966 as a result of the Model Cities Program of 1966.136  
Another aspect of the housing problem was concerned with the demolition of housing 
units as a result of urban renewal, which added pressure to existing housing issues.  From 1957–
1967, 21,000 units of housing totaling 67,000 people were demolished for expressway 
                                                 
135 Ibid. 
 
136 Ibid; see also President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized the Model Cities program on November 3, 1966 
by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and ended in 1974.  Model Cities 
originated in several concerns of the mid-1960s. Widespread urban violence, disillusionment with the Urban 
Renewal program, and bureaucratic difficulties in the first years of the War on Poverty led to calls for reform of 
federal programs. The Model Cities initiative created a new program at the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) intended to improve coordination of existing urban programs and provide additional funds for 
local plans. The program's initial goals emphasized comprehensive planning, involving not just rebuilding but also 
rehabilitation, social service delivery, and citizen participation. In 1969 Nixon administration changed course, and 
HUD retreated from insisting on citizen participation. 
 
 85 
construction, urban renewal, and other government projects.  Expressways were the greatest 
evictors, displacing 23,000 Atlantans.  Urban renewal—cynically referred to as “urban removal” 
by black Atlantans resulted in the destruction of 3,806 dwellings and displaced 17,000.  While 
the 21,000 units were being bulldozed, the city built only 5000 units of low rent low rent 
housing, affecting all poor people, both black and white.  In Atlanta, blacks comprised the 
overwhelming majority of the poor. Forty-two percent of Atlanta’s black paid less than $50 a 
month in rent while only 13 percent of white people did the same.  Additionally, white Atlanta 
would not rent or sell to black Atlantans.  Although new areas opened up to blacks as result of 
white flight to the suburbs—segregated housing became a glaring blight on the city as concluded 
in a study conducted by City Hall. According to another study done by City Hall, the index of 
housing segregation in Atlanta rose from 87.4 percent in 1940 to 91.5 percent in 1950 to 93.6 
percent in 1960, by 1970, there was total segregation. As such, these forces developed Atlanta’s 
ghettos where blacks were forced to live because housing was neither sold nor rented to them. In 
the 1960s, statistics showed that bathroom facilities were either missing, shared or not located in 
the same building in 1 out of every 8 black owned housing units as compared to one out of every 
80 white owned.137 
The 1967 Community Improvement Program reported that “a majority of the white 
community in Atlanta believed that all blacks were socially unacceptable.”  Consequently the 
report continued that members of the white community did not wish to have blacks moving into 
their neighborhoods.138  A report by the Southern Regional Council confirmed similar 
observations and added that more sophisticated whites sometimes tried to retain the prestige of 
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not living on the same streets as blacks by having their street’s name changed blanketed under 
the mask of urban renewal.  The reports concluded “this is why Hunter Road became Mozley 
Drive at Chappel Road, Boulevard became Monroe Drive at Ponce De Leon and Parkway turned 
to Charles Allen drive at Ponce de Leon.”139  What is noted is that Ponce de Leon was the 
historic marker that separated Atlanta’s downtown district from Buckhead, an all white affluent 
Atlanta neighborhood.  However, most whites threatened by housing integration fled to the 
suburbs.  As such, surrounding counties refused to build public housing units, thus adding to the 
flow of poor blacks to Atlanta. 
 In regards to white flight, white Atlantans, fearful of the social and economic implication 
of having black neighbors, moved to the suburbs by the thousands.  White flight was a trend best 
seen in the area of housing.  The city lost nearly 10,000 white people every year to suburbs.  At 
the same time, it gained an average of 4,000 blacks per year.  Though there were other factors 
involved—lack of land in the city and higher taxes—the majority of whites left because they did 
not want integrate.  As a result, the percentage of white people living inside the city dropped 61.7 
percent in 1960 to 55.2 percent in 1967.  The Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission 
(now the Atlanta Regional Commission) predicted that the city would be less that 50 percent 
white by 1972.  Despite residential movement outwards, whites kept their jobs that brought them 
to the inner city everyday.  More than two-thirds, approximately 89,000 people of the suburban 
communities worked in the city.  This group made up about one-third of the city’s total work 
force.  As such, white flight was a result of black social and physical mobility.140 
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Life in the Atlanta ghettoes was not altogether different than other cities.  Yet there was 
little to no contact between the two Atlantas.   What the Kerner Report stated about the ghetto 
was that “white institutions created it, white institutions maintained it, and white society 
condoned it.”141  As such, Atlanta was trying to fight its blight.  The problem to fix what was 
often deemed unrepairable communities with the city housing code did not erase Atlanta’s slums.  
The purpose for housing codes was not to eliminate slums but to stabilize good neighborhoods.  
One approach of ridding the city of slum blight was the use of housing codes to care 
improvements in its blighted areas.  In 1967, city officials found 752 violations and collected 
$48,000 in fines. By the end of 1969, Atlanta housing inspectors reviewed every housing unit 
deemed substandard in the 1960 census, a total of 40,000, in order to prevent a repeat of these 
housing units in the 1970 census count.  Of substandard housing in Atlanta, it was estimated that 
75 percent was rental and this fact, presented problems for the city because slumlords fought 
court orders for as long as a year.142 
Atlanta City Hall engaged in slum removal to a large extent, although much of it had 
been in the name of progress rather than improved housing.  During the 1960s, only three of 
twenty displaced Atlantans were moved out because their houses were substandard.  The rest had 
to leave because of governmental expansion—expressways, urban renewal, and school or airport 
construction.  
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Civil Unrest 
 
Many city governments were poorly organized to respond effectively to the needs of 
ghetto residents, even when these needs were made known to appropriate city officials.  As such, 
negligence on the part of local, state, and federal officials in the form of discrimination acted out 
through urban rebellions.  The Summerhill Riot took place in 1966 as a result of a black man 
being shot and killed by white police while resisting arrest.  The shooting was the boiling point 
between the city and residents of Summerhill, a poor black area.  However, the forces creating 
the rebellion were far greater than the killing of an African American, it was a sum total of 
numerous activities that created tension amongst Summerhill’s poor blacks and city hall.  In 
order to attract the Milwaukee Braves franchise to Atlanta, Mayor Ivan Allen and the Chamber 
of Commerce built a stadium on the edge of Summerhill in the Washington-Rawson 
neighborhood. Originally wealthy whites populated the neighborhood, however, it became a 
slum when affluent whites left the area for suburbs north of Atlanta after World War II; leaving 
the neighborhood in disrepair.   
In the late 1950s, Washington-Rawson was targeted as port of the city’s aggressive urban 
renewal plans:  part of the site was used to construct highway interchanges and overpasses for 
Interstate 20. Sixty-two acres remained undeveloped, and as the site fell between the commercial 
business district and Summerhill, Washington-Rawson was deemed a buffer zone.  By 1963, the 
Urban Renewal Administration warned the city that its use of such property for nonresidential 
purposes jeopardized future federal support.  In response, Allen proposed a white housing project 
in the area as a racial buffer, but black leaders insisted that suitable black housing in the area was 
a more pressing concern.  As such, Allen was caught between the white business elite, which did 
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not want black housing so close to the business district, and the city’s black community, whose 
support put Allen in office.  Thus, Washington-Rawson was, politically and geographically, an 
ideal site for the stadium.  Its construction fulfilled both a key campaign promise and provided a 
buffer between Summerhill and downtown. Its location was near a 32-lane highway interchanged 
close to downtown, which provided access. 
Residents in Summerhill were disgruntled with City Hall’s neglect in providing better 
services in the community.  A early as 1963, residents organized demonstrations and notified 
Allen of their demands for such services as street cleaning, health and educational facilities, 
better housing, and more employment opportunities.  By 1965, the Atlanta Constitution ran a 
series of articles that revealed the squalor in which some Atlantans lived and a subsequent study 
by the Community Council of the Atlanta Area (CCAA) revealed that expressway and stadium 
development crowded ten thousand people in toe 354 acres.  The CCAA stated that the 
prevailing attitudes were those of despair and hopelessness—and that Summerhill was ripe for 
violence.   As such, Mayor Allen attempted to increase city services to such poor neighborhoods, 
applied for federal housing aid for the communities, and hired a special assistant to advise him 
on these community improvements.  However, by the early summer of 1966 some of 
Summerhill’s residents had taken to the streets to protest the city’s failure to improve living 
conditions.143 
On September 6, 1966, just days shy of the 60-year marker of the Atlanta Race Riots; 
tensions sparked a rebellion due to the killing of black man fleeing arrest by white police.  
Sentiments of area residents were that this incident was another instance of police brutality by 
white officers; blight that long plagued the city.  An angry crowd gathered at the scene and 
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refused to obey police demands to disperse.  Stokely Carmichael, the chairman of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordination Committee (SNCC) went to Summerhill after learning about the 
shooting.  When Allen was informed of the incident and the uprising, he went to the scene 
hoping to restore peace. Allen found a crowd disgruntled and met with three leaders, 
encouraging them to bring the crowd to Capitol Street to the stadium.  Allen promised that the 
crowd could discuss their problems with him and elect delegates who could formally present 
their grievances to the Board of Aldermen.  The crowd, frustrated by the tragedy before them 
began to hurl bricks and bottles while SNCC representatives remarked that Allen promises were 
the “white man’s trick.”  As such, the crowd turned over police cars and set them aflame.  
Fearful of a massive riot if the violence spread to the community on the other side of the 
expressway, Allen ordered police to fire tear gas into the crowd.144 
According to Winston Grady-Willis, June 17, 1967 witnessed another uprising in the 
Dixie Hills community, an isolated West Atlanta neighborhood.  The incident stemmed from a 
melee between black youths and a black security guard at the Flamingo Grill, a shopping center 
restaurant with more than three hundred on lookers.  Ruffled by continuing problems of 
inadequate sanitation services and  the refusal to build playgrounds, concerned citizens organized 
a town hall meeting at the shopping center to discuss issues one day after the incident.  From 
this, the Dixie Hills’ concerned residents agreed to hold a protest rally on the following 
evening.145 
Grady-Willis also noted that on the following Monday, June 19, 1967, a black youth was 
shot and injured by the police while disabling a burglar alarm. The incident was the top agenda 
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item at the protest meeting held at Saint Joseph Baptist Church, attended by several black 
leaders, including Alderman Q.V. Williams and State Senator Leroy Johnson. Williams and 
Johnson encouraged the crowd of more than 200 to draft a petition listing their grievances.  
However, in the crowd were Stokely Carmichael, SNCC, and other grassroots organization 
members that embodied a more radical approach in dealing with grievances, and as such, the old 
guard black leaders were greeted with heckling, shouting, and being accused of being white.146 
Grady-Willis also notes that SNCC was represented by Carmichael, Donald Stone, and 
Ernest Stephens; activist that resided in Dixie Hills. Carmichael, wearing a Malcolm X shirt, 
encouraged residents “to take to the streets and force the police department to work until they fall 
in their tracks.” SNCC activists and Dixie Hill’s residents joined the meeting of over a thousand 
amidst the presence of nine police officers.  The officers fired warning shots in an effort to 
diffuse the escalating situation while citizens hurled bottles and rocks.  Heavily armed police 
reinforcements reestablished crowd but a great deal of damage had been done to patrol cars. 
According to historian Winston Grady-Willis, of the ten people arrested that night, six were 
under the age of twenty-one and police arrested Carmichael, Stone and Stephens for inciting a 
riot.147 
As electrically charged as the Summerhill uprising of 1966 and the Dixie Hills uprising in 
1967, the nation watched the city of Atlanta upon the death of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 
assassinated by a then unknown gunman on April 4, 1968.  King was Atlanta’s most beloved son 
and an international symbol of human rights and world peace.  His death reeked of racial 
overtones, concluding that his death was at the hands of either Central Intelligence Agency, the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, or white supremacist.  As such, it was expected that Atlanta 
would erupt with violence.  In honor of King, a half-million people walked five miles through 
the heart of Atlanta to mourn his death.  As Washington DC and Chicago burned, three racially 
charged nights past without one significant event in the Atlanta.  Mayor Allen Ivan attributed 
Atlanta’s civil reaction in wake of the King assassination to the city’s history and atmosphere of 
good race relations.  It is difficult to know or understand black Atlanta’s reaction.  Maybe the 
city was emotionally drained. 
A smart move on the part of Atlanta’s City Hall was that Mayor Allen and Police Chief 
Herbert Jenkins were among the first to reach the King home after the news arrived that King 
had been shot and killed.  Police immediately surrounded the homes of Dr. King and his parents, 
to ensure the safety of the families.  The mayor arranged a flight to Memphis for Coretta King 
when it was reported that her husband had died.  The official posture of the city was clear and 
city officials recognized immediately that the world, the nation, black America and Atlanta had 
lost a great leader.  With no room for insensitivity, every official and policeman of the city 
embodied this position.148 
The city accepted the responsibility because they knew that King’s funeral would not be 
an ordinary one.  Allen stated “We knew that the situation required that the city assume the 
responsibility over and beyond what the family and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference could accomplish.”  With this, the discipline and coordination that organized 
hundreds of peaceful protests, the SCLC and other volunteer civil rights groups organized Dr. 
King’s last march.  On neighborhood levels, meeting were quickly called by such groups as the 
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Pittsburgh Teen Town.  Plans of action were formulated, and within hours, volunteers were 
moving about their neighborhoods urging them to remain calm.     
On the day of King’s funeral and for the first time in the city’s history, every man in the 
Atlanta Police Department was working at the same time.  Some 875 policemen and 250 firm 
men were on duty.  What was increasingly important to understand was that a well-organized 
police department could not prevent a riot; it was the will of the people to be peaceful in paying 
their last respects to Dr. King.  Allen’s wanted to appease black Atlantans by showing a deep 
sense of reverence and respect for Martin Luther King Jr.149 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RACIAL SYMBOLISM AND ECONOMIC REALITIES: MAYNARD JACKSON AND 
THE BLACK NEW SOUTH 
 
All the players, all the hustlers. I'm talking about black man heaven, yah know what I'm saying? 
Peace!150 
 
 
 Atlanta is often the topic of discussions in terms of black political empowerment and 
electoral politics since the late 1960s.  The city’s black political experiences are central when 
assessing black political power in American cities, in general, and black political power in the 
post-Civil Rights American South, in particular. In analyzing the evolution of black political 
might in Atlanta, we must consider the recruitment of black leadership, voting behavior of 
ordinary citizens, both black and white, and the response of entrenched white economic and 
political leadership to the changing circumstances.  To contextualize black political might in 
Atlanta is to understand it as a power struggle between whites fighting to maintain their position 
of power and blacks fighting to escape this dominance.  As Blacks made advancements toward 
political control in Atlanta, counter forces are galvanized within the white community. 151 
 Political scientist Mack Jones noted that Robert Dahl’s argument on power called 
attention to the necessary distinction between the sources or bases of power and the actual 
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exercise of power.152  Often, literature on black political power noted the number of black voters 
and officeholders and implied that there was an automatic level of political power based on 
voting, holding office, favorable population distribution and economic wealth.  Jones, however, 
suggested that simple voting, having a black majority, or having black elected and appointed 
officials was not power; it was when these factors were used to manipulate the political behavior 
of others, particularly white individuals and groups that indicated power.  Therefore, any effort 
to assess political power of a black community should include conversations that entail the 
socioeconomic and political problems faced by that community, as well as logical policy 
alternatives for solving or ameliorating these problems, now popularly described as setting the 
black agenda. 153 
By the end of the 1960s, Atlanta, Georgia seemed poised as the quintessential southern 
city for progress.  Yet, Atlanta wore the scars brought on by the Summerhill rebellion of 1966, 
the Dixie Hills rebellion of 1967, and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968.  
Most notably, black Atlanta’s greatest acquisition in the 1960s came from voting.  Virginia Hein 
notes that due to the fact that there was little resistance in registering and little retribution 
towards Atlanta’s black voters by whites, black voting registration grew from 41,000 (28.6 
percent) in 1961 to 93,000 (44.8 percent in 1969. By 1968, Atlanta’s black communities made up 
45 percent of Atlanta’s population and one-third of the city’s registered voters.154  
 The strength of Atlanta’s black vote claimed victories and gained momentum as the 
1960s ended. For white politicians, black bloc voting complicated their futures and forced them 
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to reckon with black grassroots leaders.  Black political prowess in 1960s Atlanta, as elsewhere, 
transformed from an entity where one charismatic black leader delivered the entire black vote to 
forcing white Atlanta to listen to the requests of all facets of the black masses.155  This shift 
compelled politicians—both black and white—to court the black vote and forced elected officials 
and their challengers to campaign amongst the people.  Hence, emerged a new coalition emerged 
called the Metropolitan Atlanta Summit Leadership Congress that galvanized a new era in black 
Atlanta politics as opposed the Old Guard’s Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference, founded in 
1964.  
 Atlanta’s changing demographic prompted white political figures to grapple with the real 
possibility of black opposition from Atlanta’s highly developed black community.  In 1968, one 
African American sat on the Atlanta Board of Aldermen, two state senators from Fulton County 
graced the Georgia Assembly, and the probability of a black mayor seemed reachable.  The year 
1968 proved to be a watershed moment. Following the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy in April and June of 1968 respectively, attorney Maynard Holbrook 
Jackson Jr. quit his job and borrowed enough money to pay the qualifying fee on the last possible 
day and started what was deemed as a quixotic race for the U.S. senate challenging Herman 
Talmadge, a vestige of plantation politics that served as a negative marker of the old South.   
In June of 1968, Jackson challenged segregationist Herman Talmadge, the unchallenged 
symbol of the old South, for his seat in the U.S. Senate.  In Georgia’s history, few whites and no 
African Americans ever thought of challenging a Talmadge. According to Gary Pomerantz in 
regards to Jackson’s perception of the Senator, Talmadge embodied the best and worst of what 
the South had to offer; he had savoir-faire and pedigree, yet used both to keep blacks in 
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economic bondage and political segregation.156  Talmadge defeated Jackson and kept his seat in 
the Senate.  However, Jackson, young and unknown, became a force to be reckoned with, 
carrying Atlanta by a majority of six thousand votes.   This notoriety set the pace for Maynard 
Jackson Jr. storied political career and marked Atlanta as a city noted for Black political 
progress. 
Jackson was born in Dallas, Texas on March 23, 1938 to Rev. Dr. Maynard H. Jackson 
Sr. and Irene Dobbs Jackson.    At the age of seven, his family moved to Atlanta, where his 
father became pastor of Friendship Baptist Church. Jackson came from a family that stressed 
education and was a fifth generation Georgian.  His mother had a Ph.D. degree in French from 
the University of Toulouse in France.  Her five sisters—including internationally acclaimed 
opera singer Mattiwilda Dobbs—all had Master’s degrees.  Jackson’s four sisters had college 
degrees, one working on a Ph.D. His father’s church was the birthplace of Atlanta University and 
Spelman College and the home of Morehouse College when it moved its campus from Augusta. 
Jackson’s great-grand-father—Andrew Jackson—founded Atlanta’s Wheat Street Baptist 
Church.  His maternal grandfather—John Wesley Dobbs—was the grand master of the Prince 
Hall Masons of Georgia and founder of the Georgia Voters League. He was deemed also the 
“Unofficial Mayor of Sweet Auburn Avenue, one of black Atlanta’s business thoroughfares. 
Dobbs, as the endowment secretary for Morehouse College, also raised the first $1 million for 
the college. 157 
As a Ford Foundation Early Admission Scholar, Jackson graduated from Morehouse 
College at age 18, with a B.A. in Political Science and History.  He later earned the Juris Doctor 
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(cum laude) from North Carolina Central University School of Law, where he served as the 
president of the Student Bar Association and captain of the school’s national moot court team, 
which shared first-place regional honors with the University of Virginia law school.  Between 
graduation from Morehouse College and entering law school, Jackson was a claims examiner for 
a year and a half and an assistant district sales manager for a national publication firm where he 
was one of the top salesmen. After law school, Jackson practiced law with the National Labor 
Relations Board, which offered legal services to low-income Atlantans.  In 1968, Jackson left the 
National Labor Relations Board and joined the Emory Community Legal Service Center, which 
provided legal aid for persons unable to afford it.  He developed an interest in the representation 
of poor people with a special interest in housing.  Most notably in this position, Jackson filed 
cases against the DeKalb and Atlanta Housing authorities restraining them from evicting indigent 
tenants from public housing projects for two reasons: 
1. On the grounds they have a right to a hearing before eviction. 
2. On the grounds that Georgia’s so—called “double bond” law was unconstitutional 
because it requires that people evicted must post bond equal to double their rent for a 
period of time—which means poor people can’t fight eviction. 
 
Jackson later helped to found Jackson, Patterson, Parks and Franklin law firm.158 
 In 1968, Jackson’s campaign for the U.S. senate was deemed to be more foolish than it 
was met with resistance. At that time, Edward Brooke of Massachusetts was the only African 
American serving in the U.S. senate.  Jackson had entered the senate campaign on impulse, and 
had not consulted with black leaders in Atlanta.  In his haste or naiveté, Jackson was sure of 
support from black Atlanta’s leadership; however, his loss indicated that much of black Atlanta’s 
old guard supported Talmadge. The fact that Atlanta’s old guard supported a staunch 
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segregationists like Talmadge proves that the Senator had strong ties within the black 
community.  In private, Talmadge did personal favors for them in return for their vote.  
Nevertheless, poorer blacks were not privy to these favors.  This further proves Tomiko Brown-
Nagin’s notion of “Atlanta style politics of bi-racial negotiation.”159 
 In 1969, four candidates ran in Atlanta’s mayoral race.  Rodney Cook, head of an 
insurance agency, was a self-proclaimed white-Anglo-Saxon protestant republican backed by 
Atlanta’s business establishment, including the endorsement of Atlanta Newspapers Inc.  Sam 
Massell, the two-term Vice-Mayor under Ivan Allen, was a wealthy Jewish realtor and Democrat 
credited with establishing a Community Relations Commission, which divvied up an over-sized 
ward to allow more black representation and pushed for equal employment and City services.  In 
his 1965 Vice-mayoral campaign, Massell amassed seventy-two percent of the citywide vote.  G. 
Everett Millican was a 72 year-old alderman that embodied his slogan calling for “Law and 
Order with Justice.”  Millican spanned generations and was considered to be liberal.  In 1954, he 
was one of two members of the Board of Regents to vote against closing Georgia schools, a 
stance in which he was proud. When hippies and policemen violently clashed in Piedmont Park 
ten days before the election in 1968, Millican consciously disapproved of the explosive situation.  
Lastly, Dr. Horace E. Tate became the first African American to seek the office of Mayor in 
Atlanta.  Tate was a former schoolteacher and principal that had earned a bachelors degree from 
Fort Valley State College, master’s degree from Atlanta University, and a doctorate in education 
from the University of Kentucky.  He held a seat on the Atlanta School Board.  He later served 
as the Director of the National Education Association and was elected to the Georgia State senate 
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in 1974.160  Tate’s run for mayor foreshadowed the tensions that would emerge during Jackson’s 
later campaigns.  His experience is worth considerable attention. 
Tate’s campaign slogan was “Now is the Time!” and his campaign asserted, “A vote for 
Tate will give Atlanta a new image and a new thrust.”  If elected as Mayor, Tate promised: 
1. An involvement of all citizens in seeking better racial relations. 
2. A quality educational program for all pupils. 
3. Fair and equal employment policy. 
4. Decent, adequate and open housing. 
5. Strong and strongly enforced housing code. 
6. Equal order and equal law. 
7. Living wage for City employees. 
8. Elimination of police brutality. 
9. Uniform and equal services-City wide 
10.  A good system of transportation. 
11.  Atlanta to become the Convention Center of the South. 
12.   Atlanta to become the International Airport of the South.161 
His political participation included working for the passage of statewide legislation designed to 
benefit parents, teachers and students of Georgia.  Tate appeared before numerous legislative 
committees to speak in favor of progressive legislation.  He accompanied citizens to Aldermanic 
meetings to aid them in securing their rights as Atlanta citizens. Lastly, Tate directed Voter 
Registration Campaigns and participated in political clinics designed to acquaint him with 
problems in government. 
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 Atlanta’s black leadership refused to support Rodney Cook, the candidate for mayor 
endorsed by the white business elite, and instead supported Sam Massell. It was widely believed 
that the only reason for Massell’s  lack of support by the white civic and business elite was due 
to anti-Semitism.  For a black endorsement, Horace Tate was a very capable mayoral candidate.  
However, like Jackson’s run for the U.S. Senate, his candidacy was met with great resistance 
from black Atlanta’s leadership.  As Tate entered the race, there were charges from other black 
leaders that he had betrayed them by announcing his bid before they decided whether it was time 
for a black mayor, and more important, whether he was the right candidate to break  the mayoral 
color barrier.  Black old guard powers resented new movements towards power and did all that 
they could to quell Tate’s run.  This meant endorsements of Sam Massell from Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Sr. and black state senator Leroy Johnson.  Although the Southern Christian Leadership 
Coalition’s Reverend Ralph Abernathy, Coretta King and Julian Bond endorsed Tate, as well as 
Jesse Jackson, activists Hosea Williams and Reverend Joseph Boone, these endorsements came 
in the eleventh hour and were less than enthusiastic.  However, what was clear was that Tate was 
eager to serve the poor, the hungry, the needy, and the uneducated. Black Atlanta’s leadership 
was more concerned with electability and in the closing weeks of the campaign, Sam Massell 
made that his platform. Massell acquired forty to forty-five percent of the black vote.  On 
October 7, 1969, only 46 percent of Atlanta’s eligible voters turned out on a clear, cool, autumn 
day.    Massell won the election and became Atlanta’s first Jewish mayor by receiving 29,971 
(31.1 percent) of the votes; Rodney Cook received 25,830 (26.8 percent); Horace Tate received 
22,193 (23.1 percent); and G. Everett Millican received 17, 481 (18.2 percent).162  
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 Gary Pomerantz notes that for the position of Atlanta’s Vice Mayor, it was widely 
believed that two African Americans, state Senator Leroy Johnson and Vernon Jordan of the 
Southern Regional Council, would run, pushing Maynard Jackson Jr. to seek a spot on the 
aldermanic board.  However, Jackson had his own ambitions and discretely laid  the foundation 
for his emergence in Atlanta’s city politics by forming a skeletal campaign organization.  He 
proved that he could win votes in his run against Herman Talmadge.  On March 7, 1969, Jackson 
announced his candidacy for vice mayor of Atlanta at the famous Paschal’s restaurant, in 
Atlanta’s West End.  The Vice Mayoral position provided segues for the 1973 mayoral race. As 
Jackson announced his candidacy, Atlanta’s black leaders were gathered at the Hyatt Regency to 
hear M. Carl Holman of the National Urban Coalition speak about establishing a local branch in 
Atlanta.  Holman was the former deputy director of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and 
former Atlanta Inquirer editor, and gained the attention of Atlanta’s black leadership.  While 
meeting with Holman, black leaders seethed at Jackson’s bravado.  According to Pomerantz, he 
was running for the second time in a year without consulting them and many vowed not to 
support him.  In prior years, the Atlanta Negro Voter’s League (ANVL) ran by John Wesley 
Dobbs, Jackson’s grandfather, and Attorney Austin T. Walden determined which candidates the 
black voters supported.  However, Walden’s death in 1965, along with the growing number and 
independence of black candidates, reduced the ANVL’s influence.163  More important were the 
shifts in legacies left by Dobbs and Walden through the ANVL.   
According to Pomerantz, the power of the ANVL in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s shifted and 
left a very capable Maynard Jackson out of circles with black Atlanta’s power brokers.  
Consequently, Jackson campaigned as a maverick.  He believed that his future in politics would 
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not fare well at the behest of Atlanta’s black elite.  He did consult with a group of black ministers 
that knew his father; however, he never consulted with the ANVL and as such, Atlanta’s black 
leadership felt disrespected164 
 Pomerantz asserts that in 1969, the ANVL leadership comprised of Warren Cochrane of 
the Butler Street YMCA, a YMCA founded in 1894 for African Americans and located near 
historic Auburn Avenue; Reverend William Holmes Borders of Wheat Street Baptist Church; 
Jesse Hill, Chairman of Atlanta Life Insurance; Georgia state senator Leroy Johnson; architect 
Herman Russell; activist Mrs. Johnnie Yancey; Alderman Q.V. Williamson, and Lonnie King of 
the Atlanta NAACP chapter.  It was clear that Atlanta’s black leadership was not interested in 
forming a local branch of the National Urban Coalition, an urban advocacy organization created 
to bridge cultural and racial divides in American cities.  The ANVL leadership felt that it was 
now time to assert black political power, and the consensus was that it was not the right time for 
a black candidate to run for mayor or vice mayor.  Vernon Jordan, an Atlanta native and of the 
Southern Regional Commission, was viewed by the ANVL as the ideal black candidate for 
political office.  Yet, he decided not to run for mayor or the congressional seat for Atlanta’s Fifth 
District held by Republican Fletcher Thompson.  Nationally, black political figures such as Carl 
Stokes of Cleveland and Richard Hatcher of Gary, Indiana had both been elected mayors in 
1967.  Former policeman and City councilman Tom Bradley had a strong showing in Los 
Angeles.   In Atlanta, state senator Leroy Johnson had decided not to run.  According to 
Pomerantz, Johnson, the son of an Atlanta mortician was a protégé of A.T. Walden and was the 
first black legislator elected in Georgia since Reconstruction.  Clearly, if there were to be a black 
candidate to run in 1969, Atlanta’s black leadership preferred Vernon Jordan or Leroy Johnson. 
To Atlanta’s black leadership, Leroy Johnson was electable.  With Walden’s help, Johnson 
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became the first black prosecutor hired in Fulton County, Georgia and was capable of delivering 
large blocs of black votes in City, county and statewide elections. Feeling entitled to a black 
candidacy as mayor, Johnson felt that when the time was right to run for mayor of Atlanta, he 
had earned the right to be that man or would broker the person that would be.165 
 Like Massell, Maynard Jackson was elected Vice Mayor of Atlanta with a healthy 
majority of votes cast October 7, 1969.  At the age of 31, the young attorney pushed ahead of 
white Gulf Oil vice president Milton Farris, as well as candidates H.J. “Jack” Carson and Jacob 
Davis. Victory came as no surprise as most of Jackson’s staff predicted that he would carry 
anywhere from 56-59 percent of the vote.  Polls show that Jackson actually carried 58 percent, as 
opposed to Farris, who carried 38.9 percent; Carson carried 1.94 percent; and Davis carried .78 
percent.    Jackson received one-third of the vote in predominantly white areas. 
On January 5, 1970, Maynard Jackson Jr. was sworn in as Vice Mayor of Atlanta. He 
pledged to make the vice mayor’s office the “voice of the people” and developed an extensive 
chain of communications between government and constituents.  He worked for a City 
ombudsman with subpoena power and established a civic organization-sponsored complaint 
office.  On the day after his election, he immediately pushed for the publication of aldermen’s 
vote on important issues. Jackson’s election was a victory for Atlanta’s increasing black 
population, but blacks could not take full credit.  A deciding factor was the percentage of votes 
that Jackson acquired in predominantly white precincts.  He received votes in almost every 
predominantly white precinct.  For example, in one precinct where there was one black voter, 
Jackson received 40 percent of that precinct’s vote.  In predominantly black precincts, Jackson 
                                                 
165 Ibid. 
 105 
had overwhelming success, getting an average of 96 percent of the vote.  He had broad based 
supporters; young and old; rich and poor; black and white. 166 
On March 16, 1970, shortly after the election of Massell and Jackson, members of the 
City employees union voted to take Tuesday, March 17 off to demonstrate against the City’s 
inaction in granting them pay raises.  City employees vowed to remain off their jobs unless the 
City acted.  The 2,000 City workers affiliated with the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) were urged to take part in the “holiday” and union officials 
hinted at a protracted strike and a march on City Hall.  The strike vote came after a union request 
for a pay raise for all 8,000 City workers was rejected.  From the onset, Massell argued that pay 
raises were not attainable unless the City was given the funds from the Georgia General 
Assembly. The strike vote was taken hours after the full Board of Aldermen rejected a union 
request for a one-step across the board pay increase that would boost each City employees’ 
annual salary by an average of $300. A pay raise for City workers would cost the City $2.5 
million. 167   The members of the AFSCME demanded:  
1. “That the minimum wage for employees of the City of Atlanta be increased to 
from $1.67 per hour to $2.13 per hour effective on the first pay period following 
the next regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen. 
 
2. That each City employee be provided $5,000 of life insurance coverage free of 
cost to the employee within [their] present insurance plan, replacing the premium 
contribution made by the employee toward $2,500 coverage, to be made effective 
on or around July 1, 1970. 
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3. That all employees absent without official leave on this date will return to work 
at the next regular work day without pay for time absent during the work 
stoppage.”168 
 
By March 18, members of the City employees union voted to reject city wage offers and 
extend their “holiday” into a full-fledged strike.  At City Hall, Massell commented “City 
government must prepare itself to operate over an undetermined period of time with minimal 
sanitation service supplemented by contracted workers for commercial firms.”169  However, what 
was most important was the quagmire, that later became a showdown between the AFSCME and 
Sam Massell.   Unlike President Nixon, Massell decided to take on the union for leading an 
illegal strike.  According to labor historian Joseph McCartin, Massell, early on, threatened to fire 
strikers if they did not end their work stoppage.  When they rebuffed, he sanctioned 1,400 
dismissal notices, drawing him vehement disproval from civic groups and churches.  Leading the 
criticism of Massell were civil rights activists defending black strikers who insisted that the 
mayor “find some way to solve the problem short of tearing the City asunder.” 170 Jackson 
attacked Massell, calling the sanitation workers’ wages “a disgrace before God” and insisted that 
the mayor negotiate.  Massell backed down under this pressure. On April 22, after thirty-seven 
days of striking, Massell rehired strikers and gave them a 4.3 percent pay raise.  Later, most 
analysts agreed that Jackson played a key role in blocking Massell’s bid to replace the 
workers.171 
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Within the first 100 days of the administration, it was clear that Massell and Jackson were 
destined to be adversaries.  Pomerantz notes that Jackson immediately, tried to force himself into 
negotiations with the striking city sanitation workers.  He recommended binding arbitration, 
mediation, and lastly suggested an independent fact finder to help settle the strike, but the city 
rejected each.  Jackson was convinced that the strike could be settled in a matter of days. 172  He 
prided himself on being a man of the people.  Because the majority of Atlanta’s sanitation 
workers were black, Jackson, saw a place where he could assert the will of his constituency.  
However, this situation provides back drop that would resurface later in his mayoral tenure. 
Maynard Jackson had a propensity for making headlines.  In May of 1970, he called for 
city department heads charged with racism to prove their innocence or face firing.  He also 
charged the city hiring practices with discrimination.  From this, Massell was convinced that 
every political move Jackson made was for the sole purpose of benefiting blacks.  In a speech 
given at the Butler Street YMCA and with a semblance to Booker T. Washington’s Atlanta 
Compromise in 1895, Massell warned black Atlantans that their preoccupation with gaining 
political control of Atlanta could ruin the city.  Massell stated “the word around town is that you 
and I…..the black and white liberal leadership of Atlanta, are committed to Atlanta becoming an 
all black City….what a terribly confined and costly ambition that would represent.”  Massell 
cited Newark, New Jersey as a city with similar trends as to what Atlanta could become if white 
middle class families continued to leave the city and poverty stricken blacks continued to take 
their place. With a declining tax base, Atlanta’s next move was to annex neighboring 
municipalities.   Massell urged blacks to “think white,” to make the City more attractive to 
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encourage white families to remain in the City.173 It was clear that Massell was desperate and his 
vice mayor gave him no consolation.  Jackson condemned Massell for his antics and indifference 
towards poor blacks, a good portion of black Atlantans.174 
According to Pomerantz, the Metro Atlanta Rapid Train Authority (MARTA) referendum 
passed in Fulton and DeKalb counties in 1971, but only after hard dealings and black leaders 
received certain assurances.  Of these assurances were better services in black areas and a 
promise that affirmative action programs, compliant with federal guidelines would be applied to 
MARTA hires and contracts.  During the 1972-73 school year, Atlanta’s NAACP branch 
president and former sit-in leader Lonnie King negotiated with white leaders to relinquish his 
demand for broad scale busing in the City in return for an extraordinary desegregation of the City 
school system’s administrative staff, including the appointment of Atlanta first black 
superintendent.  To blacks, King’s deal undermined the NAACP’s mission, and as such, they 
removed him from his post.  Whites comprised only 23 percent of the City’s student population 
and forced busing diminished that number even more.175  The rising power and influence of 
Atlanta’s highly developed black middle class was evident in all of these political negotiations, 
including the mayoral showdown between Sam Massell and Maynard Jackson Jr. that would take 
place in 1973. 
In a speech given on March 28, 1973 from the Aldermanic Chamber at Atlanta’s City 
Hall, Maynard Jackson announced his candidacy to run for Mayor of Atlanta. In his own press 
conference, Jackson stated, 
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I repeat now what I said four years ago when I declared my candidacy for the 
office of vice mayor—the people of Atlanta will speak again this year and I 
consider the office for which I am running a challenge which I am honored to 
accept.  As your vice mayor, I have stood in this historic chamber countless times 
before.  I have worked here to forge honorable policies of progress and a better 
life. 
 
I have come to my decision, in large part, because so many of you have urged me 
to run, so many of you who come from all walks of life, who come from every 
corner of our great City, and who represent every racial, religious, economic and 
age group. 
 
My decision comes, also, because I have listened attentively as you have kept me 
informed of your profound concerns and anxieties about the quality of life in our 
City.  You have continually called to my attention the need to restore confidence 
in government in Atlanta. You have impressed upon me with fierce urgency the 
need to bring honesty back to government, and you have firmly stated the need to 
re-establish responsive government so as to render those basic City services 
which are so necessary to the public. 
 
I have listened to many thousands of you as I have walked the street of Atlanta, 
attended your meetings, appeared at schools and churches and visited you homes 
and your places of business and labor.  I promise to keep listening to you as I 
campaign. I have agreed with much of what you have brought to my attention.  I 
have tried to honor your communications to my by articulating your hurts and 
your hopes.  I shall continue to do so.176 
 
Simultaneously, most of Atlanta’s black leadership, privately annoyed by Jackson’s non-
conformist personality, endorsed Sam Massell for a second term as mayor.  Massell’s deal with 
Atlanta’s black leadership was that he would step aside and make way for a black mayor in 1977.  
Jackson was unwilling to wait for this moment and felt that it brought negative attention to his 
cause.177  However, Jackson’s candidacy announcement lent credence to his grassroots base, 
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comprised of young and old; rich and poor; black and white.  Jackson’s interaction with all 
Atlantans threatened the old guard’s style of elite interracial negotiations.178   
 Jackson had studied Atlanta’s changing demographics that faired in his favor.  According to 
Pomerantz, Atlanta’s reputation as a Mecca of opportunity attracted young, ambitious, and 
educated blacks to the City. With white flight at an all-time high nationwide, Atlanta’s black 
population grew from 38 percent in 1960, to 45 percent in 1968, to 54 percent in 1973.  Thus, 
Maynard Jackson declared Atlanta to be the best City in America for black people to live.  He 
was fully aware of the fact that black voting strength in the City had reached 48 percent and was 
still rising.179 
 
A Black New South 
 
To Jackson, Atlanta’s changing demographics were evident with a nation-wide trend that 
affected the whole South through the reverse migration of blacks from the urban North, Midwest, 
and West back to a black new South.180  Black migration from the South to the North started 
after the Civil War and heightened during World War I as floods and the boll weevil devastated 
southern farming and the northern industrialization attracted black workers. Indeed the greatest 
out migration of the Blacks from the South to the North occurred in the 1960s.  By the 1970s, 
Atlanta had become symbolic of a black new South and a land of opportunity for blacks as seen 
in Atlanta, where entrepreneurship and political ambitions flourished.  According to the 1971 
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U.S. Census projection, 108,000 blacks left other parts of the country to settle in the black new 
South in 1971, up from 97,000 in 1970.  Studies showed that between the years of 1970-1973, 
247,000 blacks moved to the South where 166,000 moved out of the South during the same 
period.  This indicated the major shift where many people returning were either born or reared in 
the South.  However, about one-third of them had never lived in the South before.181 
 By and large, most blacks returning to the black new South were young professionals 
moving to larger urban areas in the South such as Atlanta, Nashville, Memphis, and 
Birmingham. For the most part, returning blacks did not perceive the South as an idyllic 
promised land free of racial strife, crime and other social ills, even though Atlanta had a different 
image.  However, there were two major factors responsible for the South’s new attractiveness.  
First, there was a growing disenchantment with the North’s social ills; second, blacks noticed 
changes in the South’s social climate as civil rights legislation knocked down the rigid racial 
policies that marked the racial subordination of the Old South.  In 1974, there were nearly two 
thousand black elected officials across the South, including a number of black mayors. 182 Thus, 
underneath the popular image of a Black New South lay concrete evidence of changes in civil 
and political rights. 
 Despite the South’s remaining racial problems such as de facto racial prejudices, blacks 
still regarded it as a “last frontier,” a place of hope in contrast to the gloomy despair of the urban 
North.  To many northern blacks, a black new South City such as Atlanta offered more in terms 
of private entrepreneurship and the possibility of equal government services.  There was a 
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healthier belief about survival coupled with a lived experience that the urban North was not the 
“promised land” that it once had been for blacks seeking refuge from Jim Crow.183 
 For southern-born or educated black intellectuals, a primary reason for returning to the 
South was to reverse a trend known as the “black brain drain” that occurred as a result of 
segregation.  Before blacks were allowed to attend or be employed at state supported and 
traditionally white institutions of higher learning, large northern universities hired away top 
faculty from the southern historically black colleges.  For many, teaching in the North and the 
West was abstract, and many wanted to put theory in practice. In the early 1970s, there was a 
widespread belief that the South was changing more rapidly than the North and that Atlanta was 
the best place to live for a person of any race. 184 Also, state supported and traditionally white 
institutions of higher learning had integrated, taking some of the highest performing students 
from black institutions.  Because good black professors attracted good black students, a move to 
preserve the tradition and history of historically black colleges was underway. 
 Clearly, a black new South was the best place for black economic development.  The 
frustrating truth about politics and economics in the North was that the formation of black 
political power was mostly symbolic because economic power was not its foundation.  In the 
North, there were structured constraints on the creativity and opportunities of black business 
owners.  They were usually allowed to enter service kinds of operations relative to what was 
already established.  It was difficult to attain land, the foundation to economic development in 
the North, because there was very little of it.  With black land ownership in the South and the 
opportunities to broaden it, Atlanta seemed a place where blacks could get in at the ground level 
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relative to business and economic development, which was impossible to do in New York and 
Chicago.  In 1950, blacks owned or partly owned more than 12 million acres of land in the 
South, but by 1964, this was down to 7.2 million acres, a 40 percent decline. The Emergency 
Land Fund was organized for the specific purpose to address the problem of declining black land 
ownership and for providing assistance to those who wanted to remain on their land.185   
Atlanta had always had it share of college students from the North and West, many were 
the children of alumni, but the number of northern born black students steadily increased.  Many 
stayed in the city after finishing college, which added to black reverse migration movement to 
the South.  Of these transplants, many found it comforting that they were able to operate in black 
institutions, not only colleges, but also other kinds of black owned and affiliated ventures.  
Atlanta was also the site for rapid industrial expansion that created jobs for the whole region and 
opened employment opportunities to blacks.  
 A convincing measure to prove the viability for Jackson’s campaign, according to 
Pomerantz, was a meeting held in 1972 with his cousin Bill Clement Jr., a Wharton Business 
school graduate and stock broker; his new law partner David Franklin, and Chuck Williams, a 
builder of a black public relations firm in Atlanta.  Together, the foursome discussed campaign 
strategies that would make political history.  Franklin became the key strategist.  An 
entertainment lawyer, Franklin’s political experience had amounted to grassroots campaign 
organizing. 186 In 1961, he helped to establish a Muggsy Smith student group that led a race 
against Ivan Allen Jr.  In 1965, he helped Julian Bond win a seat in the Georgia Legislature.  As 
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part of his work for the National Urban Coalition, Franklin helped with the 1967 Carl Stokes’ 
mayoral victory in Cleveland.187 
 What some deemed as maturation since his 1968 run for the U.S. Senate, Jackson, for the 
first time in three campaigns, solicited support from Atlanta’s black leadership during the 1973 
election.  Jackson knew that in order to win this race, he needed the help of black Atlanta’s old 
guard.  Initially he was met with the same resistance that he endured in the past, particularly 
from Jesse Hill.  Pomerantz notes that in order to galvanize the vote, Jackson needed to coax Hill 
for an endorsement.  Hill had been a key figure in the 1972 campaign when Andrew Young 
campaigned in a redrawn district and became the first black congressman from the Deep South 
since Reconstruction.  Young’s victory spoke to Hill’s political clout amongst Atlanta’s black 
leadership.  Hill’s endorsement lent credibility, money and votes.188 
 Hill was not captivated with Jackson’s plans to run for mayor and thought that 1977 was a better 
time for a black mayor in Atlanta.  Twelve years senior to Jackson, it was evident that there was a 
generational gap between the two.  Hill was entrenched in black Atlanta and felt that a black mayor would 
upset plan for black political progress.  However, Pomerantz asserts that Jackson’s sentiments were that 
Hill embodied an old mentality that took handouts from the white power structure at the cost of black 
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political power.  Jackson thought that blacks should assert themselves, shoulder responsibility, and work 
for coalitions with whites.  Jackson’s campaign threatened Hill and the elite black power structure.189 
 Noting Jackson’s popularity amongst all of Atlanta’s voters, key strategist David Franklin 
commissioned a survey of 618 voters, which consisted of 400 white and 218 blacks.  The results of the 
survey indicated that in a field of six possible candidates, Jackson would receive 45 percent of the votes, 
more than double that of runner-up Sam Massell.  Also, the poll showed that in a nose-to-nose election, 
Jackson would receive 54 percent of the total votes, Massell would receive 28 percent of the vote and 18 
percent were undecided.  Lastly, the Gallup pole suggested that Jackson would receive 95 percent of the 
black vote.  Most notably, an overwhelming majority of whites surveyed in the poll disagreed with the 
notion that Jackson was “too radical.”  With this information, Franklin and Jackson requested another 
meeting with Jesse Hill at the Atlanta Urban League Office.  As they presented this data, it was clear that 
Maynard Jackson should run for mayor. Hill took the results of the survey and presented then to the 
Action Forum, an interracial group of business leaders, founded in 1971 by Milton Lane and black realtor 
Bill Calloway, to bridge the city’s racial chasm. Forum members were shocked with the results of the 
survey.190   
 According to Pomerantz, Georgia state senator Leroy Johnson vowed to support Jackson’s run for 
mayor; however, in March of 1973, he put his bid in to run for mayor as well.  Interestingly, the race 
between Jackson and Johnson, spoke to more than Atlanta’s top seat, it spoke to a shift in black 
leadership.  Jackson was the grandson of ANVL co-founder John Wesley Dobbs.  Johnson was the 
protégé of ANVL co-founder A.T. Walden.  It was clear that just 27 years after the founding of the 
ANVL, a split between the legacies left by Dobbs and Walden manifested itself in a black power struggle 
for the Atlanta top seat that embodied different styles and politics.  Both Jackson and Johnson were alums 
of Morehouse College, an institution of higher learning noted for the great leadership in Benjamin Mays 
as well as the tutelage of other alums such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.  Jackson and Johnson made a 
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joint campaign appearance and debate before 250 students at the Atlanta University Center. From this, a 
mock election was held at the AUC where nearly 2,400 students, faculty, and staff voted.  The results 
showed that of the 2,400 votes, 2,113 votes (84 percent) were cast for Jackson. Hill, seeing these results 
asked David Franklin to commission another poll to gauge what effects Johnson’s candidacy would have 
on Jackson’s candidacy.  The survey was conducted in April of 1973 and resulted with Jackson receiving 
80 percent of the vote to Johnson’s 2 percent. Hill then met with members of the white business elite, to 
solicit their support for Jackson.  In years past, the white business elite brought their candidates to black 
leaders in order to get black votes.  However, Maynard Jackson was different kind of candidate, and as 
such, Hill brought the black candidate to the white business elite to get their endorsement.  The sentiment 
was that many of the white business elite did not want to endorse Jackson’s candidacy, however, it was 
clear to them that Maynard Jackson was a force to be reckoned with.191 
 The major platform for Jackson, Johnson, and Johnson during the 1973 campaign was crime. In 
the 1960s, Atlanta was deemed as one of the most crime plagued cities in the U.S.  However, a key 
component of Jackson’s campaign was building an interracial coalition, which in other ways, allowed him 
to bypass discussions on issues of race with white constituency.  Jackson worked to calm fears amongst 
whites feeling that if elected, he would manipulate policies that would avenge white racism endured by 
blacks that marked race relations in the American South. 192 
 On October 16, 1973, at the age of 35, Maynard Jackson became the first black mayor of Atlanta 
and of any major southern city in general.  His platform asserted that Atlanta needed “leaders not 
politicians.” Jackson was the South’s first black, big-time, urban mayor.  In his first weeks as mayor, 
Jackson came up against similar demands from the same sanitation force as Massell did in 1970.  Yet, this 
time as management and as the city’s top official, Jackson had to tone down his support.  He forced the 
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City council to pass a pay raise agreed upon by the workers but at the expense of 480 sanitation jobs.  
Jackson discovered a state law that prohibited him from isolating a single union. 193 
 With Jackson, as with most black mayors, the most crippling political handicap was the existence 
of extensive economic resources outside of the mayor’s control.  These resources moved between federal 
and state governments, as well as private capital controlled by business establishment, which were more 
than often white in each City.  As such, virtually all urban leaders were convinced that Washington held 
the key to how cities coped with problems.  But Jackson, in Atlanta, was considered to be the litmus test.  
He took charge of an economically, healthy, upbeat City where he reorganized the charter to give him 
powers that his predecessors did not have  His January inaugural was more of a coronation that it was an 
inauguration, symbolizing the thrust of interracial benevolence that put him in office.  The Atlanta power 
structure’s nervousness stemmed from his youth as well as rumors that Jackson established a City welfare 
slush fund to take care of emergencies in Atlanta’s black community. His appointment of executive 
assistant Reginald Eaves, his college classmate and chief administrative officer Jule Sugarman who 
worked for New York mayor John Lindsay in Sin City. Initially Jackson had no trouble handling 
Atlanta’s aspiring black political leaders, and his standing in the black community, by and large, was very 
solid.  However, blacks were nervous about Jackson’s retention of the white police chief, John Inman and 
were curious to see how he would stay on the good side of Atlanta’s powerful business community. As 
political scientist Mack Jones asserted, “dealing with the charge that if you make a move toward black 
interests, you are undermining economic interests and the City’s future.”194  The second part of this 
chapter will focus on six areas where race was the central factor of tumult.  These areas were:  the city 
charter; urban renewal; public housing; public transportation, annexation and consolidation, the Sanitation 
Strike of 1977, and Airport Annexation.  These areas were critical in reshaping of black Atlanta as well as 
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cultivating relationships between Jackson’s administration and the white business elite.  Nevertheless, 
these areas were reactionary measures that became pertinent only when they arose.  This suggests that 
Jackson’s administration did not promote its own agenda for Atlanta, but reacted to agendas staged by 
prior administrations. 
 
City Charter 
 
According to Mack Jones, before Jackson, Atlanta had a weak mayor-council form of 
government where the mayor appointed aldermanic committees annually.  The committee 
chairmen worked closely with the heads of various city departments.  During the first session of 
each new aldermanic board, the mayor appointed small committees of three to five members, and 
assigned at least one black alderman to each committee.  It was noted that ten of the fifteen 
committees had only three members. Giving blacks considerable leverage, the vice-mayor and 
the one black alderman dead-locked committees and in the case of a split between the two 
whites, black members prevailed.  Black aldermen took advantage of this situation and pushed 
for ending discrimination within city departments. 195 
 Jones asserted that the political negotiations for the new city charter had the most 
sweeping implications towards race and politics in Atlanta because the new government 
approved by the charter was based on a completely redistricted city with radical changes in the 
process for choosing council members.  The power relationship between the mayor and the 
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council was distorted significantly and the administration elected in 1973 had responsibility for 
completely restructuring the city’s administrative inner workings. 196  
 The essence of a new city charter, as well as the actions through which one was adopted 
was determined by the state legislature.  However, members of the county delegations in the 
state house and senate approved measures that applied to a particular county, and any new 
charter had to have the support of black representatives from Fulton County. Consequently, 
when the general assembly appointed a commission to develop a new draft charter, care was 
taken to insure that the commission had significant black representation.   
 Jones showed that Jackson’s draft charter reflected compromises on certain issues such as 
the size of the new council and members. For example, other highly contentious points were new 
sources of revenue for the city and the desegregation of the public school system.  In one 
instance, white business and the commercial elite, doubtlessly with an eye toward the future, 
managed to have the charter reflect their particular interests by specifically calling for a director 
to head the department of finance who would be appointed by the mayor, but responsible to the 
council.  Since it was generally understood that the then-incumbent head of the finance 
department, long considered a friend of the city’s business interests, would become the director, 
the control of the city government’s finances would remain in friendly hands no matter who the 
new mayor happened to be.  Moreover, the finance department and the law department were the 
only city departments specifically authorized in the charter and, therefore, could not be 
eliminated by the mayor and the council acting jointly.197 
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 According to Jones, the new charter adopted in 1973 was critically important as it 
provided the formal setting for black political empowerment.  Under the old charter when 
members of the board of aldermen were elected at large, five of the eighteen aldermen were 
black.  Under the new charter twelve of the eighteen councilmen were chosen from single-
member districts and the other six ran at large, but for designated places based upon paired 
districts.  With the impending black voting majority, when all council members were chosen at 
large, blacks controlled all council positions as whites had done under the old system.  Though 
whites still had a slight voting margin in 1973, blacks had sizeable majorities in seven of the 
twelve single-member districts and a slight majority in an eighth.  198 
 Under the old charter as Jones asserts, Atlanta had a week mayor form of government 
with members of the aldermanic board supervising the day-to-day operations of city 
departments.  Black aldermen had used this power to force department to give greater respect to 
black interests.  The new charter, which prescribed strict separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches, made such supervision a function solely of the mayor’s 
office.199 
 Perhaps the most important feature of the new charter converted the old ceremonial 
position of vice-mayor into the president of council with significant legislative powers.  The 
president of council appointed all councilman committees, presided over council meetings, and 
supervised the newly created councilmen staff.  These powers would make him the second most 
important official in city government.  The new charter also called for a nine-member school 
board with six members to be elected from single member districts and three chosen at large.  
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The approval of the new charter in 1973 by the sate legislature signaled the end of centuries of 
white political domination in Atlanta in particular and to a lesser degree in the urban south 
generally. 200  
 
Urban Renewal 
 
 Unlike other cities, Atlanta was not affected by the national slump experienced by other 
cities during the first quarter of 1974. Despite the recessive forecast, many Atlanta businessmen 
were optimistic about the current economic health and potential growth of the downtown area.  
Businessmen boasted that Atlanta booming development was too strong for the gloomy forecast 
projected by Washington.  One spokesmen for one of Atlanta’s biggest downtown developers 
stated, “We’ve got so much money already committed for construction that is already underway 
that it would be almost impossible to derail Atlanta.201 
 Atlanta’s growth was unstoppable and the key to Atlanta’s future was not purely 
economic, but political. A spirit of cooperation between the business and political 
establishments—the white business elite and black City hall was attributed as the key to 
Atlanta’s renewal and development. In 1974, despite a slow first quarter along with decreased 
building permits and prime rate increases, the recession had little adverse impact on the city’s 
downtown development.  There was a vast amount of already financed construction activity 
underway. In Atlanta in the 1960s, a development boom of epic proportion changed the city’s 
skyline. However, an ongoing movement to finance a rapid transit system at the cost of $2 billion 
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was beginning to be the biggest priority of the city.  In addition to the rapid transit system, there 
was another estimated $2 billion in downtown constructions with hundreds of millions of dollars 
in other projects on the drawing boards and in the minds of other developers.202   
Examples of Atlanta’s potential were Cousin’s Properties and John Portman.  Cousin’s 
Properties was involved with the Omni, the Omni International and the World Congress 
Center—reportedly had some 35 more acres of choice downtown land.  In addition to numerous 
office buildings under construction, downtown Atlanta had completed nearly 5,000 new hotel 
rooms in 18 months.   Atlanta’s downtown development was considered flamboyant, but 
developers had no evidence of a decrease in convention business, tourists and other visitors to 
Atlanta.  In fact, there was every indication that every new development would be highly 
utilized.  John Portman’s 70 story cylindrical hotel on Peachtree Street had advanced bookings 
and assurance of full utilization in 1974.  It was completed in 1975.203   
In the mid-1970s, urban renewal and new developments pushed Atlanta into being the 
country’s third leading convention site.  In addition to the completion of the rapid transit system, 
the downtown area made it easy for tourists, as well as shoppers, to access both the suburban and 
downtown areas, which in turn boosted proceeds from lodging and retail sales. However, with 
urban renewal and new development, the question of crime rose as a factor as to whether 
developers would continue building in the downtown core area. Further developments indicated 
that crime was not a deterrent to builders.  An example of this can be seen in the Atlanta 
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Underground, a historic quarter and entertainment   complex covering two square blocks beneath 
downtown streets. 204 
Business fell 18 percent at Underground Atlanta as a result of the recession experienced 
nationally.  However, in Atlanta, much of it had to do with crime.  People were simply afraid to 
go downtown and the media portrayed most of these criminals as blacks.  As a result, racial fears 
were aroused.  For other cities, crime and race scares were old problems, but for modern Atlanta, 
the largest city in the South, this was fairly a new trend.  Underground Atlanta was near the 
Edgewood neighborhood, heavily black area in the city in which the media reported the 
perpetrators of the crime.  However, there was no evidence to substantiate this claim.  Because of 
its symbolism to the city, Underground Atlanta was declared as a historic park and a fence was 
erected where $.25 was charged for admission and the money was used for security and 
maintenance.  More importantly, the popular sentiment towards Underground Atlanta’s criminal 
activity was deemed as a result of friction between the majority black population and the white 
business elite. Clearly there were tensions between the two establishments as seen in a letter 
between the chairman of Atlanta based Rich’s Department store and Jackson, charging Jackson 
with racism.  In turn, Jackson addressed these false claims in his speeches referring to “bigots 
and fear mongers.” Tensions between the two establishments were high and were seen in a series 
of articles on the front pages of the Atlanta Constitution for seven days in March. The paper laid 
much of the blame on Jackson stating, “Throughout the Sixties, Atlanta was Camelot.  Spared 
serious racial turmoil and blessed with experienced leadership, the city became a great center of 
commerce and a Mecca for emerging blacks. Today, political power has shifted.  New leadership 
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wrestles new problems.  There are tensions among the people. Camelot has faded.”205  Jackson 
soon learned that Blacks in power would be easily subjected to charges of racial bias against 
whites who were becoming increasingly a minority in the “city too busy to hate.” 
In response, Jackson’s actions and words were the focus of distrust by whites.  This 
situation suggested that Atlanta’s white community, who had not been fair or just to its black 
communities in previous years, was in the minority and concerned that Jackson’s administration, 
would be as unfair to them as previous white elected administrations had been to blacks.  As 
such, Jackson stated,  
“We have a situation where the white population, by a couple of percentage 
points, is in the minority.  There is no heritage in the white community for dealing 
with that fact.  There is no background for dealing with that fact; and therefore the 
capacity to make that transition quickly, smoothly, without anxiety is lacking, 
which means therefore that we must be patient with ourselves.  The next thing is, 
the black community has no heritage of dealing with the white community, that is 
now numerically a minority, because that was never the case before, so the black 
community has no background for how to react, how to treat this phenomenon, so 
the black community best be patient.  We end up with a City where there are 
anxieties.  These anxieties should have been expected.  They are entirely 
predictable.  They are not abnormal and they can be coped with.”206 
 
Also in July of 1975, a group of downtown businessmen accused Jackson of poor planning 
and ignoring downtown needs in the proposed spending of nearly $19 million in federal 
community development aid.    In a forceful letter to Councilman Carl Ware, the Central Atlanta 
Progress (CAP) stated, “not a single penny of community development funds had been allocated 
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to the central business district.”207  CAP argued that Jackson failed to plan to multiply the federal 
aid into larger sums through programs that attracted private investment—a process that the CAP 
called leveraging.  Ware, a black councilman and chair of the Council’s Development 
Committee, accused Jackson of similar faults.  Yet, Jule Sugarman asserted that CAP had not 
backed its promises to leverage the federal aid with private fiscal commitments to neighborhood 
re-development.  The CAP letter, addressed to Ware, asserted that the spending plan endorsed by 
Jackson violated and ignored the City’s adopted 1975 comprehensive development plan.  
According to the white business elite, the plans “appeared to be a grab bag of seemingly 
unrelated projects—the very heart of the criticism of former federal categorical grant programs.” 
New federal community development programs gave open grants to city halls, replacing 
formerly separate efforts such as Model Cities and water sewer grants.  Jackson’s original plan 
provided nearly $10 million for housing and economic development; $813,000 for social 
services; $380,000 for urban environment improvements; and, $4.7 million for “urban growth 
management.”208  
Within Jackson’s administration, Councilman Carl Ware demanded that Jackson provide the 
council with six separate, specific plans that justified the various programs and attracted 
leveraging.  According to Ware, there was no place in the proposal that explicitly detailed the use 
of funds.  Ware also warned against a “scatter-gun approach to problem solving and objected that 
there was no approved citizen participation plan.”  Ware questioned the withholding of $6.7 
million, 43 percent of the total programmatic funds in an unallocated reserve, considered by 
some, a slush fund.  What was clear was that the specific proposal in question ranged from 
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clearing the Plunkettown slum; to building a $50,000 swimming pool for Perry Homes public 
housing  complex; to restoring the house next to Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.’s birthplace; to 
offering business loans to black communities such as Little Five Points and Lakewood 
Heights.209 
Jackson deemed the charges that no funds were earmarked for downtown development as 
inaccurate, and pointed to two programs to help the inner city that would renovate historic 
Auburn Avenue and Hunter Street, black business thoroughfares. Also, in 1975, Atlanta received 
a development grant with 44 percent of the funds slated for inner city improvement at the sum of 
$52.4 million.   These funds went into categories such as housing rehabilitation, parks, new 
streets, improvement of the urban environment, neighborhood social services and citywide future 
planning.  The federal guidelines for the use of these funds were outlined in seven areas:  
elimination of slums, improvement of bad health conditions, conservations of housing stock, 
expansion of community services, rational use of lands and other resources, reduction of 
isolation of income groups and the preservation and restoration of historic sites.210 
Auburn Avenue, often known as “Sweet Auburn” was home to some of the nations largest 
black-owned business firms:  Mutual Federal Savings and Loans, the ninth largest business 
according to Black Enterprise magazine; Atlanta Life Insurance Company, the second largest; 
Citizens Trust Bank, the sixth largest, the Atlanta Daily World and the Martin Luther King 
Memorial Center. However, “Sweet Auburn” also hosted a hodge-podge of dilapidated low and 
mid-rise buildings, vacant stores, shops, movie theatres and nightclubs with varying degrees of 
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disrepair.211 Regardless of this, Auburn Avenue was still a center for black enterprise but had lost 
its luster as the bustling scene in the late 19th and on into the early 20th centuries when 
segregation laws forced blacks to restricted areas.  One hundred and forty-eight firms of all sizes 
called “Sweet Auburn” home.  However, a group of black business leaders worked steadily to 
turn around the fortunes of the black business district and applied for federal funds to revitalize 
Auburn Avenue. 
The main organization heading the revitalization project was the Inner City Development 
Corps (ICDC).  ICDC not only sought to revitalize “Sweet Auburn,” it also set out to do the 
same for Hunter Street, another thoroughfare for business adjacent to the Atlanta University 
Complex located in the West End of the City.  What contributed to this was that the population 
area in the Hunter Street neighborhood exceeded that of any other in metro-Atlanta, and as such, 
would serve as a major hub for MARTA.  The MARTA station was expected to contribute to a 
projected demand for approximately 200,000 square feet of office space by 1995, about 100,000 
square feet of replacement retail space, and another 100,000 square feet of new retail space.  
Hunter Street was also home to major black businesses such as Paschal’s Motor Hotel, a favorite 
for the black community and scene of much black political history.212 
The Atlanta planning, urban design, and architectural from of Sengupta, Gruber and 
Associates, a beneficiary of Jackson’s affirmative action implementation, completed and 
presented its vision of a revitalized “Sweet Auburn” neighborhood.  It was a 50-acre study area 
in central Atlanta that constituted one of the most promising areas for the development of 
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neighborhood complexes of regional, national and international importance.  Jackson supported 
the revitalization of “Sweet Auburn” because he knew its importance to black Atlanta.  However, 
from a construction standpoint, “Sweet Auburn” did not require the demolition of large numbers 
of existing structures, many of which were shrines to Atlanta’s black community.  Planning for 
the Hunter Street community revitalization was considerably simpler because fewer property 
owners held larger tracts of proposed redevelopment sites.213 
The ICDC was an umbrella organization that included two neighborhood groups: the 
Auburn Avenue Development Association and the Hunter Street Development Association.  The 
list of officers and directors in these groups read like a who’s who of black leadership in Atlanta: 
including banker Charles Reynolds Jr., savings and loan executive Fletcher Coombs, Director of 
the Butler Street YMCA Warren Cochran, Alderman Q.V. Williamson, educator Dr. Vivian 
Henderson and businessmen T.M. Alexander and W.L. Calloway to mention just a few.  Coretta 
Scott King was the director of the ICDC.  More importantly, the plans to revitalize Auburn 
Avenue and Hunter Street had the endorsement of other organizations and demonstrated the 
strength of the central business district, such as the Central Atlanta Progress (CAP).214 
Three of Atlanta’s black-owned businesses made the list of the top 100 black firms compiled 
by Black Enterprise magazine and would have had higher representation if there was not a 
change in the requirements to make the list.  H.J. Russell & Company, a general contracting firm 
with 300 employees headed by Herman Russell was the highest ranked firm on the list with 
$8.15 million in revenue in 1973.  R.A. Banks & Company was a general contracting company 
also with 18 employees headed by R.A. Banks and was the second ranked business from Atlanta 
with $3 million in revenue in 1973.  The last but oldest Atlanta firm on the list was Henderson 
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Travel Service headed by Jacob R. Henderson which reported $1.65 million in 1973.  What is 
duly noted is that none of the black companies came anywhere close to the sales and revenue 
figures of the most famous list of companies, the Fortune 500, although the largest firm, Motown 
Industries of Los Angeles came close to the smaller firms on the Fortune Second 500 List.215 
The politics of affirmative action in Atlanta were one of the most effective ways to measure 
anxieties between blacks and whites as well as what set Jackson apart as mayor.  At the heart of 
the anxieties possessed by the white business elite in terms of urban renewal and development in 
downtown Atlanta were city contracts.  Jackson was a heavy proponent of affirmative action and 
joint ventures between minority and white contractors.  As such, this was one of the highest areas 
of conflict for Jackson as mayor.   White contractors detested the idea that they had to fight for 
contracts just as minority contractors had done before.  Much of their resentment was centered 
on what they believed were government jobs won by contractors for reasons other than price and 
performance.    White firms claimed that joint ventures forced them to hire additional black firms 
at the expense of laying off there own [white] people.  This was not the case, and Jackson’s joint-
venture mandate was brilliant, allowing middle-sized companies to go after large jobs without 
getting stuck in permanent combinations.  As such, black contractors and professional firms were 
getting jobs from City Hall.  Before Jackson’s implementation of affirmative action, there were 
relatively few black firms and as such, prior opportunities were few. Though Atlanta City Hall’s 
affirmative action plan provided work during the recession, companies with jobs were wary on 
whether they would get work in the future. 216 
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From a black perspective, the struggle for equality in government contracts was ongoing.  
However, the toughest part of the obstacle was stifled by Atlanta’s City Hall as Jackson involved 
black managers and owners in government contracts. To Jackson, black political empowerment 
meant a channel for economic influence. In a political vein, there was a level of expectation 
among blacks in which Jackson provided and responded to.  For Jackson, the implementation of 
affirmative action was the right and moral thing to do for black firms and leveled access and 
opportunity.  Jackson’s administration felt that cost and non-discrimination considerations were 
of equal weight.  Yet, on another level, affirmative action was one way for Jackson to build 
Atlanta’s economic base in regards to the City’s black majority.217  
 
Public Housing 
 
 During Maynard Jackson’s first two terms as mayor, public housing continued to be a 
blighted area in the city.  Public housing problems had long existed in Atlanta, however, Jackson 
highlighted the shortcomings after a voluntary weekend stay at Northwest Atlanta’s Bankhead 
Courts, the scene of several violent outbreaks.  To Jackson, Bankhead Courts was filthy, rat 
infested, and full of crime and vandalism, which, he asserted, represented of public housing 
throughout the city.  Jackson’s goal was to make public housing no different than any other 
housing in Atlanta, in which he concluded, was “a long, long way off.” An investigation by the 
Atlanta Journal revealed that in many of Atlanta’s low rent public housing complexes, residents 
faced conditions similar to or worse than those at Bankhead Court.  The most resounding 
complaint from tenants was the long delays in getting needed maintenance for their apartments 
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or grounds.218  However, unlike any other politician in the city’s history, Jackson experienced the 
inadequacies in public housing during his voluntary stay instead of relying on a report to convey 
his sympathy. 
In 1974, Atlanta’s Housing Authority had a $13 million budget that included $7 million 
in federal subsidies, nearly $6 million from operating receipts, and had staff people stationed at 
every complex to help residents adjust to living in low-rent public housing.  The Family Services 
staffs were undermanned and cutbacks in service areas had already been approved.  Community 
pride and togetherness were more evident in some of the older public hosing projects around 
Atlanta such as Techwood, Carver, Capitol and Grady Homes where most of the residents had 
lived for long periods of time and had established roots in the community.  There was also a 
greater mixture of different age groups in these older complexes, whereas most of the newer 
complexes were filled with relatively young families, who viewed public housing as a temporary 
stop on the way to something better.219 
Contributions to public housing problems in Atlanta were just as much environmental as 
social ills and could have been avoided.  Erosion had removed huge plots of land exposing gas 
pipes. Bankhead Courts was built on a site where there were known drainage problems.  As for 
the social ills, project planners failed to include a playground or large play area for children. 
Jackson’s visit to Bankhead Courts focused on the public housing situation in the city that led to 
a number of suggestions for citywide improvements from private organizations, city officials, 
and housing experts.  A number of improvements in recreation, sanitation and security were 
made.  Jackson suggested the planting of community gardens in the complexes to help bring 
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residents closer together and also “help out with food in these hard times.”  Also, he suggested 
that experts in landscaping and animal and plant husbandry” should be added to maintenance 
staffs and should also teach the tenants the proper ways to care for their environment. Lastly, 
Jackson suggested that fencing and lighting for public housing complexes for security reasons, as 
well as auxiliary police patrols in housing complexes. With this, Jackson aggressively sought 
federal funds to teach people how to live together.220 
The Atlanta Housing Authority, at the behest of Jackson, compiled a statistical analysis 
from information on more than 32,000 low rent public housing tenants, which concluded what 
Jackson knew, that there was widespread despair and instability amongst Atlanta’s poor. The 
data stated that of some 10,377 heads of household, 82 percent were women; only 9 percent of 
the households had both a mother and father present; about 60 percent of the heads of households 
were between the ages of 20 and 49; slightly more than 60 percent of the persons surveyed were 
16 years old or younger; more than 65 percent of the low-income tenants received some form of 
government welfare payments; and more than 26 percent received Social Security or other 
governmental benefits. Fifty-eight percent of family heads had annual incomes of less than 
$2,500, which was below the poverty line. As such, forty-two percent of the residents paid less 
than $20 per month in rent. Another 35 percent paid less than $70 per month.  From 1972 to 
1974, fifty-three percent of Atlanta’s public housing residents had moved into housing projects 
from hardships due to the economic recession.  For seventy-one percent of those living in 
apartments, it was there first experience in public housing.  However, in 1974, 2,542 persons 
reportedly left public housing.  Only 1 percent of the departures were a result of eviction for non-
payment of rent.  About 12 percent of those leaving moved into private rental residences and 5 
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percent bought homes. Eighty-three percent of public housing tenants were black, and pubic 
housing in Atlanta was getting blacker.221 Being that the Atlanta Housing Authority could charge 
no more than 25 percent of a families’ adjusted income for rent, the high poverty level in Atlanta 
drained city funds and prompted the Jackson administration to constantly seek federal funds.   
 It was clear that public housing was blight on the city and agreed upon by Atlanta city 
officials, public housing administrators, federal authorities, and public housing residents.  
Lawmakers lamented that the problem with public housing could not be solved by public funds, 
that the real source of the problem was working with the people and providing educational and 
employee training programs.  There were 52,000- 80,000 low-income Atlantans who lived in 
public housing.  Housing authority spokesmen admitted that they did not know the number of 
people that lived in public housing projects because of the large number of unlisted relatives and 
friends living with residents.222   
 
Public Transportation, Annexation, and Consolidation 
 
In 1971, a campaign to obtain voter approval for plans to establish a billion dollar 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority was waged. As early as the 1960s, Atlanta’s 
business elite pushed for a rapid transit system.  The measure was first put on the ballot in 1968. 
Two-thirds of the billion dollar project was to be funded by the federal government and one-third 
by local investors.  However, black leadership had no significant role in structuring the 
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proposition which was put to the voters and as a result was defeated, with blacks voting against it 
overwhelmingly.  According to Mack Jones, in preparing for a second referendum, blacks were 
added to both the MARTA Board of directors and its staff, and MARTA hired a young black 
executive as community relations director with the primary responsibility for selling the 
proposition, which was ultimately approved by referendum.  This event shows the ebb and flow 
of negotiations which occurred between white leadership and a task force that represented the 
black coalition led by black state senator Leroy Johnson and then Vice-Mayor Maynard Jackson. 
223 
Jones asserts that  the coalition agreed to support the change from financing by the 
property tax to a sales tax, though the latter imposed a greater burden on the black working poor.  
MARTA agreed, in turn, to reduce the transit fare from $.40 to $.15 for the first seven years of 
its operation to run a rail line to an outlying black area not included in its initial plans.  Once the 
agreement between MARTA and the black coalition was reached, black leaders supported the 
referendum almost unanimously.  The issue was structured in such a way that anyone who did 
not support the referendum was characterized as opposing economic growth and civic progress.  
Black politicians aspiring to higher office could not afford such a label.224 
While the airport was being renovated, MARTA was set to begin construction.   Progress 
towards public transportation was deeply intertwined with annexation, with had been a point of 
contention due to Atlanta changing demographics.  In 1968, the original plans to begin a rapid 
transit authority were voted on during the November election, seeking rejection or approval of a 
$377.6 million bond issue.  To convince voters of their intentions, MARTA went so far as to 
draw up a timetable and work schedule of there plans where the 40 mile system would reach 
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from Hartsfield Airport to Interstate 285 on the northeast, east and west and would include 32 
stations.225  
In the 1970s, the MARTA issue demonstrated Maynard Jackson’s responsibility to his 
black constituents.  Jackson fought to put MARTA stations in majority black neighborhoods on 
the west, south and east sides of the city to assure access to transportation for commuting 
working blacks.  In 1978, construction of the MARTA to link downtown with the suburbs was 
progressively moving forward.  However, the clear issue over MARTA centered on a movement 
of annexation, consolidation and race.  Annexation, consolidation, and race became an issue as a 
result of resentment by rural and suburban whites in the state legislature.  One unnamed 
suburban legislator stated, “Maybe “these people” in Atlanta got too much responsibility.  
Maybe some of it ought to be taken away from ‘em.”  On the other hand, an unnamed black 
Atlanta city councilman stated, “Some of the legislators dislike Maynard and Reggie Eaves more 
that any two black men I’ve ever known.  They dislike them because they don’t understand them.  
The push is on now because the administration is black and they (whites) don’t have the input 
they once had.”226  Clearly, the statements of the unnamed suburban legislator were racist 
remarks as seen in how, he felt, “these people” could not handle the responsibility.  
The issue of race was at the center of annexation because some whites looked eagerly 
toward expansion of the City as a way of boosting the white voting percentage and, perhaps, 
recovering some white control of City government.  Much of the defamation of Jackson came 
from his determination to get blacks a share of city contracts through minority joint ventures.  
Many rural legislators took an interest in the annexation and consolidation fight and some of 
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them suggested the creation of a “District of Atlanta” that would be ran by the Georgia General 
Assembly and controlled firmly in order to oust Jackson and people of his kind.  This sentiment 
or more moderate versions of it, meant that downtown senators and representatives who favored 
expansions would find themselves in bed with their rural colleagues, albeit for entirely different 
and contradictory reasons.227 
Some of Atlanta blacks favored enlarging the city for the simple reason that an expanded 
tax base brought in more tax revenues to help meet increasing costs of providing services.  Yet, 
these same blacks also recognized that expansion could wash away many of the black political 
gains from the long civil rights struggles with a flood of new white registered voters.  To blacks, 
it was unclear as to how voter registration, annexation and consolidation would change Atlanta’s 
ever changing population.  In 1975, Atlanta’s population including 44,000 citizens in the 
Atlanta-DeKalb overlap was estimated at 477,100.  This figure, from the Atlanta Regional 
Commission, set the racial split at 286,400 blacks (60 percent) and 190,700 white (40 percent).  
However, the voter registration figures were a slightly different.  According to the Fulton and 
DeKalb county records, blacks made up 51.8 percent of the city’s registered voters with 100,445.  
Whites comprised 48.2 percent with 93,387.  Annexation plans discussed would dilute black 
voting strength to some degree.  The consolidation of all of the governments in Fulton County 
into one successor government would impede black progress the most, where blacks only 
accounted for 37.9 percent of voters in the entire county.228   
The dilution of black voting strength would arouse the U.S. Justice Department and could 
lead to a review by the U.S. attorney general under the authority of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  
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Dilution would not automatically lead to a dismissal of annexation plans, however, some lawyers 
believed that court decisions like the Richmond, Virginia annexation case, would allow 
expansion of the city even if blacks lost voting strengths.  There were some black legislators who 
pushed for total county consolidation.  Their idea was grounded on the fact that whites were 
leaving the city and the county for other areas, and as such, statistics indicated that Fulton 
County would continue to be majority black in 1980.  According to state Rep. Ben Brown of 
Atlanta, total county consolidation and properly drawn voting lines, along with efforts to register 
black voters would give blacks 60 percent control in the new council, which was larger than the 
37 percent majority held in 1975.229   
 Because blacks were in control of Atlanta, many did not trust legislation and felt that 
there was a movement to undermine their power.  As such, they were careful not to give up any 
power, despite revenue woes. For black Atlantans, the popular sentiment was that political power 
was all they had. Atlanta City Councilman Marvin Arrington viewed the consolidation and 
annexation “as a tool for getting at Maynard [Jackson] and Reggie Eaves.”  According to 
Arrington, “The truth is that Maynard Jacksons, Reggie Eaveses and Marvin Arringtons are 
always going to be in office now. We’ve passed that point.  We’re not going back to the way it 
used to be.”230  Somewhat grandiose, Arrington’s comments detailed tensions between white 
business leaders and the black City hall. 
 With massive annexation and consolidation, and attempt to consolidate the governments 
of Atlanta and Fulton County without also merging their schools systems would be dismissed by 
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federal officials.  Atlanta’s public schools system was 87 percent black; whereas Fulton County’s 
was 86 percent white.  Groups such as Research Atlanta, suggested that massive busing could be 
averted if the two school systems were consolidated in conjunction with a city-county merger.  
However, it speculated that the federal courts faced with an attempt to merger the governments 
while keeping the school systems separate would be perceived as an attempt to resegregate and 
would order a cross-district integration plan.”  231 
 In a speech given to the Hungry Club forum at the Butler Street YMCA, Maynard Jackson 
proposed a three-to-five-year moratorium to further study a valid annexation plan for the City of Atlanta. 
This time away extended beyond the 1977 election, in which Jackson ran for reelection.  Jackson asserted 
that all of the annexation plans put forth lacked merit.  As such, he proposed that a citizen’s study 
commission and a state committee explore the annexation and consolidation and present a plan for voters’ 
approval by 1980.  At the center of Jackson’s agenda was the assurance that black voters would retain a 
strong role in local politics and that annexation schemes drawn up without proper data collection and 
interpretation could deprive whites as well as blacks of their right to citizen participation.  Jackson’s 
announcement of his stand towards annexation and consolidation broke several weeks of silence while the 
political climate sweltered.232  This can be deemed as a clever move by Jackson.  He solidified a black 
majority, along with significant white support that assured his re-election.  Jackson would not chance 
black political empowerment that would have been weakened by annexation and consolidation.  
However, he was not the only figure working to assure his re-election and galvanize his base. 
 Among the mostly white pro-annexation camps, reactions to Jackson’s proposal for a three to five 
year moratorium were extremely negative.  Former Georgia Governor Carl Sanders, who proposed a 
                                                 
231 “1965 Voting Rights Act Is Biggest Legal Hurdle,” 20 October 1975, Atlanta Constitution, box 1, 
Newsweek Inc. Atlanta Collection, EU, MARBL. 
 
232 “Mayor Asks 3-Year Wait on Annexing,” 2 October 1975, Atlanta Constitution, box 1, Newsweek Inc. 
Atlanta Collection, EU, MARBL; For many years the Butler Street YMCA served as the hub of community 
activities in Atlanta, particularly those related to the black community.  In 1945, it started Atlanta’s first city-wide 
forum, the Hungry Club Forum, as a meeting place for blacks and whites in Atlanta. 
 
 139 
metro-wide umbrella form of government stated, “To wait three to five years for anything is unrealistic 
and most unfortunate.  I don’t think this is what we need.”  Sam Williams, head of the Atlanta Chamber 
of Commerce task force examining the annexation question stated “I don’t think we’ll know any more in 
three to five years than we can assemble in s short time—because it has been researched to death.”233  By 
examining the responses of political figures and Atlanta’s white business elite, it is clear that both the 
political and economic platforms of the white establishment ran counter to that of black leadership and 
political interest. 
 In the event that the General Assembly enacted a plan disapproved by Jackson, the Mayor 
asserted “I would be inclined to take whatever action would be appropriate under circumstances.” Jackson 
demanded that any criteria for annexation or consolidation be: 
1. Backed up by thorough studies of the effects on costs of all facets of government. 
 
2.  Promote tax equity and uniform tax assessments. 
 
3. Guarantee more citizen participation. 
 
4. Attract economic growth and development. 
 
5. Improve governmental services. 
 
6. Submitted to the approval of voters in the entire area to be affected, without a stipulation that a 
majority of the registered voters must go to the poles. 
 
7. Preserve existing corporate charters, meet federal voting rights standards and retain the Atlanta-
in-DeKalb portion of the city within Atlanta. 
 
Jackson also stated that a Commission of Fiscal and Annexation matters (CORFAM) would be 
established, including 25 members to be named by the Atlanta University Center, Georgia State 
University and local elected officials.  In addition, a state committee was set up to analyze the fiscal 
relationships in the 15 county Atlanta metropolitan area and present a report to the 1977 General 
Assembly.234 
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 As the political climate over the issue of annexation and consolidation sweltered, a group of 
Atlanta’s black leaders met discretely to start the process of strategizing to keep Atlanta “viable and 
solvent” while protecting black voting power.  According to Reverend Joseph Lowery, the group was 
called Mayor Maynard Jackson’s Private Black Advisory Committee on Annexation and their meetings 
were labeled as community forums to examine a number of plans for expanding Atlanta’s boundaries.  
Although invitations to these meeting were mailed by Jackson’s staff, the mayor’s name appeared 
nowhere on the invitation and those present denied that the meetings were at the mayor’s behest.  
The initial community forums were discussions among leaders and were not made public until an 
Atlanta Constitution article was published on October 1, 1975.  When the press asked if they could attend 
subsequent meetings, those present asserted that they believed that “freer and more open discussion 
would take place” if the press were not present.  Atlanta City Councilman John H. Calhoun asserted that 
he did not want to be quoted on the annexation issue.  Regardless of these private meetings, members of 
the Jackson’s private black advisory committee on annexation assured the public that there was nothing to 
hide.235   
The committee also considered the plans of both former Governor Carl Sanders and state Rep. Ben 
Brown.  However, the committee’s sentiment towards annexation and consolidation was what 
authentically good for the black community was authentically good for the total community.236  These 
private committee members showed black Atlanta investment in Jackson’s plan.  When Jackson bullied 
his way into Atlanta politics in 1968, he annoyed black Atlanta’s king makers.  However, he later won 
overwhelming support during some of the city’s most challenging moments such as the 1977 sanitation 
strike. 
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The 1977 Sanitation Strike 
 
On March 28, 1977, just days before ninth anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr., Atlanta was in the midst of yet another bitter sanitation strike. On April 4th, Rev. 
John Bell reminded the City’s African American sanitation strikers that King had been 
assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee on a mission to aide men like themselves, also members of 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (ASFCME).  Bell asserted 
that King’s spirit would inspire Atlanta sanitation workers to victory in their own struggle.  
However, the strikers knew that there were a thousand men in the wings, waiting to apply for 
their jobs.   
 Simultaneously on April 4th, Mayor Maynard Jackson met with the press to summon 
King’s name for a different purpose.  On the strike’s second day, Jackson announced that strikers 
would be permanently replaced if they did not return to work within 48 hours.  As promised, he 
terminated their employment on April1st.  On this morning, Jackson, a former lawyer with the 
National Labor Relations Board, told the press that replacement workers were being hired. 
Jackson had broad support from Atlanta’s white business and civic leaders such as the Atlanta 
Business League and the Chamber of Commerce as well as the black middle class such as the 
Urban League and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  However, climax of the press 
conference came when black Atlanta’s most eminent minister, Reverend Martin Luther King Sr. 
defended Jackson on the anniversary of his son’s death.  According to King Sr., Jackson 
attempted to mollify the unreasonable strikers and the time had come to draw the line.  King Sr. 
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stated, “If you do everything you can [for the union] and don’t get satisfaction, then fire the hell 
out of them,’ and Jackson did just that and was now moving on.”237 
 The strike commenced on March 28 when 1,300 workers demanded a fifty-cent an hour 
wage increase to raise incomes that averaged $7,000 annually which placed a family of four with 
one wage earner below the poverty line. With Jackson’s actions, questions arose on what 
happened between 1970, when he was vice-mayor and marched with the sanitation workers, and 
1977 as mayor and advocate for taxpayers.  It was evident that the reactions to Jackson were 
different than those of Sam Massell in 1970.  However, as some argue that the 1970s was a 
watershed moment for striker replacement tactics where political and economic forces shifted 
against unions.238  With the majority of Atlanta’s City workers being black, this strike portrayed 
how public workers won the right to strike in practice when the law did not allow it.  Also, this 
strike fit into the larger milieu of the ways in which public workers lost recently won protections 
against replacement as a result of the fiscal crises of the 1970s because of the political turmoil in 
which it resulted. 
 Jackson’s accomplishments made his likeliness as a strikebreaker doubtful. He had a 
strong record for defending and pursuing black interests, especially in the area of affirmative 
action and city contracts as seen in building Hartsfield Airport.  Ironically, Jackson received high 
endorsements from the AFSCME in his 1973 election.  He had also called attention to the labor 
plight of public workers in the climate of fiscal severity by predicting that the nation’s economic 
woes would get worse and that American cities would become extremely moderate in terms of 
budgeting.  However, two factors pushed Jackson toward his confrontation with the AFCSME in 
1977.  First, in 1977, he was seeking re-election with a secured base within the black community 
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but made a concerted effort to win over middle-class whites and the business establishment.  
Second, Atlanta faced a financial crisis, and as a result, the law required the city to balance its 
annual budget.  Jackson, being the first black mayor with charges of reverse racism, did not want 
to be labeled as financially irresponsible.  Jackson once stated “Before I take the city into a 
deficit financial position, elephants will roost in the trees.”239 
 Jackson’s political commitment to all Atlantans assured a showdown between City Hall 
and the AFSCME.  The AFSCME had demanded a pay raise for more than a year.  A sanitation 
strike had almost erupted in the July of 1976; however, it was postponed when Jackson rerouted 
federal funds into a temporary $200 raise.  With inflation up 7 percent, workers knew that little 
to no money would come from the city and Jackson claimed that there was nothing that he could 
do. Jackson admitted that city employees needed and deserved a pay increase but claimed that 
the city did not have it. 240  A wildcat walkout in January of 1977 detailed how serious the 
workers were about a raise.  As such, Jackson urged patience. 
 Jackson strategies to fight the AFSCME were effective, claiming that Jerry Wurf, the 
white president of the AFSCME, instigated the walkout from Washington.  Jackson stated 
“Maybe the union thought that because I’m liberal, because I’m black, I would respond to any 
demand no matter how outlandish.  If they think that, they’ve got another thing coming.” 
According to McCartin, Jackson saw himself as the first domino in the labor’s southern domino 
theory and asserted that if labor made a move on black political leadership, it was going to have 
severe consequences for labor throughout the South.241 Once again, Jackson and Atlanta were 
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seen as the litmus test, and to Jackson, the very future of black political leadership depended on 
him showing that his administration could not be intimidated by unions into a fiscally reckless 
settlement. 
 With Jackson’s posture, Atlanta business leaders applauded and with their influence with 
the Newspaper, the Atlanta Constitution ran an ad that stated “Fire the Strikers” on March 30th 
and 31st.  This ad asserted the sentiments of Atlanta business and civic community that Jackson 
needed to show some consideration to taxpayers.  When the ad ran, Jackson issued an ultimatum: 
that if employees did not return to work by April 1st, they were terminated.  In reference to the 
AFSCME, Jackson stated “We’ve leaned over backwards so many times that I think that the 
AFSCME is walking up our back.”242    
In an attempt to redeem themselves, the AFSCME ran an ad in the New York Times 
chastising Jackson with “phonyism and cronyism.”  Union spokespersons charged Jackson as a 
union buster that bullied the AFSCME as a friend of the poor man, working man, black man and 
so fourth.”  To add insult to injury, strikers made banners that read “Maynard’s Word is 
Garbage” during a nationally televised baseball game.  However, these antics did not discourage 
Jackson and he authorized termination letters to the strikers forty-eight hours after the deadline 
passed.  Most of the strikers went through the same process in 1970 and felt that they would be 
rehired as before.  However, Jackson began hiring replacement workers, and strikers were 
bewildered when hundreds applied for their jobs.  Strikers were stunned in the way Atlanta’s 
black leadership and middle class backed Jackson. 243 
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Tensions between black elites and middle classes; black working classes and the poor can 
be seen in Jackson’s actions toward the strikers.  Most black community leaders supported the 
mayor.  The Atlanta Daily World regarded elite and middle class sentiment, calling the AFSCME 
demands extreme power grabs by the Union and questioned by they [AFSCME] challenged a 
black mayor “at this time, when we stand at the point of convincing the world that our people 
can lead a section in the South.”  Atlanta’s chapters of the NAACP and the Urban League 
supported Jackson as well, and Rev. Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference encouraged strikers to return to work.  However, the most boisterous and effective 
tactic that quelled the strike was King Sr., who did so by stating “If any group comes to try to 
destroy our town, we are against it, with all the power we have.244 This statement is reminiscent 
of the same sentiments held by William Hartsfield and Ralph McGill when Atlanta integrated it 
schools in 1961. 
McCartin asserts that Atlanta’s white business and civic communities were impressed 
with Jackson’s handling of the strike.  He notes that Jackson knew that if he appeased them, he 
was sure to get re-elected.  However, some black unions denounced Jackson for using “black 
workers as political pawns in his efforts to please a middle class black political constituency and 
satisfy the white establishment.” Pastors of smaller churches with working class congregations 
condemned Jackson’s action also. James Farmer, formerly of the Congress of Racial Equality 
and Rev. James Lawson of Memphis supported the strikers.  Lawson compared Jackson to Henry 
Loeb, the infamous mayor of Memphis and strikebreaker, which brought Dr. King to Memphis 
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and resulted in his assassination.  Jackson rebutted, “Is it liberal to make a predominantly black 
city financially unsound?”245 
After hiring replacements, McCartin asserts that it was clear that Jackson had defeated 
the AFSCME. Jackson announced that the strike was over and by late April, half of the strikers 
had reapplied for their old jobs.  Many were rehired at lower salaries through the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA).  Understanding the situation at hand, the union gave in 
on April 29, 1977.246 Most strikers regained full-time employment with their old salaries by the 
end of 1977.  However, Jackson’s popularity was insurmountable with Atlanta’s white business 
and civic communities.  In 1977, Jackson took 63.6 percent of the vote. 
 
The Airport 
 
 As far as new developments and affirmative action, Jackson’s crown jewel was the 
midfield expansion at Hartsfield International Airport.  The city built new terminals between 
then-existing runways at Hartsfield with 135 loading gates and nearly doubled the number at the 
then-present terminal.  The cost was estimated at $400 million.    Jackson halted the design phase 
of the development while architects and engineers went through the process of bringing in black-
owned firms.  His intention was to make a three-way partnership, where architects, engineers and 
black-owned firms worked together.  In July of 1975, Chief Administrative Officer Jule 
Sugarman confirmed that at least 25 percent of the airport contracts were earmarked for blacks.  
Shortly afterwards, Jackson announced that four black-owned architectural firms were put 
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together to create their own joint venture.  This assured that the firms could handle 25 percent of 
the work.247   
Much more money was spent in the construction phase of the airport expansion. 
Jackson’s administration drew up standards for minority involvements in construction in order to 
present them to potential bidders before work specification were sent out.   Some airline 
officials, like white businessmen, worried about the pending costs and minority involvement and 
looked to the extent in which Newark’s airport, which endured a similar situation where airline 
officials attributed 25 percent of his costs—several millions dollars—to efforts that involved 
black firms.   
Maynard Jackson’s vision for the airport had a two fold goal, first, to help minority 
contractors to get contracts; and second to build the world’s largest terminal complex.  This 
terminal complex made Atlanta ready for an estimated 40 million air passengers annually by 
1980 and assured its continuing leadership as the Southeast’s transportation hub.  In the late 
1960s, Atlanta had the nation’s fourth busiest airport.248 Under Jackson, the goals for the 1974 
expansion included air routes and facilities.  With this, Jackson authorized that a series of 
international good will and business development exchanges between Atlanta, “the crossroads 
city of the Southern U.S.” and Hong Kong, “the crossroads city of the Far East.”  As such, 85 
Atlantans visited Hong Kong, which included Wyche Fowler, Jr., President of the Atlanta City 
Council; Mrs. Maynard Jackson, representing her husband; representatives of the Atlanta 
Chamber of Commerce; businessmen and news media.  To Atlanta City Hall and business 
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community, the successful joint venture foreshadowed many other business areas where cities 
with common characteristics and interests came together.  Both cities were interested in the 
expansion of international air routes as well as in a new rapid transit program to serve their 
growing populations.249  
Renovations to Hartsfield International Airport were put on hold when a dispute erupted.  
At the center of the dispute, was the Davis-Bacon Act, which set minimum wage standards for 
projects partially funded by federal dollars.  Under the act, the U.S. Labor Department set the 
minimum wage scales for certain categories or building projects, categorizing them into building 
rates, heavy construction rates and highway construction rates.  Projects categorized as 
“building” carried the highest wage scales, followed by the “heavy” rates and then the 
“highway” rates.  As such, the Labor Department initially determined that one of disputed 
projects would be ruled by the heavy rates, and the other two by the highway rates.  The Trades 
Council, contesting the designations, filed further facts and won a new Labor Department 
decision placing all three projects in the higher paying category of building construction.  The 
Labor Department later notified the city of the new designation in a mail-a-gram, which arrived 
there nine days before the deadline for contractors to submit bids, violating its rule mandating a 
10-day notice.  Since the federal bureaucracy failed to abide by its own bureaucratic rules, the 
city of Atlanta and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which supplied the federal funds, 
said they were not bound by the revised wage scale designation. A decision in the union’s favor 
would hike the cost of the project anywhere from $1.2 million, the unions figure, up to $20 
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million, the city’s figures.  Through their rent payments, the airlines would have shouldered the 
cost for expansion.250  
After a week of heated discussion on whether Atlanta would be able to build its $400 
million expansion for Hartsfield International Airport, a sigh of relief came for Jackson and the 
other City Hall negotiators in the project.  The solution came after round-the-clock talks between 
the city, the airlines and the North Georgia Builders Trade Council and was contingent upon an 
agreement to both the city and the airlines in case the union won its appeal.  The settlement was 
reached after negotiation ended with six airlines agreed to shoulder the extra cost through their 
lease documents with the city.  That agreement cleared the way for the awarding of $35 million 
worth of contracts.  Bids on those contracts were to expire by 11:59 pm on Tuesday, March 22, 
1977 which would have delayed the project for at least a year, because of the length of time 
necessary to rebid and because the city would have missed most, if not all, of the summer 
construction season.  The agreement that saved the first three contracts was signed by six of the 
eight airlines that served Atlanta.  As for the agreements, Jackson stated, “the fact that they are 
willing to run that risk demonstrates the crucial importance of the midfield terminal and the high 
sense of civic responsibility and commitment to Atlanta on the part of the airlines.”251 
After the agreement, Jackson immediately signed $35 million in contacts for the first 
work on the airport expansion. The contracts for taxiways, aprons, fencing, a tunnel for a “people 
mover” to the new terminal and an access road, were awarded.  J.A. Jones Construction Co. 
received $18,628,846 for the “people mover; the C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. received 
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$15,657,840 for the taxiways and aprons; and McDougald-Warren Inc. received $759,508 for 
fences and access roads.  What is not clear is whether any of these construction companies were 
minority contractors.252  Built on schedule and under budget, Hartsfield [-Jackson] International 
Airport was Maynard Jackson’s greatest feat as mayor of Atlanta.  It is currently the world’s 
busiest airport with 50 passenger and cargo air carriers and serving 80 million passengers in 
2007.253   
 As Maynard Jackson served as Mayor for two terms (1974-1982), a period of economic 
development, fiscal stability, job creation, neighborhood revitalization, improved delivery of City 
services, effective public safety and construction of the modern Atlanta airport marked his tenure.  
Jackson’s politics of inclusion opened the doors of City government to all citizens, and for the first time, 
minorities and women had the opportunity to compete for jobs and contracts on an equal basis.  In his 
first term as mayor, less than one half of one percent of all City contracts went to minorities.  Eight years 
later, nearly thirty percent of those contracts went to minority and female owned businesses, and 
employment of minority and female managers gained national and local acclaim.  Accurately reflecting 
the accomplishments of the Jackson years, Rand McNally, in its Almanac of Places Rated, established 
Atlanta as the best major City in which to live and work in the United States in December of 1981.254   
What is of particular interest in looking at the influences that Maynard Jackson had in 
local, statewide and national politics requires the investigation of Jackson’s tenure as Mayor of 
Atlanta.  Atlanta’s new status was not solely Jackson’s prodigy.  In a 1973 edition of Newsweek 
Magazine, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce submitted a by-liner entitled “Atlanta. The world’s 
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next great City.”  Some considered this by-liner as typical Atlanta boosterism, however, Atlanta 
was deemed the vanguard of new era cities.  Outside of major national capitals, most of the 
handful of cities with true international influence began as ports.  However, with burgeoning 
technology in transportation, particularly in aviation, gave key inland cities the same 
opportunities to flourish as international centers.  Atlanta was uniquely positioned to become the 
first city in this new era to gain worldwide importance.  It was a gateway to a regional market of 
30 million people.  It was an importer and exporter of goods and services, architecture and 
culture, ideas and technology.  Among its major resources were the enlightened attitudes of its 
leaders and the involvement of its people.  As such, Atlanta was the world’s next great City.255 
 However, the relationship between Atlanta’s rise to international status and boosterism 
should not be taken lightly.  To some, Atlanta was a land of slick page dreams.  This kind of 
boisterous and exploding city of Chamber of Commerce presidents, merchants, daredevil 
promoters, developers, bright young architects, entrepreneurs set a tone that rung with 
confidence and arrogance that built city-states in yesteryears.  New downtown buildings were 
erected, each reaching for some niche of notoriety and accomplishment.  Some of these such as 
the world’s tallest round hotel with floating cocktail lounge, the world’s fastest sinking sports 
arena, the tearing away of buildings at Five Points to create a spacious part in the center of town, 
and the demolitions of a stately old marble library to float a spectacular new design all spoke to 
ideas centered on the price that the City would pay.  There was popular sentiment that Atlanta’s 
youthful vigor lacked in spiritual dimensions.  Though the Atlanta business community was less 
than enthused to support cultural endeavors, the city had grown into a place immersed with 
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hearty sports fans and invested millions in developing one of the greatest convention cities in the 
nation with the Atlanta Falcons, Hawks, and its Underground District.256 
 Absolutely and positively, Maynard Jackson moved mountains to make Atlanta not only 
a black Mecca, but an international city. His combination of maverick qualities, paradigm 
breaking, and the gift of gab made him a very effective and influential politician.  However, his 
commitment to black Atlantans, meant so much more and it can be concluded that Jackson’s 
agenda was to promote black political empowerment.  He moved to better Atlanta, by enhancing 
black Atlanta.  This is not to say that Jackson made Atlanta a viable city for all blacks.  The 
relationship between Atlanta’s rise to world-class status and boosterism should be considered.  
By and large, it was clear that he pushed a black agenda, and at the same time, moved Atlanta to 
the world’s center stage.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SORROW OF A CITY:  COLLISIONS IN CLASS AND COUNTER NARRATIVES 
TOWARDS ATLANTA’S BLACK MECCA STATUS AS SEEN THROUGH THE 
ATLANTA YOUTH MURDERS 
 
Thinkin' that in reality the world is like a ball full of players. We trapped off in this maze with 
walls made of layers. And only prayer, is the tightest game that you can have. 
The devil's takin' a swing that might explain the broken glass. But my crystal ball see the pistol 
fall to the wayside. Nobody would die in cops and robbers when we used to play right……..Huh, 
the only thang we feared was Williams, Wayne!257 
 
 
 In Atlanta, the 1970s and 80s signaled a watershed moment where black electoral politics 
and black political empowerment came together to form what was purported as the black Mecca.  
The popularity of Maynard Holbrook Jackson Jr. and Andrew Young were insurmountable with 
Atlanta’s white business and civic communities.  In 1977, Jackson took 63.6 percent of the vote 
garnering wide support from white Atlantans.258  Young in turn, received 55.1 percent of the vote 
catapulting him into office in 1981, and 83 percent of the vote in 1985.259  On the surface, 
galvanizing these percentages for victory indicated that Atlanta was truly “a city too busy to 
hate,” but, Jackson’s second term as mayor was a tumultuous time in the city, as schisms within 
the black Atlanta widened.  An example of this is illustrated with the sudden resignation of black 
City Councilman Arthur Langford Jr. His resignation indicated a growing frustration from black 
leaders excluded from the new emerging coalition with Maynard Jackson at its center.  Black and 
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white political observers disagreed about the cause of the schism; however, most agreed that the 
new black power structure, the Maynard Machine, was beginning to take shape.  A new group 
including David Franklin, Jackson, Joe Hudson and Mack Wilbourne were asserting themselves 
in Atlanta politics.  With the exception of Jackson, this group raised $20,000 for Jackson’s 1977 
re-election campaign.  With the formation of the new black coalition, members of the old guard 
closed ranks to protect what leverage they had left.  However, the primary elections held in 1978, 
especially the races for the Fulton County Commission where the mayor placed a large measure 
of personal prestige on the line—was a barometer of how much the old guard’s power had ebbed 
and the new coalition had grown.  For the New Coalition, it would be a political embarrassment 
for the Maynard Machine should either of the two candidates—Michael Lomax or Chuck 
Williams suffer defeat at the polls. Yet some observers blamed Jackson for the split stating that 
he had lost touch with the old guard and cut them out of the patronage that was dispensed from 
City Hall.  With the changes in the city charter in 1974, several black councilmen lost massive 
amounts of power.  Bureau directors no longer reported directly to heads of council Committees.  
With more power concentrated in the hands of the mayor and city bureaucracy as a result of the 
charter change, it was widely believed that Jackson forgot that he had to “stroke the sometimes 
massive egos of Atlanta’s black politicians, and that he limited patronage to his friends.”260  
Clearly, this was a moment where Jackson’s highly touted ego and the backing of the City’s 
white business fueled the belief that he had outgrown his black constituents.   
 To some, Jackson’s failure to consult the old guard might have saved him from being 
attacked during the controversies that surrounded the firing of former Commissioner of 
Administrative Services Emma Darnell and ousted Public Safety Reginald Eaves.  The ousting of 
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both Darnell and Eaves was compared to a bitter divorce resulting from Jackson’s inability to 
accept criticism. Clearly, black Atlantans no longer took Jackson at face value and began to 
question his credibility.  There were several opinions circulating over the public bickering 
between Jackson and other black elected officials.  Those that were pro-Jackson thought that the 
attacks stemmed from a desire on the part of Jackson’s rivals to stake out a position and 
constituency in order to play some role—either as candidate or power broker—in the 1981 
mayoral elections.  However, some observers voiced that this split was the natural maturing of 
black Atlanta politics in which the need to unify behind a single, symbolic leader had passed, 
leaving the field open for the diversity of the city’s black community to be seen.  This meant that 
some aspects of the Civil Rights movement had grown enough to criticize itself.261  During the 
inauguration of Jackson in 1974, the Civic Center was packed with more than 44,000 people, 
mainly black people expecting to see the first black mayor change their lives.  Four years later, 
they found their lives were not changed and were very disappointed.  This spoke to a tremendous 
lack of understanding on what power the mayor actually had.  Though Jackson was considered to 
be a sacred cow in Atlanta, there was the belief that his election would remedy many of the 
problems experienced by Atlanta’s poor and black populations.   
 It was clear that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Atlanta had grown into an economic 
powerhouse in the South.  By 1972, Atlanta ranked among the most prosperous cities in the 
United States and before the end of the decade, the city was home to seven Fortune 500 
manufacturing companies, including Coca-Cola.  Eight Fortune 500 service firms also called 
Atlanta home:  Cox Communications, Genuine Parts, Citizens and Southern Georgia, First 
Atlanta, Trust Company of Georgia, Delta Airlines, Continental Telecom and Southern 
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Company.262 For Jackson, balancing power between his black constituency and the existing 
white business elite was most crucial.  However, walking the fine tightrope between these two 
groups was seen as disloyalty by black Atlantans.  According to Bernard Headley, throughout 
much of Jackson’s second term, a context of racial tension was prevalent. 
 As stated earlier and a central theme in this story, despite the economic growth of 
Atlanta, the black population of the city remained in abject poverty.  Crime continued to blight 
the city as the business community feared that commerce would leave the cities and conventions 
would find other venues to host meetings. In the early months of 1979, two very high profile 
murders took place in Atlanta’s downtown.  On June 28, 1979, Marc Tetalman, young white 
doctor from Ohio was murdered by two black robbers while in the city for a convention.263  Less 
than four months later, Patricia Barry, a white legal secretary was shot and killed in broad 
daylight on October 17th while celebrating her birthday.264  These murders infuriated the city 
and further deemed downtown as unsafe.  But these murders would be upstaged by a series of 
events that would cripple the city for the coming years. 
 Indeed, this was an interesting time for the city, when Jackson’s reign included wide 
scale criticism from whites while he strove to keep the issues of black Atlantans in mind.  But 
Jackson’s second term as mayor marked the beginning of the darkest chapters in the city’s 
history.  Horrendous crimes were committed against Atlanta’s most vulnerable but vibrant 
population, its black youth.  These crimes, known as the missing and murdered children of 
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Atlanta, were some of the most horrific crimes committed against black children since the years 
of American slavery.   
The Atlanta Youth Murders reached national and international audiences.   This mass 
murder of black children purportedly included fourteen children between the ages seven and 
fourteen, all of whom were from the city’s black poor and working class whose families 
embodied various levels of economic poverty and familial stability.  Most of these children were 
believed to have disappeared between July of 1979 and September of 1980 while running errands 
for parents or neighbors or while trying to make some extra money to improve their 
impoverished circumstances—activities that the media disparagingly deemed as “hustling.” 
Days, weeks and months passed before the bodies of nine of the children were found, disposed in 
numerous locations, often considerable distances from the victims’ homes or the places where 
they were last seen alive.265  
The police had no leads in any of the cases, and with the whereabouts of the other five 
victims unknown, hope had given way to fear—that more bodies would turn up, along with the 
frightening possibility that other black children would be snatched. More kidnappings and 
killings did follow.  Between October 1980 and May 1981, sixteen additional black males were 
reported missing.  Their bodies turned up in various places across metropolitan Atlanta.  
Altogether by May of 1981, law enforcement authorities were investigating thirty alleged serial 
killings and searching for one missing boy.266   
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold; it will analyze tensions within the black 
community towards Atlanta black city administration by focusing on the missing and murdered 
children of Atlanta, where approximately 29 blacks, mostly male children and young adults, 
were preyed upon.  Also, this analysis will focus on the efforts of two community organizations:  
the Committee to Stop the Murders of Children comprised primarily of mothers of victims as 
well as the Techwood Bat Patrol, a group armed with baseball bats and guns that patrolled 
Techwood Homes to protect their community from the killer.  These two groups formed because 
of their disappointment and distrust of the Jackson administration and can be seen as direct 
action against an administration perceived as neglecting to the murders because the victims were 
black and poor.  This chapter will also examine the ways in which these murders were 
downplayed in order for Atlanta to make a competitive bid for the Democratic National 
Convention and Olympic Games, explaining and analyzing how local and state governments 
enacted and transformed laws to silence the Committee to Stop the Murders of Children and the 
Bat Patrol from their public rebuke.  To be sure, both groups skirted compliance with city law.  
Still, once the groups submitted to threats and little legal action, all charges were dropped, 
suggesting that the threat of legal action was intended to silence protest, not to curve illegal 
activity. But most important, the city of Atlanta and the State of Georgia used legal prowess to 
foil the efforts of those least protected by the law, at least as seen through the trudging pace of 
Atlanta City Hall to investigate the crime. This chapter will also focus on the tensions between 
Atlanta’s black upper and middle classes and black working and poor classes as manifested 
through various episodes of the Atlanta Youth murders.  Finally, this chapter will attempt to 
explain the city’s willingness to place the charges of murders exclusively on Wayne Williams, a 
23-year old charlatan posing as talent agent and freelance photographer who outfitted his car 
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with police lights to impress people, most notably children.  Williams was a strange character, 
charged and convicted with the murders of Jimmy Rae Payne and Nathaniel Cater, victims both 
in their twenties as a result of a Georgia Law that allowed the prosecutors to use evidence from 
other cases as evidence against the accused.  With this, Fulton County prosecutors placed the 
blame for all of the murders on Williams, an accomodationist and irresponsible tactic by local 
and state officials to alleviate fear and rebuke. 
 Discussions of the Atlanta missing and murdered children connected to a larger discourse 
of race in America, as many feared the resurgence of klan-like racism with an international 
reach.  In fact, some believed that the murders were the handiwork of the Ku Klux Klan while 
others feared these acts to be a part of a federal government agency to carry out the killings, or a 
conspiracy with the FBI and the CIA and even Atlanta based Centers for Disease Control—to 
commit mass murder.  According to Bernard Headley and FBI sources, there were others who 
believed that both the FBI and CIA were in diabolical cahoots with the Klan to murder black 
male children, whose bodies the CDC needed for penile experimentation.    Segments of the Far 
Left saw the murders as tied to forces of institutionalized international oppression.  The 
disappearance and killing of black children in America, and a stint of killings of immigrant black 
West Indian youth in Great Britain allegedly by British police—had broader historical 
implications to the right wing, reactionary politics of the Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher 
era.  There were also a series of racially motivated murders of blacks in Buffalo, New York. The 
Atlanta murders were manifestations of racial oppression everywhere. However, and most 
important, there were sentiments amongst Atlanta’s black working and poor classes that Atlanta 
City Hall and police forces were carrying out these horrific acts.267  
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Black Body Snatchers 
 
In the summer of 1979, the bodies of two black boys were found on a vacant lot on 
Niskey Lake Road located in southwest Atlanta.  The murder of the two boys signaled the 
beginning of one of the darkest chapters in the history of the city of Atlanta.  By the fall of 1980, 
fifteen of the Atlanta areas black children between the ages of 7 and 15 had been abducted or 
murdered.  Eleven of these children had been found murdered and four of them were missing.  
At this time, two of the children were females and 13 were males. It was clear that there was a 
serial killer on the loose that targeted Atlanta’s children of poverty living on the City’s west, 
south and east sides.  This dark episode known as Atlanta’s Missing and Murdered children but 
was often referred to in  public circles as the Atlanta Child Murders, highlighted Atlanta’s 
increasing black underclass because all of the victims were black and poor children.  The 1980 
census indicated that 27 percent of Atlanta’s population was living in poverty, which was a 
higher percentage of poor people than all but one American city, Newark.  As such, poor blacks 
in Atlanta looked to Jackson for provisions and comfort.268   
The Atlanta police bureau was headed by two African Americans, Reginald Eaves’ 
successor and public safety commissioner Lee Brown and his chief of police, George Napper.  In 
August of 1980, Brown announced that agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
suspected a pattern in the killings and were conducting the investigation as if the deaths of the 
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children were related.  However, this also proved to be a test for Mayor Maynard Jackson to 
show his prowess as a leader in a time of crisis centered on terror, not political infighting and 
economic development.  In the past, one of Jackson’s strong suits was his dealing with police 
brutality which was a major problem when he took office.  Jackson had all but eliminated police 
brutality on poor blacks, a place where he received wide support from blacks.  But months 
passed with no arrest and the mothers of Atlanta’s missing and murdered children formed vocal 
support groups that criticized the mayor, along with others of black Atlanta’s community. 
Jackson became the center of contempt and ridicule from blacks, particularly blacks that were 
part of Atlanta’s working poor and poor communities.  Gary Pomerantz wrote “for the moment, 
Maynard Jr. no longer was a symbol of racial progress, but a symbol of authority—authority was 
failing to protect black children.”269 This was one of the few but clear cut cases where Atlanta’s 
poor blacks turned against Jackson, seeing him as one that had gained notoriety and status with 
their support, but did nothing to protect their children. 
The abduction and murdering of Atlanta’s black children caused a range of emotions 
within the black community, both locally and nationally.  Questions focused on whether this was 
the act of one serial killer, a group of serial killers working together, or a series of simultaneous 
and disconnected murders.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there had been no history of a 
black serial killer.  The common sentiment within the black community was that no black person 
would commit these kinds of murder and that this was the work of a “typical” white serial 
killer.270  However, as time passed with no arrests or new leads, Jackson surmised that this had to 
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be the work of a black person, or a white person made to look as if he was black.  In Atlanta’s 
overwhelmingly black communities, white persons frolicking in the streets raised serious 
amounts of suspicion.  If this were the case, blacks would have either retaliated against white 
killers themselves or turned the killer(s) in to the Atlanta police.  Since this did not happen, the 
terror of the murders added a traumatic psychological factor where the killer(s) may prowl freely 
within the black community. 
On the streets, the killer was referred to as the Man, a term ironically appropriated for the 
police.  It was widely believed that the most suspicious population within the black community 
was Atlanta’s black police.  Black Atlanta had interesting episodes with the police since the City 
hired its first black police in the late 1940s.  Amongst poor blacks, the sentiment was “if you 
must call a policeman—for God’s sake, try to make sure it was a white one.”271 The sentiments 
expressed with this were that black policemen knew far more about blacks than whites did, and 
as such, the black community was without defenses before black officers for whom, it was 
widely believed, their entire reason for breathing seemed to be the hope to that, though they were 
black, they were not black like the masses. Black policeman knew that many elements of the 
community distrusted them, and there were some that viewed the police as the murderers of 
black children.272   
The black community felt as if City Hall responded slowly because the missing and 
murdered children of Atlanta were characterized as “runaways and hustlers.”  This description 
was more indicative about how City Hall, black elites and the middle classes felt about children 
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whose parents were at the bottom of the economic ladder.  However, Jackson made sure that he 
was present within the black community.  He went into the streets and attended three churches 
every Sunday.  Gary Pomerantz notes that during the time of the murders, his own son, Maynard 
H. Jackson, III was almost ten years old, the same age as some of the boys found murdered or 
missing.  This made these tragedies both real and personal to Jackson.  For weeks, Jackson had 
declined interviews with the national television networks, fearing it would sensationalize the 
murders of black children on a national and international stage, which would hurt Atlanta’s 
image as the “City too busy too hate.”  However, he eventually conceded to an interview with 
CBS reporter Ed Bradley, conducted at a local park while Maynard III played a little league 
baseball game. This interview displayed Jackson’s compassion and expressiveness.273 
By April of 1981, FBI Director, William Webster reported that three of the murders of 
Atlanta youth deemed disconnected from the patterned murders had been “substantially solved.”  
According to FBI sources, the killers were not indicted for the murders because Georgia 
prosecutors were hesitant about pursuing criminal charges, in the event that it would weaken the 
chances of convicting a serial killer.  However, Fulton County District Attorney Lewis Slaton 
denied that there was any intention to wait for any particular case. According to Slaton, he was 
not aware of the “sufficient evidence to indict anyone at the time.”  In this event, he stated, “If 
any case breaks and we’ve got the evidence, we’ll proceed.  We will not hold up a case to wait 
for another case.”274  Webster did not indicate whether FBI evidence concluded that there was a 
single killer or more than one killer operating in concert.  The fact that 30 FBI investigators and 
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roughly 35 Georgia Bureau Investigators worked the cases with no results convinced Atlanta’s 
black community that there was no real attempt to catch the killer.275 
 
The STOP Committee 
 
When the murders purportedly commenced in 1979, it had been estimated that more than 
4,000 children were murdered annually in the United States, with many of the crimes going 
unreported.  In 1979, the FBI listed 2,773 homicides involving children of different races 
brought together by the cruel bond of murder, sexual assault, and neglect.  American children 
were being forced into prostitution, their bodies infused with drugs and their minds tormented 
with abuse.  At that moment, there were 50,000 children that were missing or dead. With this 
frustration, Camille Bell, a former civil rights worker and mother of victim Yusuf Bell, along 
with six other victims’ mothers founded the Committee to Stop the Murders of Children (STOP 
Committee) in May of 1980.  The STOP Committee’ mission for short term goals were to make 
it more difficult for potential murderers to commit more murders and abductions and to organize 
and combat more violent crimes against children.  Their long term mission was to promote better 
and safer environments for children; to “remind each person that [they] were their brother’s 
keeper; and to actively prevent physical, emotional, moral and educational murder of children.”  
Along with their mission, the organization had nine objectives.276  
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Almost as important as the protection of Atlanta’s children, the STOP Committee also 
worked to dismiss the notion that their children were hoodlums or hustlers. They asserted that the 
children were ordinary and engaged in ordinary children’s pursuits and that many of them were 
gifted and watched over their brothers and sisters when parents were absent.  It was a network 
through which the murdered children’s parents stayed in touch and worked to keep the memory 
of Atlanta’s missing and murdered children afloat and in the public eye.  Also, it served as an 
attempt to remedy the negligence they felt from City hall.  The STOP Committee boldly 
challenged the City’s slow response with resistance of its own.  The group also prepared 
pamphlets on rules for child safety which they distributed in shopping centers and neighborhoods 
around Atlanta.  Because the organization grew out of mothers grieving over the deaths of their 
children, STOP Committee mothers vehemently rebuked Maynard Jackson, Public Safety 
Director Lee P. Brown and police chief George Napper.  As evidence of this, Camille Bell 
publicly referred to Mayor Jackson as “the Fat boy,”277 
However, STOP Committee’s rebuke towards Atlanta city officials was more than just 
mere name-calling as the group hosted a series of conferences to inform parents of how they 
could better protect their children from being “snatched”.  The Committee called for the 
establishment of a national computerized data bank for missing children that could be used to 
study and analyze solved and unsolved murder cases involving children.  The Committee also 
called for a rally on May 25, 1981 at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington DC, to focus on the 
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problems of children nationwide.  The purpose of the rally was to raise the awareness on the war 
on American children.  During one of her emotional outbursts, Bell, the spokeswoman for STOP 
Committee, stated, “Our children don’t learn in schools; they are dying on the streets; they are 
being used as sexual objects….kiddy porn flourishes, drugs are being pumped into their little 
systems. When these things happen to any group of people, you would consider it a war.  Any 
nation that does not operate on a children-first basis is being suicidal.”278  Though the STOP 
Committee had not registered as a non-profit organization, they did gain endorsements by the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), District 65 of the 
United Auto Workers and District of Columbia’s Mayor Marion Barry.  As previously stated, the 
AFSCME fought tooth and nail against Maynard Jackson during the sanitary worker strikes of 
the 1970s.  With the widespread criticism towards Jackson, AFSCME’s endorsement of the 
STOP Committee prolonged its fight with the mayor over the central question as to whether 
Jackson had the best interests of Atlanta’s working people in mind.  Much of this can also be 
seen in the STOP Committee’s critique of the Mayor. Bell, as well as the STOP Committee, was 
critical of the inept response of Atlanta officials, asserting that missing ghetto children were 
more likely to be labeled as runaways instead of victims of crime.  The STOP Committee pushed 
for Atlanta’s officials to call in the National Guard to help solve the cases.279 
The most notable critique of the STOP Committee was City Hall’s slow response in 
forming a task force to investigate the murders.  Bell asserted that her anger towards City Hall 
was not solely on the fact that she had lost her son Yusef to the killer, but because Atlanta’s 
black leaders had done little to prevent the crimes from happening.  In Bell’s words, Atlanta 
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officials acted as though their children had “dropped of the face of the earth.”  But her most 
critical point was that it took City Hall too long to admit that a serial killer preyed on the city’s 
black and poor children.  As Bell stated, “…the mayor has not come out and said there is a 
problem. There may be no connection, but that borders on ridiculous.”  Bell’s ridicule was based 
on the fact that few of Atlanta’s public officials had publicly expressed outrage over abuse of its 
children, nor actively warned parents of the dangers, a situation that left Bell, and the rest of the 
mothers of the STOP Committee, hurt, confused and disgusted.280  
In point of fact, it took Mayor Jackson from July of 1979, when the bodies of two boys 
were found of Niskey Road, to July of 1980 to create a task force to investigate the murders. By 
this time Bell and the Stop Committee had begun to cast the city’s neglect in terms of class 
division.  She stated plainly, “I know that it can’t be because we’re black. It is because we’re 
poor!  I think that it is time that he [Jackson] acted responsibly.”  Of the murders, six of the boys 
either belonged to the YMCA or the Boy’s Club, ranged within eight inches of each other in 
height, was of brown complexion and wore a medium afro haircut.  All of the victims hailed 
from low-income areas. Bell charged Police Chief George Napper with incompetence because of 
his consistent refusal to establish a connection between the murders, accused Mayor Jackson of 
“pussyfooting around,” and accused the public service commissioner of a “mealy-mouthed” 
response to the situation. Her tirade was indicative of the sentiments of black Atlantans in 
general—that too few public officials had expressed outrage regarding the serial killer of 
Atlanta’s poor black children.  The STOP Committee had invited Jackson to all press 
conferences, meetings at Wheat Street Baptist Church, and other conferences around the city.  
Yet he did not attend.  Bell and the STOP Committee regarded Jackson’s stance as insulting and 
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dismissive because, according to them, he never bothered to send a city representative to the 
meetings nor did he ever respond to an invitation to speak at the STOP Committee’s conference. 
The opposition noted that Jackson found time to campaign for Governor Zell Miller, and yet “he 
couldn’t find the time to be concerned about the kids of Atlanta.” The mothers of the murdered 
and missing children were convinced that Jackson could at very least perform one important 
event, to get in front of the media and say, “Hey, Atlanta, there’s a problem.” After all, Jackson 
himself was a father of a 10 year old son.281 
Though Mayor Maynard Jackson bore the brunt of the STOP Committee’s criticism, 
Bell’s scathing denouncement of other political elites was also noteworthy.  When white city 
councilwoman Elaine Williams Lester showed up to STOP Committee meetings, this provided a 
stage for Bell to lash out at other political brokers in the Atlanta area.  To Bell, Lester’s 
attendance of the meetings was seen as a gesture of genuine concern for Atlanta; however, it 
provided a stage for Bell to call out others.  In this event, Bell stated, “Where were Q.V. 
Williamson, James Bond, Morris Finley, Marvin Arrington and Bill McKinney?  When they 
wanted votes, they knew where to find us…right over there in McDaniel-Glenn [housing 
projects].”282  Bell’s critique of the Atlanta’s black political leaders pointed increasingly to class 
divisions between the city’s black power structure, and its working class Black community.  The 
charge that Atlanta’s black political leaders only looked to Atlanta’s poor for votes spoke 
directly to a feeling of class exploitation.  
To Bell and the STOP Committee’s credit, they were influential in getting police chief 
Napper to establish a five man task force—only after Bell appeared before the Public Service 
Committee meeting to lobby for its necessity.  Also, Bell’s outspokenness and detective work 
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provided the few known leads to police.  Without her help, the only lead that the police had was 
that an early model blue Chevrolet Nova was the vehicle in which several of the missing and 
murdered children were last seen.  But from Bell’s perspective, the real issue with the lack of 
public acknowledgement hinged on political in-fighting within black political ranks.  Angelo 
Fuster, Jackson’s press secretary, rebuked the group’s plea for help as a result of what he gleaned 
from the STOP Committee’s newspaper coverage.  Fuster felt as if Bell and the STOP 
Committee’s were out to embarrass the Atlanta’s black administration.  Another account of this 
can be seen when Bell approached 35th District Representative Billy McKinney for help, he 
stated “the mayor’s trying to get me thrown out of office. After the election, I will help you.”283  
But, more importantly, Atlanta’s black administration’s failure to address the abduction and 
murders of black children as a by product of political in-fighting was confusing and called for 
some poor blacks to begin seeking the election of a white mayor and administration. Evidence of 
this was seen when Bell stated, “Back when we had a white administration, every black person in 
this city would be out calling racism, but it can’t be racism because Maynard’s supposed to be 
black, but if it’s not racism, what is it?  I don’t know why the mayor won’t act.  I just know that 
the mayor’s types of people are not being hurt.  I hope I’m wrong, but either he’s surrounded by 
a bunch of incompetents or he just doesn’t care. If white people don’t care about black people, 
that’s bad. But if black people don’t care about black people, that’s deplorable.  Atlanta used to 
be the ‘city too busy to hate,’ don’t tell me it’s the ‘city too busy to care’ now.”284 Again, Bell 
pointed directly to Jackson and the rest of the city’s administration, making class rather than race 
the central issue. Bell’s reference to the “mayor’s kind of people” in later years was termed “our 
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kind of people,”285 a term associated with the exclusivity of black elites and as such, Bell’s 
reference situated Jackson’s elite background and pedigree to his negligence on Atlanta’s poor.  
Bell’s unsafe implication here is that Jackson, who was purportedly too busy conceding to white 
business interests, embodied the same kind of prejudice and angst that whites had against blacks; 
albeit Jackson’s prejudice and angst was towards poor blacks and “ghetto children.”  If this was 
the case, Jackson’s black elite disposition was the same as, if not worse, than racist whites.  It is 
not a question of better or worse or race versus class.  Rather the unfolding of the Atlanta child 
murders under a Black political regime constructs new contradictions and shed light on long-
standing contradictions that being poor is the source of a complex set of problems that do not 
disappear with the triumph of black political power.   
In regards to the city and the missing and murdered children, Camille Bell’s critique of 
the city not only focused on city leaders, it focused on the activities of everyday rank and file 
police.  Bell’s sentiments were that Atlanta police officers were not well-trained enough to 
handle a full investigation of the abduction and murders.  Though Public Safety Commissioner 
Lee P. Brown authorized the establishment of the task force and made it larger, and operative 24 
hours a day, it still took a year plagued with abductions and murders to make solving these 
mysteries the top priority.  The police response in creating the task force was slow as police 
willingly admitted that the rash of slayings was very unusual.  Before the episode known as the 
missing and murdered children of Atlanta, statistics show that the city averaged less than one 
such homicide a year.  Bell’s own detective handiwork and establishment was far better than the 
police’s.  Based on a pattern that she noticed, she predicted that another child would be murdered 
that week.  Victim Clifford Jones was found murdered during that week, his body found in the 
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vicinity of the prediction.  With this kind of foresight, Bell and the STOP Committee constructed 
their own task force, gathering useful information such as descriptions or characteristics of men 
who approached children who were “snatched” or about strangers in a given neighborhood.  
They also received the volunteer services of a private detective to supply the police task force 
with information.286 
Bell’s activism raised awareness and fostered fellowship with other civil rights groups.  
Groups such as the SCLC could see that Bell’s investigative results made sense and gave some 
answers to the ailing black community.  On October 5, 1980, the STOP Committee and the 
SCLC joined forces and rallied for Atlanta’s missing and murdered children as a group of 300 
trekked along Auburn Avenue chanting and singing.  The march began in front of the SCLC 
National Office and ended in the Central City Park Amphitheatre.  As a show of the willingness 
to protect the youth, even if the city refused to do so, several groups of uniformed Boy Scouts 
joined the rally.  In a soul stirring oratory, SCLC president Joseph Lowery asserted his disgust 
towards the economic development for Atlanta’s elites, while the black and poor continued to be 
underdeveloped and, some believed, even victims of genocide.  Rev. Lowery challenged the 
community by stating, “Atlanta must not only boast of having the biggest airport in the world, 
but must also strive to be the community with the biggest heart in the world.”  Along with his 
challenge, he chided City officials by asserting that City Hall was more interested in “who killed 
J.R.” than with who was killing Atlanta’ children, “the dream of brotherhood, and justice.”  The 
crowd comprised mostly of those that lived in the most disparaging areas of the city, erupted and 
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gave the SCLC president a standing ovation.287  Lowery’s oration asserted the sentiments 
towards City Hall, an administration that seemed to be more preoccupied with everything else in 
the world other than the concern for Atlanta’s citizens. 
In the week following the rally, an explosion rocked Bowen Homes, one of the Atlanta 
housing projects killing four children and a teacher.  Among the dead were Kelvin Snelson, 
Andre Stanford, Ronald Brown, and Terrance Bradford, all three years old; along with their 
teacher Nell Robinson, 58 years of age. Immediately after the explosion, it was widely 
speculated by West Atlantans that a white supremacist organization was involved. As network 
news programs showed the bodies of black children being removed from rivers, streams, or 
grassy hillsides in Atlanta, a gesture of good faith came from the white business elite who 
worked closer with Jackson than any other time during his mayoral tenure.  For example, the 
Central Atlanta Progress raised $75,000 to build a replacement nursery center at Bowen Homes. 
The white business elite understood that the negative press generated by the murders was 
harming the city’s commercial efforts.  The Atlanta Chamber of Commerce joined to produce an 
advertising motto to boost morale that stated “Let’s Keep Pulling Together, Atlanta.”288  
However, there was no evidence that the daycare explosion was the handiwork of criminal 
behavior and investigators concluded that the Atlanta Housing Authority’s negligence in 
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maintaining the furnace was the cause of the blast.289 This conclusion did not sit well with black 
Atlanta’s most vulnerable, a community that refused to believe that no foul play was involved.  
According to Pomerantz, after a community meeting at the Greater Fairhill Baptist Church, 
members were so enraged that Hosea Williams asked reporters to leave the meeting and led a 
twelve mile march to City Hall, in part to defuse the seething anger.290 
On October 22, 1980, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution ran a picture of Maynard Jackson 
sitting behind a table stacked with $100,000 in small bills of one, five, and ten dollar bills 
provided by First National Bank.  This would be one of the most lasting images of missing and 
murdered episode and of modern Atlanta, as it was indelibly seared into the minds of Americans.  
This was reward money for anyone that came forward with information about the murders.  For 
Jackson’s skeptics, the picture resembled that of Boss Hog291 counting his money.  However, 
what was clear was that City Hall had to do anything possible to get leads that would help them 
solves these cases.  
With influence and pressure from the STOP Committee, not only did members of the 
community join together to address the missing and murdered children as seen with the SCLC 
rally and the donation from the Central Atlanta Project, but local, state and national organizations 
donated their services as well.  Organizations such as the Atlanta Bar Association sponsored a 
week of special police appreciation where speakers discussed the need to support the police and 
involvement in block watch type program; distributed bumper stickers, brochures, posters, and 
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buttons; established a scholarship fund for the dependents of police officers killed in the line of 
duty; and staged a noon rally in Central City Park during which citizens and police met to 
discuss the mutual goal of fighting crime.  The Atlanta Board of Education distributed child 
safety brochures to each child enrolled in elementary and middle school levels, as coordinated by 
the SAFE program.  Also, teachers on all levels discussed child safety tips in their classrooms.  
The Atlanta Bureau of Police Services Crime Prevention Unit conducted community forums and 
personal safety workshops regarding murdered and missing children. It also conducted door-to-
door canvassing of neighborhoods for information relative to murdered and missing children and 
disseminated trading cards to youth.  The Atlanta Bureau of Police Service Field Operations 
Division conducted and responded to preliminary investigations of related activities such as the 
reports of suspicious activities related to crimes in progress; encouraged collaboration between 
the Task Force, school crossing guards and school detectives on suspicious activities near 
schools.  The Atlanta Bureau of Police Service—Missing Persons Unit investigated missing 
children reported, initiated investigation, organized search parties and collected physical 
evidence.292  
 Despite wide ranging criticism from the STOP Committee, Atlanta’s City Hall, which 
housed the Mayor’s Office and the Office of Community and Consumer Affairs, offered its aide 
to help the STOP Committee as a sign of good faith.  Not only did they collect funds to rebuild 
Bowen Homes Daycare, but as a sign of his support, the Mayor Jackson had staffers to attend 
funerals for slain children.  City Hall was also instrumental in coordinating financial 
contributions and words of inspiration to the family through letters and phone calls; providing 
flowers for the slain children; and solicitation and acquisition of monies in excess of $150,000 
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for the reward fund leading to the arrest and conviction of persons responsible for the unsolved 
homicides; accepting contributions for families who received them through distribution from the 
STOP Committee; and assisting in the coordination of searches for the missing children.  Though 
these gestures showed that Jackson held sympathy for the slain children, it did little to ease the 
panic of the city, and some saw his gestures as mere politicking.293  Interestingly the list provided 
shows evidence Jackson’s continuous quagmire with President Jimmy Carter and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in his attempt to get federal help in solving the missing and murdered 
children cases. 
 The episode of the missing and murdered children of Atlanta exposed deeper  and wider 
fault lines in the Black New South Atlanta.  Clearly, Atlanta was not the poster child for black 
success and business as it had been portrayed.  The fact that poor and black children were being 
hunted in the New South’s rising capital contradicted the image of Atlanta as a black Mecca for 
those with education and skill level.  Nonetheless Maynard Jackson continued his campaign to 
portray Atlanta as a cultural and commercial haven of yet another New South. Because Atlanta 
had successfully elected a black mayor to his second term in a city where the black middle 
classes enjoyed much success, black businesses from around the nation looked upon the attack 
on black children in Atlanta as a strike against their own thriving business communities.  This 
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can be best seen in a letter written from Pro-Line Corporation, a company that specializes in hair 
products for African Americans housed in Dallas, Texas.  In the letter, Director of Public 
Relations Lydia Furry wrote: 
As a corporate entity we would like to express our concern through some meaningful 
involvement.  Although you have been promised financial assistance from the 
government, it is our premise that those of us in black businesses should also reach out 
to help our own people. 
 
If you would assist me by informing for suggesting to me some significant role we 
could play in bringing this nightmare to an end, please call me here at Pro-Line 
Corporation. 
 
Maybe we could send out the call to our corporate peers and make a joint financial 
commitment regarding this endeavor.294 
 
This letter spoke to the terms in which black communities around America looked to Atlanta.  
The reference to “our children” further asserts Atlanta’s black Mecca status because it showed 
that Atlanta’s notoriety as a booming black city and the vanguard of black business.  With this, it 
was apparent that in the black business communities, proprietors felt not only kinship to Atlanta, 
but citizenship as well because of the inclusive nature of the letter, which put Atlanta, Dallas, 
and other cities with a strong black business presence, in the same community connoted in the 
use of the word “our.”  With this, it was important that Atlanta remain as the capital of black 
business, even as the abduction and murders of black children marred the city’s image. 
 Attention to the missing and murdered children of Atlanta also commanded attention and 
responses from black celebrities.  Actress Ester Rolle called for the total community to come 
together and realize that there was a serious problem. Rolle also suggested that focusing on the 
positive activities of Atlanta’s youth would help to solve the cases and ease tensions.295  Rolle’s 
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character, Florida Evans, from the popular black sitcom “Good Times” qualified her as an 
advocate who debunked myths about ghetto black children as hustlers.  In the show, she played 
the wife of a working mother of three gifted black children raised in the most abject poverty of 
Chicago’s public housing.  A benefit hosted by two members of the famed Rat Pack, Frank 
Sinatra and Sammy Davis Jr. raised $280,000.  The famous novelist, playwright, poet, essayist, 
and civil rights activist James Baldwin was prompted to write an essay in Playboy Magazine 
which in 1985 turned into his famous book The Evidence of Things Not Seen, a scathing critique 
that examined the relationship between the murders and the larger issue of race in America and 
recapitulated themes throughout Baldwin’s masterpieces, the connection of the oppressed and the 
oppressor, and government mistreatment of poor blacks.  But Baldwin’s account asserted that the 
conviction of Wayne William failed to prove his guilt beyond a shadow of a doubt and uncovers 
some of the theories and beliefs of Atlanta’s poor and black communities, whose children had 
fallen prey.  Interestingly, Baldwin described the aforementioned benefit hosted by Davis and 
Sinatra, as “buck-dancing on the graves” of the missing and murdered youth.296 
 After a series of meetings in which Jackson attempted to sequester the FBI to help with 
finding the killer of poor black children, President Jimmy Carter, in a press conference, promised 
a group of black ministers that he would do whatever possible to help in the investigation.  
Carter’s “deep disturbance” for the citizens in his home state that had elected him to Governor in 
1971, did not influence the dispatching of FBI agents to Atlanta.  It was not until an anonymous 
call to the mother of Earl Terrell that stated that the boy was unharmed and in Alabama, that FBI 
became active.  The fact that a child was purportedly transported across state lines made the 
abduction a federal offense. Along with the FBI’s help, came Dorothy Allison, a psychic from 
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New Jersey.  Allison was brought in to assist police with hopes that her psychic ability would 
bring forth information.  She toured areas where the victims had been found and concluded that 
at least one of the killers was a black man and believed that there was more than one killer.297 
 The efforts of Camille Bell and the STOP Committee, in terms of fundraising, were not 
the only efforts by organizations to raise funds.  Other fundraising and support activities took 
place across the nation. One thousand marched in Chattanooga, Tennessee chanting, “We want it 
stopped.”  In Columbus, Ohio, a “Columbus Cares” slogan raised $37,000 given to the City of 
Atlanta.  A grandmother in Philadelphia started a green ribbon campaign.  A candlelight vigil 
was organized by 30 groups in Harlem.  Members of the recording industry raised money for the 
families of the slain children. The Coalition for Black Colleges and the National Black Child 
Development Institute called for black ribbons with the slogan, “We Must Do More!” President 
Ronald Reagan, in an unprecedented move, gave Atlanta an additional $1.5 million to help 
finance their investigation. These efforts showed that the killings of black children in Atlanta 
precipitated a new look at the condition of black children in America, with Atlanta holding 
center stage.  Americans across the country were wearing ribbons—some green, some black, 
some red. They were a symbol for the special horror and sense of concern for the murdered and 
missing black children.298  These widespread activities showed that the attention that Atlanta 
warranted was not solely based on grief from death, but the embarrassment that came for the city 
administration’s inability to find the killer(s).  With this notion, tourists questioned what need 
they had to go to Atlanta. 
                                                 
297 FBI Papers, Atlanta Child Murders, Part 1. 
 
298 Tony Brown, “Tony Brown’s Journal, Black Children: Can We Do More,” Atlanta Daily World, 2 April 
1981, 4. 
 
 179 
 However, the eagerness to donate to the cause of finding the killer(s) and healing the 
community presented new problems for the STOP Committee.  When citizens in New York City 
were eager to donate money to help the families of slain children, Mayor Maynard Jackson 
asserted that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s Family Fund was the only 
legitimate charity distributing money to the victims’ families and that donations could be 
received at P.O. Box 4485, Atlanta, Georgia, 30303.299  This, in turn, pitted and portrayed other 
organizations collecting money as rogue groups, using the charities for profit.   
 Meanwhile, the STOP Committee negligence to register as 501 © (4) status gave law 
makers an opening to quell the efforts of the organization that loudly criticized local, state and 
federal officials for negligence. To some Atlantans, Camille Bell seemed an embarrassment 
because of her uncompromising stance that no one had the authority to collect money for the 
children but the parents of the children.  The STOP Committee had gone nationally and 
internationally to raise money not only for the families of Atlanta’s children but for children in 
general and further blister Atlanta’s City hall. Following the threat of prosecution by Tim Ryles, 
the director of the Governor’s Office of Consumer Affairs, the STOP Committee was expected 
to file for charity organization status as the first step of many hurdles that the organization 
needed to avoid possible criminal charges.  The threat of prosecution was based on the fact that 
the STOP Committee was purportedly collecting donations for families of victims and for other 
events.  This brought up questions of accountability towards donations and how monies collected 
were being used.  Ryles threatened that “If they [could not] account for the money that was 
raised, if they cannot account for how it [was] spent, if they [were] unable to show at the end of 
the year that 70 percent of the money went for the purposes for which it was collected, then [they 
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were] potentially liable for some fairly serious penalties.”300  The threats made by Ryles were 
welcomed by City Hall because Bell’s attacks on the administration not only gave voice to the 
murdered children, but, more important, they opened up a critique of black middle class 
sentiments towards poor black children.  The STOP Committee’s critique of the city, to sum it 
up, aired the political infighting within Atlanta as manifested in tensions between the black 
power structure and ordinary black citizens. 
 In an effort to be compliant with the Governor’s Office of Consumer Affairs, the STOP 
Committee reported that it had collected nearly $40,000 and had expenditures of more than 
$15,000 in donations to families of missing and murdered young blacks.  When officers Camille 
Bell and Venus Taylor filed for non-profit status on August 19, 1980, they listed the purpose of 
their fund-raising activities as “aid for summer camps for Atlanta Children who [were] showing 
symptoms of psychological effects of the Atlanta Children’s murders.” However, little or no 
money collected in the first six months of the STOP Committee’s existence went to summer 
camps.  Most of the early donations were designated by donors for distribution to families of 
victims.  The STOP Committee claimed to have raised money through direct mail, personal and 
telephone solicitation, benefit performances, appearances of celebrities, and the sale of t-shirts 
and buttons.  From October through December of 1980, the STOP Committee reported that it 
raised $8,476.69 and spent $8,080.43 with mothers of victims receiving $929 in small amounts.  
From January to March of 1981, the Committee reported income of $30,581.22 with 
expenditures of $18,366.09, with $14,808 of that going to 22 relatives of victims. Most of the 
relatives were mothers of slain children and received $677.50 each. The report also listed $44.50 
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expenditure for the funeral of victim Charles Stevens.301  With these figures, the STOP 
Committee welcomed any investigation by the Office of Consumer Affairs. 
 As the STOP Committee welcomed an investigation, Tim Ryles of the Office of 
Consumer Affairs vowed to seek a subpoena for group of mother’s fund-raising records unless 
they voluntarily complied with Georgia’s charitable solicitation laws.  Though the STOP 
Committee provided financial reports, they did not provide bank records and ledgers to validate 
the two quarters reported on June 30, 1981.  To the Office of Consumer Affairs, of the 
approximate $40,000 collected, about half that amount was paid to relatives of slain young 
blacks.  Georgia law required that 70 percent of donations go for the charitable purposes outlined 
in a solicitation—with a ceiling of 30 percent of administrative costs. The law also required 
annual audits of charitable operations collecting more than $50,000, a level that would be 
attained before the end of the year.  If the Committee was found in violation of the law, it could 
he fined, enjoined from raising more money and there could be criminal action.302 
 Because the STOP Committee had turned in two reports deemed unsatisfactory and had 
failed to meet a September 30th deadline set by Tim Ryles, legal action was sought against the 
group due to Ryles’ weariness of waiting for STOP Committee’s compliance with state charity 
laws. Before Ryles’ threat, the group announced plans to disband and form a new organization 
that would collect money to help with counseling and rehabilitation efforts for children suffering 
psychological damage from two years worth of murders to Atlanta’s children.  The logic of the 
disbandment was that there would be no need to supply financial reports to the Office of 
Consumer Affairs because the group no longer existed.  To Ryles, the use of this tactic by a 
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group refashioning itself to re-establish its credibility raised serious doubts about the integrity of 
the organization.   The STOP Committee disbandment and refashioning was a mockery for 
reasons that it came to avoid requirements of the law.  Ryles and the Office of Consumer Affairs 
were spent on trying to track the ebb and flow of income and found it every difficulty to establish 
an audit trail.  After being given three months to comply and the fact that the STOP Committee 
collected income of more than $50,000 for the year which required that the annual report be 
certified by an accountant,  opened a full investigation of the committee by local and state 
auditors.303  Ryles and the Office of Consumer Affairs would stifle the might of the STOP 
Committee, however, evidence of misappropriation would be exposed and bruise the credibility 
of the organization. 
 On October 20, 1981, Tim Ryles charged the officers of the STOP Committee for 
abusing the public’s trust and making a mockery of the law.  The three officers charged were 
Camille Bell, Willie Mae Mathis and Venus Taylor, all mothers of slain children.  Through an 
ongoing investigation, officers uncovered that Venus Taylor used $800 of committee money to 
pay for a plastic surgery procedure known as a “tummy tuck.”  With this, Ryles vowed to seek 
criminal and civil misconduct charges against the organization.  The STOP Committee stated 
that it had raised about $90,000 but all indications showed that the Committee actually raised 
about $40,000.  The inflation of the purported amount in the committee’s statement allowed for 
the $50,000 difference between the actual collected evidence to charade as a figure closer to the 
70 percent expenditure mark required by Georgia law.  Members of the group had committed a 
series of other violations which included failure to file an annual audit conducted by a certified 
public accountant and was required by law.  On the day the charges were filed, the Bell, Mathis 
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and Taylor brought Ryles a statement indicating that the STOP Committee had insufficient funds 
to pay a Certified Public Accountant to conduct an audit.  Other violations were failure to 
register as a charity, failure to file quarterly fund-raising reports and claiming sponsors that did 
not exist.  Also, Ryles charged the refashioned group with violation of a Georgia law that 
prohibited a group from using a name that was “confusingly similar to another organization.”  It 
was evident that Ryles sought to prosecute the women asserting “had he had the authority to 
prosecute the STOP officers…they would be in jail.”  With this, Ryles asked local prosecutors to 
proceed with criminal action. These charges called for the STOP Committee to file suit on 
October 26, 1981, asking that Tim Ryles be stopped from harassment and whether the new group 
was responsible for the old group’s debt. With the threat of conviction, Camille Bell admitted 
that the STOP Committee made some fundraising mistakes “out of ignorance” but asserted that 
the committee had no intention of violation the law.  In late December, attorneys for the STOP 
Committee negotiated with the state of Georgia for a settlement of two civil suits. 304 However, it 
seemed that the real charges against the STOP Committee were that they had alerted the nation 
and the world to the fact that there was indeed a problem raging in the “city too busy to hate.” 
 
The Bat Patrol 
 
In another attempt to help protect black children, a movement of armed resistance grew 
amongst those within Atlanta as citizens took the law into their own hands. The most notable of 
these armed groups was the Bat Patrol, a group of citizens from Techwood Homes whose adults 
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carried firearms and teenagers carried baseball bats as they secured their housing project from 
suspected killers.  The Bat Patrol, also dubbed the Ron Carter Patrol in honor of the slain Black 
Panther activist, acted as a protective agent in providing security for community children.  
Interestingly, the Bat Patrol was founded on the March 20, 1981, the same day that mentally 
retarded resident Eddie Lee Duncan went missing. Organized by Chimurenga Jenga, Techwood 
Tenant Association spokesman, initially it was not clear as to the number of members that 
patrolled Techwood, Atlanta’s largest housing project.  Jenga, a black radical, had been at the 
forefront of other demonstrations seen in Atlanta.  His radical approach of armed resistance was 
seen by some in Techwood Homes as agitation.  However, they conceded that it was a necessary 
measure to ensure that the children of Techwood Homes were safe.305 
 To Atlanta City Hall, the Bat Patrol’s armed resistance was problematic.  It suggested 
that Atlanta’s black city administration was incapable of protecting black citizens, shining more 
light on the popular negative sentiments towards the mayor and City Hall.  To combat this, 
Jackson commissioned the police and city attorneys to “explore the legal parameters” of the 
community setting up armed patrol. To Bat Patrollers, Jackson’s strategy was not because of 
legal implications, but because citizens were protecting their own communities better than 
Atlanta police.  The sentiments held by City Hall and some members of the Techwood Homes 
community were predicated on the idea of teens as well as adults carrying weapons with 
intentions of using them on anyone appearing to be abducting a child.  Some citizens felt that the 
Bat Patrol drew unwarranted attention to their community and would result in the abductions and 
the murders of additional Techwood children.  Others did not understand the need for bats or 
guns.  With this, Jackson asserted that the job of patrolling the community for such incidents 
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belonged to the police force and he cautioned Jenga and the rest of the Bat Patrollers to allow 
police to do their job or run the risk of not only harming themselves, but Techwood children.306  
For this reason, the Atlanta Police Department asked the Bat Patrol to discontinue their patrols 
and leave law enforcement to them. The Bat Patrol’s refusal to adhere to this request resulted in 
an opening to dismember the group by City Hall based on Atlanta law and policy. 
 One of the compromising aspects of Bat Patrol members was that the organization was 
not tactically exclusive.  Techwood Homes, Atlanta’s largest housing project was more diverse 
than many of the housing projects in the city’s West End, which had overwhelmingly black 
populations.  The foundation of the organization comprised of radical blacks and excluded 
whites, however, at least three of the patrolmen: Gene Ferguson, Jerome Gibbs and Modibo 
Kadalie were all prohibited from carrying weapons because of prior convictions.  With this, they 
were charged with weapons violations. Jenga was initially charged with six counts; which 
included carrying a pistol without license, carrying a concealed weapon at a public gathering, 
obstructing a police officer, disorderly conduct, reckless conduct and obstructing an officer.  In 
the Fulton County State Court, these charges were misdemeanors and carried a maximum fine of 
$1,000 and up to one year in prison.  This aggressive approach using law asserted the City’s 
stance against armed patrol.  Deputy Police Chief Eldren Bell assured the public that “if they 
carried weapons either concealed or otherwise…they would be arrested.”307 
 Patterned after the Black Panther Party of Self-Defense, the Bat Patrol promoted black 
power and self defense through social agitation.  The similarities between the groups fostered 
sentiments of the black power movement that embodied the components of provocative rhetoric 
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and militant posturing.  Just as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover declared that the Black Panthers as 
a threat to internal security, it became clear that Maynard Jackson and City Hall shared similar 
sentiment towards the Bat Patrol. The group’s resistance to political threats of incarceration if 
caught with weapons and dialogue with City Hall turned into a showdown resembling that of the 
Black Panther Party of Self Defense’s circumstances with the state of California in the 1960s and 
70s.  With this, Israel Green, President of the Techwood Homes Tenants Association in Jenga’s 
absence and co-founder of the Bat Patrol stated, “Nothing will stop our patrols.  We will carry 
weapons but they will be concealed.  IF we have to arm people on the roofs, we’ll do it.”308   
 The arrival of the Bat Patrol and their subsequent vigilante status also spoke to other 
issues seen in Atlanta.  Unlike other central cities, it was far too easy to get hand guns in Atlanta.  
The Guardian Angels of New York, who had converged on the city for a three week stay with 
the intentions of helping catch the killer(s), left the city bewildered at the fact that guns could be 
purchased at grocery stores.  In Georgia, the criteria for purchasing a gun were a driver’s license 
and adult status.  Guns were sold at K-Mart and other popular retail stores.  The sentiments 
expressed by the Guardian Angels seemed counter productive to the Bat Patrol, a group that 
believed in the second amendment as did most of the southern states, and can be seen through 
relaxed gun laws in the said region.  Because the Guardian Angels went to Atlanta to persuade 
Atlanta’s children to band together and not resort to using weapons, they were instrumental in 
delivering the deathblow to the Bat Patrol.  Their presence in the city prompted a city-wide 
Advisory Council on Public Housing, which represented 18 of the 25 public housing projects in 
the city that would provide patrols and organize search parties.309  However, it should be noted 
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that the Guardian Angels, deemed fraudulent themselves, were not well received by black 
Atlantans and considered interlopers, were unfamiliar with Atlanta’s black community and 
people, the primary targets of the killers.  Because City Hall knew this, they were able to counter 
wide spread sentiments felt by Atlanta’s black and poor and enacted a more systematic approach 
to patrol which further marginalized armed resistance.   
 The patrols were established by citizen volunteers was called the Watch Patrol.  The 
Watch Patrol was created by the United Youth Adult Conference, which was led by Councilman 
Arthur Langford, and brought together citizen volunteers with band radios trained by the police.  
With this, they worked with the police, not as agitators. Their primary concern was to enforce the 
7a.m. to 7 p.m. curfew in the city.  The group planned to flood the streets with one to two 
thousand volunteers during the summer months when hundreds of thousands of school children 
would need supervision. Along with the development of the Watch Patrol and the start of the 
summer months, Public safety commissioner Lee P. Brown appealed youth to travel in groups at 
all times. Brown also pointed out that all of the adductions occurred when the victim was alone 
and stressed the importance of parents insuring their children to be aware of that fact at all time. 
 To black Atlantans, the episode of the 29 murdered black children and young adults was 
one of Atlanta’s greatest tragedies.  However, what was just as great was the city’s inability to 
end the tragedy bringing the murderer(s) to justice.  This inability derived from a lack of 
appropriate police investigation early compounded with a lack of guidance from the Mayor’s 
office and jurisdictional disputes.  But most important, the implicit silent consensus of the city on 
the part of black and white leaders was the greatest tragedy.310  All of this would come to terms 
as candidates vied for the city’s top position with elections in the fall of 1981.  What was most 
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evident about this situation was that none of the candidates running, including the subsequent 
winner Andrew Young, spoke to the issues of the missing and murdered children at length.  
From all of the evidence shown, none of the candidates took a strong position as to how to end 
this tragedy and further safeguard the people of Atlanta. 
 The inability for Atlanta police to apprehend the killers left room for all manner of rumor, 
gossip and speculation. Yet, it was widely believed that had the victims been white, the reaction 
from the white community would have been vociferous and sustained until justice was bestowed.  
There existed also the widely held belief that if any of the victims had been from the black 
middle classes, Atlanta’s administration would have acted with more firmness and dispatch.  
Moreover, the popular political sentiment within Atlanta’s working and poor classes was that if 
the city’s administration was white, the black community would have descended upon City Hall 
in a storm of protest, accusing the Mayor and his Commissioners of racism. The fact that the 
black community had not exerted the same kind of pressure on the Jackson administration spoke 
of its hypocrisy. But, as the black community treated the city’s administration with kid gloves, 
29 young Atlantans lost their lives.  When Maynard Jackson and his administration finally 
decided that the city of Atlanta was faced with a crisis, he asked for and received federal 
financial assistance.  When he asked that the reward fund be increased, it was.  When he asked 
for federal agents to aid the investigation, though it was a struggle, he was granted that request 
also.  When he asked citizens to rally and protect their own children and their neighbors, the 
citizens of Atlanta responded with a massive “kid watch” effort.  All that Jackson asked the 
community to do was done, and yet the murders continued.311 Because class was perceived as the 
fundamental source of Atlanta’s neglect, what resonated was that even within class race matter 
namely, if the murdered children had been poor whites, the response would have been quicker 
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and more forceful. This asserts that even within black class structures, a race analysis is 
pertinent. 
 The black citizens of Atlanta who had elected Jackson and the members of the Atlanta 
City Council had a right and moral responsibility to call for an accounting.  It was necessary for 
the Atlantans to expect, and not hope, that the murderer(s) would be stopped and brought to 
justice.  What was needed was for all Atlantans, in a collective voice, to attack City Hall.  The 
Atlanta City Council, though it did not have executive responsibilities, needed to reflect the 
feelings of its constituents by pressuring Jackson’s administration to resolve the murders.   
 
Snapshot….The Guilt and Innocence of Wayne Williams 
 
With pressure from local groups, the Atlanta Police bureau linked a dozen of the murders 
through a pattern initially calculated by the STOP Committee mothers.  It was clear that the 
victims were all from South Atlanta, mostly black males, and had all been strangled to death.  
There was evidence of sexual molestation and the computer data base matched known 
pedophiles to Lubie Geter and Timothy Hill.  Hill had admitted to a sexual liaison with 
pedophiles prior to his death.  Victim Clifford Jones was last seen at a laundromat that was 
known as a pick up spot for homosexual liaisons. Three witnesses saw the laundromat manager 
go into a back room with a boy fitting Jones’ description. One of the witnesses claimed to see the 
manager strangle and beat the boy and then carry his body out to the trash container.  FBI 
records showed that the laundromat manager was subjected to two polygraph tests, in which he 
failed and admitted to knowing Jones and confirming that the boy had been at the laundromat at 
the time of his disappearance.  Medical experts determined that the time of Jones’ death was 
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between four and six hours before the discovery of his body which placed the victim at the 
laundromat at the time of his death.  However, the FBI and Atlanta police did not charge the 
manager with any crime because the eyewitness who gave his account was deemed mentally 
retarded.  Other witnesses came forward with similar stories, but to no avail.312  This account lent 
credence to the different threads and distinct patterns prevalent in the murders, all of them 
necessary to better understand Wayne Williams’ framing. 
Four of the final bodies had been dumped into the South and Chattahoochee Rivers and 
because of this; police officers patrolled the James Jackson Parkway Bridge spanning the 
Chattahoochee River in Atlanta’s West Side.  In the early morning of May 22, 1981, police 
officers spotted a blue Chevrolet slowly crossing the bridge and claimed that they heard a loud 
splash.  The officers stopped the car and found 23-year-old Wayne Bertram Williams. 
 Wayne Williams was born in Atlanta, Georgia on May 27, 1958 and lived with his school 
teaching parents in Dixie Hill, a neighborhood in West Atlanta where many of the victims once 
lived or were abducted. He graduated from Frederick Douglass High School and had attended 
Georgia State University to pursue a career in entertainment, but dropped out to become a talent 
agent, freelance photographer, and edited demo tapes for local artists.  Williams’ lack of success 
disappointed his parents, who had spoiled him and funded his quixotic and lofty ideas.  He 
dreamed of being successful as a broadcasting and entertainment agent.  Williams had started his 
own radio station in his parents’ basement when he was sixteen.  Of the many people that he 
impressed and interviewed, the most prominent was then U.S. Congressman Andrew Young.313 
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 After dropping out of college, Williams worked for a radio station owned by civil rights 
leader Benjamin Hooks.  It was in this venue that he honed his skills in promoting his own 
station and Atlanta’s rising musical talents.  His job duties in radio entailed odd jobs that funded 
his ideas and gave him ample time to try out electronics, which was a hobby of his.  But 
contracting the odd jobs also put him in close proximity to children who were willing to perform 
jobs for money.  As part of his side jobs, Williams sold video footage of citywide accidents, such 
as fires, car accident, and in one instance, a plane crash.  He heard about the incidents from a 
police scanner and wiring his car with police lights, he would often arrive at the scene before 
police.314 
 As a talent agent, Williams set out to find the next popular culture sensation such as the 
Jackson Five or Stevie Wonder and go all the way to the top with the likes of Berry Gordy as 
their promoter and manager. With this, he spent a considerable amount of time scouting black 
youth talent shows and interacting with boys that he thought had talent.  Williams had an eye for 
performance, but lacked the savoir-faire to select boys who were talented musicians.  His money 
making schemes should have been characterized as scams.  His parents, trying to promote their 
son with hopes that he would become successful, filed for bankruptcy as a result of funding 
recordings of local boys with less than stellar talent.  To add insult, Williams was known as a 
charlatan around Atlanta, where he claimed that he was at the center of record deals and ran in 
circles with big time producers.315  Suspicions of Williams furthered when the nude body of 
Nathaniel Cater appeared in the Chattahoochee River on May 24, 1981, two days after being 
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question on the James Jackson Parkway Bridge.  With the emergence of Cater’s body, police 
speculated that Williams had killed the man and thrown him off the bridge on May 22nd.   
Williams gave conflicting stories about his reasons for being on the bridge on May 22 
while being interrogated by the FBI without legal representation.  Williams claimed that on May 
22, he played basketball at the Ben Hill Recreation Center and later went to Sans Souci Lounge 
to retrieve his recorder from the midnight hour club manager so that he could audition Cheryl 
Johnson, an aspiring songstress who lived in the Spanish Trace Apartments in Smyrna, a western 
suburb.  Williams stopped at a convenience store to call Johnson moments before he was pulled 
over and questioned.  However, the problematic aspects of Williams’ account were that the 
police found no Cheryl Johnson or Spanish Trace apartment and the phone number that he 
purportedly called was fraudulent.  According to FBI files, Williams was given three polygraph 
tests, all of which indicated dishonesty in his answers. 316 
 Williams fit the profile of a serial killer. He lived with his parents and was considered a 
loner.  Bernard Hedley asserted that Williams had the uncanny ability to masquerade as a police 
officer.  In 1976, this behavior landed Williams in jail for impersonating an officer and 
unauthorized use of a vehicle.   As stated earlier, he had illegally added red lights beneath the 
grill and flashing blue dashboards lights to his car. There were rumors that he was homosexual, 
but these accusations were unfounded. Also, to add to his mystique, Dettlinger asserts that in the 
days following the event on the bridge, Williams and his father cleaned their house from top to 
bottom, carrying off boxes and burning photographs and negatives on an outdoor grill.  Williams 
then called a press conference at his home, distributing his resume full of fabrication.  At the 
press conference, Williams asserted that the police’s apprehension and interrogation attempted to 
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railroad him as the Atlanta Youth killer.317  This would be the first event in a long media frenzy 
where Williams became totally complicit in his conviction. 
 As the FBI investigated Williams, laboratory results claimed to find fibers and canine 
hair follicles on numerous victim bodies synonymous with those found in Williams’ car and 
home.  Also, results reported that these hair follicles were identical to that of Williams’ dog. 
Though the FBI considered this evidence a breakthrough, District Attorney Lewis Slaton was 
skeptical because he did not want to prosecute Williams with fiber evidence as the sole evidence.  
Slaton felt that conventional evidence would satisfy the jury.  With this, several considerable but 
subjective accounts emerged that coaxed Slaton to prosecute pursue Williams.  Of these 
accounts, a number of witnesses materialized who avowed they saw Williams with various 
victims; a couple of recording studio people claimed to have seen abrasions on Williams’ arms 
suggesting that he had been in a struggle; and pressure by Georgia George Busbee to cooperate 
with the FBI.  On June, 21, 1981, William’s attorney, Mary Welcome and town deputy sheriffs 
arrived at the Williams home with an arrest warrant.  Williams was indicted for the murders 
Jimmy Payne and Nathaniel Cater. However, Georgia Law allowed the prosecution to bring 
evidence from other cases if they helped to establish a pattern.318  However, what is particular 
about the “hard” evidence that persuaded Slaton was that none of the eye witnesses came 
forward for the task force and Williams was not a suspect until after he had been stopped on the 
bridge by police.  To some, FBI leads were suspicious because it was not clear why witnesses 
helped the FBI but did not cooperate with the Atlanta Police task force. 
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 Attorney Mary Welcome was the lead lawyer in Williams’ defense in the case.  
Controversies with the case ran rampant for numerous reasons.  First, the selection of Judge 
Clarence Cooper, the first black judge elected to the Fulton County bench, to preside over the 
case proved to be contentious.  Cooper had been an assistant district attorney and was an 
associate of District Attorney Lewis Slaton along with assistant district attorney Jack Mallard, a 
member of Slaton’s prosecution team.  This appeared to be a match that compromised justice 
considering that he had former colleagues that were prosecuting Williams.  However, the Fulton 
County Courts asserted that a computer program chose Cooper through random selection. 
Another controversial situation was that murder victim Jimmy Ray Payne’s autopsy listed his 
cause of death as undetermined, and it was not clear if Payne was murdered.  However, when 
prosecutors recognized the difficulty in trying Williams for an undetermined death, Payne’s 
death certificate was mysteriously reissued by the coroner with the status of homicide as the 
cause of death.  The medical examiner asserted that he checked the wrong box. Interestingly, in 
that section of a Georgia death certificate, there was no check box, but a fill in the blank. 319  
Again, these inconsistencies lent credence to the public’s skepticism of whether Williams 
committed the Atlanta Youth Murders. 
 Opening arguments for the trial began on January 6, 1982.  The defense team lacked the 
funds to employ the quality of expert witnesses to refute the FBI and GBI crime lab results. Also, 
there was not sufficient time to interview hundreds of prosecution witnesses.  The mounting 
forensic evidence was much more than the defense was prepared to fight but was the foundation 
for how the prosecution proceeded with the expertise of an FBI scientist.  This showcased the 
use of new technology established to fight crime. To cast doubt among the jury comprised of 
nine women and three men, eight black and four white, the defense needed to hire expert textile 
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witnesses.  The defense lacked the funds to do so. During the trial, that lasted two months, 
prosecutors focused on four areas:   
1. The character and credibility of Wayne Williams 
 
2. What happened on Jackson parkway 
 
3. Eyewitnesses to Wayne Willams’ behavior and alleged interaction with victims 
 
4. The physical evidence, which was primarily based on fibers, hairs and bloodstains 
found on victims that matched elements in Williams’ environment.320 
 
These areas gave way to success for the prosecution.  On Saturday, February 27, 1981, the jury 
convicted Wayne Bertram Williams of murder of Jimmy Ray Payne and Nathaniel Cater after 11 
hours of deliberation.  Judge Clarence Cooper then sentenced Williams to two life sentences to 
be served consecutively and eligible for parole in seven years.321 
 Upon the sentencing, Atlanta’s black officials disconnected from the case showed support 
for the verdict.  The newly installed Mayor Andrew Young said the verdict “represented our jury 
system.  They heard the evidence and saw the charts and under our system they convicted him.”  
Veteran civil rights activist and then-elected to Atlanta’s City Council John Lewis stated that he 
was glad this case was over and expressed confidence in the jury system.  Lewis Slaton felt the 
jury had the evidence and approved the verdict.  Other city councilmen expressed similar 
approval.  State and federal investigators purportedly pieced together enough information to 
conclude that Williams was responsible for all but two of the series in the Atlanta youth killings.  
Investigators linked Williams to 10 victims through circumstantial evidence such as fibers, 
bloodstains and witnesses.  According to FBI records, the total of 12 deaths mentioned during 
the trial, the fibers found on the bodies of 10 more victims matched fibers found on at least six 
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items from Williams’ house and car.  In all, FBI records established fiber links between Williams 
and 22 slaying victims.322 
With Williams found guilty, the Atlanta Police disbanded the Atlanta Police task force.  
This conjured negative outbursts from Atlanta’s black community who contested the verdict. 
Many remained convinced that the murders were unsolved.  Camille Bell exclaimed “Judge 
Cooper [was] part of the prosecution.”  Joseph Lowery stated “I don’t think you will find anyone 
in the black community who believes Wayne Williams committed all those murders alone. We 
feel there should be some continuing, cooperative effort with the federal agencies.”  Rev. Joseph 
Boone, director of the Metropolitan Atlanta Summit Leadership Congress openly attacked the 
closing of the books on the two murders and explained that many mothers in black areas of the 
city were still afraid that a killer was on the loose.323 Again, there was a growing suspicion 
amongst those preyed upon by the serial killer(s) that the jury found the wrong man guilty. 
 Another aspect in Fulton County’s failure to prove Williams’ guilt was the fact that the 
police set the parameters as to what homicides around the city fit in to the missing and murdered 
youth category.  The list became somewhat controversial because the standard by which cases 
were added to the list was compromised by botched police work and negligence by authorities 
that resulted in murders categorized incorrectly.  Investigator Chet Dettlinger asserted that many 
of the cases that should have been added to list did not for this very reason.  According to 
Dettlinger, the total number of murders with consistent patterns was 64, as compared to the thirty 
set by Atlanta police.  Dettlinger’s list included eighteen female victims and twenty-six victims 
over the age of 20 years-old as opposed to the FBI’s two female victims and 6 victims over the 
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age of 20 years. Most notable was the fact many of the homicides were omitted from the list 
because they did not meet the ever changing parameters.  With this, it was noted that after 
Wayne Williams’ was taken into to custody, more than 20 people were murdered.  These victims 
were never added to the list because the police quit counting after Williams’ arrest.324  This 
further shows failure to prove Williams’ guilt of all thirty of the murders. 
 To prove this, there were at least seven unsolved murders of black women starting in 
January 1982, while Williams was imprisoned.  Once again, Atlanta’s black community called 
on black leaders and other civic organizations to pressure police to step up investigations of the 
slayings.  Consequently, the city renewed its curfew ordinance for children under the age of 14 
for the summer months.  The police considered establishing a new special task force to 
investigate these murders.  George Napper, who acted as Public Safety Commissioner since the 
departure of Lee P. Brown, announced that a “major offender squad” would investigate in to the 
slaying of the women.325  The continuing murders were taken as evidence that there was 
probably more than one serial killer operating in Atlanta. 
 From the time that Williams was convicted, black Atlantans, skeptical of his guilt 
asserted that the government had manufactured the evidence to close the case.  Throughout the 
Atlanta youth murders, there was widespread fear within in the black community that the Ku 
Klux Klan in cahoots with the CIA and FBI  were hunting and killing black children.  A police 
informant had knowledge that Klan members were trying to begin a race war by killing black 
children.326  For a group with a history of murdering black children with no remorse this was not 
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far fetched. However, through interviews for the project, it was asserted that the Ku Klux Klan 
was attempting to get back at Maynard Jackson because of the airport.  Other rumors concluded 
that multiple killers were at work during the murders.  There was evidence of homosexual 
activity by some of the male victims to earn money. One of the most interesting theories 
presented was that the Atlanta Police were killing the children. There were numerous testimonies 
that some of the missing boys had gotten into a police car.327 It was this kind of information and 
disinformation that worked against Wayne Williams.  The fact that Williams illegally installed 
police lights on his car can be seen as attractive to young boys.  With this, the lights were seen as 
a tool to lure to boys to the car or to appear as having police authority. 
As the thirty-one month saga formally known as the missing and murdered youth of 
Atlanta left the city crippled, Atlanta’s black communities responded with safety education 
programs along with neighborhood patrols.  The armed vigilante groups as seen through the Bat 
Patrol carried firearms as the patrolled Techwood Homes until the police arrested five members 
of the posse. Volunteer search patrols navigated remote areas looking for the bodies of missing 
children.  By April of 1981, the Task Force established by Public Safety commissioner Lee P. 
Brown, numbered forty investigators. At a headquarters located at a renovated car dealership 
showroom on West Peachtree in downtown Atlanta, Maynard Jackson and Commissioner Brown 
were kept abreast with the most sophisticated and advanced computer system. There were dozens 
of phone workers who took hundreds of tips a day, feeding information into a pair of IBM 3031 
computers.  Psychics and profilers were called in to help with the investigation.  Helicopter 
patrols were commissioned for surveillance in areas where kidnapping were likely to take place.  
Computerized telephone messages dialed to 150,000 homes asked residents for any relevant 
information.  The cost of this hi-tech operation was $230,000 a month, which prompted Jackson 
                                                 
327 Trashinda Wright, interview by Maurice J. Hobson, Atlanta, GA, 26 October 2007. 
 199 
to appeal President Ronald Reagan for aid.  In his response, Reagan loosed $1.5 million in 
federal funds.  Atlanta’s business community also contributed services such as transportation and 
communications.  Though no white children fell victim to the killers, Atlanta’s white citizens put 
up a $100,000 in reward money for information that lead to arrests. On a national scale, people 
wore green, black, and red ribbons, colors from the Black Power movement of the 1960s, to 
demonstrate their support for the families of the slain youth.   
Undoubtedly the episode known as the Atlanta missing and murdered youth presented 
Atlanta in a different light.  It besmirched the name of a city that had poised itself as a beacon on 
the hill while the rest of the South sweltered in the hellish heat of American racism.  It forced 
Georgians, the rest of the South and America to reexamine a history marked by white terror as 
seen in Klan violence and lynching.  It quelled the belief of forward thinking and progress seen 
in the political gains acquired through black electoral politics and black political empowerment.  
Most importantly, it forced the nation and the world to question Atlanta’s notoriety as the new 
and highly touted black Mecca, a land that represented the highest educational, political and 
economic aspirations for black Americans.  It forced people in general to grapple with the fact 
that the city also housed some of the roughest and most destitute conditions for blacks in the 
South and the nation. Yet, in an attempt to once again transform itself international city of 
business progress and racial tolerance, the city moved forward with the election of Mayor 
Andrew Young.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BRAVADO OF BLACK ATLANTA: ANDREW YOUNG, NEOLIBERALISM AND 
A BOISTEROUS BLACK NEW SOUTH MECCA 
 
Oh you know what else they tryin to do….make a curfew especially for me and you.  The traces 
of the New World Order. Time is getting shorter. If we don't get prepared people it's gone be a 
slaughter. My mind won't allow me to not be curious. My folk don't understand so they don't take 
it serious. But every now and then, I wonder if the gate was put up to keep crime out or to keep 
our ass in!328 
 
 
In 1974, a white senator from Mississippi introduced Andrew Jackson Young as a 
congressman from Georgia’s Fifth District at the presidential prayer breakfast.  Just twenty years 
prior, he had been a lieutenant for Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Montgomery, Alabama.  Young 
recognized that before the Brown v Board of Topeka Kansas decision and voting, blacks could 
not exercise their right to vote in the South due to various forms of racism, including the 
infamous literacy tests used to disfranchise many literate Blacks while allowing many illiterate 
whites to vote..  An example of this prejudice can be seen through the literacy test given to his 
younger brother upon his return to the South from the Navy.  According to Young, his younger 
brother who was also a graduate of Harvard University’s dental school and had passed the 
Louisiana state dental exam was denied the right to register because he was told by white court 
officials, that he’d failed the literacy test.  This was the kind of racist society into which Young 
was born and bred.329  
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Young had been baptized by the Civil Rights movement as a lieutenant and close 
confident of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.  He was born on March 12, 1932 in New Orleans, 
Louisiana to a prosperous middle-class family.  Young graduated form Howard University in 
Washington, DC in 1951 and later earned a divinity degree from Hartford Theological Seminary 
in Connecticut.  Upon graduation, he accepted the pastorate of Bethany Congregational Church 
in Thomasville, Georgia, a job that helped him immerse himself in civil rights and in organizing 
voter registration drives. In 1961, young left his position as pastor to work with the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the church based civil rights organization led by Dr. 
King.  Young worked with the SCLC by organizing “citizenship schools,” workshops that taught 
nonviolent organizing strategies to local people who possessed leadership qualities.  The schools 
served rural, mostly uneducated blacks that were annoyed by Young’s light complexion and 
middle-class persona and high-brow attitude, from which many considered him an elitist.330 
Young’s organizing of voter registration drives were met with fears that the black 
community would suffer at the hands of violence as a result of white recalcitrance and various 
forms of white terror.  Around 1948, a black man in Thomasville tried to register to vote and was 
lassoed on the courthouse steps, tied to the back of a pickup truck and dragged throughout the 
black community until he was dead, then cut loose in front of the jail.  This act asserted the 
violence and terror bestowed upon blacks by hateful whites throughout America in general and 
the South in particular. Nevertheless, when Young moved to the city and organized a voter 
registration drive, there was quite a northern presence, which put the spotlight on Thomasville 
and quieted white violence, allowing blacks to be registered to vote.  Some examples of this 
northern presence were the fact that President Dwight Eisenhower went on quail hunting 
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excursions in Thomasville and former Secretary of Treasurer Hubert Humphrey owned a 
plantation in the town.  However, in organizing the voter registration drives, Young called upon 
John Wesley Dobbs, the grandfather of Maynard Jackson, founder of the Atlanta Negro Voters 
League, and key component in the Primus King case, which struck down the all white primary in 
Georgia.  Dobbs’ influence with the Prince Hall Masonic Order allowed for voter registration 
drives at Masonic lodges all around the state, particular in Georgia’s bigger cities.  
Simultaneously, Georgia Governor Ellis Arnold’s moderate stance triggered a vote among the 
youth.  These things together moved Atlanta ahead in moderate politics in regards to race.331 
Another contributing factor was the appointment of relatively liberal Republican justices 
in Southern states by the Eisenhower administration. They were not tied to the old southern 
Democratic machine, which assured some of the best-trained and brightest lawyers in the South, 
quite often, moving into judgeships.  In Atlanta, there were blacks on the Republican state 
committee that were approving and recommending judges.  Oftentimes, they appointed judges 
that were not a part of the old southern and racist oligarchy.  Some of the Judges that fit in to this 
category were Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth District; Judge John Minor Wisdom, also of the 
Fifth District; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and later the Eleventh Circuit Judge 
Frank Minis Johnson of Alabama;  J. Skelly Wright of New Orleans who was a judge for the 
U.S. Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia and a staunch anti-segregationists; and U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and later the Eleventh Circuit Judge Bryan Simpson.  This 
group was the basis of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which spanned from Savannah, 
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Georgia to El Paso, Texas and was arguably the most liberal wing of the judiciary in America 
before the Civil Rights movement.  This group of liberal republican judges allowed for black 
civil gains on two fronts; first they were some of the most independent jurists available and they 
were constantly under pressure to make decisions on civil rights cases.332 
As other events for black freedom along with the Montgomery Bus Boycott awoke the 
black masses, Young viewed the National Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the watershed moment 
where social change prevailed.  Though the Civil Rights Act of 1964 changed traditions and 
customs, it did little to challenge the political power relationships in the South.  In this regard, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was far less consequential than the passage of the 1965 act that gave 
blacks access to political power.  In Atlanta, black voter efficiency by elites, middle and working 
class blacks was pertinent to black political gains seen in the 1960s.  Though Atlanta had a 
highly developed black community with black institutions of higher learning, a black intellectual 
community, a half dozen black millionaires, Citizens Trust Bank of Atlanta, and the might of the 
Atlanta Life Insurance Company, the black community was being denied political opportunities 
prior to the 1960s.  As black politicians became agents of change throughout Atlanta and the 
state of Georgia, a need for voter registration workers became prevalent.  Most of the deputy 
registrars came from outside states.  Companies and organizations such as Atlanta Life Insurance 
Company, Citizens Trust Bank of Atlanta, and the American Teachers’ Association* provided 
manpower as deputy registrars.  Other strategies used to push voter registration drive included 
volunteering activity.333 
 
                                                 
 332 Ibid; See also David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice:  Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights 
Revolution, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2007. 
 
 
 333 Ibid. 
 204 
Andrew Young: Towards a Black New South 
 
Andrew Young attributed change in part to organic relationships between blacks and 
whites.  According to Young, “a lot of [white] people in leadership positions had been cared for 
by black women, where there was not just a servant relationship, but where it was somebody that 
worked with the family through long tears, and they were probably more mother to the people 
than their own parents were. You had a complicated set of personal relationships in the white 
community in the South that made southern whites very, very guilty about the racial situation.” 
 To Young, the watershed moments in leaning towards a black New South were the deaths 
of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert Kennedy.  Young stated:  
“It was almost as though, I sensed that whites wanted to help, but didn’t know how.  Of 
course, that was also the period that blacks began to express their hostility.  It was even 
more difficulty.  But in spite of all that, the tremendous white turnout for the Poor 
People’s campaign, we could have not brought poor people to Washington, had not we 
had help from white southerners in just about every city and that was right straight on 
though Atlanta.  The Roman Catholic Archbishop in Savannah and in Charleston 
provided them with food and shelter. There were not resources in the black community 
alone and with the slightest invitation; the white community in the South was ready to 
move toward new relationships with blacks.  The news media were not publicizing 
people like me.  They were publicizing folks that were saying, “Burn.”  John Lewis was 
around; talking non-violence back then, but nobody was listening to John.  It was the 
Black Panther types, you know, the rhetorical revolutionaries that had the mass media.  
And that’s the impression most whites had of blacks.  At the same time, [politicians 
like] Richard Nixon and Lester Maddox were playing to the fears of this same white 
southerner in white America.  Nobody was giving them a vehicle to get out of their 
racist heritage.  I think when black politicians came along, and one of the reasons I ran 
was that it seemed to me that if I could win in 1970, it would put an end to the Nixon 
southern strategy.  I saw that southern strategy as really damaging everything that I had 
been working for and instead of a New South, you’d get the old Dixiecrat South in 
Republican dress, coming backs to the South.”334 
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Young’s credit to white southerners may be somewhat gratuitous yet it does speak to the fact that 
the Old South order of white supremacy ended with the help of some moderate whites from all 
over the United States, including the South. 
In 1972, after King’s assassination, Young won Georgia’s Fifth district seat in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  He, along with Barbara Jordan, a Texas Democrat, became the first 
black southerners since Reconstruction to be elected to Congress from the South.  Young’s 
success was attributed to the many voter registration campaigns he had organized throughout the 
South in the 1950s and 1960s and eventually elected thousands of blacks to higher office in the 
coming decades. While in Congress, Young championed on behalf of the poor and working-class 
Americans.  He was later rewarded for his labor by being appointed ambassador to the United 
Nations (UN) by President Jimmy Carter in 1977.  As UN ambassador, Young helped to change 
the foundation of foreign policy, making human rights a central focus and arguing that economic 
development in the Third World, particularly in Africa, was in the best interest of the United 
States.  Young was one of the initial diplomats to call for sanctions against the apartheid regime 
in South Africa, while simultaneously calling for the U.S. to recognize Communist Vietnam.  He 
was forced to resign his position in 1979 for having met with a representative of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), which at that time was considered a terrorist organization.335 
As a congressman for the Fifth District of Georgia, all evidence indicated that Young 
identified more with the Georgia Caucus and the Democratic study Group than he did with the 
Congressional Black Caucus.  In doing this, Young kept open relationships with arch-Republican 
conservatives to better know and understand how they would vote.  He effectively utilized his bi-
partisan relationship to get swing votes.  To some, his open relationship with arch-Republicans 
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proved him to be a shrewd politician, but to other, he was considered a flip-flopper that 
fraternized with the enemy.  However, because the Voting Rights Act of 1965 redrew district 
lines and new district lines almost gerrymandered black politicians such as Young and Maynard 
Jackson out of Atlanta’s black community to an overwhelming white district, Young understood 
the increasing need to appeal to moderate and swing voters.336 
The Coca-Cola Company, an international business that called Atlanta home, helped give 
Atlanta an uniquely cosmopolitan swagger. It was at the behest of Robert Winship Woodruff, 
President of Coca-Cola that Atlanta slowly and peacefully integrated and eventually endorsed 
black political candidates.  When Ivan Allen became the Chairman of the Atlanta Chamber of 
Commerce after his terms as mayor, though he did not support Maynard Jackson for mayor, he 
did support Young for Congress. Allen’s endorsement of Young for congress and later as mayor 
brought significant support from the business community and millions of dollars.  Young 
concluded that Allen and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce did not really support him, but 
more importantly, they did not support his opponent.337   
During his tenure in politics, Andrew Young presented a different kind of politician, 
spanning two constituencies that elected him to two different public offices.  In his bid for 
Congress in 1972, Young’s constituency was, by and large, a combination of Atlanta’s black old 
guard coalition and the white business elite.  However, because of Maynard Jackson’s success at 
creating a new black constituency, Young utilized a new coalition of blacks, as well as the white 
business elite.  According to Young, one difference between the new coalition and the old 
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coalition is that there were both black and white businessmen that came to meetings with black 
politicians, as opposed to only white businessmen in prior years. 
Under the leadership of Andrew Young, Atlanta continued to exercise its black political 
might. His election in 1981 signaled the solidification of the black political power that he had 
helped to create in Georgia.  What was historic about Young’s feat is that oftentimes after the 
end of a” first” black elected official’s tenure, power often shifts back to a white majority.  
However, in Atlanta and for the first time, Maynard Jackson was succeeded by another African 
American.  Young’s tenure included two terms as mayor.  His terms as mayor marked a change 
for the city in business and economic development, urban renewal and gentrification as some 
would argue, at the social cost of the poor, especially the Black poor. 
  Andrew Young assumed power as mayor of Atlanta in 1982, under extremely favorable 
circumstances. His predecessor left him debt-free, a major deed for city governments.  He had 
been convinced to run for mayor by Coretta Scott King and Susie LaBord, the President of the 
Grady Homes Housing Project Tenant Association.  According to Young, Atlanta’s black 
coalition scoured the city to find someone that was an electable candidate for mayor.  There was 
much talk that Atlanta needed to go with a white mayor because there was a great 
misunderstanding in the business community at the time as to why business was leaving the city.  
The widely believed cause was that many in the business community deemed Maynard Jackson 
as anti-business.   Also, the business community was leaving because of a black mayor.  In an 
attempt to bring Young to the table, Maynard Jackson invited him to a meeting to talk about the 
direction of City Hall following the end of his two terms.  In an aggressive approach Susie 
LaBord pushed for Young’s candidacy, when she told him, “Andy, remember when you came 
here you weren’t nothing.  We made you somebody and we sent you to congress and we sent you 
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to the United Nations and if you haven’t learned to help us.  Boy….we got too much invested in 
you to let you go out of the pasture!  So we gon’ have to make you run for mayor. If, with all you 
know, you can’t run the city, there’s no hope.  You’ve got to run for mayor.”338  To Young, Susie 
Labord was a woman of moral authority whose leadership had worked in all of his campaigns 
along with Martin Luther King, Sr. [Daddy King].  She was also someone that he respected and 
did not question, as Young openly admitted to questioning the judgments of and arguing with 
Daddy King or Dr. Benjamin E. Mays, the longtime president of Morehouse College and mentor 
to the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
Some of Young’s good friends in the business community told Young, “We know that 
you would make a good mayor.  You’ve got all of the talent and ability.  But we just wish you 
were white.”339  This criticism of Jackson was due to his revitalization of black neighborhood 
and historic landmarks, notwithstanding the fact that he completed the new airport and opened 
the city rapid transit system, done on the insistence of affirmative action in employment and in 
city contracts and micromanagement of decision making for the city.  
Deeming himself a public person, Young accepted the challenge claiming, “There’s 
nothing more exciting than America’s cities.”  The mayoral campaign of 1981 was brutal and the 
election was tainted with racial overtones with young winning 55 percent of the vote. With 
tensions centered on the issue of race, it became clear that whatever skills Young had as a 
                                                 
338 Gary Pomerantz, Interview with Andrew Young, 24 July 1995, Gary Pomerantz Collection, EU, 
MARBL; William Womack, Interview With Andrew Young, Atlanta Interfaith Broadcasters Oral History 
Interviews, Auburn Avenue Research Library, Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
 339 Ibid. 
 
 209 
diplomat was useful in curtailing racial divisions and other dilemmas that he would face 
including a massive budget deficit, widespread poverty, a rising crime rate and white flight.340 
 Some naysayers doubted Young’s ability to grapple with Atlanta’s problems.  He was 
seen as anti-business and a weak administrator.  However, Young quickly proved his critics 
wrong.  Young won the mayoral election in 1981 with only ten percent of the white vote in the 
runoff election.  However, he won with overwhelming numbers in black precincts. After 
assuming office, Young showed himself able to work closely with the white business elite, 
promoting economic development.  This in turn won him the support of the white business elite 
and the white press and immediately avoided the problems faced by his predecessor Maynard 
Jackson, whose administration was perceived as anti-business.  By 1984, the city was extremely 
successful in attracting new businesses and experienced substantial growth and development.  By 
1988, a survey of 385 executives concluded that Atlanta was their first choice to locate a 
business.  Though blacks reigned over the city’s politics and whites controlled the economy, 
Young found his niche by serving as a liaison to ensure “that whites get some of the power and 
blacks get some of the money.”  However, Alton Hornsby notes that the overwhelming sentiment 
of Young within the black community was that he catered to the white business elite and 
neglected poor blacks, while simultaneously gaining support for Atlanta’s growing black middle 
class.341 
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 By the mid 1980s, Atlanta encompassed an eighteen county metropolitan area.  
According to Hornsby, to the north of Fulton County, Cobb and Gwinnett counties were among 
the nation’s fastest growing area with big economic promise as evidenced in the nation’s most 
lucrative high end car dealerships. Also, the Cable News Network (CNN) founded by Ted Turner 
drew attention to Atlanta.  Hornsby notes that though the City boomed, the greatest nemesis 
during Young’s tenure was public safety.  Atlanta remained at the top or near the top of the list 
for all major American cities in the category of violent crimes.  Incidence of forcible rape in the 
city averaged 157 per 100,000 population per year, five times the national average.  Aggravated 
assault averaged 1,573 per 100,000 population; robbery 1,099 per 100,000; and murders eight 
per 100,000.  Much of this was the result of the distribution and selling of crack cocaine, a cheap 
street drug that target the poor.342 
 
Crack Cocaine 
 
“Drugs and black oppression have been inextricably linked since the first African slaves were 
brought to the New World to harvest sugar cane, in a three-sided trade system that ultimately 
delivered rum—the hot new drug of its day—into the mouths of Europe’s poor.  But no amount 
of precedent, it seems, has adequately prepared black America or its leaders for the 
thundershock of crack.”343 
 
The repercussions of crack cocaine drew new boundaries lines on old issues. Crack cocaine 
disproportionately affected black communities and was deemed as the greatest concern that 
threatened black progress.  In a poll conducted by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution of 12 
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southern states in April of 1989, it was concluded that drugs were perceived as the country’s 
biggest problem and that blacks were more concerned about drugs than any other group.  The 
influx of crack cocaine in the black community represented, in a brutal way, the paradox of the 
Reagan years for poorer communities of color.  While drug use in middle class American 
purportedly waned, crack came from hinterland and devastated the poorest communities.  
Simultaneously, middle class blacks purportedly benefited from these years, even as poor blacks 
fell farther behind.  The political responses to crack ranged from the radical perspective of Louis 
Farrakhan who regarded crack’s sudden emergence as evidence of a genocidal plot, to black 
conservatives such as Robert Woodson who argued that crack represents the failure of the social 
welfare programs that were designed to “uplift” poor blacks.344 
 With crack cocaine, black politicians found themselves in a quagmire muddied by a long 
history of oppression that was not easily discussed for fear that it may put black folk and black 
culture in an unfavorable light.  Peter Bell, the executive director of the Institute of Black 
Chemical Abuse, stated, “Black leadership is truly on the horns of a dilemma in terms of 
recognizing the need to deal with the drug problem, but fearing that by doing so it could 
contribute to the stigmatization of the black community.”  With this sentiment, what is clear is 
that crack cocaine, in some ways, can be seen as a new marker for black class identity as this 
identity is often embodied by the black middle and upper classes.345 
 In fiscal year 1981, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) interdicted 1,937 kilos 
(4,270.3 lbs.) of cocaine.  By fiscal 1988, following a period when numerous surveys showed a 
steady decline in middle-class drug use, the DEA interdicted 55,896 kilos of crack (123,229.59 
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lbs.).  The Cocaine hotline, a toll-free telephone counseling service for cocaine users reported 
that 52 percent of callers made more than $25,000 a year; by 1987 that percentage had dropped 
to 20 percent.  During this same period, the percentage of callers employed dropped from 84 
percent to 46 percent. The percentage of college-educated users dropped from 50 percent to 16 
percent.  And theses figures were from a source in which poor blacks were likely 
underrepresented.346  What should be considered is that the shifts in population provide room for 
statistical error.  With a continuing drug habit, drug users that began calling in 1983 may be the 
same drug users calling in 1987. This means that the shift in populations may not be a shift, but 
the changing conditions for constant callers who lost their job as a result of their drug abuse. 
 Black communities were divided over the large-scale sweeps through housing projects, in 
which there were an unprecedented amount of reports of mistaken arrests and police brutality.  
Around the issue of civil liberties, questions surrounded the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development policy of evicting whole families from public housing if one member of the 
family was a drug dealer.  However, as seen by “corner boys,” young men that loiter to make 
drug transactions, crack dealers took care of the young people, primarily boys, that worked for 
them by feeding them and making sure that their families had money.  More important, in the 
streets even small children called the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] the Cocaine Importing 
Agency.347  What can be gleaned from this is the sentiment felt by poor blacks that the U.S. 
government trafficked cocaine into urban black communities.348 
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On a wide scale level, the increase in arrests of lower level dealers increased the nation’s 
jails and prisons, which activists long pointed out, were disproportionately imbalanced along 
racial lines.  Also, there was increasing concern for innocent residents of poor areas virtually 
vulnerable to violence as a result of crack.  But, the common thread between the two was that 
political establishment, historically white, had failed to prevent the crack problem and lacked 
both the will and insight to combat it.   What was clear was that blacks, conservative or liberal, 
radical or mainstream, began to express their convictions by taking matters into their own hands. 
This proved to be an interesting and uncertain moment in black and urban experiences.349 
 As Young took office, the effects of Reaganomics gripped the U.S. and as a result, 
Ronald Reagan was taking money away from the city.  In 1983, Atlanta received approximately 
$49 million form the federal government in funds.  By the time Young left office, the city 
received $9 million, cutting all federal funding by $40 million.  Mayors Ivan Allen, Sam Massell 
and Maynard Jackson went back and forth to Washington to receive money for different 
developments in the city, but during Young’s tenure, the funds desiccated and could not be 
replaced in Washington. As a result, Young turned to his “citizen of the world” approach and 
courted the private sector and international investor to Atlanta.  Some of the grievances by 
Young’s constituency included feelings of neglect in the areas public safety; public housing; 
transportation; minority business development; urban renewal and gentrification; and affirmative 
action.   
 
                                                 
349 Ibid. 
 214 
Public Safety 
 
On August 13, 1985, Eddie Kirkland died in Grady Memorial Hospital some 16 hours 
after his arrest at the Perry Homes housing project by Atlanta police officers.  Initially, it seemed 
like an old story where an alcohol or substance abuser became violent.  The police subdued him 
and he died.  But there were whispers of what seemed to be an instance of police brutality. Police 
brutality in Atlanta was an all too often occurrence and Kirkland’s’ death, purportedly at the 
hand of police, rallied citizens to meet city officials with much unrest and criticism.  In an 
attempt to calm the Perry Homes’ crowd, Mayor Andrew Young held two meetings with 
residents to assure the angry mob that the mysterious death of Eddie Kirkland was being 
thoroughly investigated and that “justice would prevail.” Young’s first meeting, a closed-door 
session with officers of the Perry Homes Tenant Association, lasted about 90 minutes. 
Afterwards, he spoke to about 75 residents for 30 minutes, asking their patience until the 
investigations of the incident were completed by the Atlanta Police Bureau’s internal affairs 
office, the U.S. Justice Department, and the city’s Civilian Review Board, a panel appointed by 
Young to look into allegations of police brutality.350 
As Young promised suspension and prosecution of officers if it were found that there was 
excessive use of force that caused Kirkland’s death, several people in the crowd booed and 
hissed and called for immediate prosecution of the officers involved.  The sentiment amongst the 
crowd was that police officers had no right to be judge and jury on the scene.  They felt that the 
police had killed a man by beating him to death.  Yet, on the other side, Atlanta police had been 
responding to an unprecedented amount of violence in the community.  The crowd, however, felt 
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that Young had attained office and had forgotten about poor people.  To the Perry Homes crowd, 
it had been too long of an investigation without any explanation or results.  In a mailgram sent by 
Rev. Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the leader urged Young 
to speed up the investigations so that the community might know the facts within the next two or 
three days. In the summer of 1985, Kirkland and three others had been shot by Atlanta police and 
“immediate investigation” was demanded and not “routine procedure.”351   
The Kirkland incident provides a window into the lives experienced by some black 
Atlantans that lived in the Atlanta Housing Authority’s projects. Robert Scheer, a reporter for the 
Los Angeles Times, found Perry Homes to be a sprawling housing project  and a desolated 
ghetto.  He wrote, “At dusk, the endless young of Perry Homes become a milling throng, a disco 
dance without music or lights, degenerating frequently into hassling and knife fights, while most 
of the residents hide behind locked doors hearing bad sound and fearing the worst.”  Scheer’s 
portrait of Atlanta as a black city “floats in a sea of white suburbia whose inhabitants desperately 
avoid contact with the untouchables” was heavily criticized and even ridiculed; however, when 
Scheer set out to find Perry Homes while riding with John Lewis and Julian Bond, they could not 
find it after spending an hour driving.352  This example illustrates the opinion towards city 
officials held by Perry Homes’ residents as well as others amongst Atlanta’s black poor.  
The citizens of Perry Homes were unhappy with Public Safety Commissioner George 
Napper’s swift opinion that police used no excessive force.  The difference in opinion held 
between City Hall and Perry Homes residents was viewed by the latter as being afraid to come to 
Perry Homes to combat the issues of poor people who had put Young in office.  Perry Homes’ 
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citizens expressed their desire for police to patrol their housing projects and felt that if charges of 
police brutality continued, then police would stop patrolling altogether. Perry Homes was not a 
slum, but a community of mostly law abiding citizens that had more than its share of 
frustrations.353 
Though the death of Eddie Kirkland riled a segment of Atlanta’s black poor, an autopsy 
report showed that Kirkland died as a result of a cocaine overdose rather than police brutality.  It 
was widely believed that Kirkland swallowed a bag of crack cocaine, a practice used by drug 
dealers and users to hide evidence of the possession of a controlled substance from police.  
Purportedly, the bag of crack cocaine burst in Kirkland’s stomach causing a drug overdose. From 
City Hall’s perspective, these result cleared Atlanta’s police of all wrong doing.  But this did not 
unravel the long history of police brutality endured by Atlanta’s black poor and as a result the 
issue of whether Atlanta police used excessive force remained unresolved.  To its credit, Andrew 
Young and the Atlanta Police Bureau set up a special task force probing not only the Kirkland 
Case, but three other cases in which citizens died as a result of confrontations with the police in a 
three month period. All of these cases went before the Civilian Review Board.  The Board was 
chaired by Rev. P.C. Ennis, pastor of the Central Presbyterian Church and Rev. McKinley 
Young, pastor of Big Bethel A.M.E. Church.  Other members ranged from the wife of a retired 
motorcycle officer to Buren Batson, a gay rights activist.  Investigations took months.  Members 
reviewed police records, interviewed witnesses, visited crime scenes and watched re-enactments 
by the officers themselves.  This was a useful and necessary process, not only to calm 
community fears about what was perceived as the appearance of eagerness by police to resort to 
deadly force, but also to help the Police Bureau discover and correct any short comings in 
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training, operating procedures or attitudinal approaches.354 Yet often, after receiving the Civilian 
Review Board report, Young and other city leaders proceeded without considering the Board’s 
decision.  This practice hurt Young’s credibility amongst Atlanta’s blacks.  
The crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s contributed to the economic recession faced by 
the United States in the 1980s.  Subsequently, an influx in illegal drug dependency, 
homelessness, murder, burglary, armed robbery and imprisonment took precedence, particularly 
in lower income communities of color.  In the Atlanta Metropolitan area, the city had swelled to 
3.3 million people where 736,000 were black.  The City’s core had a population of 264,000 of 
which 67 percent were black.355  Within the black community, a large black population gave way 
to a large homeless and poor population where the effects of the crack cocaine epidemic were 
evident.  The flooding of crack cocaine in lower income communities warranted the necessity for 
calculated steps.  By the end of 1988, Atlanta jails were bursting at their seams with recidivists 
drug offenders whose cases of possession with the intent to distribute resulted in probation.  State 
law required that the sentence in such cases be from five to thirty years in prison.  In the first 
nine months of 1988 alone, Atlanta police arrested 171 offenders younger than seventeen years 
of age, almost three times as many as during the same period in 1986.356   
As a measure to combat crime and attacks on police that resulted in injury or death, 
Public Safety Commissioner Napper pushed to arm Atlanta police with hollow-point bullets.  
Hollow-point bullets were banned in 1973 by then-Public Safety Commissioner Reginald Eaves 
after a rash of police shootings drew charges of brutality, particularly from the black community.  
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Records indicated that in 1973, when the hollow-points were banned, 19 people were killed by 
police.  Since then, police shootings had dropped dramatically, to only four in 1986.  Some of 
Atlanta’s law makers felt that hollow-point ammunition promoted violence while others felt that 
the more lethal-hollow-points were inhumane and caused severe internal injuries to shooting 
victims.  However, in his March 1987 attempt to persuade local law makers that hollow-point 
bullets were needed, Napper obtained local experts to endorse the lethal ammunitions.  
Proponents contended that hollow-point bullets were better designed for use in densely populated 
areas.  Ballistic studies showed that semi-wadcutters’—bullets used by police as opposed to 
hollow-points—potentially penetrated victims and ricocheted causing harm to innocent by-
standers.  It was also noted that law enforcement officers in all of the surrounding Atlanta metro-
counties, including DeKalb, Cobb, Gwinnett, Fulton and Clayton used hollow points.  As a 
result, Napper used Randy Hanzlick, the associate medical examiner of Fulton County, to cite 
the shooting death of Clarence Smith by police after he fatally wounded Sergeant Willie 
Cameron at the crowded West End Mall.357  
As Napper pushed for the use of hollow-points, community representatives spoke out 
against his proposal stating it would produce a rash of police shootings and “Start an arms race in 
Atlanta.” Ethel Matthews, president of the Welfare Rights Organization, asserted that poor 
blacks and whites would be the likely victims of overzealous police if hollow-points were 
reissued.  Former federal penitentiary warden John O. Boone told the committee that the push for 
hollow-points was a reflection of misplaced priorities by city officials.  He warned that if police 
carried heavier artillery, that would-be criminals would respond in kind.  Proponents of hollow-
points such as Hanzlick noted a study of police shooting cases in Atlanta and found that 57 
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percent of the semi-wadcutters used exited the victims’ bodies.  A small sampling of people shot 
with hollow-point bullets showed that they exited 25 percent of the time.  Police officer Faye 
Coffield told the committee that police-community relations had improved since Eaves banned 
hollow-points, characterizing semi-wadcutters as “soft” and citing the Cameron shooting at West 
End Mall.  Police had to shoot Cameron’s assailant Clarence Smith several times to stop him.  
Several of the bullets exited the man’s body, an investigation revealed.    Councilman Thomas 
Cuffie, a former police officer and chairman of the Public Safety Committee argued that the 
bullets were needed to help the police battle a rising tide of crime in Atlanta.358 To Napper and 
Hanzlick, using hollow point bullets were an issue of police safety. 
Most black Atlantans believed that illegal drugs were the number one problem faced by 
the city, but many believed that street police mistreated people in their communities.  Interviews 
with 1,019 registered voters were conducted between the dates April 10-25 of 1988 to compile a 
poll conducted by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.  About 66 percent of the correspondents 
were black and about 30 percent white. The poll found that 51 percent of Atlanta blacks across 
all education and economic levels thought that drugs were the major problem far above other 
issues such as crime, employment, education, housing and the homeless.  Among Atlanta’s white 
community, crime and drugs ranked together at the top of the list.  Nineteen percent mentioned 
crime and 17 percent mentioned drugs as the worst problem of the city.  More than whites, 66 
percent of black Atlantans believed that crime in Atlanta had risen sharply since 1986, which 
was in direct correlation with drugs as opposed to 49 percent of whites. Crime actually did 
increase significantly between 1986 and 1988.  In 1987, crime in the seven major categories of 
homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault burglary, larceny and auto theft had increased 18.4 
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percent since 1985.  Rape was the only major crime that decreased during that period, from 683 
reported cases in 1985 to 636 in 1987.359 
This poll by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution revealed significant differences between 
blacks and whites in the way they felt police officers treated people.  Thirty percent of blacks 
compared to 14 percent of whites felt police used insulting language; 24 percent of blacks versus 
10 percent of whites said police frisked or searched people without adequate reason; and 29 
percent of blacks compared to 9 percent of whites felt police used unnecessary force in making 
arrests in their neighborhood.  360 
With the drug crisis gripping the city in horrendous fashion, Atlanta Public Safety 
Commissioner George Napper declared that there was nothing within his power that could curtail 
criminal activity as a result of drugs.  As part of his solution to this problem, Napper created the 
“Red Dog Unit” in April 1988 to provide an aggressive police presence in areas that have a high 
incidence of street drug sales, use, and drug related crimes.  In just seven months, the “Red 
Dogs” were responsible for 721 felony arrest.361  The establishment of the “Red Dog Unit” was 
partly at the behest of citizen complaints and media exposure that suggested City Hall was not 
working to quell the flood of drugs in the city and to combat other crimes.   
As a result of the establishment of the “Red Dog Unit” led by Lt. H.B. Goldhagen of the 
Atlanta Police Department’s Special Operations Section, police raided nine drug-infested areas 
in 6 days.  The term “red dog” was an old football term meaning blitz or attack all at once, like 
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blitzing the quarterback.”  According the “Red Dog Unit,” they aimed “to come in real fast and 
hard and go over any obstacle to get to the drug dealers.” Most of their targets were low-income 
buildings and housing projects.  The unit consisted of 25-30 of Atlanta’s fittest and able-bodied 
police.362   
The “Red Dog Unit” was quite effective.  At the McDaniel-Glenn housing project, they 
sized 230 packets of crack cocaine and nearly $2,000 the night before.  At the Allen Temple 
apartments of the Southwest side of the City, officers moved silently in on the reputed “Miami 
Boys,” a drug cartel believed to be connected to a Jamaican or Haitian posse headquartered in 
Miami.  However, “Red Dog” activities put more fear in apartment and public housing tenants.  
During a bust with no results at the Allen Temple Apartments, a woman yelled to Public Safety 
Commission Napper, “Y’all don’t know what you’ve done to me and my family.  They gonna 
think we called the police.  Two of ‘em got uzis and y’all didn’t get either one.  Me and my 
family is through.”  Another woman said that “drug dealers lobbed bricks through windows if 
residents don’t let dealers in when the cops come.”  At another housing project, dealers reserved 
a row of parking spaces for their customers.363  The reference to an uzi speaks of the kind of 
submachine gun widely considered a machine gun pistol and was the weapon of choice for 
corner boys, young dealers that worked for a posse. 
 The duo of race and criminal activity had been a divisive issue that split Atlanta along 
racial lines. Both Maynard Jackson’s and Andrew Young’s administrations had been accused of 
being soft on crime.  The overall portrait was that one’s safety, on Atlanta’s downtown streets, 
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was in jeopardy and as result, stifled downtown shopping, dining and recreation.  However, 
Hornsby notes that the true portrayal of the city was that most of the crime took place in black 
low income neighborhoods and housing projects.  Black attitudes towards controlling crime were 
influenced by the city’s long history of police brutality of its black citizens.364  This strategy 
worked well to clean up the streets, but the incidence of police brutality rose as a result of the 
“Red Dog” unit, who struck fear in the hearts of residents in high-crime neighborhoods.   
 An incident of police brutality at the George Washington Carver housing project in the 
southeast section of Atlanta best portrays division along racial lines over the issue of public 
safety and law enforcement in 1980s. On September 10, 1987, Eddie Lee Callahan was shot five 
times in the back by Officer Michael Long.  Callahan, a Vietnam War Veteran, purportedly 
grappled with police and took a revolver away from Long’s partner, Ridley A. Watson.  Callahan 
died from six wounds, five in the back and one at close range.  Long and Watson maintained that 
their lives were endangered by Callahan’s attempt to gain control of the gun, but according to 
Hornsby, several Carver Homes residents who witnessed the altercation asserted that Callahan 
was restrained on the ground when Long fired five consecutive shots to his black at point blank 
range.  Both a Fulton County jury and an internal police panel cleared Long of excessive force in 
the unlawful death.  But Watson, who was not charged in the incident, was fired.  Public Safety 
Commissioner Napper said Watson’s release resulted from “8 or 10” citizen complaints against 
the officer over a three year period. 365 
 According to Hornsby, in the days following the Callahan shootings, residents of Carver 
Homes joined with Atlanta City Councilman Hosea Williams.  They asserted that the white 
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police officers had “murdered” a restrained black man and that Mayor Young and Commissioner 
Napper refused to punish them.  After the internal police panel and a Fulton County jury 
exonerated the officers, the protests continued.  Young made an effort to calm the situation by 
going to Carver Homes to urge the residents to allow the processes of the law to determine what 
happened and who should be punished.  For yet another time, in his tenure as mayor, Young was 
met with hisses and boos as result of a fatal incident in one of Atlanta’s housing projects.    
Young was also met with a personal, political attack from Councilman Williams, a former ally in 
the Civil Rights Movement.366  
 Williams’ demanded that another grand jury be assembled to investigate recent police 
shootings in Atlanta and Fulton County.  According to Williams, “the mayor became very, very, 
upset, and invited me outside to fight it out in the streets.”  However, Williams noted that the 
fight was not between Young and Williams, “this was a fight between the oppressed citizens and 
the volatile police department” in general and Atlanta City hall in particular.  Williams presented 
a list of demands to Young on behalf of a coalition called the Metro Atlanta Coalition to Stop 
Senseless Police Brutality.  Members included Williams, state Rep. Tyrone Books (D-Atlanta), 
Louise Watley, president of the Carver Homes Tenants Association, Hosea Williams II and 
Charles Callahan, brother of Eddie Callahan. The group demanded that Young join them in 
asking Fulton County District attorney Lewis Slaton to assemble another “unbiased” grand jury 
to hear the Callahan case. The coalition also demanded that Slaton allow a new grand jury to 
hear the case of former Fulton County Sheriff’s Deputy Willie Nash, who shot Alvin Lamar 
Montgomery in the back of the head, considered widely to be another act of brutality.367 
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 According to Hornsby, although Young hoped that justice would prevail in the Callahan 
case, white Altantans charged the city’s administration with ineffectiveness towards crime, 
denouncing the firing of Watson as retribution for Long.   Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
columnist Dick Williams cited several examples of robberies and murders of professionals in the 
downtown business district and concluded that actions taken against Watson and Long made 
Atlanta’s “Finest” gun-shy.368 
 Before the summer months of 1987, three officers had been shot, eight officers had been 
cited for disciplinary actions arising out of the Julian Bond Affair, 369another went to court to 
defend his actions in the shooting of Eddie Callahan, and another officer was awaiting trial for 
allegedly shooting a drug dealer outside a hooker’s house.  Just as the Bond incident was being 
resolved, the Callahan case thrust the department back under public scrutiny.  
 
Public Housing 
 
The most critical aspect of crime and punishment was seen in the lives of those 
dependent on public assistance.  In Atlanta, the Atlanta Housing Authority had been a vanguard 
in regards to race and public housing since 1937, when Harold Ickles dedicated University 
Homes and forty other housing projects had been constructed in black neighborhoods throughout 
the city. Despite a valiant effort, Young admitted that he had failed to meet the city’s demand for 
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affordable housing.  To no surprise, Young understood the failure to meet the economic and 
social needs of thousands of Atlantans, who were overwhelmingly black, already housed in the 
city’s dilapidating housing projects.  The worsening conditions that plagued the more modern 
housing complexes, such as Bankhead Courts in the Northwest Atlanta were shocking.370 
Bankhead Courts were built on a dump site in 1970 at a cost of almost $10 million.  It is 
sandwiched between Interstate 285 and the Chattahoochee River a mile north of Interstate 20 on 
the edge of the city, which allowed it to become self-contained.  By the end of 1988, the 500 
units housed 1,703 tenants, 1,025 of them younger than 19 years of age; eighty-one of the units 
were vacant.  The average monthly rent was $79.  Ninety-eight percent of the households were 
headed by single women, many of them either teen-aged mothers or young grandmothers. 
According to the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) the average age of grandmothers in 
Bankhead Courts was 32.  The average annual family income was $3,500. Only 42 of the 1703 
tenants were employed.371  
 What was striking about Bankhead Courts was that it had become too dangerous for 
letter carriers, telephone repairmen, taxi drop offs and emergency services.  Most of these 
services were either cut or waned significantly as a result of drug related violence.  Violence was 
so rampant, that a three day hiatus of mail delivery and restriction of phone service was a normal 
occurrence. The Atlanta Housing Authority acknowledged serious sewage and plumbing 
problems caused by the apartment’s location.  Although the AHA spent more than $2 million in 
repairs from 1984-1988, it would cost another $1.5 million to renovate each of the 81 vacant 
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apartments.  “We would tear it down and relocated everybody…if we had the authorization from 
Washington.”  Beyond the physical deficiencies, Bankhead Courts had serious management 
difficulties that left the project without a single social program or organized activity. 372 
In light of the dire conditions seen in Bankhead Courts, several black public officials and 
civic leader, including state senator Arthur Langford, City Councilman Archie Byron, and Fulton 
County Commission Chairman Michael Lomax amassed ‘educational vigils’ in the drug-infested 
apartments.  Noted by Hornsby, the vigil was cut short when gunfire was heard.  But political 
and civic figures experienced a first-hand account from tenants the nature of the drug crisis, as 
well as other social and economical ills in order to assure them of their concerns.373 
Hornsby notes that Andrew Young was aware and concerned about the housing needs 
and social ills of inner city projects and he was uneasy about the reported 10,000 homeless 
persons in Atlanta as he seemed more preoccupied with the development of upscale housing in 
the central city.  According to Young, good jobs required good housing which were at the center 
of his economic plan for the economic development of downtown Atlanta.  However, Young’s 
policies frequently ran opposite to his aspirations, as demonstrated in the City’s proposed 
agreement with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) that promoted 
downtown housing expansion.  His Commissioner of Community Development convinced 
Young that the $13.5 million location price tag was too high and that the project spent too much 
of the Community Development resources.  As a result, the city’s neglect to purchase did not foil 
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all opportunity for housing expansion near the Atlanta Civic Center; however, the chance to 
capitalize waned significantly.374 
Downtown progress through upscale housing, while the centerpiece to downtown 
renewal, was also seen as a new catalyst for gentrification—buying and renovation of buildings 
in deteriorated urban neighborhoods by upper or middle-income families or individuals, 
improving property values but often displacing low-income families and small businesses.  In the 
case of Atlanta, this meant white flight back into the central city. Because of the concern that 
gentrification could weaken black political might and, hence, black political control of the city, 
Young seldom spoke of this matter in terms of race.  Yet, it was clear that those in most need of 
affordable housing were black lower income residents—one of Young’s most reliable 
constituencies.   
 
Transportation 
 
According to Hornsby, Young’s greatest contribution to transportation in regards to 
Atlanta was to the airport, which was among the worlds busiest; MARTA had extended into the 
far corners towards the northeast Atlanta and to the Airport, and the downtown freeway was 
broadened from six to ten lanes.  However, Young was unsuccessful in adding additional 
runways at Hartsfield-International Airport, white suburbanites refused to use MARTA, North 
Atlanta neighborhoods were still congested with traffic, and Young had not been successful in 
building a parkway to the Jimmy Carter library.  Despite adding two new runways since 1981, 
the airport, often in competition with O’Hare Airport as the world’s busiest airport, had grown 
and needed new runways  to not only compete with O’Hare but to prevent long delays in both 
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takeoffs and landings.  Delays resulted in a boost of other southern hubs such as Charlotte, 
Nashville or Memphis.   However, many Clayton County residents opposed new runway 
expansion, claiming that noise pollution would decrease their property value and quality of life.  
What seemed to be clear to the residents living near Hartsfield Airport was that airport expansion 
was not at the behest of efficiency, it was to dote that Atlanta had the world’s busiest airport. 375   
An example of Young’s business savoir-faire was seen while in the United Kingdom on 
one of his numerous trips abroad to get international capital to invest in Atlanta.  Young had 
heard that both UK airports Heathrow and Gatwick sold for $3 billion under Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s privatization plan.  Young knew that Atlanta’s airport was bigger than both 
airports put together and more modern. With this in mind, he called Bill Coleman, the Secretary 
of Transportation when the airport was expanded, and asked him to look into the covenants that 
governed airport operations.   Being the pro-business and neo-liberal mayor that he was, Young 
believed that he could give control of the airport to a private Georgia Board but continue to have 
it managed by the City of Atlanta on contract to a private agency.   This freed the City of the 
$600 million dollar airport debt.376 It also exposed Atlanta to the epitome of neo-liberalism, the 
blending of liberal political views with an emphasis on economic growth. 
Young’s rationale was this.  If the city of Atlanta could get $2 billion for Hartsfield 
International Airport, it could have paid off the city’s airport debt and had a billion and a half left 
for a trust fund, which could run the city in perpetuity.  Young wanted to use the billion dollar 
trust fund to eliminate all residential property taxes with half of the interest.  With one-fourth of 
the interest, he planned to give a free college education to every Atlanta Public Schools 
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graduating senior.  With the other fourth, he wanted to create a low-income public housing trust 
fund that could indefinitely fund projects like Habitat for Humanity for the working poor to own 
homes.  This would have left the city debt free.377 
Young’s attempt to privatize the airport was met with great resistance.  The Georgia 
Assembly said that Young wanted to sell the airport to the Japanese.  The Japanese were heavily 
investing in the city.  Nevertheless, Young knew that there was a law that prohibited any airline 
to have more than twenty-five percent ownership of the airport.  This allowed for city officials to 
sell up to twenty-five percent of the stocks to international ownership by creating stock bonds 
where international buyers could have bought up to twenty-five percent in stock controlled by a 
Georgia Board. This proposal was voted down.  But Young asserted that “nobody is questioning 
Heathrow and Gatwick.”378 
Young’s hand in progress towards transportation was at a minimum considering he 
inherited a city with a new airport and a brave attempt for public transportation.  However, 
Young’s legacy in regard to transportation could have been greater, had his economic plan 
included low rent housing and job training.  In turn, jobs provided for low rent tenants would 
have allowed workers to use the MARTA to destinations around the city and would refund 
monies that would have been paid by suburban white workers refusing to use public 
transportation to go into the city. 
Because the MARTA nearly operated in a deficit through out the 1980s, despite 
opposition from central city residents, the fee for public transportation reached $.85, a 
negotiation reached by those who wanted little to no raise in the fare and those who wanted a 
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significant increase.  This stipulation, noted by Hornsby, stated that the new fare would stay the 
same for three years, however, by the end of 1988, it was in danger and MARTA needed an in 
addition $7.5-$10 million by the summer of 1989 or undergo significant cuts to bus services, a 
mode of transportation used by Atlanta’s poor and overwhelmingly black residents.379 With 
federal support dwindling from $49 million to $9 million, what was crucial to MARTA surviving 
was that it needed to be an increase in use amongst riders.  The lucrative rail-line that connected 
from downtown southwest to the airport supported this idea.  However, MARTA lines and bus 
routes from white suburban communities in North Fulton, Gwinnett and Cobb counties were the 
necessary component that would provide the extra funding needed to sustain MARTA as a big 
city transit authority.  White suburban resistance to MARTA, as mentioned earlier, hinged on a 
number of beliefs perceived by former white flight communities.  Many hypotheses included 
cited increased traffic in residential areas, fears that property would be converted from residential 
areas to MARTA parking lots, disturbances of schools and fears of crime and the trespassing of 
vagrants, vagabonds and rascals.380  However, at the heart of this matter was the issue of race, 
particularly white supremacy galvanized in all white suburban areas used to make the black city 
government fail in an attempt to take back the city. 
Other hot button issues in respect to the Young administration, race and transportation 
were the building of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Parkway that would grant access to the 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and expansion of state highway Georgia 400 in to the wealthy 
overwhelmingly white Buckhead community so that the wealthy could access the city’s 
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highways and interstates.  Young, the former U.N. ambassador under President Jimmy Carter, 
whole-heartedly supported the Presidential Parkway, but the city’s northeastern neighborhood 
leadership felt that this kind of urban renewal, seen as political appreciation to Carter, would 
divvy up or reduce long-standing neighborhoods to nothing.  As a result, neighborhood groups 
protested the project through, none violent means, blocking construction equipment, political 
lobbying, and legal action through state and federal means to express their anxiety of the road 
being built.381  What ensued as a result of resistant activity on the part of neighborhood 
leadership was a showdown not only between federal and local officials, but a showdown for 
black Atlanta’s political clout. 
Neighborhood groups in opposition to the Presidential Parkway project called on U.S. 
Representative John Lewis of Atlanta.  Lewis had also served under Carter as the associate 
director of ACTION for Domestic Operations.382  He urged the U.S. Department of 
Transportation to suspend federal funding for the parkway to no avail.  He then attempted to get 
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee to prohibit the use of federal money for 
the parkway also to no avail.  What Lewis did not know was that Young was a political ally to 
House Public Works and Transportation committee and used his own political might to get the 
downtown expressways repaved.  An example of this can be seen when Young became mayor.  
The completion of road repair was a constant problem.  Young went to Tom Moreland, one of 
the nations leading road-building experts with 30 years of experience with the Georgia 
Department of Transportation.   Moreland stated that the City could not get the money to finish 
the roads and that he needed some help to secure funding.  Both Young and Moreland met with 
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Jim Howard, Chairman of the Public Works committee in Washington and over a billion dollars 
were given to the state of Georgia for roads.  As Young prepared to leave office, though the 
parkway was not constructed due to legal and political quagmires, it seemed as if all roadblocks 
had been removed.  As such, he called on Russian sculptor, Zurab Tzereteli to carve a thirty-foot, 
300-ton statute to tower the parkway.383 
In 1986, the Atlanta City Council agreed on plans for Georgia 400 without approving 
construction providing that the Georgia Department of Transportation would return to the body 
for approval.  Though Atlanta’s business elite admired the intended toll road, neighborhood 
groups resisted stating the negative implications that would result in building an express way 
through Buckhead.  Just as it was with the Presidential Parkway, neighborhood groups felt that 
Georgia 400 would divvy up and reduce long-standing neighborhoods to nothing.  On October 
19, 1988, neighborhood groups filed a grievance in the Fulton County Superior Court demanding 
that the state be absolved from building the road because construction had yet to be accepted by 
the Atlanta City Council.  Simultaneously, Atlanta’s City Council passed a resolution prohibiting 
all toll roads, the Georgia 400 included.  Shortly thereafter, the Atlanta City Council banned toll 
roads in the city and Buckhead Neighborhood groups filed suit against the construction of 
Georgia 400. Young vetoed the toll bans stating the “the collection of tolls was a ‘necessary 
component’ for building Georgia 400,” an important artery to the city.  Young asserted that 
banning tolls was “an impediment for the city and state in [the] efforts to complete this much 
needed freeway.”384 
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As the Atlanta City Council worked to override the Young’s veto, Atlanta’s business elite 
initiated an unparalleled lobbying campaign to avert the veto override.  Young and Atlanta’s 
business elite asserted that the construction of Georgia 400 would alleviate traffic congestions 
that cramped not only comfort, but also business.  Neighborhood groups countered stating that 
extending the MARTA rail line, which preserved neighborhoods, would rectify Atlanta’s 
transportation needs.  An important component to Young’s economic development program, 
interstate expansion was key because it further solidified Atlanta’s reputation as a model city for 
transportation feats, considering it was once a rail hub, home to the world’s busiest airport and 
had MARTA, which made it an attractive business venue or better yet, as the aim of the 
“Forward Atlanta” one of the nations “boomtowns.”  However, the distribution of wealth 
amongst the citizens was imbalanced.  The wealthy Buckhead community, as well as northern 
suburbs in Gwinnett County boomed so, that the infrastructure could not handle the ebb and flow 
of daily life.  Employment in these areas skyrocketed with technical jobs that moved to Atlanta 
in particular and the Sunbelt in general.  However, the economic savior-faire was far less 
impressive in downtown Atlanta and its southern, largely black businesses and residential 
enclaves.385    
Atlanta was a perfect example of what was called the “split-level South.”  The 
metropolitan area, predominantly white, had expanded dramatically, with a population growth of 
more than twenty-two percent and a job growth of forty-three percent.  According to the 1990 
Census, the mostly black inner city grew by one percent in population, with an unemployment 
rate that was more than twice that of whites.  Auburn Avenue was the main thoroughfare in the 
once-thriving black Atlanta business district.  However, except for the area near Ebenezer 
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Baptist Church and the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, it was in 
shambles.  In the 15 years since Atlanta had a black mayor, and despite all the millions of dollars 
invested in the downtown and Midtown business districts, Auburn Avenue remained a ragged 
island in a sea of influence.386 
  Much of this was due to the chagrining practices where Atlanta’s banking institutions 
lent little, if any capital to black residential and business aspirations.  To shed light on this 
notion, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution printed a Pulitzer Prize winning series called “The 
Color of Money” that focused on racial discrimination in regards to mortgage lending. The series 
charged the majority of banks in Atlanta, except black owned Citizen Trust Bank and Mutual 
Federal Savings and Loan of the unlawful practice of “redlining.387  This allegation resulted in 
numerous local and federal investigations.  Indeed, Atlanta banks rejected the accusation of 
“redlining and took concerted strides to be more inclusive of majority black south Atlanta.  
According to Alton Hornsby, a consortium of banks created a $65 million loan fund with 
reduced interest and developers aligned with the non-profit Cabbagetown Restoration and Future 
Trust [CRAFT] to refurbish twenty-five homes to be sold at low interest rates to poor and middle 
income persons in an older mostly white community called “Cabbagetown.” Simultaneously, the 
city approved the sale of the Candler Warehouse property in southwest Atlanta.  This move 
served as a catalyst to push for revitalization in the area.388 
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Minority Business Development 
 
In regards to minority business, Atlanta’s crowned jewel was the Minority Business 
Enterprise program started during the Maynard Jackson administration.  It mandated that thirty-
five percent of all city contracts be given to minority businesses and developers.  During 
Young’s mayoral tenure, 500 minority owned and operated firms did approximately $200 
million worth of business for the city. By the end of Young’s final term, the city had awarded 
thirty-seven percent, an approximate total of $30 million dollars worth of work to minority 
firms.389  Nevertheless, the assessment of this accomplishment was that nearly all of the minority 
contracts went to a small cartel of black owned firms.390  This criticism can be seen as Young 
buying political favors by giving contracts to his favorites, creating only a few black 
millionaires, and leaving other minorities excluded from this cadre. 
Atlanta’s concerted efforts to augment minority and poor economic situation came when 
the Atlanta City Council unanimously decided to mandate private businesses contracted to do 
public work to hire fifty percent of all extra, unskilled help from a list of the city’s “down and 
out” workers in a program called the “First Source” program.  There was much concern about 
the veracity of the program based on qualification standards as seen by laborers and the 
affirmative action as seen by contractors.  Moreover, the Atlanta Constitution viewed the idea of 
helping a sector of Atlanta’s underclass capture a bit of the prosperity enjoyed by the rest of 
Atlanta as admirable.391  This gesture may have been admirable, but it was also paternalistic.  
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Young’s citizen of the world persona continued to boost Atlanta as a new juggernaut in 
convention and tourism while soliciting new foreign investors.  Young and the Atlanta Chamber 
of Commerce knew it was not possible to meet the employment needs, particularly in terms of 
unskilled and semi-skilled labor which further lends credence that the nature of this program 
was, in turn, just what the Atlanta Constitution deemed it, an admirable gesture. 
 
Urban Renewal and Gentrification 
 
Young lured financiers from London, Amsterdam, Zurich, Canada, Stockholm and Tokyo 
to invest in downtown Atlanta projects, contacts gathered during his years in congress and as 
ambassador to the United Nations. As a result, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and Monarch Plaza in the 
Buckhead community were a Dutch investments; Fifty- Five Park Place was a Canadian 
investment, new apartments on 14th Street that were later used as the Olympic Village were 
British Investments, and there were numerous hotels erected that were Swedish Investments.  
According to Young and as a result of Reaganomics, he could either raise taxes, cut services, or 
make the economy grow; he decided to make the economy grow.392 
 Young’s willingness to court international investors was perceived by Atlanta’s working 
and poor classes as neglect.  To Young, international investments meant jobs and “that’s the way 
you feed the hungry.”   His panoramic view of what downtown Atlanta needed indicated his 
macro-managing style that delegated authority too freely and left the duties of mayor to his staff.  
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In pursuing investors, Young became known as the “businessman’s mayor,” who championed 
urban renewal and gentrification with no respect for historic landmarks.  He was christened ‘the 
globetrotting mayor” because of his international trips seeking new investors.393 
 As the Atlanta Urban Design Commission (AUDC) sought to preserve historical 
landmarks around the downtown area, Young usurped its ruling and approved construction of 
new hotels and office buildings at the cost of demolishing historical landmarks.  He operated 
from the perspective that history must yield to the present and the future, especially where 
economic development was concerned.   According to Hornsby, at the annual awards program of 
the AUDC in the Spring of 1986, organization’s executive director and chairman lectured Young 
on the pertinence of historic landmarks to the life and culture of a city.  Travel guide writer 
Arthur Frommer also chimed in and warned that Atlanta “can’t attract people just with hotels and 
not life.  Unless downtown Atlanta became more livable, there would be a serious downturn in 
the city’s convention and tourism.  What’s pitiful is that the mayor of Atlanta is not sympathetic 
to this.”394 
As the “globetrotting” mayor attained downtown development, he received national and 
international commendations as the catalyst that set the standard for creating the model of urban 
renewal and gentrification through neo-liberalism.  Phoenix, Arizona mayor Terry Goddard, 
president of the National League of Cities stated that “the success of Atlanta is fabled and known 
to us all….Mayor Young gets a lot of credit for that.” However, amongst Atlantans, there was a 
sentiment of disregard from the mayor and many wished that he would spend more time at home 
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than abroad.395  Many Atlantans wondered how Young was at ease with taking international trips 
at the expense of tax-payers.  However, he insisted that he never let his constituency pay for his 
travel and that he traveled internationally at the behest of the people that invited him.396   
As Young’s business plan for the city hinged on national and international investments 
and projects, it also included an initiative to make Atlanta a convention and tourists poster child. 
Nonetheless, this portrayal of Atlanta was threatened when the Atlanta Falcon’s football 
franchise threatened to leave the city in 1986.  This greatly disturbed Atlanta’s government and 
business elite because it threatened the city’s image.  As stated in previous chapters, the Atlanta 
Falcons of the National Football League and the Atlanta Braves of Major League Baseball 
shared Fulton County Stadium located in the heart of southeast Atlanta.  Fulton-County stadium, 
at its erection, was considered to be a state of the art facility; however, by the early 1980s, the 
60,000 seat facility was one of the lesser sports venues in the nation with the worst playing turf 
in professional sports..  In 1988, the Atlanta Braves made similar threats in the similar likeness.  
The Falcons had Jacksonville, Florida as its prospective city as the Braves began to negotiate 
relocating to Atlanta’s suburban counties.397 
In a series of events that resulted in a stalemate between private investors and the city, the 
project was salvaged in the nick of time when Georgia Governor Joe Frank Harris announced 
that he had developed a plan where the state of Georgia would donate land near the Georgia 
World Congress Center, the state’s largest convention facility, as the stadium site.  This proposal 
would allow the “Dome” to supplement the state-owned Congress center, solidifying the 
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facilities as one convention exhibit and entertainment complex colossus.  Harris also proposed 
that additional construction and operating costs outside of those provided by private investors, 
could be managed by the state if the state permitted the City of Atlanta and Fulton County to 
increase their sales taxes buy up to two cents on the dollar.  He vowed to promote this plan in the 
Georgia General Assembly during it 1989 session.  Both the Atlanta City Council and the Fulton 
County Commission approved the state-supported pitch with stipulations that incited another 
stalemate.  Both the City and County demanded a $10 million housing trust fund for displaced 
families in neighborhoods near the proposed Dome construction site, some financial 
consideration for affected churches, a guarantee that thirty-five percent of contracts in the design 
and construction of the Dome went to minority firms, and representation on the governing board 
of the Georgia World Congress Center, the overseeing body of construction and operation of the 
Dome. The private investors and state officials found these terms ridiculous and a gridlock 
ensued; another hold was put on construction.  However, another miraculous nick of time 
salvage plan emerged to save the future of professional sports in Atlanta.398  
As mayor of course, Andrew Young made enemies within the church communities as a 
result of the building of the Dome stadium. The churches made off with a good price as Young 
closed off the streets and made the state pay for the streets so that he would see to it that 
churches were compensated.  Though Young worked to compensate churches and neighborhoods 
for the inconvenience of relocation, he missed the point of concern held by churches and 
neighborhood organizations.  His component of economic development that included the 
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[Georgia] Dome interrupted the lifestyles and habits of Atlanta’s low-income communities and 
further asserted is disregard for historical markers within the city.399   
Though the construction of the Dome continued to frustrate officials, Young doted two 
feats deemed as major successes.  City Hall tentatively agreed with MCA to build a multi-million 
dollar, 18,000-seat amphitheater on the Southside of the city.  The residual affects of this project 
would provide jobs and more capital generated from taxes.  It also served as stimulus to 
revitalize Atlanta’s Southside.400  This venue would also prove to be an alternative to the Omni, 
the sports venue where the National Basketball Association’s Atlanta Hawks played their 
basketball games. 
In 1987, Billy Payne, a lawyer, investment banker and former All-Southeastern 
Conference football player for the University of Georgia Bulldog football team approached 
Andrew Young about hosting the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games.  Young aspired to be an 
Olympian who competed at the Olympics Trials in 1951 at Quantico Marine Base.  In that foot 
race which was his first competitive race ever, Young, who borrowed someone’s track shoes, ran 
an impressive 21.4 seconds in the 220k dash, breaking a ten year old record.401  According to an 
interview done with Gary Pomerantz, Payne’s initial meeting with Young made him feel as if he 
was wasting the Mayor’s time, until he brought up the involvement with children.  However, 
Young admitted that he was interested in Payne’s proposition from the beginning.402 
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From all accounts, the most important event for the city and under the leadership of 
Andrew Young was Atlanta’s hosting of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) Convention 
in the summer of 1988.  After the DNC Convention took place in San Francisco in 1984, the 
Democratic Party looked to host the next convention in a southern venue. Atlanta was sure to be 
in the running with Houston and New Orleans as the convention site.  Houston and New Orleans 
had larger and more modern facilities; however Atlanta had better commercial capability and 
public transportation as well as hotel accommodations.  Yet, what gave Atlanta the edge was that 
it was home to President Jimmy Carter, who had been the last Democrat elected as Commander-
in-Chief, his former U.N. Ambassador Young, and Democratic governor Joe Frank Harris.  This 
triumvirate was critical to the formation of an umbrella group called “Atlanta 88” a cadre that 
traveled to Democratic bulwarks flattering the DCN site selection committee members, 
especially DNC party chairman Paul Kirk, inundating them with “southern hospitality” when 
visiting Atlanta.  What stood against Atlanta was the small, outdated Omni Arena, an arena with 
15,000 seats.  But the DNC endorsed the Omni Arena and Atlanta citing that ingenious 
architectural design could alleviate the problem and awarded Atlanta the 1988 Democratic 
National Convention.403 
Though the DNC picked Atlanta as host for the ’88 Convention, the press published 
unbecoming accounts about Atlanta.  Attacks against the Omni ranged from its capacity and 
esoteric qualities. The press asserted that the city lacked important cultural sites and had a less 
than stellar nightlife.  Media portrayal of the city showed Atlanta as less than ready for prime 
time.  The 1988 Democratic National Convention concluded with approbation for Atlanta and 
her growth and promise.  Atlanta embodied the epitome of “southern hospitality” in genuine 
fashion and Young and Governor Joe Frank Harris were credited with the city’s success.  
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Wyoming governor Mike Sullivan stated, “Atlanta established a new standard [of hospitality] 
during the Democratic National Convention.  It was a marvelous effort…you have every reason 
to be proud of your city, your people.”  Donald Ward, Director of Special Markets of the Greater 
Houston Convention and Visitors Bureau, an advocate for Houston to host stated that he“ ‘tip its 
hat’ to Atlanta for its outstanding success in hosting.  The 1988 convention in Atlanta had to be 
one of the most outstanding successes in political party history.” The citizens of Atlanta 
characterized the convention as a great success.  According to the city’s foremost architect, John 
Portman stated: 
All Atlanta can feel proud of Mayor Andrew Young as he graciously hosted the 
most important convention of the city’s history.  What made his contribution 
particularly special?  It is his leadership.  Leadership in helping the convention 
come to Atlanta in the first place.  Leadership demonstrated by his diplomatic 
handling of civil disobedience.  Leadership in helping beautify Atlanta with the 
Trees Atlanta and Peachtree Planters program…And finally leadership in helping 
our visitors from all over the world feel at home…. At a time when Atlanta is 
working hard to become “the next great international city,’ Andrew Young helped 
make the city a little more personal and a little more friendly than any other city 
in the world.  And that’s something which all Atlantans can be proud. 404 
 
 The most convicting charge that Young endured was that his platform during his two 
terms in office centered on economic development.  He accomplished his goal in making Atlanta 
a true international city, but by many, he was seen as a neo-liberal too accommodating to 
business needs in respects that few other and white mayors had been.  Support came from across 
party lines to push his pro-business stance.  Though Young believed that the offspring of a 
vibrant business-savvy Atlanta did beget jobs and other resources that he thought would trickle 
down to the poor; very little of that took place during his mayoral tenure.   
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In the final moments of his terms, Atlanta’s poor blacks began to express their popular 
public sentiment, which on all fronts asserted that Andrew Young cared very little for poor 
people.  Even Susie LaBord, President of the Grady Homes Housing Project Tenant association 
and the same woman who convinced a disinterested Young to run for mayor in 1982, blamed his 
too often travel abroad as his Achilles heel amongst black Atlanta’s poor.  She stated “So many 
times, things happen and we can’t find him.  If he is concerned, you’d never know it.  This city 
hasn’t moved forward.  There ain’t no better jobs and they are getting harder and harder to get.  
He should be doing more.”  Other critics believed that Young’s borrowing of the “trickle down” 
from Reagan’s America as well as central theme lost their way.  Political Scientist Robert L 
Woodson believed that Young “failed to understand the difference between jobs and wealth. No 
matter how good one’s job, a job is not something one can leave to one’s children.  Homes, 
businesses, and other capital assets represent the wealth that can, in turn create jobs.”405  
 During the 1980s, Atlanta had the second highest poverty rate, a large homeless 
population, a high drop out rate along with a drug crisis and a recession; it can be assumed that 
crime was immeasurable.  However, in the end, while the city was on solid financial grounds, 
many of the needs of Atlanta’s people were left unmet.  Mid-town and the northern enclaves 
endured burgeoning growth and successes while the south and west sides of the city remained in 
dire straits.  Its transportation system was one of the most modern; however racism reared its 
ugly head to stifle its potential.  While Atlanta sought international status, it struggled to get its 
white citizens to visit down town.  But Young succeeded at one thing, he sold Atlanta to the 
world as the newest American city.  Perhaps what was most striking and promising about the 
1988 Democratic National Convention was Atlanta, as seen by the international press.  The 
Times of London called the convention “the most spectacular event to hit the city since General 
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Sherman—a republican –burnt it down in 1864”; Israel state television said Atlanta “was trying 
to showcase itself to the world”; a French reporter stated, “It is appropriate that the convention is 
here because this year, for the first time, blacks feel they are really participating in the system”; 
the Daily Telegraph in London stated, “This is not politics.  This is show time”; the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine asserted, “Mayor Andrew Young rules a city where political power is black and 
economic power is white”; and Bonn’s daily newspaper the General Anzeiger stated “this 
boomtown in the American South looks like an energetic combination of Washington and 
Hollywood.  However, not all accounts were favorable and as such, journalists did not fail to 
note the economic discrepancies dividing the city’s white and black populations. Peter Jenkins, a 
respected British columnist likened Atlanta to a “vast and hideous concrete pile”; and Britain’s 
Independent Television News noted, “even in this pride of the New South, some ways of the old 
South live on in secret.”406  It was clear that Atlanta was a rising force to be reckoned with 
whether the world liked it or not.  The Democratic National Convention set the stage for what 
may be the watershed moment of international inclusion in the history of the American South, 
and Atlanta would be at the center of this event. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SPEAKING TO THE SPIRIT OF THE GAMES: ATLANTA AS BLACK NEW SOUTH 
MECCA AND OLYMPIC CITY THROUGH THE PRISM OF POPULAR CULTURE 
 
You can be sure, some will owe to get high, you may hurt till you cry. You may die... (you may 
die) …….Keep on trying (keep on trying). Till it's summer in the city! Till it's summer in the 
city.407 
 
Atlanta, Georgia was the only city to win the bid for the Olympic Games on its first 
attempt.  A diverse cohort, with a plan of action, generated the funds needed to refashion a city 
plagued by urban blight and vice.  It included influential businessmen:  Chief Executive Officers 
of BellSouth, the Coca-Cola Company, Delta Airlines and Georgia Power; yet Andrew Young 
and Billy Payne  along with Maynard Jackson Jr. remained the key figures in solidifying this 
accomplishment.  With this, a series of events characterizing the scurrying of Atlanta’s public 
officials and businessmen took place.  This series of events henceforth will be referred to as the 
“olympification” of Atlanta. 
 With the same swiftness of Atlanta’s rise to world class status came rebuke and scorn 
towards the city’s transformation. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the black working and poor 
classes expressed resentment toward the leadership of Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young, 
developing specific responses to the different events and situations that emerged within the city.  
Such feelings of resentment were due mainly to the facelift experienced by the city at the cost of 
the black working poor and homeless who were frequently criminalized, segregated and further 
marginalized along class lines.  There were often many within the black middle classes that saw 
Jackson and Young as business and political prodigies who gallantly led Atlanta into the 21st 
century by developing its world-class commercial status.  Acquiring the Centennial Olympic bid 
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affirmed Atlanta’s success and reinvigorated the city for global commerce, and for the second 
time, Atlanta had risen like its city symbol, the phoenix, refashioning itself in the midst of 
despondency. Atlanta’s hosting of the Centennial Olympiad served as a pivotal moment for the 
American South in general and the black new south in particular.  Black politicians and 
professionals stood at the center with others to await the American South’s greatest achievement.  
Because of the Olympic Games, Atlanta’s people, its history and culture became points of 
interest to the world and its new status situated it as the crux of intra-racial class tensions as seen 
in popular culture indigenous to the city, particularly the development of “Dirty South” rap 
music.  This development opened black Atlanta and the Black New South to social commentary 
from a new generation of rap artists who lived in the underbelly trampled over by Atlanta’s 
pursuit of a global commercial center. Dirty South rap music provided a new and different lens 
for exploring the intra-race and class tensions that attended the rise of the Black New South’s 
most important political regime. 
 Indeed, the central need to investigate these tensions within Black New South cultural 
studies prompted this chapter.  It examines Atlanta’s shift from regional to world-class city on 
the heels of olympification,  a movement that also created the space for a new genre of popular 
culture to enter into ongoing debates about race and class. By focusing on OutKast’s early 
albums Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik and Goodie Mob’s early album Soul Food, it is clear 
that this popular culture Atlanta served to counter Atlanta’s mythical black Mecca status.  
Analyses of lyrics provided by these albums produced a counter narrative for these artists that 
uncovers the realities of black life of Atlanta’s poor juxtaposed with the city’s black Mecca 
status. Hence, this chapter will draw heavily on popular culture to give voice to a particular 
working class analysis of Atlanta political and economic makeover.   
 247 
Hip Hop Music and Culture 
East Coast 
 
It has been over three decades since Hip hop emerged as a phenomenon reflecting 
cultural, social, political and economic milieus that were at the center of “Dirty Southern” Hip 
hop. Hip hop as a larger musical and cultural form fused aesthetics from numerous venues.  A 
culture that connected the creativity of Clive Hercules “Kool Herc” Campbell, originally of 
Kingston, Jamaica, with Grandmaster Flash, Afrika Bambaataa, and others along with graffiti art 
and break-dancing that came together in the South Bronx is evidence of that.  However, the 
music morphed into more distinct styles as it gained a foothold with different sub-cultures and 
eventually—sub-genres. 
Since its inception in the mid 1970s, rap music, according to Matt Miller, was typified by 
the production and consumption by recognizing place and space through the means of 
“representing,” which identifies the relevance of one’s home town or neighborhood in regards to 
shaping the contours of the music.  The grounds to which space and place are inextricably 
connected continue to be uncertain.  Nonetheless, what should be considered is that this 
inextricable connection to place and space was a result of the marginalization of communities in 
politics, economics and  mass media. Rap music power lay in the expression and transmission of 
place-based identities.408 
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Forging the Dirty South:  OutKast and Goodie Mob 
 
As gentrification and urban renewal engulfed Atlanta in the form of downtown 
construction, Atlanta slowly flourished into a newly emerging music seen that not only recorded, 
produced and distributed music on a nationwide scale, this new industry focused on the trends 
and tensions that shaped the city.  According to Roni Sarig, friends Rico Wade and Patrick 
“Sleepy” Brown met with also friend Tionne “T-Boz” Watkins of TLC.  Watkins was already 
affiliated with the then-wife of L.A. Reid, Perri “Pebbles” Reid, who was instrumental in 
developing the image of LaFace Records.  Wade and Brown wanted to showcase their singing 
group the Uboyz to Reid. However, after listening to the group’s demo tape, she assessed that 
vocals were not their strength but liked the music’s production. Wade and Brown heeded Reid’s 
advice and met Ray Murray, a hip-hop producer and talent agent from Atlanta’s Greenbriar area.  
Murray was familiar with Atlanta’s talent scene at the grass-roots level and was knowledgeable 
of neighborhood talents that were emerging.  He was also an artist in a group called Sixth Sense 
and making track for local artists.  Wade, Brown and Murray all came together through a friend 
had a full recording studio in his home because his mother was former back-up singer of Earth, 
Wind & Fire. This quartering, however, did not last long as a fallout ensued between the trio and 
the owner of the studio, who was accused of taking credit of for the progeny produced by Wade, 
Brown, and Murray.409 
 Sarig notes that Wade, Brown and Murray’s collaboration found sanctuary with the help 
of Rueben “Big Rube” Bailey, a friend of Wade.  Bailey’s father had died when he was young.  
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Because Bailey had been a troubled student at East Point’s Tri-Cities High School, his mother, 
who knew and respected Wade, invested a few thousand dollars from Bailey’s father’s insurance 
policy which allowed him to buy a MPC60 sampler machine, which kept Bailey occupied and 
out of trouble.  Bailey donated the machine to the collaborative efforts with some other 
equipment from Brown, Wade and Murray.  They set up a studio at Wade’s small Delowe 
Gardens apartment in East Point.  However, it was not long before Wade’s mother and the 
neighbors complained that the production crew’s progeny broke Atlanta City noise ordinances.  
With this, Wade found a room to rent at Jellybeans, a skate rink on the decline in the Ben Hill 
neighborhood,  that served as a haven for black teens for gatherings and was the site where 
Atlanta’s skating and dancing legends were made. At Jellybeans, Wade, Brown and Murray built 
a studio where artists met around the three.  This collaborative effort formed a production team 
called Organized Noize, a name taken from the triad’s plans to create a female group that never 
came into fruition.  Brown’s R&B background, pitted with Murray’s Hip-hop prowess and 
Wade’s integration and focus, made them a force to be reckoned with.410   
 According to Sarig, when the studio at Jellybeans became difficult to keep with his 
family being threatened of eviction, Wade asked a favor of his most powerful acquaintance, the 
former personal bodyguard to Mayor Maynard Jackson and embattled Atlanta Police Chief 
Eldrin Bell.  Bell helped Wade’s family to relocate to an adequate and discrete place on 
Lakewood Terrace on Atlanta’s Southside. With this, Organized Noize set up a studio in the 
house’s unfinished basement, which they described as a crawl space with a dirty floor with 
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“vibes that were otherworldly.”  As a result of the conditions of the space, the studio was called 
“the Dungeon” because of its red clay walls and overhead pipes that resembled a boiler room 
where artists rarely left.411  This space was the epicenter of a new movement and subgenre in rap 
music.  Wade’s Lakewood Terrace home provided sanctuary for talented and aspiring artists to 
commune.  A couple of this artists would prevail as the earliest voice of a southern movement in 
rap music and Hip hop culture.   
Of the many aspiring artists who inhabited the “Dungeon,” OutKast were the first to 
make it to national and international acclaim as Hip Hop artists.  Comprised of Andre Benjamin 
and Antwan Patton, OutKast, a rap duo that hailed from Atlanta met as sophomores at Tri-Cities 
High School in East Point, a section of Southwest Atlanta known to locals as the heart of the 
SWATS.412 They knew each other from school, however Sarig notes they forged their close-knit 
friendship while both taking the MARTA train to Buckhead’s Lenox mall.  Bonding over music, 
while at the mall along with Patton’s brother James, they rode the MARTA back to East Point 
together and discussed the typical subjects of teenagers: school, music and girls.  From this 
encounter, Andre called his father, with whom he lived with at the time, and asked if Antwan 
could spend the night.  This was the start of a world-renowned friendship as the two combined 
common interests and rearing as well as different, yet complimentary qualities.413 
Born February 1, 1975 in Savannah, Georgia, Antwan Patton was the first child born to a 
teenaged mother Rowena Patton, yet subsequently raised by his maternal grandmother, Edna 
Mae Kearse amongst a host of other grandchildren.  Patton’s family life benefited greatly from 
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his extended family, as his aunts and uncles, and occasionally his father had a hand in his 
upbringing. Interestingly, Patton learned his street savior-fair from his teenaged uncles while in 
Savannah which is a major characteristic of his rap style and persona, as he is considered to be 
the player of the group.  His musical influences included Kate Bush, Bob Marley, Gil-Scott 
Heron and gospel music, as well as his grandmother singing spirituals as a child.  While in his 
early teens, his mother sent him to live with his Aunt Renee in Atlanta, seeking better 
educational opportunities for him.  He was able to stay in Atlanta under the condition that he 
kept good grades. Patton graduated from Tri-Cities High School with honors in 1993.414 
Born on May 27, 1975 in Atlanta, Andre Lauren Benjamin was born to unwed parents as 
a result of a short lived relationship between his 19 year old mother Sharon Benjamin and his 
father, Lawrence Walker, a loan officer ten years Sharon’s senior.  With no intention to start a 
family, Benjamin’s parents parted ways perpetually when he was a child.  Later, his parents had 
joint custody, considering neither of his parents ever had anymore children.  By age nine, 
Benjamin, self sufficient and comfortable in solitude, proved to his mother that he could stay at 
home alone while she worked the night shift at the General Motors plant.  His personality was 
reflective and quiet; Andre had been exposed to some different elements early, as he is 
considered the poet of the group.  At age 13, he got his first job working at the Apparel Mart in 
downtown Atlanta.  His musical influences included Sly Stone, Curtis Mayfield, Marvin Gaye, 
Gil-Scott Heron, Al Green and a host of gospel music.  He favored rap artist such as Eric B. and 
Rakim, EPMD, Public Enemy Pete Rock and C.L. Smooth and KRS One.  Benjamin did not 
finish high school in a traditional sense.  Together, Antwan Patton, referred to as Big Boi and 
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Andre Benjamin referred to as Dre, were known as “the Playa and the Poet”—OutKast. 415 
However and more importantly, the lives of these two artists spoke to the shifting trends and 
tensions found in Atlanta from their births in the mid-1970s to the present. 
Roni Sarig notes that in the mid-1980s, Benjamin’s mother Sharon, enrolled her son into 
Atlanta’s minority-to-majority busing program which gave “gifted” black students from lower 
performing schools and overwhelmingly black schools the opportunity to transfer to better-
performing and overwhelmingly white schools.  With this, Benjamin rode the bus daily from 
Southwest Atlanta to Buckhead’s Sarah Smith Elementary School and then to Willis A. Sutton 
Middle School.  Though he missed going to schools with children from his neighborhood, 
Benjamin thrived at the Buckhead schools while also taking up hobbies that were inextricably 
linked to white suburbia such as skateboarding and rock music.416 
Though Patton had multifaceted talents, his interaction with Benjamin focused on Hip 
hop considering the times they focused on stealing cars from Old National Highway on Atlanta’s 
Southside.  They also endured a stint at dealing marijuana but admittedly stopped as noted by 
Sarig for the reason they smoked the product before selling it.  Subsequently, Benjamin landed a 
job at Foot Action in the Southwest Atlanta’s Greenbriar Mall while Patton worked at Foot 
Locker at the Underground Atlanta. By his junior year in high school, Benjamin had dropped out 
of Tri-Cities High School and took classes at Frank McLaren High School, an alternative school 
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for youth who had jobs or children and wanted to get their Graduate Equivalency Diploma 
(GED).  Educationally, the two took different paths. However, they remained close friends 
through cultivating music and forging a rap duo initially named 2 Shades Deep. Yet, when it was 
learned that there was a group in Atlanta called 4 Shades Deep, they changed their names to the 
Misfits, not wanting to be like any other group.  Misfits, however, did not capture their imagined 
persona and essence of the duo, and with the help of the dictionary they changed their names to 
OutKast, a phonetic spelling derived from outcast, defined as a person who has been rejected by 
society or a social group.417  Benjamin and Patton attempted to establish something different than 
what the bi-coastal hegemony offered in Hip hop music and as such, their southern identity, 
unmeshed with the standards of Hip hop and marginalized found themselves with this name. 
According to Andre, “OutKast blended the feel of blues, the togetherness of funk, the conviction 
of gospel, the energy of rock, and the improvisation of jazz.  With no intensions of disassociation 
from the music, Dre declared, “our music is different…..you listen to East Coast music, it’s got a 
kind of rhythm,  You listen to West Coast, it’s got its own kind of rhythm.  You listen to 
southern music, its got kind of like a bouncy feel to it. It’s soul. That’s what it is.  It’s soulful 
music with more instrumentation.”  L.A. Reid agreed, claiming that his prodigy “tapped into the 
‘soul’ of ‘soul music’ remembering that their music had spirit, Southern spirit.”418 
By 1992, Benjamin and Patton felt ready to perform for a record label and solidify a deal.  
According to Sarig, a classmate of theirs from Tri-Cities High School knew Rico Wade. By then, 
Organized Noize had earned the notoriety as a newly emerging production company in Atlanta.  
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As they auditioned for Wade, it was noticed that they did not imbibe the markings of typical 
Atlanta aspiring artists, seen as “ghetto Atlanta niggas with gold teeth,” but performed with a  
sound that had the stylistic likings of “Das EFX and Onyx,” established New York  groups.  As 
such, Benjamin and Patton rapped for twenty minutes over an instrumental to A Tribe Called 
Quest’s “Scenario.”  The two went back and forth until out of breath and in the end, Wade asked 
them to accompany him to the Dungeon at Lakewood Terrace.  Upon arrival to the recording 
studio, though younger than most of the other artists there, they blended in quickly.  It seemed 
that this recording locale was crawling with artists, notepads, marijuana and malt liquor.419   
In the attempt to cash in on Atlanta’s coming popular culture that was to be, instead of a 
full album deal, Antonio “L.A.” Reid offered OutKast the opportunity to record a song for a 
1993 LaFace Christmas album.  Less than enthused, Benjamin and Patton saw this opportunity as 
Reid’s less than stellar attempt to appease Organized Noize.  For those that grew up poor in the 
ghettoes, the kind of merry Christmas associated with Holiday music was something unlived and 
therefore the group felt as if they could not convey.  However, it was a chance to record and 
Wade encouraged them to write Christmas from their own experiences.   As a result, OutKast 
created a song entitled “Player’s Ball” that would change Atlanta’s sound in particular and Hip 
hop’s sound in general forever.420 
 Roni Sarig asserts that “Player’s Ball” was an amalgamation of Hip Hop styles that 
blended early East Coast trends, West Coast funks and southern sensibilities and parlance. The 
Christmas theme found in “Player’s Ball” solidified OutKast’s credibility amongst a particular 
demographic amongst Atlanta’s black and poor.  It was apparent that “Player’s Ball” 
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demonstrated that Christmas Day, the epicenter of a holiday season marketed as a time where 
gifts are given and received, was no different than any other day to the poor in Atlanta, and to a 
larger degree, the world. The success of “Player’s Ball” pushed OutKast to regional and some 
nation-wide success, but more importantly it gave way to the production and release of there first 
album Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik (Southern Playalistic Cadillac Music) released the last 
week of April in 1994.421 
 One of the aims of Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik in the formation of Atlanta’s identity 
as well as a southern identity in Hip hop was to show audiences outside of Atlanta, in particular, 
and the south, in general, what it was like in the city.  It started an era that pushed southern hip-
hop and rap as a full partner in the culture.  With characteristics of East Coast and West Coast 
rap, Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik provided a mutated third strain of the other two, where the 
integration of sound and a reinvention for hip-hop.422  The albums strengths were that it provided 
a narrative to black and poor life in Atlanta by using identifiable southern standards such as 
dialect and proverbial maxims.  It lent credence to new and emerging tensions and trends as seen 
through southern aesthetic, fashion, and bravado in regards to cars, clothes, and taste.  Lastly, the 
album utilized numerous members of the Dungeon Family by addressing the events that effected 
black Atlanta life as seen in the areas of East Point, College Park and the SWATs with a 
somewhat of a hospitable southern swagger.  However, OutKast’s release of 
Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik did more than for Atlanta; it solidified Organized Noize and the 
Dungeon Family as one of the early vanguards of southern rap.   
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 In 1994, at Freaknik, an annual black college student event that took place in Atlanta in 
April just before the start of final exams, OutKast utilized a street team that greeted college 
students from across the nation with an album sample packaged with dice and incense.  This was 
the way that the emerging group initially put their music out to a national audience.  Locally, the 
group had resounding success.  To Atlanta’s overwhelmingly black southwest neighborhoods, 
OutKast’s music put local landmarks on a national stage in terms of popular culture.  Atlanta’s 
high schools, thoroughfares, nightclubs, and businesses were often referenced in the music.423 
 Sarig notes that as OutKast successfully emerged, LaFace Records, Organized Noize and 
the Dungeon Family solidified there presence and a tertiary sub-culture in hip-hop.  Organized 
Noize’s next project was a new group called Goodie Mob, a group of the Dungeon Family’s 
most promising lyricists. Goodie Mob, also hailed from Southwest Atlanta, an though it started 
as a group of artists who worked well with Willie “Khujo Goodie” Knighton Jr. and Robert “T-
Mo” Barnett, original members of The Lumberjacks, they later merged with their classmate from 
Benjamin E. Mays High School Cameron “Big Gipp” Gipp and younger schoolmate  Thomas 
“Cee-lo” Callaway.  Just as OutKast, Callaway had heard about Organized Noize’s studio 
located in the dungeon and had impressed Wade, Brown and Murray with his skills as a lyricists 
as well as vocals.  With this talent, he appeared on numerous songs on 
Southernplayalisticadillacmuzik in both capacities.424 
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According to Sarig, Goodie Mob’s emergence provided a complementary narrative to 
Atlanta as OutKast had done, while simultaneously bringing something that was more in tune 
with the soul of the city’s streets.425 The name Goodie Mob bore witness to the experiences of 
black Atlanta’s most vulnerable, its working poor, poor and homeless and lent credence to the 
group’s motto where the “Good die Mostly Over Bullshit.”426  There initial album Soul Food 
released on November 21, 1995, imbibed stylistics lyrics and melodic soul.  As OutKast 
soliloquized southern streets, Goodie Mob’s portrayed the experiences of blacks in the South, a 
land where their forefathers worked as chattel on the Old South’s plantations.  Goodie Mob’s 
music challenged Atlanta’s legacy as “City too busy to hate.”  Soul Food, according to Sarig, 
was a simmering anger and yearning to break out of the trap.  It was, in a way that hip-hop had 
never been before, part blues and part gospel—from Callaway’s pained wails to the aggression 
seen in the lyrics presented by Knighton. According to Miller, one of Soul Food’s most 
successful songs was “Dirty South,” a track that expropriated the negative markers of poverty, 
ignorance and violence of rural life that was often portrayed in images of the South and its 
hermeneutical fluidity in regards to southern history, of which its Achilles heel was race relations 
where blacks were complicit in the often subscribed Old South romance interpreted by white 
southerners in their lost cause of the Confederacy. “Dirty South” also linked the motifs of 
iniquities that had been seen along racial lines and practices, an understanding of Atlanta rarely 
exposed. To group member Robert Barnett, “Dirty South” asserted  “the song portrays Atlanta as 
a racist stronghold where the confederate flag still waves for ‘good ole boys and slavery’” 
Cameron Gipp, another member of the group asserted that “the symbols of slavery still stand in 
the South, an it’s evidence that the mentality still lives….ain’t too much changed; they just 
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learned to make it look a little better.” In a documentary entitled The Dirty South: Raw and 
Uncut, Willie Knighton asserted: 
It’s just dirty in the form of…racism,…..it’s still the old prune-face ass white folk who 
still run the ATL…that’s what’s dirty about it, ‘cause they still run it….they run the 
ATL from the inside out…..during the nighttime, the street is ours….during the daytime 
they got white folk coming from all over Roswell, I’m talking about Alpharetta, coming 
in just to run ATL out of these big buildings that they done fuck around and built 
downtown.  That’s what dirty about it, you feel what I’m saying?”427   
 
In this same documentary, Gipp called for the need for black economic empowerment with his 
connotations of the “Dirty South” asserting the need to “start controlling this [music] business 
and getting all the other folks up out of it.  Lastly, Thomas Callaway asserted that “a great 
number of our black leaders….come right from the South, so, the South is the heartland….the 
South is ….a mother.” 428  To historicize this, perhaps both Miller and Sarig’s cultural analysis 
should consider Atlanta’s history in the post Civil Rights context. There are some understandings 
of the South that are not always quantified by attempts to explicate the meanings of new 
developments in black culture but are linked by and large to the lived experiences of the people.  
By 1996, OutKast had matured personally and creatively, where Benjamin showed 
significant signs of change.  He had put down the vices of marijuana and alcohol referenced in 
Southernplayalisticcadillacmuzik and had become a strict vegan.  He wore dreaded hair, and 
while waiting for the excess growth to lock the hair, he took to wearing a turban much like 
Atlanta’s R&B icon Hannibal.  This was seen by audiences as an increased sense of spirituality 
and eccentricity.  Moreover, what was clear was that he showed himself as an individual and had 
somewhat distinguished himself from the rest of the Dungeon Family. Along with this, OutKast 
endured significant musical growth, making their own music, apart from Organized Noize.  With 
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money earned from record sales, the group set out to create their own studio.  From this, OutKast 
birthed a popular song that would lead their second album entitled ATLiens, released in August 
of 1996, after Atlanta hosted the Olympics.  The track called “Elevators (Me & You) showed as 
OutKast as taking more control over their music.  This album asserted the group’s individuality 
with imagery—aliens, extraterrestrials—that reasserted OutKast’s distinctiveness and as they 
represented Atlanta apart from other forms of Southern Rap.  According to Sarig, their music 
was untethered by regionalism; some aspects of it were from out of space.429 This asserts the 
music’s distinct sound and content and further embodies the marginal quality of an outcast. 
The“Dirty South” genre served as a rallying cry for southern rap on southern terms.   One 
of the original aims of Organized Noize was to identify talent that embodied southern aesthetic. 
Interestingly, the dynamics of black southern life morphed rap music and Hip hop culture into a 
sub-culture that was and is particular to the American South.  It preyed upon a resilient tradition 
that is old as the American black experience, the oral tradition.  Yet, negative markers associated 
with the sordid history of the American South such as racial injustices, miseducation, and 
economic hardship significantly informed the genre.  As early as 1990 a new development in the 
history and culture of the black New South appeared in this a newly self-defined southern-style 
of rap music and Hip-hop culture.  This particular movement, known as Dirty Southern rap, 
initially found credence amongst a southern audience.  However, it impacted the genre as a 
whole later. At the center of this development were Atlanta based artists OutKast and Goodie 
Mob, who willfully used black southern standards such as dialect, sensuality and older genres 
found within black southern musical traditions to gain a foothold in a competitive but budding 
music industry.  Enthusiasts felt that both OutKast and Goodie Mob brought forth the divers 
history and culture of post Civil Rights black Atlanta while steeped in the paramount cultural 
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traditions still prevalent and seen throughout the African American experiences. As Atlanta 
developed into a global commercial center, it became very clear that OutKast and Goodie Mob’s 
social commentary spoke to the social costs paid by the majority of black poor and homeless at 
the center of Atlanta’s transformation.  Hence, early forms of Dirty Southern rap music 
constituted an appropriate snapshot of the contrasting lifestyles between two black Atlantas.  For 
the sake of the music, OutKast’s Andre Benjamin and Antwan Patton will be referred to as Dre 
and Big Boi respectively; and Goodie Mob’s Robert Barnett, Thomas Callaway, Cameron Gipp 
and Willie Knighton will be referred to as T-Mo, Cee-Lo, Big Gipp and Khujo respectively.  The 
lives of these artists spoke to the shifting trends and tensions found in Atlanta from their births in 
the mid-1970s to 1996. 
 
Player’s Ball 
 
Roni Sarig’s characterization of OutKast’s 1993 hit “Player’s Ball” as a “synthesis of 
Hip-hop styles, meeting at the Atlanta crossroads: the mellow ’70s funk that defined Dr. Dre’s 
West Coast flavor, mixed with the rapid-fire lyricism of Native Tongues MCs, delivered with the 
slur and slang of southerners” works from the perspective  and cultural analysis of an 
ethnomusicologist or literary critic by attributing the “Player’s Ball” to musician Lightnin’ Rod’s 
1973 album-length toast, Hustler’s Convention and asserts that Christmas day was just as any 
other in Atlanta’s ghettoes.430  There may be some validity to this claim.  However, in the 
original version of the song, the chorus, sung with Sleepy Brown’s soulful falsetto voice, it 
states:  “All the players came from far and wide. Wearing afros and braids, kicking them 
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gangster rides.  Now I’m here to tell you of a better day, when the player’s ball is happening on 
Christmas day.”431 In an interview conducted for the purpose of this dissertation research, it was 
acknowledged that the actual Player’s Ball was the Hustler’s Ball, a part an underground 
working class coalition uninvited to debutante parties and all the events catered by Atlanta’s 
black upper and middle classes. From a historical perspective in regards to black Atlanta was that 
the annual Hustler’s Ball was held at various hotels and hosted by the highly regarded Atlanta 
bookmaker Wesley Merritt.  Merritt ran the illegal lottery in Atlanta known as “the bug” and 
credited as the most lucrative illegal gambling operation in the Southeast. He originally hailed 
from Spaulding County, Georgia with humble beginnings but made resident in the Summerhill 
community on Atlanta’s Southside.  Though he owned a lucrative and illegal business, he 
dressed in neatly pressed bibbed overalls with nice shoes, the clothes uncommon to the bravado 
of a stereotypical hustler.  At every chance, he invested his proceeds in legal ventures such as 
real estate, nightclubs, pool halls and a motel.  As he did numerous stints in jail for his illegal 
activity, he remained in the good graces of the police and politicians, attributed to their payoffs 
received from “the bug.” Evidence of this can be send during one of Merritt’s prison stints where 
former Atlanta City Councilman Q.V. Williamson’s real estate company handled his gambling 
property holdings and the Atlanta politician would occasionally free Merritt from jail to conduct 
his personal business.  In 1971, Williamson used his authority to “sign out” Merritt from jail four 
times. 432   
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Merritt ran “the bug” with the most shrewd business practices.  In the community, “the 
bug” involved thousands of bettors making 50-cent and $1 bets at odds as much as 400 to 1.  
Players picked a three-digit number, and the winning combination was determined by each day’s 
final sales of stocks and bond on the stock market.  His operation followed a pyramid scheme 
where runners, the lowest ranking employees, answered to the captains of middle management.  
The captains then answered to the lieutenants and the lieutenants answered to Merritt.  Merritt 
had his employees working at all of the local hospitals, barbershops, hair salons and the General 
Motors automobile plant where in house captains worked. His operation was lucrative until 
1993, when the state of Georgia initiated the Georgia Lottery under the pretenses to fund 
education, where legalized gambling crushed underground bookmaking to wane significantly.  
Merritt was killed in an attempted robbery by drug dealing corner boys in 1995 in his front yard 
with $9,700 in cash on his person.  At his funeral he was eulogized as “a good and passionate 
man where over a thousand agreed with shouts of amen and hallelujah.”  Perhaps the best 
assessment of Merritt’s contribution to Atlanta’s black working class and poor communities was 
Deacon Clarence Mitchell asserted that Merritt was a “jack-‘em-up businessman, a jack like one 
you put under your car when you get a flat tire to jack it up which is what Wesley Merritt did for 
poor people who needed his help.  The sentiment in some black communities was that Merritt’s 
“bug” never shot folks dead, never threw fire into babies’ bedrooms.  Douglas Dean, the 
president of the Summerhill Neighborhood Association, declared “every black church in every 
black community has a Wesley.  He gave back to his people because he had a heart.”433 
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Another story of Merritt showed his interest in helping students go to college and the 
numerous contributions to churches. In an interview, showing Merritt’s commitment to 
education, it was stated that: 
Benjamin Mays….if there was a student that was deserving of money to stay in 
school. Dr. Mays, we called him Buck Benny would write a little note and send it 
down on Martin Luther King Drive to Wesley and tell him he needed a couple of 
thousand dollars or something or whatever he needed and Wesley would put it in 
a #2 bag, that’s a little brown bag and have one of his runners to carry it back to 
him [Mays].  That’s how he helped to support the students at Morehouse.  They 
[Mays and Merritt] had their understanding.  These people [bookmakers] were 
just as concerned in the development of black children as the man that was Doctor 
so and so and Lawyer so and so.  They might be more concerned, but they 
couldn’t go out and sport it cause they [police]  would ask where you got all this 
money from? But they were just as concerned, just as dedicated in raising their 
children.434 
 
Once again, this shows Merritt as a complicated figure in the complicated worlds of black 
Atlanta. 
 Though modest, Merritt saved his bravado for an event that he hosted annually, his lavish 
Hustler’s Balls or Player’s Balls held at local Atlanta hotels.  The fact that this signature event 
was held in Atlanta and idolized by Atlanta’s Youth in the 1990s were inextricable. When the 
“crown jeweled” Marriott Marquis came to Atlanta as a result of urban renewal during 1960s, the 
Hustler’s Ball was moved to the hotel.  Before, it was held at clubs like the Poinciana on “Sweet 
Auburn” Avenue or at Dinkins’ Plaza.  But the Marriott provided a space for the annual swank 
affair, which was a grand and successful event where “everybody who was anybody went.” It 
was quoted as “everybody was well dressed and well mannered and…it was fine food, no 
cutting, fine cigars to smoke and beautiful women to talk to.  It was the event of the day and all 
the men who came were well endowed financially.  All the top sergeants, captains, lieutenants all 
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came and enjoyed itself.”435  Though there was trouble in finding evidence of this affair in local 
newspapers, the researcher bore witness to a Hustler’s Ball invitation and saw pictures from the 
event, as the interviewee worked for the racket.  What was gleaned from these articles was that 
the event happened during the Holiday season and was the talk of the town amongst black 
Atlanta’s prosecutable business.  In a historical perspective and with this evidence, it is 
irresponsible to discount the fact that OutKast, fashioning themselves with hustler qualities, 
named their first hit after one of black and working Atlanta’s grandest events hosted by Atlanta 
and the Southeast most prominent bookmakers. Perhaps this historical analysis lends credence to 
“Player’s Ball’s” introduction, where it was described as “a black man’s heaven!”436 
 
Towards the Confederate Battle Flag 
 
 Though Sarig and Miller briefly touch on the ways in which the music of OutKast and 
Goodie Mob address issues surrounding the embodiment of progress and the commercial 
branding of the American South, their analyses lacked a historical and sociological 
understanding of the Georgia confederate state flag issue.   Though there were many inferences 
that talked about the underlying themes surrounding Georgia’s racist past and present as seen 
through OutKast and Goodie Mob, there are two references found in OutKast’s 
Southernplayalistccadillacmuzik that speak directly to this issue.  One of these references came 
in an interlude entitled “Welcome To Atlanta.”  In this interlude, the scenario is descriptive of an 
airplane carrying passengers into the city of Atlanta.  Atlanta’s Hartsfield International Airport is 
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located in the Southwestern corner of the city.  The speaker in this interlude, who is the captain 
of the plane,  states: 
This is your captain.  We are now in our final descent into Atlanta-Hartsfield Airport. 
We’d like to welcome you to Atlanta.  We have clear blue skies in Atlanta, which, by 
the way is the home of the Atlanta Hawks, the Braves and the Falcons.  To the far left, 
you can see the Georgia Dome, which by the way still flies the confederate battle flag.  
Atlanta has been called the new Motown of the South and is the home of Laface 
Records’ Organized Noize Production.  If you look to your far right you can see 
Decatur and below you to the right is East Point and College Park, home of the Red 
Dogs, Black Cats, and robbing crews; and home of the players, lacks and mother 
fucking OutKast.”437 
 
Readers can interpret this interlude as the captain declaring that with the arrival of OutKast in the 
music industry, understanding this music was hinged on understanding the landscape particularly 
the SWATs, the community that had much influence on the content of the music.  
 In another instance, the song entitled “D.E.E.P.” from Southernplayalisticcadillacmuzik 
as well references the Confederate Georgia battle flag issue and gives voice to black political 
sentiments that can be seen in through the commercial branding of the American South at the 
behest of the Olympics and how Atlanta’s black poor still struggled.  In this, Dre declared:   
…..Oh step in my Cadillac, let’s ride through the hood and why don’t you roll your 
window down so you can see it real good. And take a look at all the pimps and all the 
pushers and the players that’s living on w whim, thin ice and prayer.  Oh and mayor, 
can I get a little backup.  Please don’t let them pussy motherfuckers put that flag up.  
But let me shut up cause they say we need dough, whenever the fuck our album come 
out in 1994.”438 
 
Clearly, these lyrics speak to the politically charged nature of Georgia’s confederate flag, a 
symbol of oppression that was expected to greet the international community by southerners who 
held that symbol dear.  It also underscores the politics of compromise in pursuit of “dough,” 
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reminding one of Du Bois’ warning regarding pursuit of the golden apples.  Dre did not set out to 
bring negative repercussions to local and state politicians as 2 Live Crew and NWA had done in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  However, the larger contest for Dre’s commentary illustrates the 
historical underpinnings of OutKast’s counter narratives. 
Consider this for the historical synthesis.  As Atlanta moved forward making preparations 
and concessions for the Centennial Games, the city, state, and region were  forced to confront an 
issue that had long been a negative marker of white supremacy.  In 1994, Atlanta’s Georgia 
Dome played host to Super Bowl XXVIII, the championship game of the National Football 
League that pitted the National Football Conference champion Dallas Cowboys against the 
American Football Conference champion Buffalo Bills, a highly anticipated rematch of the 1993 
championship game held at Pasadena, California’s Rose Bowl.  In the days preceding the event, 
Atlanta councilwoman Carolyn Long Banks, a native daughter of Atlanta and the Council’s first 
black woman member raised the issue, wanting an explanation as to why Georgia flew the Old 
South  most identifiable ideological symbol, the confederate battle flag’, known in Georgia as the 
“stars and bars.” The Georgia state flag flew atop local, state, and federal buildings.  In Georgia, 
the “Navy Jack” designed stars and bars were added to the state flag in 1956 as retaliation to the 
1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education, which furthered the way 
for school integration.  The flag generally represented the South’s resistance to federal mandates 
for civil and political equality. Georgia was not the only state confronting its endorsement of 
racists’ symbolism disguising it as “southern heritage.” The neighboring states of Alabama and 
South Carolina, as well as Mississippi, Florida, and North Carolina were all embroiled in similar 
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issues surrounding their respective flags. To blacks in Atlanta, the Georgia Dome had been built 
on the “skull and bones” of the black community.439 
 On the Thursday prior to the Super Bowl, U.S. Representative and Civil Rights figure 
John Lewis blasted the National Football League and some local political leaders for not calling 
for the removal of the state flag from the Georgia Dome for the Sunday match.  He stated, 
“People should stand up and say this is not in the best interests of our state or city.  All elected 
officials should have the courage to put this issue behind us.”  Lewis’s criticism asserted his 
concerns toward former Mayor Andrew Young, presiding Mayor Bill Campbell and Governor 
Zell Miller when the group told the media that attention should be focused on other matters.  
Former Mayor Maynard Jackson was exempted from this criticism because he removed the 
confederate Georgia banner from areas under the jurisdiction of City Hall and called a press 
conference and rejected the banner.   In June of  1992, Jackson signed a City Council resolution 
supporting Governor Miller’s call to remove the Confederate battle flag from Georgia’s state 
flag.  As a black mayor of a predominantly back city, Jackson not only knew but understood the 
racial antagonism the battle flag represented and that it was not a banner under which the diverse 
population of Georgia’s citizens could unite.  As early as 1993, Gov. Miller, raised the idea of 
changing the flag before 1996, but squelched his proposal after it was meet with intense 
opposition from the legislature. To bring attention to the centrality of the “stars and bars” and the 
showcasing of the Georgia Dome through Super Bowl XXVIII, Georgia Civil Rights activists, 
led by state Senator Ralph David Abernathy III of Atlanta, planned a noon march on the dome 
that Sunday to protest the flag.  Meanwhile, Georgia’s two largest groups interested in preserving 
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the Georgia Flag that donned the “stars and bars,” the Sons of the Confederate Veterans and the 
Heritage Preservation Association, made no plans to appear at the dome to express their right 
given by the First Amendment.  Lee Collins, president of the heritage association stated, “Let 
Abernathy’s group lynch themselves.  We’ve recommended our group stay away.” The issue 
surrounding the Confederate flag was another dress rehearsal for a critical discourse yet to unfold 
regarding the Olympics and Atlanta. 
 On February 23, 1994, Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium removed the Georgia state flag 
bearing the confederate symbol from atop the stadium and relegated the issue to by the Georgia 
Assembly as the city moved closer to the Olympiad.  With Atlanta’s baseball stadium refusing to 
fly the flag, only the Georgia Dome, the largest stadium in the city, displayed it.  Fulton County 
Commissioner Michael Hightower, a member of the Atlanta-Fulton County Recreation Authority 
responsible for the vote that took down the flag asserted that this decision was made with hopes 
that all minds be brought together as the city moved toward the 1996 event. However, Georgia 
lawmakers across party lines had mixed reactions to the removal of the flag from the stadium.  In 
both parties, white lawmakers though it was “bad judgment” to remove the flag.  Black political 
leaders, as well as those preparing the city for the Olympics praised actions taken at Atlanta-
Fulton County Stadium.  With this, they predicted that more venues and public buildings would 
take similar actions. The Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) asserted that the 
flag was a political issue that transcended the Games, the Super Bowl, but embodied a long 
discourse of southern politics along race lines.  As such, ACOG suggested that Georgia’s 
political leaders handle this matter.  In a survey utilized to measure public opinion, slightly more 
than half of Georgians opposed changing the flag.  Another survey in January of 1994 
administered by Georgia State University’s Center for Urban Policy Research showed that black 
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support had waned since the spring of 1993, falling from 62 percent to 50 percent.  For more 
dramatic affect, the decision by Stone Mountain Park officials to eliminate the playing of 
“Dixie” and images of the confederate battle flag in the park’s laser show was considered to be a 
seminal issue in the 1994 governor election.  Because of Miller’s stance toward the flag and his 
endorsement of Bill Clinton in 1992, he prevailed as Governor for the second time with the 
slimmest margin in Georgia history, receiving 51 percent of the votes to 48.95 percent of the 
votes received by his opponent Guy Millner, the difference in the votes being a mere 32,555 
votes.440 
 As Atlanta moved towards the Olympics, the flag issue heated once more as this time it 
involved not only blacks, whites, southerners, and northerners; but international relations in the 
form of world class athletes, diplomats and potentates.  Also, the threat of protest by African 
American athletes had far reaching ramifications well beyond politics and into the realm of 
economics and sports. Unless U.S. District Judge Orinda Evans issued a temporary injunction 
forcing removal of the flag from public buildings, then decided to hear a lawsuit alleging that 
changes to the flag in 1956 were intended to promote segregation, sports pages would be 
dominated with extensive analyses of America’s most glaring social ill.  Morality and conscience 
would supplant terms such as salary cap and free agency.  Allegations of racism and self-
righteousness would compete with the Dream Team III for prime play and witty headlines and 
Team USA’s cache of gold would be tarnished by the unprecedented exposure of America’s 
greatest embarrassment.441 
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 Though not yet selected, black American athletes were sure to protest if the Confederate 
version of the Georgia state flag were too fly atop venues in which they were to compete.  
Atlantans and former Olympians Teresa Edwards and Katrina McClain were monitoring the 
matter as well as representatives of the Black Coaches Association and National Basketball 
Association Players Association who held sentiments of disappointment, anger, and surprise.  
Charles Grantham, the executive director of the NBA’s union stated “This is 1995! Why are we 
even talking about this?  I thought we’d moved beyond this type of thing. But I think that other 
black Americans would concur when I say that the [stars and bars] clearly symbolize segregation 
and racism.”  Two time Olympic coaching assistant George Raveling also anticipated some 
forms of civil disobedience.  He thought that players might wear black armbands, remain in 
locker rooms while the national anthem was played, or worse boycott the games altogether.  
Raveling stated, “first and foremost, the flag should always be a symbol that generates enormous 
pride in yourself, your team and your country.  I remembered when I’d watch the Olympics, long 
before I coached, I’d envision myself receiving the gold medal, filled with pride, tears in my 
eyes.  Thus, the fundamental issue here is this:  Why would anyone want a state flag that offends 
a percentage of this population and precludes that feelings of pride?” Raveling further suggested 
this litmus test: “Imagine you are a black American, on the victory stand, gold medal slung 
around your neck.  With hand on heart, you hear the national anthem and watch as the American 
flag is raised.  This is your grandest moment, your emotions spilling over. But yards away flies a 
flag that symbolizes much of what you and your ancestors have overcome, slavery and racism. 
How would you feel?” 442 
In the days just before the opening ceremonies, 20 protesters carrying confederate 
Georgia state flags gathered in front of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution building to condemn the 
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newspaper and the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games for what they said were efforts to 
ban the flag from Olympic venues.  The group was led by staunch segregationist and former 
governor Lester Maddox, who also cited the newspaper’s editorial policy advocating removal of 
the St. Andrew’s Cross, considered the Confederate battle emblem, from the flag, and ACOG’s 
decision not to include flag pins in its collections of Olympic pins.  While protesting, the former 
statesman Maddox carried a sign that read, “You Too Can Become a South Hater.  Simply Join 
ACOG Leaders and the Atlanta Constitution and Oppose the Georgia Flag.”443  Once again, the 
narrow mindedness of southern politics before civil rights reared its ugly head, only to show 
itself as outdated and ignorant. 
 
“Git Up! Git Out!,”:  Towards the City Government and Black Popular Political Sentiment 
 
OutKast’s song entitled “Git Up, Git Out,” [“Get Up, Get Out”], the song’s phonetic spelling 
result from the pronunciation derived from black southern parlance] perhaps may be the most 
intelligible critique of Atlanta’s glaring social ills more often seen amongst black Atlanta’s poor 
and homeless.  The collaboration between OutKast and Goodie Mob lent credence to the 
struggles seen by Atlanta’s poor and underclass and gave details to a myriad of issues that ranged 
from truancy to voter inclusion. The song had good balance and included two verses rapped by 
Goodie Mob’s Cee-lo and Big Gipp, as well as both members of OutKast.  As part of the counter 
narrative, Cee-lo croons the chorus:   
You need to get up, git out and git something. Don’t let the days of your life pass by.  
You need to git up, git out and git something.  Don’t spend all your time trying to get 
high. You need to git up, git out and git something.  How will you make if you never 
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even try? You need to git up, git out and git something.  Cause you and I got to do for 
you and I.444    
 
Because of the songs content, the radio version of the song was and is still widely used at 
activities centered around youth because of its message against apathy, high school drop out and 
crime.  However in a very bold and striking fashion, Big Gipp’s verse calls out Atlanta’s black 
leadership.  Gipp voiced these words:   
….I had Jamaica’s best [marijuana] and when I light it up, I hear a voice in my head 
[You got to git up, git out and git something].  Now I know it’s on.  My day is finally 
started.  Back up in my crib, eat my grits, break out quick in my slick ’84 sedan Deville 
[Cadillac] steady bouncing out to the point to Campbellton road.  The valley of that 
Southside flow.  Everybody know about that killer that we call blow [heroine]. So keep 
your eyes peeled for the cobra unit cause they known for jumping out of black Chevy 
trucks and through the fog.  Here come the Red Dogs.  I’m busting out around the 
corner in my Hog.* Dipping in an area, I’m scared.  So one of these bitches might wind 
up dead. Cause I have no time for jail. Fuck Clampett cops! Fuck Elgin Bell! And 
crooked ass Jackson, got the whole county.  Thinking that my city is the big lick for ’96.  
’94, Big Gipp, Goodie Mo, OutKast, a vision form the past.  Hootie Hoo [a call that 
signifies that the Red Dog police are coming].445 
 
It is clear here that Gipp’s account detailed drug trafficking still very prevalent as the city of 
Atlanta went through olympification.  Gipp voiced fears of the undercover cobra units and the 
Red Dog police, whose primary purpose was to purge Atlanta’s streets of drugs, vagrants and 
other “undesirables.”  The excessive force used by City hall enforcers influenced Gipp’s 
description.  Unlike their parent’s generation that adored black politicians such as Jackson, 
Atlanta’s new black youth rebuked not only Maynard “crooked ass” Jackson, but also Police 
Chief Eldrin Bell, President Bill “Clampett” Clinton, Mayor Bill “Clampett” Campbell.  
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 In his third term in office, it was clear that Maynard Jackson was not perceived as  the 
same man elected in 1973.  Among the youth, there was a sense that the established leadership 
was out of touch.  Jackson had left office in 1982 under what was perhaps the darkest chapter in 
the city’s history, the missing and murdered children of Atlanta.  Most of the Atlanta’s youth, 
students and these rap artist all fell into the age bracket most severely effect by the serial killer[s] 
rampage on the city.  Particularly, the artists, all black males, from Atlanta’s southwest side, 
embodied the characteristics of those hunted as prey.  Perhaps the displacement of the poor, 
destitute and disfranchised along with the influences that shaped the popular political sentiments 
of Atlanta’s youth, as seen through Atlanta’s Hip Hop, manifested itself most clearly on April 
30, 1992 when hundreds of young blacks shattered storefront windows, looted downtown stores, 
and brutalized lone whites near the Henry Grady statue on Marietta street in downtown Atlanta.  
The riot contradicted the harmonious image championed for and protected by Atlanta’s city 
leaders and businessmen.  For several hours, downtown Atlanta belonged to the mobs.  It was a 
reversed picture of the Atlanta race riots of 1906 to some extent, but this time young blacks 
vented their rage by assaulting any white person in sight.  This wrath was stirred by a jury 
verdict handed down in Los Angeles, clearing four police officers of brutality charges in the 
beating of black motorist Rodney King.  A novice video tape of the thrashing of King shown on 
national television for months had elevated the black expectations for a speedy conviction, yet an 
acquittal of the four police officers sparked riots nationwide.446  
 
Responses from City Leadership 
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In Atlanta, nearly one thousand students from the Atlanta University as well as black 
youths from the housing projects near the campus rampaged through downtown Atlanta, 
confronted by about 100 police decked out in riot gear with several hundred National Guard 
troops on standby, ordered by Gov. Zell Miller to protect “the lives of innocent people and the 
protection of public and private property.”  Youths from the Atlanta Housing Authority and 
Atlanta University Center students alike felt that a deep sense of anger gripped the black 
community because the city’s black leadership and been unresponsive to the community and that 
their message of non-violence applied to a different time and place.447 
 At the time of the unrest surrounding the King Verdict, Atlanta’s Police Chief Eldrin Bell 
was vacationing in St. Thomas U.S. Virgin Islands. Because he was inaccessible, Deputy Chief 
Julius Derico, along with Jackson, began planning a strategy to quell the unrest.  Of the 
downtown place ransacked were the Downtown Macy’s on Peachtree Street and Underground 
Atlanta, both shopping attractions in the area.  To Atlanta city officials, the city was attempting 
to be patient with the youths.  However, destroying public and private property would hurt the 
city’s image towards progress and the Olympic spirit.   With this, Fulton County Police in riot 
gear surrounded the county government buildings and heavily armed state troopers, Georgia 
Bureau of Investigation agents and MARTA police lined the Five Points MARTA station 
making downtown Atlanta a full police state under martial law.  To maintain order, Jackson 
enacted a citywide curfew imposed from 11pm to 5am on the first night.  On the first day of the 
unrest, more than 320 people were arrested, most of them in their teens or early 20s and most 
charged with disorderly conduct or obstructing an officer.  These arrests swelled the incarcerated 
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population in Atlanta to 1,154—more than double its capacity of 521. At least 41 people, many 
of them police officers, reporters and photographers were treated at hospitals for minor injuries.  
One Stone Mountain businessman was in critical condition with head wounds.  Interestingly, 
then-Councilman Bill Campbell felt as if the police responded accordingly and promptly, but felt 
that no one anticipated that Atlanta would react with this kind of violence.  He stated “we have a 
black administration.  We have a black police chief.  We have a black judicial system.  It’s hard 
to comprehend.”448  Again, this kind of aloofness speaks to the reasons that Atlanta’s black youth 
felt as if the city’s political leadership had rejected its poor black constituency. 
 On the second day of unrest, Atlanta’s police waged a daylong confrontation with about 
200 Atlanta University students intent on marching on downtown Atlanta.  Police attempted to 
disperse the crowd with tear gas and students responded by hurling bricks and stone at police.  
Sixty-eight were arrested and the 11pm curfew imposed by Jackson on Thursday was reissued 
for Friday night.  Police Chief Eldrin Bell, back from his Caribbean vacation asserted that “we 
will not tolerate in this city the unrest and the kind of violence we have seen.” To enforce this, he 
ordered the police helicopters to monitor the city.  Jackson attempted to conduct business as 
usual but was interrupted with the frequent updates by Bell.  Jackson maintained that he 
understood the anger and rage felt by Atlantans, but asserted that disturbance would not be 
tolerated.  Jackson stated “We love and respect the student over there [AUC], but there are some 
who are misguided and think that can take the law in their own hands and they cannot do 
that….we will not tolerate lawlessness in any form.” Jackson, a Morehouse alum accustomed to 
winning crowds over with his enthusiastic speeches, knew that he did not have the solution to the 
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problems of racial discrimination but recommended that they learn to fight injustice with “the 
ballot, the buck and the book,” urging students to vote, to use economic leverage and to 
concentrate on school.  This advice was not well received by students who felt as if Jackson had 
labeled their unrest as trivial and was dismissive.  In an attempt to suppress student activity, 
police continued to guard the perimeter of Clark Atlanta’s campus as throughout the weekend.  
As a result of the policing of the campus, students were warned against public assembly and such 
gatherings were considered unruly and actions would be taken by authorities. Several meetings 
between Clark Atlanta President Thomas Cole and City Hall worked to ease tensions.  Cole 
asserted that the students felt “violated” when hundreds of riot police stormed the peaceful 
campus.  This tactic was to keep students isolated so that they would not add to the growing mob 
in the downtown area.  Cole and Bell differed on view points greatly and in a haughty fashion, 
Chief Bell stated, “I certainly don’t think all students ought to be lumped into this…..because 
some hoodlums in the community got caught up in the emotion.  In hindsight, we would change 
one or two things but no parent had to bury a child this morning, and I’m pleased with that.”449  
To the students, these statements by Bell were insensitive. Bell’s haughtiness  added to the 
discourse of Atlanta’s city officials’ unresponsiveness. 
 As classes convened classes and students prepared for final exams on Monday, May 4, 
1992, AUC students circulated petitions the prior Sunday calling for a boycott of the first day of 
final exams because of the city government’s “unending oppression.”  Clark Atlanta President 
Cole urged faculty to be “compassionate and lenient” with students who missed exams in the 
wake of the unrest.  In the meantime,, AUC student leaders met with Mayor Jackson and Police 
Chief Bell, where the mayor refused to apologize for police actions at the college complex.  Cole 
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had been critical of the police response at the AUC.  The petition circulated called for a boycott 
of Monday finals and all non-black-owned businesses in protest of the “unending oppression 
endured at the hands of the city’s government.”  Chief Bell defended the performance of his 
officers and asserted that officers “were going about their normal business.”  Bell stated, “Yes, 
we used tear gas but in my estimation as commander, tear gas is a lot more human than billy 
clubs or bullets.  We are pleased that no parents had to come and visit their child in the intensive-
care wards in Atlanta.  There had been enough finger-pointing and certainly enough blame to go 
around with regard to what occurred.  Jackson refused the students’ request for an apology 
because he felt as if “the students owed him an apology too.”450  By all of accounts gathered 
through interviews, tear gas was perhaps the most dehumanizing measure used by the police on 
the students.  What can be assumed is that Jackson’s request for an apology was prevalent 
because he thought that  the demonstrators’ attempt to tarnish Atlanta’s downtown movement to 
prepare the city for the Olympics. Evidence of this is seen through the abundance of phone calls 
to the mayor from local business elites including the white business leaders underscoring their 
support for the Jackson administration in handling the crisis.451  
 
Responses from Community Activists 
 
In the larger community and in an effort to restore peace in Atlanta, the King Center and 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference went in to action with conference calls, rallies, 
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petition drives and strategy sessions.  Dr. King’s widow, Coretta Scott King spoke with Los 
Angeles mayor Tom Bradley about lending assistance of three nationally known staff members 
with law enforcement training expertise.  Perhaps the best known was Captain Charles Alphin, 
who had conducted dozens of non-violent, law enforcement training seminars for the King 
Center and worked with police in Atlanta, New York, St. Louis and Miami.  Mrs. King stated, 
“We want to teach people in the community and police officers how to manage conflict. We 
have a track record that says it worked.”452  Mrs. King’s offer to Bradley was premature as she 
did not predict the unrest that would hinder Atlanta’s day-to-day operations throughout the days 
following the riot. 
 In its non-violent fashion, Reverend Joseph Lowery, head of the SCLC, led a crowd of 
300 people in prayer and song claiming that the acquittal of the four white police officers “ought 
to be a wake-up call” to America surrounding instances of prejudice.  Even as Rev. Lowery 
urged civil disobedience, Fulton County Commissioner and son to the slain Dr. King, Martin 
Luther King III along with Mayor Jackson urged restraint because protest around Atlanta had the 
potential of turning into violent outbursts.  The rally at the King Center was a sharp contrast to 
the demonstration at the near City Hall.  The predominantly black crowd on Auburn Avenue 
exchanged hugs, prayed and linked arms while singing the traditional non-violent theme music 
of “We Shall Overcome.”453  This method reflective of the 1960s seemed problematic to youth 
groups.  
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From the Mouths of Babes 
 
 The manners in which Atlanta’s youth addressed civil unrest when faced with the King 
verdict and in the face of Atlanta city officials were indicative of youth vigor.  They wanted 
results and they wanted them quickly, a part of there youthful “by any means necessary” 
approach.  To the youth, the administrations of Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson and former 
Mayor Andrew Young were criticized for not transforming their political success in attracting 
business in a way to help the poor.  However, the youth in Atlanta took matters one step further 
and those at the AUC aligned with faculty to assert their views about Jackson.  Many of them 
denounced the “bankrupt black political leadership.”  The shared sentiment amongst students as 
well as Atlanta’s youth singled out Jackson, Dr. Louis Sullivan, the secretary of Human Services 
in Washington, as well as Reverend Joseph Lowery, president of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, stating that they had grown fat and complacent.”  However, students did 
pay homage to the earlier leadership provided by these three.454 
 Other students at Spelman College met and discussed the broader issue behind the King 
verdict—economics, social justice and racism.  Many students of the post Civil Rights 
generation saw the same images as the Civil Rights generation, police in riot gear. Students were 
tired of being advised by politicians who alienated many of them.  One student was quoted as 
saying, “People like Maynard Jackson don’t know where we’re coming from.  Maynard Jackson 
lives in Buckhead, What does he know about the brothers on the streets?  How often does he 
visit campus?” From a more radical perspective, former Black Panther Willie Ricks, who 
changed his name to Mukasa and was a fixture at Morehouse, encouraged the more militant 
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students to take a more radical stance.  Mukasa’s view was widely appealing to students because 
many of them believed that his approach spoke to the common man.  However, the medium that 
had the most widespread appeal was rap music. It was noted that “to many of the youth, Rap was 
the CNN to young black America and replaced the civil rights establishment.  Students were 
more likely to respond to Chuck D of Public Enemy and Ice Cube, artist with an 
uncompromising eye on social, economic and political justices.”455  It is for this reason that in 
the next two years, the emergence of OutKast and Goodie Mob added to the discourse provided 
by youth culture that critiqued Atlanta’s city government in the wake of the Rodney King Riots.  
OutKast  and Goodie Mob’s lambasting of Eldrin Bell  proves to be ironic considering that it was 
Bell who placed Rico Wade in the house on Lakewood Terrace that cultivated Organized Noize 
and the Dungeon Family.  In no way is this to invalidate Atlanta’s rap music movement’s social 
critique and commentary of the city, but Gipp’s verse not only gives a glimpse into the 
relationships between Atlanta’s black political leaders and poorer black constituency, it also 
shows the short political memory of Atlanta’s youth. 
 In a subsequent verse to “Git Up! Git Out!,” Dre voices other issues pertinent to street 
corner conversations in regard to black political empowerment.  Dre declared in the last verse of 
the song: 
Y’all telling me that I need to get out and vote, huh? Why? Ain’t nobody black running 
but crackers. So, why I got to register? I’m thinking of better shit to do with my time. 
Never smelled aroma of diploma, but I write the deep ass rhymes. So let me take you 
way… back to when a nigga stayed in Southwest Atlanta-A……..456  
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Though the verse goes on to talk about Andre’s experiences that led to his high school drop out 
status and involvement in petty crimes, perhaps this statement was aimed directly at Maynard 
Jackson due to a number of events that were at the center of black voting.   
To Atlanta’s youth, Maynard Jackson’s assertion that black voting prowess would 
eradicate many of the social ills as seen by Atlanta’s poor blacks were fraudulent. This was so 
not only because he and former Mayor Andrew Young were unsuccessful in transforming their 
political victories to attract businesses to help the poor, but the Voter Education Project in 
Atlanta went out of business due to a lack of funding. Between 1970 and 1992, Atlanta’s 
population had dwindled from 495,000 to 394,000 as middle-class blacks and whites fled the city 
to the suburbs where few blacks lived in the 1970s. The onus of the Voter Education Project’s 
downfall was attributed to black politicians and the black middle class, those who had benefited 
the most from the progress of the organization with their elections being made possible. The 
blame was based on the fact that these groups failed to provide money to keep the VEP going 
after the foundation left for the suburbs. When Jackson returned to politics in 1989 and won a 
third term as mayor, though his oratory was still captivating, his black constituency complained 
that his priorities had changed and he had become a tool of the white business interests.  Jackson 
and Young’s negotiations with developers resulted in business opportunities for black 
professionals, but none of the largesse trickled down to the poor.  According to some black 
leaders in Atlanta, “the civil rights movement turned out to be one of the worst things that ever 
happened to the black community where the dream of Martin Luther King became a nightmare 
because it resulted in white businessmen becoming richer and blacks becoming poorer.457  This 
perspective towards gains acquired as a result of civil rights is inaccurate.  What cannot be 
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discounted are the legal barriers removed as a result of legislation, court decision and executive 
orders. Though civil rights did not solve many of the problems in regards to social blight, it did 
change black America. However what should be considered is the impact of class within the 
black community as a result of the role of civil rights and the weakening of black communities 
nationwide. 
As Jackson pushed politics as the salvation of black America, he noted that black turnout 
in the 1992 presidential primaries had fallen significantly as compared to 1988’s.  Jackson went 
on record stating, “I think we are in a business at the ballot box.  We’re sitting on the means of 
our economic and social liberation and not using the power we have.” Nevertheless, political 
pundits pointed out the fact that poor blacks went to polls in record numbers to help blacks get 
elected, but became discouraged after the unresponsiveness of the triumphant candidate.  This 
can be attributed to black politicians will to satisfy the demands of businessmen, including 
blacks, who returned the political favors for campaign contributions. Even Atlanta Congressman 
John Lewis noted that “a segment of black leadership has gotten wrapped up in deal making that 
they’ve forgotten the people who elected them.”458 Therefore Andre’s words in this verse speak 
to the discouragement experienced by Atlanta’s poor voters. His expression lends credence to the 
marginality of black life  under Black political power.  
Much of Atlanta’s youth, whether student or citizen, found Maynard Jackson’s attitude 
ambivalent.  They saw him as a politician that put on a show for the cameras while a crisis 
loomed over the city.  During Jackson’s visits to the Atlanta University Center campuses, he 
talked more of how his whole family grew up on the campus but did not address the reasons that 
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the Atlanta Police, Georgia Bureau of Investigation and state police terrorized the city. This, 
along with his failing health, would prove to be a defining moment in his decision later to forego 
his second set of consecutive terms in office and paved the way for city councilman Bill 
Campbell to fulfill the seat. 
 
Towards the Dirty South 
 
Goodie Mob’s release of the song “Dirty South” not only created the battle cry for 
southern MCs, it also coalesced some of the issues experienced by the poor as a result of 
“Olympification.”  The song brings together a look at Atlanta’s aforementioned “Red Dog Unit,” 
created in 1988 by then Public Safety Commissioner George Napper under the pretense of 
purging the streets of rampant drug activity and violence as a result of the emergence of crack 
cocaine.  Interestingly, with Atlanta winning of the 1988 Democratic National Convention, its 
vying for the XXVIII Super Bowl and the 1996 Centennial Olympiad, it was not far reaching to 
surmise that Atlanta’s City Government formed this special unit to help the city’s facelift.   
The song opens with an interlude entitled “Red Dog” which foreshadows the song and re-
enacts a drug sale, where an undercover agent named “Straight Shooter” beats on the doors of a 
trap house459 and requests that the dealers inside “hit [him] three times.” After the transaction is 
complete, “Red Dog” police swarm the place and kick in the door ordering all inhabitants get 
face down on the floor as they enter the house with guns drawn, cocked and loaded.  It is at this 
point where it becomes clear that “Straight Shooter” is a narcotic agent.460 
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In the first stanza of the course, Cool Breeze, a member of the Dungeon Family declared: 
One to the two the three the four/Them dirty Red Dogs done hit the door/And they got 
everybody on they hands and knees/And they ain’t gon’ leave until they find them keys [kilos of 
cocaine].461 
 
The interlude sets the stage from which numerous interpretation of the Dirty South can be 
derived but goes directly into the song “Dirty South.” The factual components of Atlanta’s illicit 
drug trade are very prevalent here.  Cool Breeze then goes on to rap: 
“Now if dirty Bill Clinton fronted me some weight. Told me keep two, bring him back 
eight.  But I only brought him five and stuck his ass for three. Do you think that 
Clampett will sick his goons on me.”462 
 
In this, Cool Breeze lays out a scenario where the government, the believed primary perpetrator 
in the drug trade, is duped by Atlanta hustlers.  He does this in an attempt to predict 
repercussions by the establishment that must be done clandestinely because widespread 
knowledge of the government’s dealing of illegal drugs and guns is irresponsible, hypocritical 
and an overt form of corruption.  The references to President Bill “Clampett” Clinton and Mayor 
Bill “Clampett” Campbell spoke to several sentiments held by Atlanta’s black poor constituency 
towards local and national leaders but is centered on the idea of urban renewal and gentrification.  
Conjuring Clinton’s name spoke to the involvement of white business and political elites through 
neo-liberalism manifested by Atlanta’s “Olympification.” Conjuring “Jed Clampett,” a character 
in the 1960s television series the Beverly Hillbillies, reflects inconsistent historical characters of 
the South, suggesting that southerners were backwards hill people.  Clinton, the Arkansas 
governor turned American President, who achieved national political prominence while Atlanta’s 
rap scene was on the rise; lent credence to both stereotypes of “good ole boys of the old South 
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and a celebration of capitalists, non-racist “New South.”  Clinton seemed to embody complicated 
southern identities that included both southern blacks and whites.463 
 
Atlanta Olympics and Displacement 
 
Perhaps the most thwarting component in regards to the “Olympification” of Atlanta was 
the displacement of the poor and homeless people in order to make the city seem user friendly 
for visitors.  Not only did this component lack the camaraderie embodied by the Olympic Spirit, 
it was considered by many, wealthy and poor, black and white alike to be immoral and unethical.  
The story of Atlanta and the Centennial Olympiad exposed the shame and revelation as a result 
of boosting false images to the world.  However, the “real” Atlanta and its poverty were seen by 
the world press and visitors behind the new construction.  The city was amongst the nation’s 
poorest.  “Real” Atlanta lay behind the new homes that lined main streets of poor, black inner 
city neighborhoods like Summerhill, the neighborhood where Olympic Stadium was erected. The 
new houses lined the way to the stadium. Also, just behind the façade of a new city, Atlanta’s 
homeless slept outside and while trying to avoid arrest.  In order to limit the visibility of poverty, 
planners and developers used the city government to control the apparent need for additional 
low-cost housing by convincing Atlantans that the homeless of the city were not deserving of 
housing but were social deviants and criminals better off in jail.464 
 Goodie Mob, whose prowess as an Atlanta rap group centered on capturing the 
experiences of Atlanta’s downtrodden, critically assessed the mechanisms that used race, class 
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and geo-political economic control to further marginalize the poor and homeless by hosting the 
Olympics.  Goodie Mob’s song entitled “Cell Therapy” grappled with the acceleration and the 
completion of gentrification projects of neighborhoods in order to confiscate downtown property 
that developers wanted while incarcerating the visible homeless.  The demonizing of Atlanta’s 
poor and homeless by the white business elite over the black city administration served as the 
prevailing shapers of public policy. In light of this, Cee-lo voiced: 
Me and my family moved in our apartment complex.  A gate with the serial code was 
put up nest.  The claim that this community was so drug free, but it don’t look that way 
to me. ‘Cause I can see the young bloods hanging out at the sto’ [corner store]. 24/7, 
junkies looking for a hit of the blow [heroin], it’s powerful. Oh you know what else 
they trying to do is make a curfew especially for me and you. The traces of the New 
World Order, time is getting shorter. If we don’t get prepared people its gon’ [going] to 
be a slaughter.  My mind won’t allow me to not be curious. My folk don’t understand so 
they don’t take it serious. But every now and then, I wonder if the gate was put up to 
keep crime out or to keep our ass in.”465 
 
Cee-lo’s verse in this song speaks to the construction of zones created by numerous projects 
of importance.  Two of these movements were of paramount precedence; yet one was an 
underground movement that allowed the experiences of black Atlantans to be assessed through 
Cee-lo’s parlance.  The first movement was a joint effort between the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) and the Atlanta Organizing Committee (AOC) which worked to get the city 
ready for the Games.  The second movement was the Atlanta Project (TAP), an effort filled with 
the idealism and potential to effect social change in the city and wage ware against poverty in the 
city started by President Jimmy Carter.  This program funded by the Carter Center, was to 
address the social problems associated with urban poverty where some 180 private organizations 
committed more than $700 million in investments to neighborhoods; and state and city 
governments pledged $290 million, less than half as much. This program identified four 
priorities in inner-city neighborhoods:  new jobs and business, safe and livable communities, 
                                                 
 465 Goodie Mob, “Cell Therapy,” Soul Food LP, LaFace, 1995. 
 287 
adequate housing, and lifting youth and families out of poverty.  It hinged on empowerment zone 
executive boards comprising of residents, the private sector, service providers, the Atlanta Public 
Schools, and the Atlanta Housing Authority.  In addition, a 36-member Community 
Empowerment Advisory Board comprised of neighborhood representatives was charged with 
selecting the agencies and programs that fulfill the mission of  the program.  Through TAP, four 
of Atlanta’s roughest housing projects reaped the benefits. Carver Homes, Grady Homes, 
Southside Homes and Washington Homes received $100 million of federal funds and over $150 
million n tax incentives as a part of 9.3-square-mile network of 30 neighborhoods.  The tax 
incentives attracted new business to the area, providing long term jobs for thousands of 
Atlantans.  The Empowerment Zone received rave reviews from Brenda Muhammad, 
coordinator at the Southside Projects.  She stated, “The Empowerment Zone is a wonderful 
collaboration of dreams and opportunities.  Finally, communities can connect with the resources 
that are sorely needed to implement their plans for improvement.  The Atlanta Project is 
facilitating that connection.”466 
 As the Atlanta Project moved forward, major construction engulfed the downtown 
Atlanta area.  Of this construction, the Georgia Dome, Olympic Stadium, Centennial Park and 
Olympic Village were most grand.  The Georgia Dome, the world’s largest domed Stadium with 
71,250 was proposed as the new home of the Atlanta Falcons; however, it served as a venue to 
host most of the indoor sports of the Games.  The building covered 8.9 acres of land in 
downtown Atlanta.  Also, in preparation for the Games, construction began on a 21-acre 
Centennial Olympic Park—a gathering place for concerts, exhibits, food and more.  In March of 
1993, plans were approved to build Olympic Stadium on a lot next to Atlanta’s Fulton County 
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Stadium.  Centennial Olympic Stadium held 85,000 and was host the opening and closing 
ceremonies of the Games.  Immediately after the Games, it was converted to turner Field, the 
new home for Major League Baseball’s Atlanta Braves.467  Much of this construction displaced 
poor blacks living in Atlanta’s central city.  There are some implications that this gentrification 
project pushed some blacks to homelessness.  As an effort to give the city a facelift, poor blacks 
and the homeless were ordered to be moved by Atlanta’s City Hall. 
In the decade prior to the Centennial Olympiad, Atlanta’s metropolitan area family 
income grew twice as fast as that of the national income growth rate.  Simultaneously, the rate of 
growth for those that dwelled inside the city declined.  The population shifts in respects to 
housing, income and employment happened in the city’s northern suburbs.  However, in Atlanta 
City Hall, an attempt to “reverse white flight” that took place in the 1960s to revitalize and take 
back the city occurred.  However, it seemed that there was no intention to include Atlanta’s poor, 
homeless, and overwhelmingly black population.  In fact, the 1990 census indicated the poverty 
rate for blacks in Atlanta had increased from 29 percent in 1970 to 35 percent.468 
In an effort to clean up downtown Atlanta for the Centennial Olympiad, Atlanta’s City 
Hall passed ordinances that further criminalized and demonized Atlanta’s poor and homeless.  
Atlanta’s 20,000 homeless spent much of their time during the Olympic Games in jail. Though 
the Games served as the South’s showpiece of progress as an international city past all racial 
tensions and a veritable capital of the new South worthy of tourist’s dollars, the Games meant 
something else altogether for Atlantans.  They understood that City Hall’s, corporations’ and 
government agencies’ concerted efforts to strategize and revitalize the downtown business 
district into a 24-hour hub for shops, restaurants, and high income apartments were not for their 
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benefit, but at the behest of international tourists.  Spearheading these efforts was the Central 
Atlanta Progress (CAP), an organization of the white business elite for white economic power.  
CAP made it perfectly clear that the poor and homeless had no place in its vision of downtown 
Atlanta.  As such, a joint venture ensued where CAP and City Hall administrators viewed the 
homeless as a high priority concern and recommended a number of measures to assist the police 
safeguarding the image of downtown, including the creation of new police zones solely for the 
central downtown area, the utilization for undercover surveillance, and the construction of new 
zone headquarters in the CNN Center as well as in the downtown Underground District.  When 
strictly enforced, these new zones forbade panhandling, loitering and public drunkenness. On 
this matter, one of the CAP members stated, “It is not an attempt to round up the homeless and 
move them to concentration camps….but I think everyone agrees that in order to have economic 
development in the central area, we really have to do something about homeless people walking 
up and down the street.469 This shows the insensitive sentiments of CAP as well as city 
government. 
 The Centennial Olympic Games presented downtown planners with an opportunity to 
showcase their hospitality to an international community, much as the City did during the 1988 
Democratic National Convention.  However, in order to do so, the successful tactic used in 
clearing Atlanta’s homeless off the street was to simplify the process to arrest homeless people 
by passing laws that criminalized and demonized behaviors necessitated by the status of living 
on the street, or which were vague enough to be selectively enforced against undesirables.  In 
1991, shortly after the International Olympic Committee awarded the games to Atlanta, the City 
Council enacted three ordinances that effectively constituted a de facto vagrancy free zone.  The 
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new laws outlawed soliciting alms by “forcing oneself upon the company of another;” entering 
vacant buildings; and walking across parking lots without owning a vehicle. These three 
ordinances also came in addition to an arsenal of other laws, one of which made it illegal to be in 
a “known drug area.”470  This somewhat cattle herding asserts that the notion of race and class 
worked to enforce incarceration in public spaces and bestowed boundaries to and limited the 
mobility of Atlanta’s poor and homeless. 
 Adding insensitivity towards the homeless as a result of the “Olympification” of the city, 
the City Council voted to increase the maximum sentence for a municipal ordinance violation 
from two to six years.  In 1994, the city completed the construction of a new $56 million, one 
thousand-bed jail, ironically the first Olympic project completed under budget and on time. It 
appeared as if CAP’s main goal was to run the homeless out of town and Atlanta’s City Hall did 
anything to help.  Atlanta’s homeless were constantly harassed.  Those who could not find beds 
in the city’s limited shelters slept in the public parks or on the sidewalks only to be awakened by 
the nudge of police boots at 5am or just before morning rush hour.  During large tourist events, 
the situation worsened. Studies conducted by the Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless 
concluded that the number of homeless arrests rose significantly shortly before large business 
conventions or on Friday nights.  Friday nights ensured that the homeless would be forced to stay 
in jail until their court date on Monday.  Typically, arresting officers would not be present  for 
court, the case would be dismissed, and the homeless person could go, but, the CAP and Atlanta 
City hall’s objective was accomplished; the homeless had been effectively removed from public 
sight for the duration of the weekend.471 
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 Atlanta City Hall’s and CAP’s criminalization and demonization of Atlanta’s most 
vulnerable populations disfranchised and dehumanized the homeless as well.  An example of this 
was seen when a homeless person with no loose change was seen asking someone for change.  
Often times, parking lot attendants misinterpreted this action and called the police, who arrested 
the homeless person.  When the arresting officer appeared in court for the Monday morning 
hearing, the defendant face two options:  to plead innocent and spend another week in jail until 
the trial date came, or they could plead guilty and get off for time served.  If the accused chose 
the latter, the week in jail interfered with employment and caused them to lose their job or the 
chance to gain employment.  After accruing a new charge on their criminal record, it was now 
harder for the accused to get a job and after so many convictions; a felon’s voter status was 
vulnerable.472 
 As a part of Atlanta’s preparation for the Centennial Olympiad, the city’s black working 
class and poor communities saw the erection of “noise absorbing” walls built on the sides of the 
Interstates 20, as well as Interstate 75/85 and the 285 bypass. According to the city officials and 
the Georgia Department of Transportation, the walls were built to reduce highway traffic noise. 
However, it was widely believed and proven that city officials erected these walls so that 
travelers passing through Atlanta would not see the dire straits on the city’s overwhelmingly 
black south, west and east sides. In the downtown and midtown areas of the city as well as on the 
northern suburbs, these “noise absorbing” interstate wall of this nature did not exist.  Because 
Atlanta’s west, Southwest, Southside, and Southeast side had their share of the working poor and 
housed examples of the poor infrastructure believed to be a detractor from the city, the walls 
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were an attempt to hide this aspect of Atlanta life from the city’s visitors.473 Perhaps the verse 
voiced by Cee-lo does not only speak to the fact that preparation for the Olympic Games 
displaced or imprisoned  20,000, it speaks to the erections of barriers that further marginalized 
Atlanta’s black community from the rest of the world.  Cee-lo’s verse counter narrates the notion 
that Atlanta’s preparation for the Games was not to benefit the city’s citizen but was to serve as a 
marketing showcasing of the city to the world.  Communities with barriers as seen in the erection 
of gated communities and the “noise absorbing” walls shielded on looking passersby from the 
real elements of that were particular to Atlanta, Georgia. 
 There are a plethora of other lyrics by OutKast and Goodie Mob that articulate counter 
narratives to Atlanta’s rise to world-class status.  But the examples used in this chapter were 
those that were able to reinforce historical arguments that centered on the contexts of Atlanta and 
the content of the music.  In this, the music of both OutKast and Goodie Mob, serves as a living 
text, much like an oral history interview and the point of its use is to find actual historical 
experiences in which the lyrical content of the music supports.  It is clear that the social critiques 
of OutKast and Goodie Mob as seen through the  “Player’s Ball,”; issues surrounding the 
confederate battle flag; the social critiques by Atlanta’s youths in the face of the Rodney King 
unrest; black voting disappointment, illegal drug trafficking in Atlanta; and the displacement of 
the poor as a result of the Olympic show how engrained these aspects of black experience find 
life in the popular culture spewed and accessed critically by Atlanta’s new and emerging youth 
culture. Both Southernplayalisticcadillacmuzik and Soul Food have particular songs that feature 
both OutKast and Goodie Mob together embody Atlanta.  There are an abundance of chronicled 
experiences that make this music as unique as the black  Atlantan experience such as the 
references to the conviction of the purported Atlanta child murderer Wayne Williams in the song 
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by Goodie Mob featuring Dre called “Thought Process.” However, that analysis would be more 
cultural than historical.  As such, a good cultural analysis of the music of OutKast and Goodie 
Mob would force history scholars to often move outside of the scope of historical research which 
found its limitations as a result of this historical analysis.  What should be considered is that 
Atlanta’s rise to world class status and the social cost paid by overwhelmingly black and poor 
populations shaped the contours of the popular public sentiment towards the preparation of the 
Olympic Games as seen by Atlanta’s working poor and homeless.  The coined concept of the 
“Dirty South” in regards to the black New South provides the critical need to make sense of 
these meanings, definitions, and appropriation of black southern life and experience after the 
passage of the Voting Rights act of 1965.   
Cameron Gipp’s reference to Maynard Jackson in his verse of “Git Up! Git Out” best 
demonstrates the frustration expressed by poor blacks in his depiction of the Mayor as crooked.  
It also counter narrates Atlanta’s black Mecca status from the perspective of black Youths, no 
longer willing to ceded sacred status to Jackson.  Perhaps Du Bois’ counter narrative illustrated 
through golden apples manifested itself through Gipp some 90 years later.  It is important to 
understand the significance of Atlanta’s indigenous popular culture and the politicized moment 
in which it was spewed and assessed critically.  Yet, Dirty South Hip hop artists were not the 
only critics taking note to Atlanta’s quest for golden apples.  John Helyar, of the Wall Street 
Journal wrote: “It is a land of Mercedes and the mall, of the hungry and the homeless….It is 
“Hotlanta”:  capital city of the South at a time when the South has risen; city myriad services at a 
time when the service economy rules; city of the 1980s, more suburban than downtown, more 
footloose than fixed.  If New York is the Big Apple and New Orleans the Big Easy, Atlanta is 
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the Big Hustle.”474  Considering this, speaking to the Olympic spirit in Atlanta made W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s prophecy true.  There is a saying of precedence on this notion simply put in these terms; 
“every thing that glitters, isn’t gold. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In as much as we attempt to understand African American history and race relations in 
the United States, one would be remised if neglecting to study Atlanta, Georgia. The African 
American experience in Atlanta, Georgia along with its people are points of interest for pundits 
and scholars alike as the City represents the greatest successes and failures for African 
Americans seen by these United States.  As a Deep South city, Atlanta markings by the sordid 
racial history of the American South were seen through the episodes of the Atlanta Riots of 
1906, urban unrests of the 1960s, and the missing and murdered children crisis of the 1970s and 
80s. However, Atlanta rose as a “City on the Hill” in respect to race relations which manifested 
itself through black political empowerment and electoral politics and transitioned the city from 
regional to global commercial center hosting the 1988 Democratic National Convention and the 
Centennial Olympic Games.  It is this component that set Atlanta apart as unique southern 
enclave. 
At the dawning of the Twentieth Century, Atlanta was the center of black achievement in 
the South as well as the nation with much of that reputation being centered on black education.  
However, it is important to note the abounding themes centered on the fundamental impact of 
education linked to liberating black communities.  This is arguably the most important 
acquisition for African Americans throughout their experience in this country.  Education serves 
as an interesting scope when investigating southern African American life and history because it 
was influenced by geo-politics, social, cultural and economic factors.  With this, it is critical to 
note the crucial understanding of African American educational history, while recognizing that 
in American democracy there have been classes of oppressed people and there have been 
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essential relationships between popular education and the politics of oppression.  Education for 
both democratic citizenship and second-class citizenship found its roots in American education.  
However, these opposing traditions were not the difference between the mainstream of American 
education and some aberrations or isolated alternatives. Similar to what historian James 
Anderson’s The Education of Blacks in the South explains, when understanding the unique 
system of public and private education developed by and for black southerners; it is a critical 
need to understand that the structure, ideology, and content of black education was part and 
parcel of the larger political subordination of blacks, because it was the social system in which 
blacks lived that made their educational experiences than those of other Americans.475   
The American South, as other distinct regions in the nation, provide different 
sensibilities, trends, tensions, and characteristics shaped by geo-political, social, cultural and 
economic factors of its people of particular areas. As such, Atlanta, Georgia catapulted herself in 
the Twentieth Century by refashioning herself as the capitol of the New South with what was 
purported to be, a white business elite willing to work with Atlanta’s black community.  Unlike 
other southern urban areas, Atlanta is unique and it has been historically deemed the “promise 
land” of the New South for African Americans.  With newly freed blacks migrating from rural 
landscapes in the South to Atlanta for work with ideas of securing a better quality of life than 
that of pre-Emancipation servitude along with the migration of African American’s in pursuit of 
higher education simultaneously converging on the City after the Civil War provides an 
interesting point of departure in terms of class formation and division within Atlanta’s black 
community.  Those African Americans seeking education formed a thriving black upper and 
middle class largely created and sustained by Atlanta’s unique system of historically black 
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institutions of higher learning.  It is through this unique cluster of black higher educational 
institutions where it is critical to for understanding class formation and division within black 
Atlanta. 
As black Atlanta’s educated community gained strength, scholar-activists Du Bois and 
Hope promoted the “talented tenth” a notion of racial uplift ideology that would guide black 
America. Cultivating a group to lead and masses to follow presents a contentious point whereas 
it may be more necessary to focus more on the ninety percent than the ten percent set aside for 
leadership.  As such, we should consider that the black institutions of higher learning positioned 
Atlanta’s black elite ad middle classes as power brokers that fostered the “Atlanta Style” politics 
of bi-racial negotiation and gave way for Atlanta’s black urban regime and white business elites 
to control the city. Through “Atlanta Style” politics of bi-racial negotiation, black elites 
bargaining on behalf of Atlanta’s rank and file without consultation is problematic. Atlanta’s 
black elites and the middle class advanced programs expressing their own political, social, and 
economic interests while most of Atlanta’s black communities lived in poverty where we see 
some of the most disparaging living conditions imaginable. This challenges the Kerner report’s 
conclusion that America was two societies; one black and one white that were moving in 
different directions and asserts that the American South in general and Atlanta in particular were 
three societies; one white and two black. This demonstration is a major point of contention and is 
but one factor worthy of considerable attention and research and provides the significance to 
understanding Atlanta.  
Atlanta’s black political experiences are central when assessing black political power in 
American cities, in general, and black political power in the post Civil Rights American South, in 
particular.  This salience quantifies legal changes sustained since passing the Civil Rights Acts of 
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1964 and the Voters Rights Act of 1965, which removed de jure legal barriers to black voter 
participation. Along with black reverse migration; the migration of blacks from rural to urban 
areas; and white flight, what resulted were black majorities as well as significant black minority 
populations in other American cities.  As a result of black political participation, blacks 
assembled majorities and sizable minorities with political influences where the political culture 
called for their participation.  An understanding of this can be seen through the 1973 mayoral 
election of Maynard H. Jackson Jr. 
Before the November 2008 election of Barack H. Obama as the 44th American president 
and the first U.S. president to identify as African American, the election of Maynard Holbrook 
Jackson Jr. as Atlanta’s and the South’s first big time mayor was one of the most notable feats in 
American political history for African Americans.  Inspired by the assassinations of Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. and U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Jackson entered politics in 
quixotic fashion in 1968, challenging Herman Talmadge for his U.S. senate seat.  His run for the 
U.S. Senate failed, but he had gained prominence in Atlanta’s political circles.  The youthful 
Jackson’s new reputation annoyed the black political king makers in Atlanta as he challenged the 
advancement of political programs and the “Atlanta Style” of bi-racial negotiations.  Sure, 
Jackson embodied Atlanta’s black middle class, but to the City’s exclusive black Old Guard he 
had not paid his dues and therefore was unworthy of political candidacy. However, we should 
note that Jackson’s ascension to political power was based on demographical research where 
black migration back South combined with white flight were changing the City. Jackson’s 
commissioning of survey polls and results convinced Atlanta’s Old Guard that he was the most 
viable candidate.  This secured his election as Vice-Mayor and Mayor.  
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Jackson’s election to Mayor in 1973 summed up Atlanta’s black Mecca status, a city 
flourishing in the midst of white flight. But Jackson’s victory was not solely because of the black 
vote.  He received votes in many of the predominantly white precincts suggesting a bi-racial 
coalition that would be pertinent to Jackson’s first two terms as Mayor.  Jackson’s fought tooth 
and nail over the city charter, urban renewal, public housing, public transportation, annexation, 
and consolidation all of which speak to the issue of race and space.   
Jackson’s accomplishments were astounding. By 1976, Atlanta's crime rates were down, 
which had been a previous blight on the city.  Atlanta's rapid rail system, MARTA, began during 
Jackson's administration.  Jackson was committed to instituting affirmative action programs 
wherever possible in the city, with a special emphasis on minority contracting.  By his second 
term, minorities were receiving more than 30 percent of the city contracts, which further 
developed an already solid black middle class in Atlanta. Jackson was instrumental in the 
successful expansion of the Hartsfield International Airport (now Hartfield-Jackson International 
Airport), which was finished ahead of schedule and under budget. These projects created many 
jobs for Atlantans. All of these entities worked together to show Atlanta as a city that could 
handle the world’s traffic.  Jackson’s prowess endorsed him as the poster boy for the New South.  
Some called him the “King of the South” while others coined him “the ultimate champion for 
black business.”476  
In his first time as mayor, Jackson was loved and adored by the vast majority of Atlanta’s 
black voters and a significant number of the city’s white voters.  But a series of events caused 
some unrest within his constituencies consisting of white Atlantans, along with the black 
working and poor classes.  Through these events, Jackson’s black working and poor constituency 
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questioned his commitment to a better world for all of the citizens and they expressed their 
resentment toward him.  The two events of the greatest significance:  the first being Jackson’s 
dismissal of Atlanta’s mostly black sanitation workers, as they hit the picket line in March of 
1977 where he had marched with these same workers when they struck in 1970; and what was 
perceived as the mishandling of the Atlanta Youth Murders, of which he moved his family out of 
overwhelmingly black Southwest Atlanta to exclusively white Buckhead in 1981.  The 
significance of these events is that one can measure class division centered on Atlanta’s new 
notoriety. 
Undeniably, what was clear was the fact that Atlanta was well on her way to being the 
next American global commercial center and the commercial branding of the American South 
with black decision makers at the helm.  What was unclear were the social costs that was paid by 
Atlanta’s black poor and working communities through this transition.  By the end of Jackson’s 
second term, his legacy would be marred by a crisis of unsurpassable wickedness which loomed 
over the city and hunted Atlanta’s poor black children.   
The end of Maynard Jackson’s first mayoral tenure was marked by political in-fighting 
within black political circles.  This was evident of the emerging schisms indicative of black 
Atlanta’s political maturity.  However, the schisms were enhanced by the Atlanta Youth 
Murders.  The fact that Atlanta’s most vulnerable citizens, primarily poor black children, were 
being hunted is of the most significant importance to understanding not only race, but class 
tensions within black America. 
The Atlanta Youth Murders provide a counter-narrative on class to Atlanta’s black Mecca 
status as well as a series of rumors and eccentric theories as to whom and for what reasons the 
murders were being committed. It engaged pedophilia and homosexuality within the black 
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community in different terms. Most importantly, it engaged the highly problematic culture of 
poverty theory.  The fact that the mostly poor black male youth victims were labeled and 
dismissed as “hustlers and runaways” attempts to lend credence to the culture of poverty theory; 
a social theory that asserts, in very bad taste, that the cycle of poverty based on the concept that 
the poor have a unique value system and they remain in poverty because of their adaptations to 
the burdens of poverty.  It is important to understand that this theory’s employment by the 
Atlanta police, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was 
used to prevent these entities from admitting that their was a serial killer on the loose in Atlanta.  
In an attempt to calm public fear local, state and federal administrations controlled the criteria as 
to which murders made it on the Atlanta missing and murdered children’s list. Official records 
indicate that there were 30 victims throughout this episode.  However, botched police work, slow 
lead responses, and apprehension of FBI involvement suggested to black Atlantans that there was 
a conspiracy afoot.   
In an attempt to shed light on the cases with hopes of bringing the killer(s) to justice, 
debunking the pathologizing “hustler and runaway” myths about victims, and to secure the 
protection of potential victims in the future, the formation of the STOP Committee by Camille 
Bell and the Techwood Bat Patrol by Chimurenga Jenga speaks to black Atlantans skepticism in 
City Hall ability to protect them.  What becomes apparent is the fact that if there had been a 
white mayor at the helm of the City during the Missing and Murdered episode in Atlanta; then 
Atlanta’s black communities would have stormed City Hall.  But a black City Administration 
quelled most civil unrest for fear that it would tarnish Maynard Jackson.  With this in mind, 
readers must understand the importance of the roles of the STOP Committee and the Techwood 
Bat Patrol; to hold Jackson and the rest of the City Administration accountable regardless of his 
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race.  This, along with dishonest business practices for the STOP Committee along with the 
carrying of firearms by member who were also convicted felons in regards to the Techwood Bat 
Patrol led to their demise.  It is clear that the technicalities within the law were at work which 
silenced these groups for shedding light on the murders.  But again we see the handiwork of class 
divisions within Atlanta black communities.  A point to note, is that when Camille Bell, the 
founder of the STOP Committee asked questions centered on impact of class as seen through the 
episode of Atlanta’s Missing and Murdered children, she was met with no answer.  In Atlanta, 
this put Atlanta’s black rank and file on the brink of class consciousness and provides a counter-
narrative of Atlanta as profound as “Dirty South” Hip hop. 
The arrest and subsequent conviction of Wayne Williams lends credence to the notion 
that a conspiracy was afoot also.  Williams is a strange character with charlatan qualities 
convicted of two of the murders.  He knew and was in contact with the victims prior to their 
deaths.  However, the fact that Mayor Jackson pressed for federal aid in this case to be shunned 
by the FBI for most of the episode to the arrests and conviction of Wayne Williams brought to 
justice by numerous eye-witness accounts and fiber analysis through new technology provided 
by FBI laboratories seems suspicious.  Though Williams was convicted of two murders, local, 
state and federal police pinned most of the murders on Williams and closed out the cases as if all 
of the murders had been solved. But most important is the fact that many in black Atlanta felt 
that Williams was not the killer and that another killer was on the loose. Duly noted is that after 
Williams is taken into custody, there were murders around the Atlanta still being committed.  
Yet, these murders were concealed from the public as Atlanta expanded and needed nothing to 
beset its growth. 
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When Andrew Young was elected to Mayor of Atlanta in 1981, it continued what was 
perceived to be black political empowerment through electoral politics.  Young had won critical 
acclaim as a lieutenant of Dr. Martin Luther King and as a minister.  His stints in state and 
national politics made him electable.  What is significant about the transition of power between 
Maynard Jackson and Young was that Young inherited a debt-free city, and unexpected feat for 
the new black City administration.  However, the 1980s proved to be altogether different, 
providing new challenges to local politics nationwide.  The nation was still reeling from the 
corruption in national politics and had lost faith in the American government.  Also, the nation 
was in the midst of numerous wars; of which the Cold War and the War on Drugs took 
precedence.  But the rise of Reaganomics, Crack Cocaine, the AIDS epidemic and post industrial 
conditioning made it difficult to run a city.  When President Ronald Reagan cut federal funding 
to American cities, Young found it necessary to fund and expand the city through foreign 
investments and neo-liberalistic forms of urban renewal and gentrification. Atlanta’s white 
business elite saw these neo-liberalist tactics as selling the city to the Japanese while most of 
Atlanta’s black community saw a business-minded and globetrotting mayor with plan to deal 
with issues pertinent to the poor. With this, Young’s citizen of the world persona was not a good 
fit for Atlanta’s black community because it seemed that he did not embody their interests. 
 During the Young years, what is significant was the emergence and impact of Crack 
Cocaine which caused crime in Atlanta’s black ghettos to skyrocket.  The subsequent rise of 
murders, rapes, armed robberies and assaults were overwhelming and Young’s grappling with 
issues of police brutality and public safety expressed the lack of confidence that Atlanta’s black 
community would eventually have towards the mayor.  However, his ability to fundraise and 
bring together foreign investors was brilliant.  Young used his savior-faire and political influence 
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to refashion a city worthy the 1988 Democratic National Convention and the Centennial 
Olympiad.  The Democratic National Convention served as the dress rehearsal for the Centennial 
Olympiad and from this event it was clear that Atlanta was a new City to consider worthy of 
hosting events world’s stage.  But Atlanta’s overwhelming poor and black did not share this 
vision of their city nor were they at the center of the commercialization of the America South. 
The significance of this is that once again, the issue of class within the black community presents 
itself as more divisive than cohesive. 
The calculated and concerted steps taken by Atlanta’s white business elite and black city 
government to bid for the Centennial Olympic Games lends credence to regime theory and 
shows that issues along racial lines could be appeased through acquisition of capital.  With this, 
the emergence of a diverse cohort convening a plan of action to generate the necessary funds that 
would give Atlanta a competitive bid for the Games formed.  The cohort included officers of 
some of Atlanta’s fortune 500 companies including  the Coca-Cola Company, and Delta Airlines 
along with politicians Maynard Jackson, Mayor Andrew Young.    
Once awarded the Centennial Games Bid, the two movements of paramount importance 
commenced are referred to as the “olympification” of Atlanta.  The fact that a joint effort 
between the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the Atlanta Organizing Committee 
(AOC) worked to get the city ready for the Games is of extreme importance.  The second 
movement, the Atlanta Project, gave way to social change in Atlanta waging war against poverty 
within in the city.  Started by the former U.S. president, humanitarian and Georgia native Jimmy 
Carter, this project had good intentions.  But in the end, it did very little for Atlanta’s poor.  
Between these two projects, major construction engulfed Atlanta’s downtown area from which 
the Georgia Dome, Olympic Stadium, Centennial Park, and Olympic Village resulted.  These 
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new edifices were grand feats for Atlanta and the Olympics, but a grim and dismal story of 
gentrification, incarceration, and displacement of poor blacks lurked in its shadow. The 
significance of this is that it gives purview to the impact of political economy on urban renewal 
and gentrification. As Atlanta cleaned up its downtown for the Centennial Games, City Hall 
passed number of ordinances that further criminalized and demonized Atlanta’s poor and 
homeless.  It is noted that more than 20,000 homeless persons in Atlanta were incarcerated the 
Olympic Games.  The Atlanta Project’s completion of a new $56 million, thousand bed jail 
which was the first Olympic project completed on time is problematic.  The fact that the number 
of homeless arrests rose significantly shortly before large business conventions, eventful 
weekends along with the fact jails were full during the Games not only lends credence to the 
impact of political economy; but asserts the critical need for another counter-narratives to 
Atlanta’s international and black Mecca status.   
With Atlanta’s new found world class status, an in-road for a counter-narrative as seen 
through a southern perspective of popular culture was spewed and assessed critically in the City.  
This particular aspect of popular culture grounded itself in Hip Hop and  centered on this 
particular sector of youth culture, were the meanings and significance of the recently self-defined 
southern–style of rap and Hip-hop culture called “Dirty South” Hip-hop established and 
promoted by OutKast and Goodie Mob, rap groups hailing from Atlanta’s Southwest.  Their 
music imbibed aesthetic that is particular to the South and was consumed by markets nationwide.  
But this music was Atlanta specific and  is used as a supplement to the documented research in 
fleshing out a black working and poor counter-narrative to Atlanta’s new world-class status.  The 
significance in using popular culture from Atlanta provides an interesting scope to the emerging 
tensions and trends that were particular to Atlanta as a result of the “Olympification” of the city.    
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OutKast, were the first Hip-hop artists embracing “southerness” and providing purview 
where the life experiences of growing up in Atlanta can be accessed and analyzed. Their multi-
platinum classic "Southernplayalisticcadillacmuzik” made them a force to be reckoned in the 
recording industry and confronted the Los Angeles and New York Coastal hegemony.  Goodie 
Mob quickly followed their Dungeon Family label mates in 1995, with their release of Soul 
Food.  The messages conveyed in this early form of “Dirty South” Hip Hop speak with a voice 
that gives a counter-narrative social critique of Atlanta’s rise to world-class status. This music 
calls out City Officials, events, and social issues by name that are pertinent to Atlanta, Georgia 
as a result of the “olympification” of the city.  The lyrics of this music are as credible as the oral 
history interviews collected for this dissertation.  The text has been supported with 
documentation and informs listeners of the destitution and oppression experienced in the black 
communities of Atlanta, where some considered the Maynard Machine as part of the problem. 
What is clear here is that a gap existed between the generation of Maynard Jackson and 
Atlanta’s youth in the early 1990s.  OutKast and Goodie Mob take aim at City officials such as 
Maynard Jackson; issues surrounding the confederate battle flag being flown atop the Georgia 
Dome; the displacement of the poor and homeless; the establishment of the “Red Dog” police 
unit; and the enactment of city ordinances to preserve the City’s new facelift for the Games.  To 
an extent, they provide purview to the underbelly of the life experiences black Atlanta’s rank and 
file. It also demonstrates that the Olympic Spirit was not embodied by or intended for the poor 
and black of Atlanta. 
For future works spawned from this research, this scholar intends to continue in this same 
vein examining other black political experiences in black New South urban and rural space.  
Comparative studies of other southern cities that have exercised black political power such as 
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Birmingham, Jackson, New Orleans, Richmond and Charleston are necessary and important as I 
continue to examine the black experiences of the post Civil Rights South. With this, I am 
cultivating a new subset within African American studies.  For far too long, the Black South has 
been long misrepresented and overlooked. Though there have been recent developments that 
focus on southern urban areas, most of African American history and African American studies 
rests on the development of black urban communities without taking into account black life in 
culture in the rural black South. There have been limited studies on the impact of Crack Cocaine, 
HIV and AIDS, educational tracking on black rural spaces, areas that have been affected heavily 
by these factors.  This research will cultivate a sub-genre that I call Black New South Studies.  
Its rigorous research and scholarship will focus on the experiences of African Americans and in 
the post Civil Rights South era.  This interdisciplinary field investigates and challenges tensions 
and trends that have often been overlooked by scholars studying African Americans, seeking to 
analyze and explicate national and international implications centered on history, urban and rural 
popular culture, education, electoral politics, land ownership, health disparities, sociology, 
psychology, religion and spirituality, and business just to name a few.  This black new South 
concept is of major importance because the American South, in some ways, is still plagued by 
the negative legacy of Jim Crow, but the 20th century social movements of Civil Rights and 
black power have changed the South in many ways from which emerges an overabundance of 
trends and themes worthy of investigation. With this, our interests should focus on these 
experiences where in the post-Civil Rights South, some black communities thrived. 
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APPENDIX A: ATLANTA YOUTH MURDERS 
 
Table 1. Atlanta Youth Murders – Smith 
Edward Smith, Age 14 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
July 21, 1979  
July 28, 1979 
.22 caliber 
gunshot wound 
Not apparent Last seen by 
friends on the way 
to a skating rink; 
had been seen at a 
party where drugs 
were used, 
speculated that he 
was killed during a 
fight over drugs 
Lived with his mother, 
stepfather, two sisters 
and one stepbrother in 
public housing. He 
frequented a boys club 
in the project; attended 
Therrell High School; 
often stayed out of the 
house.  Noted as a 
normal street kid who 
roamed the streets 
 
 
Table 2. Atlanta Youth Murders – Evans 
Alfred Evans,  Age 13 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
July 25, 1979 
July 28, 1979 
Probable 
asphyxiation by 
strangulation 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
running 
errands and 
bagging 
groceries at 
the Stewart 
Lakewood 
shopping 
center, where 
several other 
victims also 
worked for 
spending 
money. 
Last seen on his 
way to a Bruce Lee 
movie on Peachtree 
Street 
Lived with parents Lois 
and Henry, a 
construction worker 
permanently disabled 
by a stroke and eight 
siblings in a southeast 
Atlanta housing project. 
the family survived on 
food stamps and $450 a 
month in welfare and 
disability checks.  
 
 
Table 3. Atlanta Youth Murders – Harvey 
Milton Harvey, Age 4 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
September 4, 1979 
November 5, 1979 
Not determined Earned 
spending 
money by 
running 
errands. 
Last seen riding 
bike in 
Not available 
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Table 4. Atlanta Youth Murders – Bell 
Yusef Bell, Age 9 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Oct. 21, 1979 
Nov. 8, 1979 
Asphyxiation, 
strangulation by 
choke hold 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
running 
errands for 
elderly 
tenants and 
balancing 
checkbooks 
for neighbors. 
Last seen on a 
snuff tobacco run 
for elderly 
neighbor 
Lived with mother, 
brother and sister in an 
apartment in the 
McDaniel Glenn 
Housing Project; noted 
as a math and science 
whiz, enrolled in a 
school for gifted 
children. 
 
 
Table 5. Atlanta Youth Murders – Lanier 
Angel Lanier1, Age 12 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
March  4, 1980 
March 10, 1980 
Asphyxiation by 
electrical cord. 
Not apparent. Not apparent.  
Noted that her 
regular scheduled 
was that every day 
after school, she 
came home, ate 
dinner and watched 
TV.   
Lived with mother, 
Venus Taylor, 32, a 
Chicago cocktail 
waitress divorced after 
her fourth marriage, 
who moved to Atlanta 
1Female 
 
 
Table 6. Atlanta Youth Murders – Mathis 
Jeffrey Mathis, 10 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
March 11, 1980 
February 13, 1981 
Not determined. Earned 
spending 
money by 
working odd 
jobs at the W. 
A. Williams' 
barbershop. 
Last seen running 
an errand to buy a 
pack of Pall Malls 
for a neighbor. 
Witnesses told 
police, he climbed 
into a blue car with 
two men, one 
white, one black. 
 
Lived with mother, 
Willie Mae Mathis, 
who raised seven 
children mostly alone. 
Mrs. Mathis husband 
was murdered seven 
years earlier while 
moonlighting as a night 
security guard at a 
cemetery 
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Table 7. Atlanta Youth Murders – Middlebrooks 
Eric Middlebrooks, Age 14 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
May 19, 1980 
May 20, 1981 
Blunt trauma to 
the head. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
working odd 
jobs for 
neighbors.  
Last seen after 
receiving a late-
night telephone 
call.  He was found 
bludgeoned to 
death the next 
morning beside his 
bicycle behind a 
southeast Atlanta 
bar near his home.  
Lived with guardian 
Robert Miller.  He was 
abandoned a few 
months after birth and 
raised by relatives and 
family friends.  
 
 
Table 8. Atlanta Youth Murders - Richardson 
Christopher Richardson, Age 12 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
June 9, 1980 
January 9, 1981 
Not determined. Not apparent. Last seen walking  
to swimming pool 
at Midway Park, a  
half mile from his 
home in Decatur, 
Dekalb County. 
Lived in grandfather's 
house with his mother 
and other relatives after 
his stepfather went to 
jail for theft.  His 
biological father was 
serving a 15-year 
sentence for armed 
robbery. 
 
 
Table 9. Atlanta Youth Murders - Wilson 
Latonya Wilson1, Age 7 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
June 22, 1980 
October 18, 1980 
Not determined. Not apparent. Last seen sleeping 
in her bedroom 
during her birthday 
slumber party. 
Lived mother and father 
and four siblings; 
Her mother, Ella 
Wilson asserted “they 
were poor, but happy.”  
Her parents were 
subjected to a 
polygraph test. 
1Female 
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Table 10. Atlanta Youth Murders - Wyche 
Aaron Wyche, Age 10 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
June 23, 1980 
June 24, 1980 
Asphyxiation 
from broken neck 
due to fall. 
Not apparent. Found faced down 
at the bottom of a 
25-foot-high 
railroad trestle after 
he fell or was 
pushed; originally 
ruled an accident: 
death by 
"positional 
asphyxiation.”  
DeKalb County 
police reviewed the 
case, learned that a 
number of other 
black youngsters 
were found within 
a few miles of 
Wyche, and 
discovered “trace 
evidence” at the 
scene that might 
connect him to 
other cases. 
Lived with mother and 
two younger brothers in 
a low-income southeast 
Atlanta neighborhood.   
Visited grandmother 
often who lived on a 
quiet, integrated street 
in DeKalb County. 
 
 
Table 11. Atlanta Youth Murders – Carter 
Anthony Carter,  Age 9 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
July 6, 1980 
July 7, 1980 
Multiple Stab 
wounds 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
running 
errands for 
neighbors. 
Last seen playing 
with a cousin.  
Found within a 
two-square-mile 
area of the homes 
of five other 
missing or 
murdered children. 
Attended the West End 
Boy’s Club. 
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Table 12. Atlanta Youth Murders - Terrell 
Earl Lee Terrell, Age 10 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
July 30, 1980 
January 9, 1981 
Not determined. Earned 
spending 
money by 
doing odd 
jobs near the 
Stewart-
Lakewood 
Shopping 
Center. 
Last seen after 
being ejected from 
the Southbend Park 
Swimming Pool for 
fighting poolside. 
Lived with mother, 
Beverly Belt and three 
brothers. 
 
 
Table 13. Atlanta Youth Murders – Jones 
Clifford Jones, Age 13 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Aug. 20, 1980 
Aug. 21, 1980 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
scouring lots 
with friends 
for 
redeemable 
cans and 
bottles. 
Last seen scouting 
aluminum cans 
with friends. 
Lived with mother, 
Clifford Jones, two 
brothers and one sister. 
Raised also by 
grandmother, Dorothy 
Williams, who helped 
the family after their 
father was killed in 
Vietnam. 
 
 
Table 14. Atlanta Youth Murders – Glass 
Darron Glass, Age 11 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Sept. 14, 1980 
Never found 
N/A Not apparent.  Last seen leaving 
his home where his 
foster mother 
assumed that he 
had gone out to 
play. 
Both of Glass’ parents 
were deceased. He lived 
with his foster mother, 
Fannie Mae Smith and 
three other children. He 
had lived with the 
family for less than 
three months when he 
disappeared. 
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Table 15. Atlanta Youth Murders - Stephens 
Charles Stephens, Age 12 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
October  9, 1980 
October 10, 1980 
Asphyxiation. Earned 
spending 
money by 
carrying 
grocery bags 
for patrons of 
the Stewart 
Lakewood 
Shopping 
Center. 
Stephens 
bought comic 
books with 
money he 
earned. 
Last seen riding his 
bicycle after 
slipping out of the 
house on the day 
which he stayed on 
from school. 
 
Lived with mother and 
sister, Tina, age 11 in a 
two-bedroom home in 
southwest Atlanta’s 
Pryor Village Housing 
Project. When 
Stephens’ mother's 
$337-a-month public 
assistance checks ran 
out, usually after two 
weeks, his uncle, 
Richard Gibbs, a father 
figure and soul singer 
would trundle would 
bring bags of groceries 
so the family could eat.  
Charles' parents split 
when he was a toddler. 
 
 
Table 16. Atlanta Youth Murders - Jackson 
Aaron Jackson, Age 9 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
November 1, 1980 
November 2, 1980 
Asphyxiation by 
suffocation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
carrying 
groceries and 
running 
errands for 
neighbors. 
Not apparent. Lived with father, a $5-
an-hour roofer who 
worked long hours, and 
two older sisters in a 
green cinder-block 
house in a lower 
income southeast 
Atlanta neighborhood.   
It is noted that the        
PTA took up a 
collection because the 
family was so poor and 
friends once raised 
money to turn on the 
gas. Aaron often went 
barefoot, in dirty 
clothes, as he worked 
for spare change 
carrying groceries and 
running errands.  A 
neighbor once found 
him asleep on her 
couch, after he'd broken 
into the house and 
helped himself to food 
in her refrigerator. 
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Table 17. Atlanta Youth Murders - Rogers 
Patrick Rogers, Age 16 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Nov. 10. 1980 
Dec. 8, 1980 
Blunt trauma to 
the head. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
running 
errands at the 
shopping 
center. 
Last seen running 
errands at the 
shopping center. 
Lived with his mother 
and seven brothers and 
sisters.  It is noted that 
he preferred the streets 
to the crowded family 
home.   
 
 
Table 18. Atlanta Youth Murders – Geter 
Lubie Geter, Age 14 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
January 3, 1981 
February 5, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
choke-hold 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
selling auto 
air fresheners 
at the Stewart 
Lakewood 
Shopping 
Center. It is 
said that he 
invested his 
Christmas 
money in the 
venture. 
Last seen selling 
auto air fresheners 
at the Stewart 
Lakewood 
Shopping Center. 
Lived with parents 
Assie Lee and Lubie 
Sr., and four siblings in 
a modest two-bedroom 
southeast Atlanta home. 
He was the youngest of 
the children. Lubie Sr. 
was a Veterans' 
Administration hospital 
chef. 
 
 
Table 19. Atlanta Youth Murders - Pue 
Terry Pue, Age 15 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
January 22, 1981 
January 23, 1981 
Asphyxiation. Earned 
spending 
money by  
pilfering a 
backroom of 
the A&P 
store where 
he would then 
redeem the 
bottles.  It is 
said that he 
was 
extremely 
street savvy. 
Last seen at an all-
night diner eating 
hamburgers. It was 
not clear at what 
point he 
disappeared. 
Lived with mother, 
father, and ten siblings 
in an overcrowded 
three-room apartment. 
The housing authority 
could never find a place 
large enough for the 
Pues.  Once, after being 
evicted, the desperate 
family spent two nights 
in Grady Hospital's 
emergency room.  He 
was enrolled in special 
education program for 
youthful offenders. He 
thrived in the program.   
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Table 20. Atlanta Youth Murders - Baltazar 
Patrick Baltazar, Age 12 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
February 6, 1981 
February 13, 1981 
Asphyxiation. May have 
been a 
concessions 
boy for the 
Atlanta 
Hawks. 
 
 
 
Last seen at the 
Omni in downtown 
Atlanta.  
Lived with his divorced 
father, Russell Baltazar, 
who had recently 
dispatched most of his 
14 children to live with 
Patrick's mother in New 
Orleans.  Patrick stayed 
behind.  Patrick was 
quite large for his age at 
5 feet 7 and 130 
pounds. 
 
 
Table 21. Atlanta Youth Murders - Jackson 
Curtis Walker, Age 13 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
February 19, 1981 
March 6, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
working after 
school at the 
local car 
wash with his 
little brother, 
Antonio, to 
scrub 
whitewalls 
for $1.  Also 
swept up at 
the gun shop 
of Archie 
Byron, a 
Vietnam 
veteran. 
Last seen leaving 
the Archie Byron’s 
Gun Shop after 
slipping out of the 
house to find work.  
His mother, fearful 
about the killings, 
had ordered him to 
play upstairs. 
Lived with mother, 
divorced and three 
brothers in Bowen 
Homes housing project 
in northwest Atlanta. 
He gave half of what he 
earned to his mother, 
Catherine Leach, 32, 
who supported the 
family on food stamps 
and a $221 monthly 
welfare check. 
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Table 22. Atlanta Youth Murders - Bell 
Joseph “Jo-Jo” Bell **, Age 15 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
March 2, 1981 
April 19, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
sometimes 
sweeping the 
floors Cap'n 
Pegs Seafood 
Carryout. 
Last seen leaving 
to play basketball. 
Lived for three years 
with his grandmother 
while his mother, Doris 
Bell, served time in 
prison for killing his 
father, a construction 
worker.  After her stint 
in prison, Doris Bell 
moved her family into a 
rented, gray frame 
house, found work as a 
janitor and dedicated 
herself to taking care of 
her other six children. 
 
 
Table 23. Atlanta Youth Murders - Hill 
Timothy Hill, Age 13 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
March 15, 1981 
March 30, 1981 
Asphyxiation, 
manner not 
determined. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
carrying 
grocery bags 
at the A&P, 
and sweeping 
the floors at a 
local fast 
food 
restaurant. 
 
Not apparent. Lived in Atlanta’s 
impoverished south 
side.  It is noted that he 
grew up fast running, 
with a group of friends 
who carried knives and 
metal pipes for use 
against anyone who 
might try to snatch 
them.  A frequent 
runaway, he often spent 
the night in vacant 
houses, or with friends.  
He read at a first-grade 
level. 
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Table 24. Atlanta Youth Murders - Duncan 
Eddie Duncan, Age 21 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
March 20, 1981 
March 31, 1981 
Not determined. Earned 
spending 
money by 
stacking 
boxes and 
carrying out 
trash at a 
grocery store 
where he 
worked part-
time. 
Not apparent. Lived with his divorced 
mother in the 
Techwood Homes 
Housing Project. 
he  was a mentally 
retarded black man with 
an IQ of 40 who 
stuttered when he 
talked and walked with 
a limp.  He dropped out 
of school. 
 
 
Table 25. Atlanta Youth Murders - Rogers 
Larry Rogers, Age 21 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Mar. 30, 1981 
April 9, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
cutting grass, 
raking leaves 
and cleaning 
out gutters for 
neighbors in 
his northwest 
Atlanta 
neighborhood 
Last seen climbing 
into a Chevrolet 
station wagon 
driven by a 
mysterious black, 
described as 50-ish 
with a "false-
looking" mustache, 
glasses and long 
hair. 
 
Lived with foster 
parent, George W. 
Hood and five other 
foster children.  Hood 
was a retired barber 
whose wife died in 
1965.  Rogers was 15 
months old when social 
workers brought him to 
the house.  He began to 
talk, with a stammer, 
the first hint of his 
disabilities.  It was said 
that he was mentally 
retarded with the mind 
of a child. 
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Table 26. Atlanta Youth Murders - McIntosh 
Michael McIntosh, Age 23 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Approx. April 1, 
1981 
April 20, 1981 
Asphyxiation, 
manner 
undetermined 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
hustling odd 
jobs in the 
same rat-
infested, 
tarpaper-
roofed inner-
city 
neighborhood 
in which he 
lived. 
Not apparent.  Lived in a yellow 
frame house on cinder 
blocks -- left to him by 
the great-aunt who 
raised him -- until he lit 
a fire in the bricked-up 
fireplace, fell asleep 
and burned up his only 
asset.  One of nine 
children, he was too 
much of a burden for 
his mother.  He dropped 
out after finishing the 
10th grade at Parks 
High School, and began 
getting in trouble.  He 
was in and out of prison 
for burglary, assault and 
drunkenness.  Lately, 
friends said, he had 
talked about finishing 
welding school. 
 
 
Table 27. Atlanta Youth Murders - Payne 
Jimmy Payne,  Age 21 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
April 22, 1981 
April 27, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
A recently 
released 
convict, 
Payne aspired 
to be a 
construction 
worker. 
Last seen heading 
to downtown 
Atlanta to sell 
Canadian coins. 
One of five children, 
Payne dropped out of 
high school after the 
9th grade, when he 
began to get in trouble. 
He learned to draw in 
state prison, where he 
served time for burglary 
before he was released. 
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Table 28. Atlanta Youth Murders - Barrett 
William Barrett**,  Age 17 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
May 11, 1981 
May 12, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending by 
working odd 
jobs. 
Last seen on his 
way to McDaniel-
Glenn Housing 
Project to pay a bill 
for his mother to a 
man.  He rode the 
MARTA bus to the 
errand and later 
returned to East 
Atlanta.  He was 
scheduled for a 
counseling session 
that afternoon but 
vanished. 
Barrett was considered 
a juvenile delinquent 
because he had spent 
time in the 
Milledgeville Youth 
Development Center.  
He was released from 
there on March 10, 
1981, precisely two 
months before his 
murder. 
 
 
Table 29. Atlanta Youth Murders - Cater 
Nathaniel Cater, Age 27 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
May 21, 1981 
May 24, 1981 
Asphyxiation by 
strangulation. 
Earned 
spending 
money by 
picking up 
odd jobs 
through Add-
A Man labor 
pool.  On 
days when he 
did not get a 
job, he hung 
around the 
Silver Dollar 
Saloon or the 
Cameo 
Lounge, to 
hustle 
suckers, male 
and female—
mostly whites 
well dressed 
out-of 
towners for 
cheap sex. 
Not apparent. Cater had moved out of 
his father’s home in 
Dixie Hills and was 
living in the Falcon 
Hotel, a rundown single 
room occupancy on 
Luckie Street, near the 
Greyhound bus station 
in downtown Atlanta. 
Cater, an ex-convict 
was also a chronic 
alcoholic which would 
land him in the city jail.  
His drinking often left 
him helpless. 
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Table 30. Atlanta Youth Murders - Porter 
John Porter, Age 28 
Last Seen 
Body Found 
Cause of Death “Hustle” Activities at 
abduction 
Conditions 
Early April, 1981 
April 12, 1981 
Multiple stab 
wounds. 
Not apparent, Not apparent. An ex-convicted, Porter 
lived sometimes with 
grandmother. She had 
kicked him out of the 
house because of his 
behavior.  He suffered 
from severe mental 
problems and had been 
in a mental hospital.  
Just before his 
abduction, he was 
kicked out by his 
grandmother for 
fondling a 2-year-old- 
boy for whom she 
cared. 
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